CampusWide: Overview and Exploits

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Presentation Overview

Transaction systems 101

- What they are
- History
- System Specs
 - Overview
 - Server (AP/NP/Database)
 - Infrastructure
 - Cards
 - Readers

Overview Continued

- Simple Transaction
- Exploits
 - Reader to Device Exploits
 - Reader to Server Exploits
 - Card Based Exploits
- Securing an existing system
 - Photos of GT Worthless Security
 - How to really protect the system

Transaction Systems 101- What they are

- "One Card solutions"
 - Debt Card (Bookstore, food court)
 - Meal Plan
 - Library (Copy Machines, checking out books)
 - Building Access (Computer Labs, Offices, Labs)
 - Access to Sporting Events

Important! - Not just a debit card, it is the key to the whole school network

Transaction Systems 101 -History

- Special Teams (1984)
- Icollege (Envision)
- AT&T (CampusWide)
- Currently: BlackBoard Transaction System (Unix and NT)

Technology basically remains unchanged since 1984.

System Specs - Overview

- Simple System
 - Central Server with a database
 - Network interface
 - Hub spaced Network of data lines
 - Daisy-chained Readers

Server

- Applications Processor (AP)
 Holds Database dbvista or Oracle
- Network Processor (NP)
 - Interface to all incoming data (RS-485, Ethernet, modem)
 - Convert to commands the AP can understand

Server - Specs

- HP9000, but any RISC processor will do
- Battery back-up
- 4 gig Tape drive for backups
- Normally Isolated from rest of network

Server - Interfacing

- Originally only from console, or 19,200 serial lines
- There are third party GUI's to the database
- These change from school to school. No standard
- GT uses ?"Osiris"? For Door Entry

Infrastructure

- Uses RS-485
 - Doesn't have protocol defined in standard
 - Used to control devices on factory assembly lines
 - Robust, has 2 data lines; uses difference between the 2
 - Short dist: 10 Mbit, Nearly a mile: 9600 baud. Repeaters extend range

Infrastructure continued

IP Converters

- Developed by Blackboard
- Use existing Ethernet, ATT said this was bad idea (Any duplex network can work)
- Hooks 16 devices to a box (Pentium w/ NIC), which encrypts, sends out TCP/IP
- Keys can be updated remotely
- Encryption unknown. High end: DES, Low end: XOR, key around 8 bytes

Infrastructure Continued still


- Merchant Dial-ups
 - Blackboard also created these
 - Low Cost, monthly fee
 - Before expensive lines needed to be run
 - Basically just a modem in a box
 - Lets you talk directly to the NP!


The Card

- Contains your standard ABA Track II.
 The card simply holds an account number which appears on the card
- These are printed on site using Polaroid card printers, just like at the DMV









Readers

- 3 types
 - Self-Vending readers (The bulk of them)
 - Door entry readers
 - Point of Sale (POS)

Readers - Overview

- Small, Black with either the ATT or Blackboard Logo
- Made of metal or plastic
- All data out of a reader is in RS-485, so it is backward compatible
- Transmits at 9600 baud
- I/O: 2x16 LCD with 16 key keyboard and activation LED's

Readers - Overview continued


- Can store offline transactions in NVRAM
- Code is in boot ROM and Flashable RAM
- Boot very quickly, normally under 15 seconds

Readers - Self Vending

- Most common reader and most varied
- Laundry, Vending, Copy machines
- Easiest to hack because they are isolated
- All work basically the same. Talk to NP, confirm or deny transaction, then send signals to device.
- Can tell if Offline

Readers - Self Vending





Readers - Door Entry

- Small and tricky
- Can't tell they are offline
- Can hold a local database of 4000-16000 card numbers in NVRAM
- Uses this if it can't reach NP
- Works just like vending, when confirmation received from NP, tell the magnetic door lock to release

Readers - Door Entry



Readers - POS

- Most complex and large
- Rare compared to others
- Access will normally be restricted since they are almost always manned

Readers- Value Transfer Station

The "Holy Grail"



Readers - Value Transfer Station

- Lets you deposit money on card
- Feed in all of your dollar bills, then it sends the signal
- Also allow temp cards (very bad)

A Simple Transaction

- Want to buy a load of wash
- Select washer on laundry reader then swipe card
- Reader takes account number off card and sends along with reader ID to the NP through RS-485 lines
- IP Converter may be in between reader and NP, but it doesn't know and doesn't care.

A Simple Transaction Continued

- NP receives signal (be it IP or RS-485) and converts it to a query for the AP.
- AP looks in account, deducts \$1, sends back a confirmation and new balance to NP
- NP sends this info back to reader
- Reader displays new balance

A Simple Transaction Continued

- Reader talks to device. This is device specific. The Device has no idea it is attached to a network.
- For Laundry, Reader sends coin pulses to board in washer where coin validation normally attaches
- Laundry machine thinks 4 quarters dropped in and gives you a load of wash

Exploits - Overview

- System is relatively secure provided that the data lines are protected
- But, dial-up could be hacked or phone number social engineered out of stupid pizza boy.
- IP Converter releases packets into the wild. Careful analysis of traffic could show their IP addresses.

Exploits - Reader to Device

- Device is stupid, doesn't know its on a network, so reader must simulate what that device is used for (in this case, quarter pulses)
- To compromise, simply access lines from reader to device, and then simulate quarter pulses yourself
- No way for machine to know the difference

Exploits - Reader to Device

Pros

- Very low risk: By their nature these are isolated
- Very easy to hack: Most devices attached to these are coin based.
- Communication is always 1 way from reader to device so there's no complex handshaking to spoof

Exploits - Reader to Device

Cons

- Many be difficult/impossible to get at date lines between reader and device (ex: coke reader is mounted inside coke machine)
- Leaves physical evidence in the way of stripped wire, etc

Exploits - Reader to Server

- Readers are stupid and can be fooled Ex:
 - Attach laptop to back to coke machine, grab all raw data after swiping card
 - Plug laptop to wall, send data to NP, record all that comes back
 - Attach laptop to coke machine, play NP's response, get a coke
 - Replay NP's response, get another coke

Exploits - Reader to Server

- RS-485 doesn't define standard, but who cares? Signal may be encrypted, but again, who cares?
- If you get the raw data, that doesn't matter
- VTS comes in here. It doesn't send the "x \$ was deposited onto y account" until you tell it to

- The Buzzcard Director confirmed that this can be done
- Would require analysis of packet, but, by depositing known \$ on known account, it could easily be done

Pros

- Very low risk: By their nature these are isolated
- RS-485 to RS-232 adapters relatively cheap (\$50-\$100)
- No physical evidence: Most readers contain plugs into RS-485 networks, so no cut wires
- Faster than Reader to Device spoofing
- Only way to spoof coke machines

Cons

- Though confirmed, have not personally tested.
- Reader could be smart, and wonder why it got a reply from server when none was sent. (Note: Even this is easily remedied.
 Swipe card, have you laptop ignore all data it receives from the reader, wait a second, and then send confirm)

Cons continued

- Data dumps from NP to reader would most likely only work on that reader, since packet most likely contains reader ID
- IP Converter Spoofing

 IP address could be found by monitoring buildings.

IP Converter Spoofing continued

- Data in normal packets as well as swiping the multiple machines (up to 16) that the converter is on would allow the IP Packet Structure to be deciphered
- Packets could then be sent from anywhere, making machines vend.
- Tell all coke machines in library to all spit out a coke!

Exploits - Card based

- Cards are ABA Standard, normal card capture tool will capture them
- Card contains basically just a number, which can be cloned
- This number could also be obtained by building a monitoring device on a RS-485 line, and let it harvest
- Clone card would work everywhere normal card would

Security - GT Style!

- If Data lines from server to reader and from reader to device are so important, they must be really protected right?
- Well, not at Georgia Tech! Metal conduit protecting lines commonly stops at hanging ceiling

Security - MW/MHWMENC

Panels containing equipment normally held on by flat head screws



Security - MW/MHWMENC

 What's inside
 Repeaters to boost Signals
 Multiplexes to talk to all the Laundry machines



Security - Laundry Machines

Coils protecting data lines, attached with flat head screws





Security - Door Readers

Lines for the door readers held on by flat head screws



Security - Coke Machines

RS485 totally unprotected



Security - Coke Machines

With Convenient plugs no less!



Security - Coke Machines

 Which plugs into a hub inside that box, which has no lock



Security - Copy Machine

They didn't even try with this one! And the reader is attached to the shelf with... **That's Right! FLAT HEAD SCREWS!**




Security - VTS



Security - VTS

A Close up of the letters



Security - Really securing the system

Secure the data lines.
Get rid of IP Converters
For god sakes, you take \$9000 from me a year, buy some god damn Torx Screws!

QUESTIONS?

Closing

- Check www.yak.net/acidus
- For much more technical info:
- See me for copies of slides or the 2600 Article
- Tell your school about how insecure the system is
- Make them change it