Re: Re: [TSCM-L] {5871} Recently Filed in the Case (VERY Interestign Details of TSCM Equipment Exports)

674. Is an introduction to international law when federal law is no longer the only government participant in which where imposed upon; with this in mind and post 9/11/2001, it is understandable the reasoning of equipment specifically designed to operate covertly. The infringement is questionable and could have been honestly consequential, however in this specific circumstance should be evident was not the case. A product sold by any entity that is found to cause a risk of serious personal injury due to proper use, should be made knowledgeable to the consumer; emphasized in article 711. Article 713 however makes one question the integrity of the Governmental entity making such a complaint. Taxation purposes as well are needed when dealing with international sales; state and federal (depending on what state you reside of course). When selling any equipment it is the seller’s responsibility to know regulations and there does seem to be probable cause to believe the defendant may be in violation of infringement laws as well; this is assumption only on my behalf, for I have seen not tangible evidence. Once again in my opinion, due to the nature of the equipment being sold, it would depend on the international purchaser, Swiss not being one of suspicion. Kazakhstan, as well as Uzbekistan would in my opinion raise extreme suspicion with consideration of several known international relations with these countries.   

                Thank you James! Now I fully understand and wish you the best of luck and am looking forward to end result.

From: James M. Atkinson <j..._at_tscm.com>
To: tscm-..._at_googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, December 3, 2011 9:48 PM
Subject: [TSCM-L] {5858} Recently Filed in the Case (VERY Interestign Details of TSCM Equipment Exports)


Go though this very slowly and very carefully and let me know what you think.

-jma



674. Defendant unlawfully exports controlled munitions and controlled devices in violation of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR, Sections 120 - 130) in that they are legally defined as defense articles on the United States Munitions List (USML). Defendants have violated, are violating, have conspired, or conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Licenses are issued by the U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).
Sec. 121.1 General. The United States Munitions List.
“(a) The following articles, services and related technical data are designated as defense articles and defense services pursuant to sections 38 and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2794(7)).”

Category XI--Military [and Space] Electronics
“(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in search, reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding, display, analysis and production of information from the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic systems or equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance or monitoring.”

675. Research Electronics has unlawfully subverted this by repeatedly claiming that the “electronics counter-measures equipment” which they make is merely “general purpose test equipment” when it is in fact “electronic counter-measures equipment” as defined by Section 121.1, Category XI(b) as “equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance or monitoring.”

676. Further, Research Electronics does not advertise this equipment for any function other than for the purposes of “counteracting electronic surveillance or monitoring,” and the equipment is purpose built for that sole function along, and no other.

677. Neither does Research Electronics train students at their school on how to use this equipment for any function other than to find, locate, and to counteract eavesdropping devices.

678. All products which the Defendant offers for sale, has a primary use described by the Defendant as being that of finding, locating, and counteract eavesdropping devices.

679. The Defendants have not only violated International Traffic in Arms Regulations, but they have also committed including, but not limited to: Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud, Scheme to Defraud, Obstruction of Criminal Investigations, Obstruction of Law Enforcement, Interference with Commerce, and Transactions in Property Derived from Specific Unlawful Activity in furtherance of this illegal exportation, and misrepresented to the federal government of the nature of their goods.

680. This scheme to defraud, and to falsely classify in order to export counter-surveillance equipment as mere “general purpose test equipment” on the part of the Defendants has caused harm to the business and property of the Plaintiff and others, represents the conduct of a continuing unit, by an enterprise, through a pattern, of prohibited activities, which resulted in income for the Defendants, and damage to the Plaintiff business and property.

681. Had Defendants not engaged in this fraud, other parties (including the Plaintiff) would have been able to apply for such licenses, and then to export an estimated $28,774,000 in goods, which the Defendant illegally exported to foreign customers between June 2007 and June 2011.

682. As this illegal export, and violations of the RICO statutes were committed by the Defendants, trebles damages for the illegal exports alone is expected to exceed $86,322,000.

683. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H. Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses, offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international commerce goods and devices sold for detecting hidden cellular phones or other electronics on or in the human body by means of non-ionizing radiation, and which are not approved medical or radiological devices, and which are expressly prohibited by Federal Guidelines due to the likelihood of very grave health risks in violation of Federal law.

684. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H. Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses, offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international commerce goods and devices manufactures medical equipment for the purposes of radiological or radiating devices to examine humans which are not approved for human use, and which are specifically prohibited by federal guidelines for human use, and which are expressly prohibited by Federal Guidelines due to the likelihood of very grave health risks, in violation of Federal law.

685. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H. Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses, offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international commerce, goods and device claimed to be able to detect bombs or explosive devices by means of non-ionizing radiation, which present a high risk of accidental detonation. Defendants recklessly endangers the life and limbs of U.S. Military forces and members of the intelligence community by selling defective equipment, and make false claims about products to obtain federal funds.

686. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H. Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and various John Does encouraged, endorsed, organized, and/orchestrated an ongoing criminal enterprise.

687. Any veil of immunity, which this defendant may have previously enjoyed by virtue of their office or position, or government connections is “pierced and ripped asunder” due to their infringement and deprivation of the Constitutional Rights of the Plaintiff, and thus this Defendant (and all other Defendants) stands fully naked and vulnerable before the court, with no immunity of any form.

688. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H. Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and various John Does, in combination, contracted to, engaged in, conspired to engage in, created trusts and agreements, engaged in monopolistic efforts, rigged contracts, inflated market price, price fixing, and restraint of trade among the several States, or with foreign nations, in violation of the law and contrary to public policy. Defendants demanded that the Plaintiff not deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of their competitor or competitors, with the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.

689. Defendants engaged in a long term course of fraud and conversion as follows to include stealing customers, refusing to pay contracted commissions, unduly delaying international and domestic shipments, and other acts which harmed the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s business.

690. Plaintiff began dealing the Defendant Research Electronics and Defendant Barsumian in approximate late Fall of 1981 as a retail customer of the company purchasing products for use in the performance of TSCM services and bug sweeps. At that time, Defendant Barsumian operated the company in the form of “Research Electronics, Inc” and alternately under the name of “Security Research International” with an address in and near the Tampa, Florida area. At the time, the Defendant stated that he was in the profession of performing TSCM (bug sweeping) services as well as the profession of making bugging devices and TSCM equipment.

691. In 1983, (by his own admission) Defendant Barsumian suffered a catastrophic financial collapse of his business in Florida, and moved to Tennessee to be supported by his wife’s parents. At that time the Defendant produced only the most primitive of TSCM products, and the quality was grossly inferior to those produced by the competitors of the Defendant.

692. In the April 1988, the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant was now operating in Tennessee after moving from Florida and contacted the Defendant in order to arrange for a visit in the Fall of 1988 while the Plaintiff would be working at a project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Defendant at this time disclosed to the Plaintiff that his business had collapsed, and that his father-in-law had to rent a U-Haul truck to move him and his wife from Florida to Tennessee and that he and his father-in-law had restarted the “Research Electronics” company, but was no longer operating the under the “Security Research” company name. At that time the Defendant disclosed to the Plaintiff that the Defendant was wholly unable to perform a TSCM inspection or bug sweep and stated to the Plaintiff that he “would be restricting his activities to the making of bug sweep devices, not of rending TSCM service, as he discovered too late that he was no good at it, and that it was at the center of his bankruptcy problems”.

693. In the late Fall of 1988, the Plaintiff visited the Defendants factory in or near Cookeville, TN in order to purchase a new model of device which the Defendant had described to him and was marketing to replaced the inferior quality equipment previously purchased by the Plaintiff from the Defendant in 1983. While the product still performed inferior to that built by competitors, it was an improvement on the product purchased roughly five years previously. During this visit, the Defendant quizzed the Plaintiff in regards to the “other equipment” the Plaintiff was using to perform TSCM services for clients, and the Plaintiff agreed to demonstrate several items, which the Plaintiff had designed and built for his own use to provide TSCM services. Among the items demonstrated was a silver Halliburton briefcase into which the Plaintiff had built a computer controlled receiver, with a swing out panel that positioned the antennas and receivers well away from the computer so that it did not pickup electrical noise the from computer, and the small printer/plotter which was also built into the case. The Plaintiff also demonstrated a sophisticated antenna system, whereby the antennas, filters, and preamplifiers were built into the “swing out wings” that would normally hold screwdriver blades. The Plaintiff discovered to some horror in 1990, that the Defendant actually took the Plaintiff design and use, claimed it as his own, and fraudulently filed a patent for it mere weeks after the demonstration by the Plaintiff.

694. In approximately 1992, Defendant again began dealing with Plaintiff, and through Plaintiff’s web site allowed an Internet presence (www.tscm.com) in which Plaintiff provided detailed descriptions, photographs, etc. of Defendants products as well as other competing manufacturers of such equipment to the TSCM, Intelligence, and private sector communities.

695. At that time, the Defendant lacked any kind of a website, lacked any sort of on-line representation of its products, lacked even primitive E-mail of their own, and lacked the technical ability to provide same.

696. As the relationship developed between the parties, in approximately December 3, 1994, Plaintiff began buying and reselling Defendants counter-surveillance products under a non written agreement in which Plaintiff received a 31.5% to 38.9% discount on all of Defendants products he purchased and was free to sell at whatever price Plaintiff desired. Plaintiff did however; refuse to have anything at all to do with the illegal bugging devices, which the Defendant was offering for sale.

697. Pursuant to this non written agreement, Plaintiff’s sold Defendants products to the United States Government, the U.S. Government Intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of State, Secret Service, Department of Energy, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, Defense Contractors, Research and Development Companies, Think Tanks, Lockheed Martin, Harvard, Raytheon Corporation, MITRE Corporation, Lawrence Livermore Labs, Lincoln Labs, Sandia Labs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and others.

698. During this same period, Defendant developed a product known as the “OSCOR” which is an Omni Spectral Correlator, Model 5000 or OSC-5000. Plaintiff took an OSCOR (which he owned), designed and modified the circuits and chassis, and thereafter showed it to Defendant suggesting the modification be made to their production units to make it more saleable to U.S. Government entities. Defendant implemented Plaintiff’s designs and modifications.

699. In 1995, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff by phone and asked Plaintiff if he had any suggestion on how to resolve a technical issue in raising the frequency coverage of the OSC-5000 product, which the Plaintiff had successfully performed on other similar systems for defense contractors. The Plaintiff described to the Defendant a very simple, and inexpensive design which he had used in the past on other equipment whereby the local oscillator of the OSC-5000 could be used to drive a simple microwave down convertor that was attached to an 18 GHz AEL blade style log periodic antenna that was commercially available. Further, the Plaintiff cautioned the Defendant that the product would not be taken seriously by the TSCM community unless it could cover up to 40 GHz or above, which would require the use of three antennas, each with a slightly different downconvertor, and some kind of switching circuit. The Plaintiff advised caution with the product, and stated that merely building a downconvertor was of limited value in the electronic countermeasures application as a system to automatically rotated the unit would also need to be provided due to the highly directional nature of the signals at those frequencies, and that a simple two-axis servo assembly could be used.

700. In approximately 1999, Defendant made additional modifications to the OSCOR and increased the price. Plaintiff, an authority in TSCM, continued to purchase and resell Defendants products and gave individual discounts to other practitioners in the TSCM field while maintaining normal pricing structure for non-TSCM professionals. Because of Plaintiff’s professional courtesy, Defendant became upset and expressed its upset with Plaintiff; however, the relationship continued.

701. In early July 1998, an FBI Agent in Boston, MA (to whom the Plaintiff had previously rendered TSCM services) approached Defendant and asked advice as to how to approach Research Electronics in a way that would allow the FBI and CIA to harvest customer information more effectively as the agents he spoke to acknowledged that Research Electronics had been provided this information to them for years, but that it was often incomplete, and they had caught Defendant Research Electronics not being forthcoming on the export information to the intelligence agencies of equipment which they had previously provided. Plaintiff explained to the FBI Agent that the only effect method to do this was to have at least one agent in place (overtly or covertly), by way of the training department so that not only would that person have access to equipment sales records, but could also assess and direct the training of foreign nationals by way of this agent-in-position. This agent-in-position was chosen by the U.S. Army as one of their own TSCM instructors and overtly put in place a few months later to act as a conduit and liaison. Additionally, in the years that followed, several additional agents were put in place inside the Defendants firm from the U.S. Army, with the Defendants permission as a type of undercover operation, with these later operatives being controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency instead of the U.S. Army.

702. Essentially, the U.S. Intelligence community has sought for decades to control the TSCM marketplace, and the manufacture of related goods and in turn to provide training so that there would be only a single control point, or monopoly on all TSCM and related equipment that was being exported to foreign countries for use by their intelligence agencies, government agencies, military, and corporations.

703. In December of 1999, the Defendant requested the assistance of the Plaintiff and attempted to use the Plaintiff to contact the manufacture of a CODEC (digital coding and decoding) system which the Defendant has seen the Plaintiff use to examine digital phone systems during TSCM inspections. The Defendant sought to develop an eavesdropping device based on the CODEC system, which the Plaintiff refused to assist in, or to have anything to do with in any way. The Plaintiff did demonstrate to the Defendant how to instead utilize near-end and far-end cross talk analysis to locate eavesdropping devices, but refused to assist the Defendant in eavesdropping methods or equipment development which they were seeking.

704. Defendant restructured the company in 2000 and in the following year, Defendant confected a Manufacturer’s Representative Contract in which Defendant now claimed that all government sales were “in house” clients of Defendant. Plaintiff discussed the improper and unethical wholesale blanket of “in house” contained in the agreement with Defendant Tom Jones, a managing member of Defendant, informed Plaintiff that if he didn’t agree Defendant would severe all ties with Plaintiff and he would be prohibited from any further purchases. In short, Defendant informed Plaintiff he could “take it or leave it” with respect to that provision and every other provision of the contract.

705. In addition, during visits made almost yearly after that point, Defendant maintained a huge inventory of illegal bugging devices (i.e. illegal devices designed primarily for the unlawful and surreptitious interception of wire and/or oral communications), which is a felony to possess, and which the Plaintiff personally examined, and in some cases covertly and/or overtly photographed. Defendant repeatedly solicited Plaintiff to purchase and deal in these illicit eavesdropping devices from them, but Plaintiff strongly refused. Further, Defendant repeatedly illegally bugged and eavesdropped upon Plaintiff during his visits in contravention of applicable State laws of the State of Tennessee and Federal law.

706. During the Plaintiff visits to the Defendants business location in 1999, 2004, 2005, and in 2007, Plaintiff photographed these illegal bugging devices, which drastically upset the Defendants as they stated that were concerned the they could get into trouble if the photographs were ever published, put on the Internet, or provided to the authorities.

707. Beginning in 2001, Defendant entered into a manufacturer’s representative agreement, which continued until October of 2010. A review of the terms and conditions imposed by Plaintiff pursuant to its inclusion of adhesion clauses in said contract required to be executed by Defendant on a “take it or leave it” basis is illustrative. For example, Defendant required Plaintiff to agree that “In the event of any dispute or controversy regarding whether a commission is due, Plaintiff “will have full authority and final discretion regarding same. REI’s decision regarding the payment or non payment will not be appealable (sic) or actionable even if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and or motivated by REI’s self interest.” In addition, Defendants provided the following: “REI may freely solicit any customer directly, even in competition with the MREP and no liability will be incurred to the MREP.”

708. After 2006, annual renewals were signed but Defendant retained all copies refusing to send copies to representatives who executed same, even after multiple requested to be provided copies.

709. Defendant required that Plaintiff provide it with a Pending Order Form on all sales of Plaintiff pursuant to the Manufacturer’s Representative Contract. In approximately 2004, Plaintiff discovered that on orders he had made with third parties, Defendant was under reporting commissions due to Plaintiff. Further, Defendant restricted Plaintiff’s ability to provide Pending Order Forms limiting him to only ten (10) per month since Plaintiff was submitting more than any other dealer in the United States (i.e. approximately 250 per month) as a result of him selling more product then any other venue outside of the Defendants business.

710. In 2004 and 2005, Plaintiff went to Defendants business to attend a two-week series of classes, and then a one-week course relative to Defendants equipment. Prior to Plaintiff’s arrival, he was told that Defendant would assist him in dealing with clients to close more sales and would also train Plaintiff in doing basic repairs on the OSCOR such as replacing batteries and alignments and would do this over a three day period over the weekend of the two week course (the “service” course was to take place on Friday Afternoon, and then all day on Saturday and Sunday). Contrary to Defendants representations, when Plaintiff arrived he was shown how to repair broken hinges; however, Defendant not only did not provide any instruction on any other repair or alignment techniques as promised, Defendant did everything to hide from Plaintiff anything related to repairs of the OSCOR.

711. In 2007, Defendant had developed another product, the TALAN (which was based on the aforementioned CODEC of the Plaintiff). Plaintiff, prior to his arrival at Defendants business, was told to bring photographic equipment because Defendant wanted Plaintiff to take extensive photographs of the TALAN in order to promote the product on the Plaintiff’s web site. Prior to this date, Defendant had published only computer mockups since Defendant was experiencing considerable problems getting a final, production model. Upon arrival, Defendant not only refused to allow photographs by Plaintiff, Defendant further prohibited Plaintiff from using photographs from Defendant brochures, even though Plaintiff was still a manufacturer’s representative. Over the two week course, Plaintiff witnessed the TALAN products used in the classroom and laboratories exhibiting catastrophic failures due to serious design flaws, and the course instructors state to the Plaintiff that the all of the units that the company was selling were having the same problems, and that all of the units which the Plaintiff had sold to the FBI as eavesdropping systems had been returned as defective.

712. In April 2007, after Plaintiff testified as a nationally recognized technical subject matter expert in TSCM and TEMPEST for the “Deepwater” Congressional Investigation and engaged as a subject matter expert for the Congressional Oversight Committee a situation unfolded which eventually resulted in the Defendant threatening to “destroy “ the Plaintiff by a series of actions the Defendant initiated in August 2007 and coordinated on behalf of the certain elements of the U.S. Government who were found to be involved by the Plaintiff in the “Deepwater” matter, while the Plaintiff was engaged by and acting on behalf of the Congressional Oversight Committee.

713. The Plaintiff asserts that this is the same pattern of retaliatory behavior by the FBI an other government agencies, which was used against Martin L. Kaiser in 1975 (and others since) after he also testified before Congress in a similar fashion about government corruption and rampant contractor fraud. This retaliation represents a long term pattern of conduct by an agency, agent, or contractor of the government in order to “pay back” or attempt to discrete the person who testified before Congress and who performing their civic duty by providing such testimony. Plaintiff further asserts, that this was a long term course of conduct of a continuing enterprise, though a pattern, of racketeering (including but not limited to: mail fraud, wire fraud, scheme to defraud, obstruction of justice, interference in commerce, witness tampering, whistle-blower retaliation, and monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activities), and have caused injury to the business and/or property of Plaintiff.

714. The project to “destroy” the Plaintiff by this Defendant thus appears to have been instituted in August of 2007, and possibly as early as July 2007 (after the Plaintiff received a barrage of threats from three defense contractor who had just lost a contract valued in the tens of billions of dollars as a result of the Plaintiffs testimony before Congress in April 2007).

715. The Plaintiff did not become aware of this pattern of criminal behavior of the Defendants until it manifested itself on December 1, 2009, and discovered the injury to the Plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff asserts that this pattern of specific, organized criminal acts (in order to destroy the Plaintiff) took place from 2007 until the present date, but also that the conduct took place over a long period of time spanning a continuum of acts from October 2001 to the present time, and acts which form a pattern even prior to September 2001, and in fact dating back over a period of nearly thirty years.

716. After the Plaintiff testified before Congress in April 2007, the Defendant began to suddenly complicate Plaintiff’s sales by kicking back or rejecting end user certificates on overseas sales of products, revealing at one point, that Defendant had “not received approval from Washington, D.C. on the end user certificate.” The Defendant repeatedly stated that these “End User Letters” or “End User Certificates” were required to export the equipment, and to obtain the licenses from the government for export (under 22 CFR 121.1XI(b) the export of these goods are strictly controlled and licensed). This tactic continued to be employed by Defendant such that simple transactions often were complicated by Defendant to cause delays in the transactions resulting in Defendant capturing the client and sale and denying Plaintiff rightful commissions, or profits.

717. In January 2011, the Plaintiff discovered that in fact, the Defendants did not have a license to export the goods as required by law, and that they had repeatedly misreported the goods to the U.S. Government as to the nature and capabilities, and had fraudulently obtain classification as “General Purpose Test Equipment,” when indeed it was not.

718. As far back as 1996, the Defendant repeatedly represented that “they had the export license,” and that the Plaintiff did not discover this fraud until extensively researching the matter in January 2011.

719. When Plaintiff questioned the Defendant concerning these suspected illegal shipments and ITAR and munitions control list violations, RICO, and related violation, the Defendant filed a vexatious and frivolous lawsuit in Putnam country court (in Tennessee) in an attempt to muzzle the Defendant, and to seek country level judgment, on what was indeed a federal matter, and to cover-up their wrong doings.

720. Several transactions regarding sales made by Plaintiff are illustrative. In approximately mid 2005, Plaintiff was contacted by a national company interested in his advice relative to their needs and TSCM equipment available from a number of manufacturers, including Defendant. After spending a substantial period of time with the client, Plaintiff submitted the Pending Order Form to Defendant for this particular sale. After submission of same, Plaintiff made an inquiry to Defendant on the status of the order and was informed no transaction took place. This was approximately a $100,000 sale of equipment in which Plaintiff should have been paid $25,000.00 commission. After being informed no transaction took place, Plaintiff was on the premises of Defendant subsequently for a training course and was greeted by one of the national company’s employees who told Plaintiff they had tried to purchase equipment from him; however, his boss had been contacted directly by Defendant who told the company they had to buy it directly from Defendant, not Plaintiff. Thereafter the sale went through directly with Defendant who retained the entirety of the transaction and informed Plaintiff that no sale had occurred.

721. A national pharmaceutical company consulted with Plaintiff in a similar manner. After the company agreed to purchase Defendants equipment from Plaintiff, Plaintiff submitted the pending order notification to Defendant.

722. The purchase order was made with the pharmaceutical company’s employee charged with providing not only budget requirements but also recommendations to the company. As soon as Defendant received the pending order notification from Plaintiff, Defendant immediately went to a higher up in the pharmaceutical company took the order, concluded the transaction and reported to Plaintiff that no sale had taken place.

723. Later at a trade show, Plaintiff encountered the pharmaceutical company’s employee, with whom Plaintiff had dealt, who informed Plaintiff that Defendant had called the company’s executive and told him they had to purchase direct with Defendant, not Plaintiff.

724. Plaintiff was contacted by a foreign government who sought his advice and counsel who desired to purchase equipment. The foreign government flew not only their representative but also a number of their TSCM personnel who came to Plaintiff place of business. The result of Plaintiff meetings with this government resulted in the sale of 16 complete sets of Defendants equipment. Defendant, after receiving the order, restricted Plaintiff’s commissions to only two of the sixteen sets thereby depriving Plaintiff of some approximate $318,000 in commissions earned.

725. In approximately September of 2007, and then in March 2008, Plaintiff was directly contacted by a foreign government for the purchase of approximately $1.5 Million dollars of Defendants equipment to be delivered directly to their Embassy in Washington, D.C. In addition, the Embassy desired Plaintiff to provide two weeks of training to their personnel. The Embassy; however, desired that a small fraction of the actual order be sent as a test transaction to ensure the confidentiality of the transaction. Again, upon receipt of the test transaction, Defendants went directly to persons inside this foreign government to take over the entire transaction (and to cut the Plaintiff out of the transaction). As a result of Defendants actions, the entire transaction was terminated with an assurance made to Plaintiff that this foreign government’s purchase would never be used in any of their Embassies throughout the world as the direct result of the methods used by Defendant as their operational security had been breached by Defendant (the purchasing of this kind of equipment requires great secrecy, or the equipment will be rendered of little or no value). Plaintiff was deprived of approximately $500,000 in direct commissions as well as the additional monies which were to be paid for Plaintiff training of these intelligence officers.

726. Because of the nature of the business of the Plaintiff, the agencies of the United States government who may or may not have been involved with Plaintiff, and the nature of the transactions, Defendant has been intentionally non specific relative to the specific details of these transactions disclosed herein. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff has provided TSCM services to virtually every intelligence agency of the United States government as a recognized GSA contractor up until December 1, 2009.

727. Upon information and belief there are hundreds of transactions which were similarly handled by Defendants who maintained no transactions occurred, when in fact they did resulting in commissions being due and owing to Plaintiff well in excess of $3,150,000.00. The conduct described herein by Defendants is submitted to have breached the contract existing between the parties. Defendant is entitled to an accounting for at least the past ten years prior to the filing of this suit, and damages for the entirety of the thirty years, as the injury was not fully discovered until December 2010 and January 2011.

728. Defendant has demanded an accounting of the aforementioned commissions due from Plaintiff, but Plaintiff has failed and/or refused and continues to fail and/or refuses to render such an accounting and pay the monies due as reflected in the demand letter transmitted to Defendant.

729. In 2004, Plaintiff advised Defendant of Ariyani Nawardi with the Intelligence service for Indonesia. Mr. Nawardi and his entourage flew to the U.S. and met with Plaintiff for several days. The result of Plaintiff’s efforts was a contract calling for an international sale with overseas delivery with Mr. Nawardi to purchase $916,880.00 of Defendants countermeasure equipment. After Plaintiff Atkinson registered his client with Defendants in accordance with written contract with Defendant, and disclosed the entirety of the sale, the end result was that Plaintiff drop shipped to Indonesia two sets of gear remitting to Defendant the price less Plaintiff’s profits on those two sets. Thereafter, Defendant fraudulently and tortuously interfered with Plaintiff’s relationship with Mr. Nawardi and converted the remainder of the order by entering an agreement with Mr. Nawardi converting the remaining 14 sets which realized $819,000.00 to Defendants of which Plaintiff received -0- commissions. To effectuate Defendants fraud, tortuous interference with the contractual rights existing between Plaintiff and Nawardi and the government of Indonesia, Defendant transformed Mr. Nawardi magically into a “house client” shorting Plaintiff of $316,000.00 commissions due. Specifically, Mr. Nawardi did not want to deal with Defendants directly and so that sale was clearly Plaintiff’s for which money is and has been due and owing.

730. In early November of 2009, Plaintiff booked a large sale to a client and obtained a $66,000.00 sale of Defendants countermeasure equipment. His commissions due were approximately $17,000.00; however, being in the hospital from multiple heart attacks as a result of the Defendant actions combined with his already being a disabled Veteran, when Plaintiff did place the order, Defendant refused to remit to him the commissions he earned and converted the customer completely.

731. Repeatedly throughout from April 2003 through October of 2010 the Plaintiff requested a written accounting of the sales and commissions between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, but the Defendant refused requests for same, and the Defendant suddenly “terminated” the agreement, when Plaintiff more strongly requested an accounting to which he is and has been entitled, Defendants threatened to terminate any further association and bar Plaintiff from continuing to service his clients as a further means of attempting to enforce the adhesion clause relative to monies due.

732. The commissions due to the Plaintiff from the Defendant at this point would have been well in excess of three million dollars, and by Plaintiff refusing to do further business with the Plaintiff they essentially retained the commissions that were due the Plaintiff.

733. Additionally, the future lost profits and commissions, which the Plaintiff could reasonably earn are in the area of in excess of fifteen million dollars in addition to moneys already owned.

734. Plaintiff asserts that between 2005 and 2007 Defendant, confected a scheme to defraud the Plaintiff out of sales and commissions, and to remove him as a market influencer, for their own benefit, and that in August of 2007 they launched their scheme.

735. During the calendar year of 2010, Plaintiff sold approximately $220,000.00 of Defendants equipment and earned at least $54,000.00 in commissions, none of which have been paid or properly credited to his in-house account, which Defendant had established for its convenience since Plaintiff was the largest seller of Defendants equipment.

736. In March 2010, the accounting department at Defendant stated that Plaintiff had a credit balance of $43,115, which was earmarked to purchase new demonstration gear and to attend classes from the Defendant, although the Plaintiff was somewhat wary of the “new products” the Defendant was trying to promote and began asking technical question about the equipment; however, the Defendant could not answer the questions to the Plaintiffs satisfaction.

737. In order to avoid payment of past monies due to Plaintiff and alternatively to avoid any accounting which had been repeatedly requested by Plaintiff, Defendant engaged in an abuse of process.

738. Specifically, in February 2009, the Plaintiff contracted for the sale of over $30,000.00 of Defendants equipment to a client located in Switzerland and an ultimate destination in Uzbekistan.

739. Upon receipt of payment by the Swiss client, Plaintiff properly registered the sale in accordance with the required disclosure to Defendant and immediately remitted full payment in the sum of over $20,000.00 to Defendant who received same.

740. Defendant has previously judicially confessed that these funds were for the entirety of the order bound for Switzerland and thence to Uzbekistan, and that the transaction had been paid in full at the time and was financially cleared for immediate shipment.

741. In order to avoid any accounting or payment of monies due to Plaintiff, Defendant required that the shipment of the Defendants equipment must be preceded by what is referred to as an “end user” certificate, rather than ship the purchased items to the address provided, and then repeatedly rejected the supplied documents without submitting them to the U.S. Government.

742. Plaintiff was repeatedly told that the shipment was “on the loading dock” and requiring only the end-user certificate to effect release.

743. In truth in fact, due to Fraud by Research Electronics and employees of Research Electronics under the U.S. Commerce classification of the equipment purchased at the time, no end user certificate was actually required. Further, neither Switzerland nor Uzbekistan required any end user certificate.

744. It has since been discovered that while no “end user” certificate is legally required, the goods are still required by law to be shipped under a State Department issued approval, which the Defendant had unlawfully subverted by falsely claiming the equipment was merely “general purpose test equipment” when in fact it was rather “electronic counter measures gear” which is tightly controlled and regulated by the U.S. Government.

745. It is by this deception, that the Defendant was engaging in tens of millions of dollars in illegal exports, as an long term organized criminal enterprise.

746. To make matter worse, under ITAR 121.1 XI(b) and international arms control treaties the goods are not actually controlled by the U.S. Commerce Department, but rather the U.S. State Department and then in turn controlled secondarily by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency though the Department of Defense.

747. The Defendant Research Electronics registered fraudulent ECCN (Export Control Numbers) with the U.S. Commerce Department to deceive the U.S. Government as to the true nature of the goods, and thus to maintain control under the umbrella of the U.S. Commerce instead other U.S. State Department. These fraudulent ECCN codes were then used to subvert U.S. Export controls and international treaty, and remove oversight, licensure, and control of the goods from the U.S. State Department, when in fact the U.S. State Department was required both by law and international treaty to control these goods, not the U.S. Commerce Department.

748. The mechanism by which the U.S. State Department controls these goods is by way of an End User License, which is obtained by making a formal application by the manufacture and exporter (in this case Research Electronics) to the U.S. State Department and including an End User Certificate or Letter along with relevant documents.

749. Thusly, a purchaser of such equipment would be required to provide an End User Certificate at some point in the transaction to effect the obtaining of the required U.S. State Department License. Additional documents in regards to the transaction would also be supplied to the U.S. State Department to obtain this license, which would vary based on whom the end user would be and their prior relationship with the U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence services.

750. Very often a purchaser of this equipment would initiate an initial End user Certificate to the U.S. State Department mere to inquire if it would be possible to obtain mere information about a product or to obtain technical manual to review as by Federal Statute detailed technical information or users manuals also require the same licenses, although they are not as strictly enforced.

751. As customers tend not to purchase good on which they have not been trained the end user also must obtain a license is order to attend training, which normally precede actual acquisition of the equipment.

752. Therefore, one End user Certificate will be issued and carried to the U.S. Embassy in the country where the actual end user is located to start the process of licensure.

753. Once approved, the end user can then obtain detailed technical materials on the equipment they seek, and obtain technical manuals to review.

754. Once the end user determines several systems which they will be interested in they will then initiate a license to attend training, and the organization which will be providing training will seek a license to be allowed to provide the same training (to better understand and evaluate the proposed equipment).

755. Once the end user is comfortable that the equipment will fulfill their requirements an initial purchase of the equipment will be made, and yet another End user Certificate issued, for the final equipment purchase. It is therefore not uncommon for there to be four or five End User Certificates issued over a six to nine month or even several year period to effect the purchase of a single piece of equipment. The last End User Certificate of course being the most vital of these.

756. By Defendant Research Electronics requiring an End User Certificate on foreign transactions they provided a complex illusion that they were applying for U.S. State Department licenses, when indeed they were not doing so. This is a very grave violation of both U.S. Law and a violation of International Treaties on Arms Control.

757. Defendant Research Electronics and their agents and mpeoyyes repeatedly stated they had the proper licenses in place to effect export of these goods, which indeed that did not. They further promised they all exports were being made in accordance with U.S. Export laws, when in fact no shipment of goods, materials, or providing of training was being provided legally.

758. Indeed, the entirety of the business operations of Defendant Research Electronics is a complex and organized criminal enterprise involved in international arm smuggling and money laundering.

759. Defendant, upon information and belief, directed the customer in Switzerland to contact the Rockport Police Department in Rockport, Massachusetts, and the Cape Ann Chamber of Commerce in Gloucester, Massachusetts and to file a criminal complaint alleging that Plaintiff was attempting to “steal” the customer’s money (when in fact the Defendant was in possession of the funds, and was delaying shipping the goods, and in full control of the transaction).

760. In addition, Defendant further rejected the first and second “end user” certificate which Defendant required in order to delay the shipment which Defendant knew the customer wanted as quickly as possible since it formed a portion of a time sensitive contract via the cut-out in Switzerland for a sale that the Swiss customer had with the Government of Uzbekistan.

761. Due to the delays in the Defendant shipping the goods to the client, the Plaintiff received a number of threatening phone calls, in an attempt to speed up shipment, and the caller (from Switzerland) even threatening bodily violence (and made terroristic threats against the Plaintiff) if the goods were not in his hands by November 6, 2009, so that the goods could in turn be provided to the end user. Further, the Plaintiff was told that he would be “severely punished” because of the delays in the shipment, which were in fact caused by the Defendant.

762. In fact, the transaction was out of the Plaintiff hands at that point as the Defendant had the entirety of the Plaintiffs funds, and was awaiting the End User to provide a legitimate End User Certificate (which was issued by the Government of Uzbekistan until November 23, 2009).

763. It has since been discovered that while Defendant Research Electronics was provided with this End User Certificate they did not in fact forward to the U.S. State Department in order to obtain an Export License for the transaction, and indeed the Defendant did falsify export documentation that was provided to the U.S. Customs Department in order to smuggle the arms out the United States.

764. Further the Defendant Research under declared the value and the nature of the goods, and even knowing that the End User Certificate indicate that the end user was in Uzbekistan, fraudulently listed another country as the end user.

765. For a number of years the Government of Kazakhstan had been covertly supplying weapons grade radiological materials to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to facilitate the development of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Numerous shipments were being made out of the strategic stockpiles of the Government of Kazakhstan over both land routes and by way of the Caspian Sea. These illicit transaction of nuclear materials where often brokered by politicians and businessmen in Uzbekistan and Switzerland. Much of these radiological materials were originating from the old Soviet stockpiles of decommissioned nuclear weapons and mining and refining operations that were still located in Kazakhstan. With minimal effort on the part of the Iranian nuclear engineers these materials could then be crafted into at least a hundred or more Iranian high yield nuclear warheads, spread over (at the time) several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles. In order to cripple the Iranian nuclear weapons program it was thus vital to relocate these nuclear materials well away from the Caspian Sea and well away from the Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan border and to a more secure and remote storage location in the far north of Kazakhstan.

766. In 2007 and 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran was also internationally procuring the materials by way of front companies in the United Arab Emirates from source companies in China, North Korea and the United States sufficient to produce deuterium oxide foam and tritium for use for roughly 130 two and three stage thermo-nuclear-pressure devices or high yield nuclear warheads for deployment on their inventory of long range Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). These raw materials for this project were inside Iran prior to February 2009, at a nuclear weapons fabrications facility just to the north of Tehran.

767. Then in 2009, and 2010 the Islamic Republic of Iran completed the procurement of raw materials to fabricate in excess of 150 completed warheads and re-entry vehicles, and made this purchase again through front companies in the United Arab Emirates from source in China and the United States of America.

768. In August and September 2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran started the procurement of additional raw materials to fabricate additional nuclear warheads and re-entry vehicles.

769. The Government of Uzbekistan had agreed to provide counter-surveillance services to the Government of Kazakhstan in preparation for the movement of sixty casks of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (sufficient to make 770+ nuclear bombs) by rail starting in Mid November 2009 (such transactions, sales, and services for such counter-surveillance goods and services are within the normal course and scope of the Plaintiff’s business and area of expertise).

770. Such equipment sales or counterintelligence services to the intelligence agencies of one country, so that they may render services to a allied or semi-allied country is the mainstay of the intelligence community and which forms a type of “diplomatic quid pro quo” where the nation with greater technical capabilities provides services to the inferior nation.

771. In this case, the Government of Kazakhstan lacked the ability to detect tracking devices and eavesdropping devices on the transport rail cars, and requested the assistance of the intelligence agencies within the Government of Uzbekistan, who then procured the equipment through the cut-out company in Switzerland, who in turn placed the order with the Plaintiff, and thus the Plaintiff placed the order with the Defendant Research Electronics who performed the manufacturing and export.

772. As the test runs of these rail cars and casks were to begin in Mid November 2009 with live runs starting in February 2010 and completing in February 2011, and it was vitally important that the counter-surveillance equipment supplied by Defendant arrive a week in advance of Mid November 2009 (the equipment had to be in the hands of the Government of Uzbekistan, not later then November 6, 2009).

773. The Government of Uzbekistan and the Government of Kazakhstan opted to utilize a “Chinese Wall” in order to procure the equipment for this project, and in February 2009, the Government of Uzbekistan CEMA contracted with the intermediary in Switzerland for the equipment purchase.

774. The Government of Kazakhstan had been obstructing the movement of these casks for years, it took supreme diplomatic and political pressure on the part of the United States Government to move the casks, and the U.S. State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Energy were strongly involved in manipulating this project to get it moving forward.

775. In short, the Government of Kazakhstan did not want to move the casks and was doing everything possible to obstruct the project.

776. The casks being close to Uzbekistan gave the country political and diplomatic power as they were accessible to Uzbekistan should they choose to make any move on the weapons grade materials or to make purchases and smuggle same.

777. Moving the nuclear materials away from the Caspian Sea moved them well outside the reach of Uzbekistan and Iran. The government of Uzbekistan did not want to move the casks and was doing everything possible to obstruct the project as it weakened them politically, and diplomatically.

778. In turn the U.S. Government requested that the Defendant, delay and interfere with the shipping the Plaintiff’s goods destined for Uzbekistan, so that the shipment arrivals would take place well after the window of opportunity (after Mid November 2009). To this end, the Defendant repeatedly and needlessly rejected the un-needed end user certificates, and created drama about the transaction to enable this delay.

779. It was presumably in the best interest of the U.S. Government diplomatic efforts for there to be no counter-surveillance gear available to the Government of Kazakhstan for use on this project, which is why, even after the Plaintiff provided Defendant will all of the funds to cover the shipment, and all of the documents requested, they claimed that the documents were not sufficient, and Plaintiff now asserts that Defendants were fully acting as agents of the U.S. Government in delaying the goods.

780. In turn, the U.S. Government applied pressure on Defendants Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research Electronics) to cause these delays in order to deprive the Government of Kazakhstan of their sweep gear so that they could not detect the bugs and tracking devices that the U.S. Government would have placed on the rail cars.

781. Ultimately, Defendants Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research Electronics) were acting as an agent of the U.S. Government (the FBI), the U.S. State Department (outside of PM/DDTC, the normal approval authority) and the Central Intelligence Agency and Plaintiff merely got caught in the middle of a legitimate business transaction whereby the U.S. Government wanted to delay the shipment, but knew that Plaintiff too honest to play games with his clients, and hence went to the less ethical supplier of the goods, the Defendant Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research Electronics) to effect the delay.

782. But these illegal manipulations, and delays, and interference with Plaintiff international shipments, along with wire fraud, and scheme to defraud, qualify this as a Racketeering Offense involving both private and government entities.

783. Thereafter, upon information and belief, Defendant Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research Electronics) was in communication with the Rockport Police Department, specifically Robert J. Tibert, who handed the matter to Patrolmen Daniel Mahoney, and other law enforcement agencies, manipulating their investigations to obtain the specific result of effectuating Plaintiff’s arrest to not only damage Plaintiff’s good name and reputation known worldwide as not only an expert and market influencer in TSCM, but also to obtain the result of not having to account for or pay for large sums of monies due and owing to Plaintiff Atkinson.

784. Indeed Defendant Research Electronics has actually judicially confessed that such a conspiracy was confected, and that they worked closely with the Rockport Police Department to create un-needed delays for the sole purpose of setting up the Plaintiff so that he may be arrested on false charges, and have his civil rights violated, even though the Plaintiff had done nothing wrong.

785. Indeed Research Electronics had been paid in full by the Plaintiff for the goods and that Research Electronics working with the Rockport Police Department created delays in the shipment.

786. In turn, once the Plaintiff Atkinson had been arrested, the Defendant Research Electronics went ahead and immediately released the shipment they had been delaying without cause (under the guise of non-existent licensing that they were not applying for, but which was indeed required), and all of the goods in the hands of the end-user a few days later (while the Plaintiff was in the hospital due to the actions of the Defendants).

787. On information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that this conspiracy was initiated and coordinated through FBI Agent Christian McDowell and ICE Agent Jamison Wiroll operating out the Boston, MA.

788. The U.S. Government had previously approached the Plaintiff to effect similar delays on foreign transactions, which the Plaintiff had always refused to take part in as a matter of ethics. The proper legal mechanism for a proper delay was to request the PM/DDTC office at the U.S. State Department to delay the license approvals, but the FBI was not doing this and was seeking extra-legal delays, which were improper.

789. After these goods where released in early December 2009 by Defendant Research Electronics, starting on or about Mid-December 2009, and running through March and April 2010, virtually all of the Defendants Research Electronics in-transit shipments were seized or delayed by U.S. Customs due to “irregularities in the export documents”, presumable due to fraudulent export documents having been repeatedly filed by the Defendant in violation of 22 CFR 121.1 XI(b).

790. In conjunction with an abuse of process (i.e. using and manipulating the criminal process to obtain a result for which the process was not intended – avoid payment of monies and accounting of monies due), Defendant further refused to ship to a customer from China, a Defendants product which was to be shipped to Arizona inside the Territory of the United States.

791. In accordance with terms and conditions of contract, which Defendant has judicially confessed, the sale of the Defendants product to the Chinese customer to be delivered to Arizona, Defendant refused to ship the product to Arizona, even though there sufficient credit balance on the Plaintiff account to fully fund the transaction.

792. Defendant again communicated with the Rockport Police Department and provided misleading, false and inaccurate information to Patrolman Daniel Mahoney in its singular scheme to avoid any accounting, payment of monies due Plaintiff from Defendant, and utterly destroy the competitive viability of Plaintiff in the marketplace as a strong market influence for which Defendant was keenly aware.

793. Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to declaratory judgment that the clauses in MREP Agreements described herein are adhesionary and contra bones mores such that they are legally unenforceable.

794. Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to an appropriate order from this Court commanding disclosure for inspection and copying by Plaintiff of all pending order forms submitted by Plaintiff to Defendant as well as all sales records, communications relative to sales, shipping, and export records of Defendant for the past ten (10) years.

795. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has committed tortuous interference with the contractual rights of Plaintiff contracts, to Plaintiff detriment causing damages.

796. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has converted Plaintiff’s funds due and owing both through refusing to remit the funds maintained in Plaintiff’s “house” account, commissions due, and via conversion of Defendants customers and clients.

797. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has committed fraud by intentionally falsifying the status of sales made by Plaintiff and falsely claiming sales made by Plaintiff as Defendants and/or other third parties.

798. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has abused the legal process by falsely reporting information to the Rockport Police Department with the intended purpose of destroying Plaintiff’s good name, business reputation, business, market influence, and accomplish the conversion of Plaintiff’s money and goods; a purpose for which the legal process was not intended to achieve with full knowledge of Defendants actions.

799. Plaintiff asserts the Research Electronics, and individual employees and agents of Research Electronics acting both in their individual capacity, and of their official capacity as agents of the Rockport Police Department and the FBI violated the civil right of the Plaintiff while acting under color of authority.

800. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has breached the laws of the State of Tennessee or/or of the United States by illegally possessing bugging devices as well as using those illegal bugging devices to intercept wire and/or oral communications of Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s consent contrary to law, doing so within and throughout at least the past ten years while Plaintiff was on the premises of Defendants establishments in Tennessee.

801. Further, this Defendant has engaged in conduct and as a continuing unit of an enterprise, through a pattern, of racketeering enterprises (including, but not limited to: mail fraud, wire fraud, scheme to defraud, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, obstruction of justice, interference in commerce, also involving monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), and have caused injury to the business and/or property of the Plaintiff Atkinson. These Defendants have violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff, infringing and deprived him of his civil rights

--
James M. Atkinson
President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662
Granite Island Group
jm..._at_tscm.com
http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803

-- 
James M. Atkinson
President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662
Granite Island Group
jm..._at_tscm.com
http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803