= From: James M.= AtkinsonTo: TSCM-LSent: Thursday, July 09, 2009 22:38<= /DIV>Subject: [TSCM-L] {3879} Wiretap foe= s turn Obama's words against fedsAll attorneys need to have their offices and homes checked f= or bugging devices monthly, but not by the same company each time.
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Instead, put together a list of TSCM people within 200-250 miles of t= heir location... NOT *** PI's *** who also "do sweeps" (with two suitcases)= , but actual, experienced electronics folks who spend most of their time pe= rforming sweeps. The use of a PI is fine for general investigative work, ov= erall security work, and EP type of work, but not for bug sweeps. In fact, = a really smart attorney will have a number of PI's who all work as outside = contractors, as well as a large number of subject matter experts they can c= all on for services, advice, or opinions (including sweepers).
The attorney should contract directly to the TSCM company for service, an= d avoid involving anybody outside of an extremely close circle of people wh= o can be depended on to maintain absolute silence about the upcoming inspec= tion. It is often wise to engage the PI firm that provides general investig= ative or security services during the sweep, but who does not provide the a= ctual sweep itself.
PI's should make note here, that you can d= o your customers a lot better service if you provide security only for the = sweep, and let an outside firm come it with all the technical gizmo, gadget= s, ladders, lights, test equipment, and appropriate vehicles, and experienc= e. You will also do your customer a better deal if you let them pay the swe= ep company separate from your billings for time (in this case the law firm = pays you for your security and coordination services).
The PI = who does this will also end up making way more money in the long run as the= y are not laying out money (most PI's will not lay down more then a few gra= nd) for gear that they only use a few days a month (if they are lucky), and= then are lucky to make only a few hundred bucks a day.
For at= torneys the way that you handle this is to call upon the security company o= r PI firm that you use on a regular basis, and with whom you have an ongoin= g relationship for a wide variety of services. Then you engage a sweep firm= to come in to check a small area, and once the engagement is scheduled you= call your local PI or security company up and have them come stand watch o= ver the area to be inspected until the sweep person can get their a few day= s later. Of course if you are going to have multiple offices checked you ar= e going to of course need multiple security people or PI’s (one per room)= , and if you have a really large series of offices you may need to even sta= tion security people at the doors of all phone rooms and wiring closets.
If you are a PI or a security person you can see where I am goi= ng with this… Take a law firm that would like to have 3 attorneys offices= checked for bugs. This project is estimated to take at least 5-6 days once= the sweep folks get into the 3 rooms, but they will also need access to th= e phone room as well, in addition to two wiring closets. This means that at= any given time you will need at least 6 people (one to cover each room, pl= us one relief person), plus someone to provide coverage outside the buildin= g, or in the hallways. This adds of to time… a lot of time in fact. Given= that there are only a few dozen sweep people in the entire country (yeah, = yeah, I know every PI thinks they can do sweeps), this means that it is goi= ng to take a few days to line up a sweep unless it is done well in advance,= on a quasi-random basis, and even then you still coverage by security peop= le before any sweep to lock down the place against any live devices being r= emoved.
Even if the attorney (CEO, etc) doesn’t actually hav= e a bug sweep performed, this sporadic flurry of security lockdown will fre= ak out any eavesdropper. Hence, if the PI understands the logistics of a sw= eep, and understands how to freak out an eavesdropper they can run through = this drill, and only occasionally bring in an actual TSCM person.
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The eavesdropper will even become complacent because they will see thes= e visible security flurries, but no sweep equipment as seen and will assume= that it was just a ruse. The eavesdropper may at some time discover that t= he lockdown was in fact a ruse in and of itself, and that the TSCM folks we= re actually performing a sweep in between these lock-down flurries. In some= cases there may even be a high profile lockdown, or an invisible lockdown.= The sweep may be done in a way that is visible, or invisible. The staff of= the law firm may know that a sweep is going to be performed the upcoming w= eekend, or the sweep may happen right under the noses of the employees and = they have no clue what is really going down.
Better to let a r= eal sweep company come in for a couple of days to do a proper job (with hun= dreds, if not thousands of pounds of equipment) and slowly clear each room,= each phone, and each wire one at a time.
The goal is to total= ly confound the spy, to trick them, and to draw them out, to cause them con= fusion, and to exploit this confusion to flush both them and their bugs out= .
I would note that just because a federal, state, or local ag= ency does something under presumed authority, or just because a executive o= rder was written, or some political order was handed down does not mean tha= t an eavesdropping project was legal and within the limits of the law.
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The law is the law, is the law... it does not bend... either some= body is aiding by the law or they are breaking it. Government employees for= centuries have justified breaking the law at the behest of their lords and= masters, and often they feel that their illegal conduct is justified by th= e illusion of the greater good, or for some political traction or power man= euver.
The FBI, DEA, USSS, USPS, etc has historically flaunted= the eavesdropping laws, and each has a long history of using illegal bugs,= break-in, burglaries, and wiretaps for political advantage, and in cases w= here their was absolutely no criminal case to be made, but only political a= gendas to be pursued. COINTELPRO is one of the classic examples (major humi= liation when hundreds of FBI and other folks lost their jobs when this prog= ram got exposed), but there have been many other similar programs over the = years.
Bottom line is all attorneys need to have their offices= , their computers, their phones, their wires, their ceilings, basements, wa= lls, furniture, their homes, and anything and everything that even remotely= involves client contact, records, or other data checked out on a regular b= asis. Just because information can not be used against your target directly= , does not mean that it, you, they, or it will not be targeted.
Eavesdroppers need to realize that someone is hunting them, and that the = person who is hunting them may be better at catching spies, than the eavesd= ropper is at doing the spying. Of course if the bugging is legally on the u= p and up, and the eavesdropper knows their business then they will have zer= o problem convincing a judge to issue a protective order, and the TSCM firm= will have zero problem giving the customer back all of their money.
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[Hint: If a TSCM firm gives you back your money, declines to give yo= u a report, and for some reason the project suddenly takes way less time th= en originally estimated then you can safely assume that you are screwed, or= are about to be screwed. Generally, a legitimate TSCM practitioner will no= t accept money for a sweep that they have a sitting judge to wave them off = of (law enforcement officers can not legally wave a TSCM’er off, only a s= itting judge can do that). If a legitimate wave-off does in fact happen the= TSCM specialist will find some reason to wrap the project up early (oops, = equipment broke), will evade providing a report either verbally or in writi= ng (oops, computer crashed), and will not request any further funds (nah, d= on’t worry about the rest of the bill), and will most likely return any f= unds they have already been given (maybe now, maybe later). Also, some TSCM= folks carry a special insurance policy that covers them in advance for any= situation where a legal court ordered wave-off happens so that the insuran= ce company pay them so long as they did not accept any further monies from = the client once they were put under a protective order (in writing), AND al= l monies paid were refunded to the client in a timely manner, AND no report= of any kind was made to the client in regards to bugs being present, or no= t being present.
Once a lawyer or law firm has an established = relationship with a TSCM firm it is wise to have another attorney retain th= e TSCM specialists services on a project-by-project basis, and then for the= second attorney to act as counsel to the first attorney. This second attor= ney actually engages the outside TSCM firm (and security and/or PI firm), a= nd the sweep is performed for the first attorney at the direction of the se= cond attorney. Then once first attorney’s office is confirmed to be free = of bugs the roles get reversed (after the books are totally closed on the f= irst assignment), the TSCM practitioner gets engaged by the first attorneys= who is acting on behalf of the second attorney and the second attorneys of= fice then gets checked for bugs, and so on. When a law firm has a sweep per= formed it may be wise to have an odd-man-out who represents the other lawye= r(s) in the firm. There are some law firms who actually handle their sweeps= via an outside associate so that nobody in the main office has even the sl= ightest idea that sweeps are being performed.
I know this all = sounds terribly confusing, but imagine the poor eavesdropper who is half bl= ind and sitting out in some un-air-conditioned listening post in boxers and= a t-shirt, trying to figure out if the cleaning crew really is a cleaning = crew, if that low slung soccer mom van is really for people or sweep gear, = and if the latest security lockdown is for a real sweep, of merely a ruse f= or a sweep that has already taken place.
Eavesdroppers are ter= rified of not knowing, and illegal eavesdroppers are more terrified still= … so keep the eavesdroppers off balance, keep them guessing, and do sweep= s that are virtually invisible to the eavesdroppers.
…and PI= ’s, please, please, please partner up with or work with several TSCM firm= s or TSCM practitioners and let them teach you how to choreograph sweeps. I= promise you that you will make way more money then trying to do sweeps you= rself, and your clients will be much happier with the end results… especi= ally if your clients are attorneys.
-jma
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009= /07/09/BADQ18LP9H.DTL&tsp=1
Wiretap foes turn Obama's wor= ds against feds
Bob Egelko, Chronicle Staff Writer
Thursday, July= 9, 2009
(07-09) 15:38 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- An Islamic charity= challenging former President George W. Bush's wiretapping program in a San= Francisco federal court cited candidate Barack Obama's words Thursday in a= rguing that a president has no power to unilaterally order eavesdropping on= Americans.
Lawyers for the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation introduce= d their brief by quoting Obama's words in December 2007: "Warrantless surve= illance of American citizens, in defiance of FISA, is unlawful and unconsti= tutional."
FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,= requires the government to get a warrant from a court that meets in secret= before intercepting messages between Americans and suspected foreign terro= rists. Bush acknowledged in 2005 that he authorized such surveillance four = years earlier and said he had constitutional authority to take such actions= during wartime.
Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker in San Fran= cisco has scheduled a hearing Sept. 1 on whether Al-Haramain has the right = to sue the government and, if so, whether it was wiretapped unconstitutiona= lly. It would be the first hearing on the legality of the surveillance prog= ram since a federal court panel assigned lawsuits from around the nation to= Walker in 2007.
The government accidentally gave Al-Haramain a clas= sified document in 2004 reportedly showing that two of the organization's l= awyers had been wiretapped. Al-Haramain returned the document at the govern= ment's request and has been barred from relying on it in court, but has arg= ued that federal officials' public statements show it was the target of ele= ctronic surveillance - a critical fact in establishing its right to sue.
Obama administration lawyers have not said whether they consider the s= urveillance program legal, an issue they may address in a filing due Aug. 5= . Instead, they contend the suit would damage national security if allowed = to proceed, and have resisted Walker's orders to let Al-Haramain's attorney= s review the classified document to help them argue against dismissal.
<= BR>In Thursday's filing, the now-defunct Islamic organization said ample pu= blic evidence showed that it had been wiretapped during an investigation th= at led the Bush administration to designate it as a terrorist group in 2004= , a classification it disputes.
Al-Haramain said a 2007 speech by a = deputy FBI director - who mentioned that the group had been under surveilla= nce during the terrorism investigation - indicated that federal agents had = eavesdropped on phone conversations in 2004 allegedly linking the organizat= ion to Osama bin Laden. Other government officials and lawyers have made st= atements pointing to the same conclusion, the group said.
Challengin= g the Bush administration's argument that the president has inherent power = to order surveillance, Al-Haramain quoted Obama and his future attorney gen= eral, Eric Holder, who said in a June 2008 speech that Bush had acted "in d= irect defiance of federal law."
This is the time, Al-Haramain's lawy= ers told Walker, for the judge to decide what the group called the central = question in the case: "May the president of the United States break the law= in the name of national security?"
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James M. Atkinson  = ; &n= bsp; Phon= e: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group &nbs= p; &= nbsp; Fax: (978= ) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 &n= bsp; Web: = http://www.tscm.com/
Glouces= ter, MA 01931-8008 &nb= sp; E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm= .com
 = ; h= ttp://www.linkedin.com/in/jamesmatkinson
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No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from= the
enemy until it is ripe for execution. - Machiavelli, The Pri= nce, 1521 <BR
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