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Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 21:19:58 -0500
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From: "James M. Atkinson" <jm..._at_tscm.com>
Subject: Top Secret CG Ship Pwnage
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NSC failed initial all VTI and ITI, has not
passed either yet and the CG and Lockheed is
posturing for a massive failure of the classified systems to keep secrets.
Note attached Press Release.
Carefully read between the lines, and notice that
they are talking about it passing in the future
and that it has not passed as of today (today was
supposed to the delivery day). The government has
now officially pissed away something like $150
million dollars on just this one boat, and it is
hemorrhaging secrets. To top it all off they are
currently building two more ships, and just got
the budget to build a fourth, so we are looking
at something like at least $600 million dollars
being wasted on ships that leak classified secrets.
Shame on the CG for wasting the publics money,
and betraying the publics trust like they got
caught doing last year with the 123 ft cutters
(another $100+ million they wasted). It looks
like the DD250 is going to take a TEMPEST and
C4ISR hit, but the CG is likely still going to
bend over and take it in the nether regions even
after they were warned to pay attention to what
the contractor was trying to do to them after
they got caught rigging the tests and inspections last year.
The Press Release is the Coast Guard attempting
to spin control the fact that they have
completely lost control of the classified
communications systems and are in way over their
heads, and that several senior Coasties have
thier head on the proverbial chopping block over this massive boondoggle.
Not good, not good at all.
-jma
http://www.uscg.mil/cgjournal/
Protecting National Security High Priority For National Security Cutter
2/25/2008 6:14:00 PM
The U.S. Coast Guards National Security Cutter
(NSC) is nearing completion at Pascagoula, MS,
shipyard. Built by a joint Lockheed Martin and
Northrup Grumman partnership (Integrated Coast
Guard Systems or ICGS), the BERTHOLFthe first
ship in a new class of eight complex and
technologically advanced 418 foot cuttersis
slated for delivery to the Coast Guard during the
spring of 2008, and will be commissioned this upcoming summer.
Unlike older cutters, the BERTHOLF contains fully
integrated command, control and communications
systems that are designed to dramatically improve
the Coast Guards ability to execute its vital
maritime missions. Because of these tightly
integrated systems, the Coast Guard must
carefully ensure that confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information processed by
these systems are appropriately protected.
Before the BERTHOLF becomes part of the Coast
Guards fleet it must go through a standardized
Information Assurance (IA) process based on
Federal and Department of Defense (DOD) policies,
wherein delivered equipment and installation
procedures are certified for compliance by the
Coast Guard. This process includes such
activities as TEMPEST testing and inspections of
emission security requirements. These along with
other IA activities are conducted and documented
forming the preliminary basis for the Coast
Guards decision to allow some or all of the
systems aboard BERTHOLF to operate. This initial
approval is called an Interim Authority to
Operate (IATO), which is a qualified
certification to operate designated C4&IT
systems. As Technical Authority, we anticipate
authorizing BERTHOLF a limited authority to
operate some or all of its systems prior to its
special commissioning status to facilitate the
vessels transit to its new homeport in Alameda, CA.
The IATO is issued by the Coast Guards
Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) who, as a
Technical Authority for all C4&ITs systems, must
determine whether or not to accept any residual
risk as identified by the IA process and allow
the systems to operate. Close coordination
between the USCG Command, Control, Communications
and Information Technology (C4&IT) Directorate
(where Technical Authority and DAA reside) and
the USCG Acquisition Directorate (which manages
the NSC project) provides for comprehensive
oversight of C4&IT system development aboard the
NSC. These two organizations work, along with
the requirements sponsors and resource providers
at headquarters, as well as third-partiessuch as
US Navys Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
(SPAWAR)to assist in this important work.
While the Coast Guard is eager to deploy with the
new technological capabilities of the NSC class
of vessels, they recognized early on that as a
first in class they would need to pay close
attention to IA issues, especially since the
contract emphasized commercial equipment and
software use, where possible. To mitigate this
risk the Coast Guard began testing and evaluating
the systems as early as possible, often before
installations were even complete. This
preliminary testing provided excellent data and
revealed several areas with the BERTHOLFs C4&IT
suite that required attention by ICGS and the
Coast Guard. In its oversight role the Coast
Guard is using this information to provide
specific direction and emphasis to the contractor.
The proactive testing regimen included an early
Visual TEMPEST Inspection (VTI), performed in
July 2007 when the ships wiring and systems were
not yet complete. As it was specifically
intended to do, the survey revealed issues that
would require correction prior to final testing.
In addition to the VTI, representatives from the
US Navys Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
(SPAWAR) spent four days aboard BERTHOLF,
performing limited instrumented TEMPEST tests of
equipment and systems for the Coast Guard. SPAWAR
identified discrepancies that will be added to
the list of IA remediation actions that need to
be completed prior to final onboard
testing. Full instrumented TEMPEST surveys along
with IA scans of the BERTHOLFs networks and
systems will be performed after Acceptance Trials
(AT) with TEMPEST and IA status highlighted and
documented on our acceptance agreement with the
shipbuilder (DD250). Up to this point all tests
and inspections have been preliminary in order to
properly identify and manage risk.
While there is some risk to BERTHOLFs delivery
schedule posed by resolution of these remediation
actions; the government and industry are working
collaboratively and proactively to aggressively
address this risk. Similar to the process
undertaken by the U.S. Navy for its own ships of
comparable size and complexity, the Coast Guard
has formed a dedicated government-industry
working group to resolve or mitigate IA
discrepancies aboard BERTHOLF. The working group
proactively tracks and addresses the
discrepancies in a Plan of Action and Milestones
to ensure compliance. The working group is an
important part of the Coast Guards strategy to
provide effective oversight of the contractors
effort and help them meet their contractual
requirements of delivering a certifiable and accreditable platform.
As the most vital modernization program in the
history of the Coast Guard continues to unfold,
the Coast Guard is more committed than ever to
providing our men and women with the tools and
technology they need to carry out their many
missions. BERTHOLF will provide an unprecedented
capability for the nation to protect our national security.
RDML David T. Glenn,
Assistant Commandant and Technical Authority for C4IT
CAPT Leonard L. Ritter Jr.,
Office of Cyber Security & Telecommunications
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Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:21 CST