>From - Sat Mar 02 00:57:22 2024
Received: by 10.35.13.4 with SMTP id q4mr10249409pyi.7.1201580905477;
Mon, 28 Jan 2008 20:28:25 -0800 (PST)
Return-Path: <ratla..._at_yahoo.com>
Received: from web36814.mail.mud.yahoo.com (web36814.mail.mud.yahoo.com [209.191.85.65])
by mx.google.com with SMTP id v63si1143573pyh.2.2008.01.28.20.28.24;
Mon, 28 Jan 2008 20:28:25 -0800 (PST)
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of ratla..._at_yahoo.com designates 209.191.85.65 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.191.85.65;
DomainKey-Status: good (test mode)
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of ratla..._at_yahoo.com designates 209.191.85.65 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=ratla..._at_yahoo.com; domainkeys=pass (test mode) header.From=ratla..._at_yahoo.com
Received: (qmail 80350 invoked by uid 60001); 29 Jan 2008 04:28:24 -0000
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws;
s=s1024; d=yahoo.com;
h=X-YMail-OSG:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Message-ID;
b=u9Pz0jYigw2Z+1360gT34iPTjoMU524fCsmOm6Q82LW741gwnAQp6Nx3KOJbt0+nM/PjBoDHYvMPOjnuDHy6S2TzHCG7H/hn5ReFcgsf6M9tUCNJ4oLWGOlIGxmUN7N18tvd4afJPwRp+K8Cgp7L38w1rIwpQG8kXeWiZDuPPjQ=;
X-YMail-OSG: vlyLzb4VM1l7p.fKks8MU6L6iNacRq9G1TI1Yv5tLCI8oO6HMje.lXVqFGeskTNv5faMGJ_Hu1NWoLGwjiBS5R_psLa283OoWDTzOYDBx6IhU989X1aKlbx5msBcFw--
Received: from [216.254.6.188] by web36814.mail.mud.yahoo.com via HTTP; Mon, 28 Jan 2008 20:28:24 PST
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2008 20:28:24 -0800 (PST)
From: Joo Faloopa <ratla..._at_yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {2349} TSA tester slips mock bomb past airport security
To: TSCM-L2006_at_googlegroups.com
In-Reply-To: <7.0.1.0.2.20080128175326.232ee008_at_tscm.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="0-352272536-1201580904=:75597"
Message-ID: <225094.75597.qm_at_web36814.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
--0-352272536-1201580904=:75597
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sounds like a great idea, but I'm having trouble imagining how to do it wit=
hout breaking the rules- or having the rules redefined to mean you broke th=
em afterward. =20
After all, if undermining confidence in our glorious masters isn't tantamou=
nt to aiding the tur'rists, than what is?
-hagar
"James M. Atkinson" <jm..._at_tscm.com> wrote:=20
I think that AP or anther outlet should=20
commission a small group of say 25 security=20
experts (5 per flight, for 5 flights) to=20
demonstrate that we are no more secure today as we were in 2001.
Everything would be done perfectly legally of=20
course, and it would be totally outside=20
government circles, (or more accurately performed=20
outside of what TSA is expecting or able to spin=20
control). No actual threat or breaching of the=20
rules would take place, but simulating the pwnage=20
of five or six commercial aircraft is quite simple.
y'all interested?
-jma
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html
TSA tester slips mock bomb past airport security
CNN goes along with a TSA tester, witnesses mock bomb slip past security
Tests such as one in Tampa, Florida, are conducted at airports nationwide
Transportation Security Administration typically keeps test results classif=
ied
By Jeanne Meserve and Mike M. Ahlers
CNN
Editor's note: CNN's Jeanne Meserve and producer=20
Mike M. Ahlers recently went along with a=20
Transportation Security Administration official=20
on an undercover test of airport screeners. Here=20
is what they witnessed. CNN agreed not to disclose the name of the tester.
TAMPA, Florida (CNN) -- Jason -- that's the name=20
CNN was asked to call him -- slides a simulated=20
explosive into an elastic back support. The mock=20
bomb is as slim as a wallet; its fuse, the size=20
of a cigarette. He wraps the support around his=20
torso, and the bomb fits comfortably into the small of his back.
It's hard to tell he's concealing anything;=20
harder still when he dons a black T-shirt and a maroon golf shirt.
Then, with CNN's cameras in tow, Jason heads to=20
Tampa International Airport, where he'll try to=20
sneak the fake explosive past security screeners.
Jason, a covert tester for the Transportation=20
Security Administration, has been probing airport=20
weaknesses for five years, beginning with big=20
mock bombs before switching to ever smaller=20
devices as the TSA adapts to evolving terrorist=20
threats. Watch the tester slip past security =BB
As jobs go, this one comes with its own unique=20
set of satisfactions and tribulations. Jason=20
wants to succeed at his task -- and he wants to=20
fail. Success is a measure of his stealth, hewn=20
by 40 years in law enforcement. But failure is=20
satisfying too, because it means airport=20
screeners are growing more adept at detecting threats.
So Jason -- looking every bit the middle-aged man=20
on an uneventful trip to anywhere -- shows a=20
boarding pass and an ID to a TSA document=20
checker, and he is directed to a checkpoint=20
where, unbeknown to the security officer on site, the real test begins.
He gets through, which in real life would mean a=20
terrorist was headed toward a plane with a bomb.
To be clear, the TSA allowed CNN to see and=20
record this test, and the agency is not concerned=20
with CNN showing it. The TSA says techniques such=20
as the one used in Tampa are known to terrorists=20
and openly discussed on known terror Web sites.
Even before the September 11, 2001, terror=20
attacks, government agencies deployed "red teams"=20
such as this one to look for holes in airport=20
security. The tests have resulted in a torrent of=20
reports criticizing the government for failing to=20
staff, train, manage and equip properly the=20
screener work force, which numbers 43,000.
While test results are classified and rarely leak=20
out, those that have been disclosed typically=20
don't inspire confidence. In tests conducted in=20
2006 and disclosed to USA Today last year,=20
investigators successfully smuggled 75 percent of=20
fake bombs through checkpoints at Los Angeles=20
International Airport, 60 percent through=20
Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and 20=20
percent at San Francisco International Airport.
The TSA has disputed some test methodologies and=20
test results. But instead of running from tests,=20
the agency has embraced the idea that testing has=20
a value that goes beyond measuring the performance of individual screeners.
Tests,the TSA says, can show systemwide security=20
vulnerabilities. When used frequently -- as was=20
the case with San Francisco in 2006 -- they can=20
heighten screener awareness. Tests can show areas=20
that need increased attention. And tests can be=20
used to determine whether terrorist plots=20
uncovered by intelligence agencies or being=20
discussed on terrorist Web sites are lunatic rants, or are plausible.
As a result, the TSA says it believes its work=20
force is the most tested in the federal=20
government, with checkpoint drills of various=20
sophistication occurring in every checkpoint at every airport daily.
Almost an hour before Jason approached the=20
checkpoint, a fellow red team member had gone=20
through the checkpoint. It's this member's job to=20
make sure the test is conducted safely.
Five minutes before the test begins, he uses a=20
cell phone to call Tampa's federal security=20
director, the airport's top security official.
"Sir, the reason we're calling today is to tell=20
you that we will be conducting covert testing at=20
your airport," the red team leader says. "But I=20
would ask that you not speak to anyone on your=20
staff to alert them of this test."
The message is clear: Don't tell anyone. Testers=20
say they will scratch a test if they believe=20
anyone has been alerted. The TSA was embarrassed=20
several years ago when word of one test leaked=20
out, and an internal auditor is investigating other possible leaks.
But in Tampa, everything goes smoothly as Jason=20
steps through the metal detector portal. The=20
detector alarm goes off, as Jason expects it to,=20
not because of the nonmetallic device strapped to=20
his back but due to his metal knee.
It's the perfect tool for ensuring he gets to=20
"secondary," where more extensive searches are conducted.
Soon Jason is in a posture familiar to air=20
travelers. He is standing, legs apart, with his=20
arms extended. A screener "wands" him with a=20
hand-held metal detector, and it beeps as it=20
passes his metal knee, his necklace and the rivets on his bluejeans.
The screener then pats him down, running=20
latex-gloved hands over Jason's legs, arms and=20
torso. And he pats down Jason's back, including=20
the lower part where the device is concealed.
But Jason explains away the back support. He=20
tells the screener that he has a bum back in addition to having a metal kne=
e.
With the patdown over, the screener releases=20
Jason. He picks up his belongings and walks=20
freely into the airport, the fake bomb still fastened to his back.
TSA officials say the Tampa test demonstrates the=20
type of systemic vulnerability that the agency is=20
working to expose and address.
Screeners have cultural sensitivities toward=20
travelers' handicaps, and they are sometimes=20
hesitant to perform intrusive searches, officials=20
said. Terrorists could exploit that reluctance, they said.
The TSA screener could have used other relatively=20
unobtrusive means to check Jason's back brace. But he didn't.
After leaving the screening checkpoint, Jason=20
returns with other members of his red team and=20
informs the screener he has failed a test. A fake=20
bomb has just entered their airport.
The screener appears devastated.
The reaction is common, says Jason, adding that=20
notifying screeners of failed tests can be the toughest part of his job.
On occasions, he says, testers have appeared=20
indifferent. In those rare instances, Jason says,=20
he gets "nasty," stressing the importance of the=20
tests. The stakes are too high to tolerate indifference.
Regardless of their reactions, screeners who fail=20
to detect contraband are "pulled off the line"=20
and retrained before being allowed back.
The test CNN witnessed was conducted by the TSA's=20
Office of Inspection, which the agency calls the=20
most sophisticated of its covert tests. But there are others.
For starters, every TSA X-ray machine has a=20
Threat Image Projection system, which digitally=20
inserts images of guns, knives and bombs into the=20
X-rays of luggage, to keep screeners alert. This=20
system library contains "tens of thousands" of=20
images, said TSA spokesman Christopher White.
If screeners observe a suspicious object, they=20
can check with the simple click of a computer=20
mouse. If they detect a threat object, the=20
computer congratulates them. Successes and=20
failures are recorded for use in a screener's=20
performance evaluation and are factors in determining pay.
Some 69,929 threat image tests are conducted on=20
an average day, or more than 25 million tests per=20
year. An array of other tests also are conducted=20
to assess screeners, including the red team ones.
The TSA declines to give test results, which are=20
classified. But it says the agency is getting=20
better at finding bomb parts. And test scores=20
won't demonstrate that, it says, because as=20
success rates improve, tests are made more difficult.
"We're designing our tests not so much to=20
indicate or to show or highlight performance,"=20
says Dave Holmes, who runs the Office of=20
Inspection, "but we're highlighting where the vulnerabilities exist."
The elaborate test at the Tampa airport, Holmes=20
says, is not to identify individuals performing=20
below par. It's intended to provide data that,=20
together with other information, will reveal the whole system's performance=
.
Back at the Tampa checkpoint, a member of Jason's=20
red team is holding court with a group of=20
screeners, including the one who missed the fake bomb.
"Today ... was a scrimmage," the red team leader=20
says. "Every day, every time a passenger is=20
coming through -- that is game day."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and
Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web:
http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
We perform bug sweeps like it's a full contact sport, we take no prisoner=
s,
and we give no quarter. Our goal is to simply, and completely stop the spy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
=20
---------------------------------
Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it =
now.
--0-352272536-1201580904=:75597
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sounds like a great idea, but I'm having trouble imagining how to do it wit=
hout breaking the rules- or having the rules redefined to mean you broke th=
em afterward. <br><br>After all, if undermining con=
fidence in our glorious masters isn't tantamount to aiding the tur'rists, t=
han what is?<br><br>-hagar<br><br><br><b><i>"James M. Atkinson" <j..._at_ts=
cm.com></i></b> wrote:<blockquote class=3D"replbq" style=3D"border-left:=
2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"> <br>I t=
hink that AP or anther outlet should <br>commission a small group of say 25=
security <br>experts (5 per flight, for 5 flights) to <br>demonstrate that=
we are no more secure today as we were in 2001.<br><br>Everything would be=
done perfectly legally of <br>course, and it would be totally outside <br>=
government circles, (or more accurately performed <br>outside of what TSA i=
s expecting or able to spin <br>control). No actual threat or breaching of =
the <br>rules
would take place, but simulating the pwnage <br>of five or six commercial =
aircraft is quite simple.<br><br>y'all interested?<br><br>-jma<br><br><br><=
br><br>
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html<br><br>TSA =
tester slips mock bomb past airport security<br><br>CNN goes along with a T=
SA tester, witnesses mock bomb slip past security<br><br>Tests such as one =
in Tampa, Florida, are conducted at airports nationwide<br><br>Transportati=
on Security Administration typically keeps test results classified<br><br>B=
y Jeanne Meserve and Mike M. Ahlers<br>CNN<br><br>Editor's note: CNN's Jean=
ne Meserve and producer <br>Mike M. Ahlers recently went along with a <br>T=
ransportation Security Administration official <br>on an undercover test of=
airport screeners. Here <br>is what they witnessed. CNN agreed not to disc=
lose the name of the tester.<br><br>TAMPA, Florida (CNN) -- Jason -- that's=
the name <br>CNN was asked to call him -- slides a simulated <br>explosive=
into an
elastic back support. The mock <br>bomb is as slim as a wallet; its fuse, =
the size <br>of a cigarette. He wraps the support around his <br>torso, and=
the bomb fits comfortably into the small of his back.<br><br>It's hard to =
tell he's concealing anything; <br>harder still when he dons a black T-shir=
t and a maroon golf shirt.<br><br>Then, with CNN's cameras in tow, Jason he=
ads to <br>Tampa International Airport, where he'll try to <br>sneak the fa=
ke explosive past security screeners.<br><br>Jason, a covert tester for the=
Transportation <br>Security Administration, has been probing airport <br>w=
eaknesses for five years, beginning with big <br>mock bombs before switchin=
g to ever smaller <br>devices as the TSA adapts to evolving terrorist <br>t=
hreats. Watch the tester slip past security =BB<br><br>As jobs go, this one=
comes with its own unique <br>set of satisfactions and tribulations. Jason=
<br>wants to succeed at his task -- and he wants to <br>fail. Success is a=
measure of his
stealth, hewn <br>by 40 years in law enforcement. But failure is <br>satis=
fying too, because it means airport <br>screeners are growing more adept at=
detecting threats.<br><br>So Jason -- looking every bit the middle-aged ma=
n <br>on an uneventful trip to anywhere -- shows a <br>boarding pass and an=
ID to a TSA document <br>checker, and he is directed to a checkpoint <br>w=
here, unbeknown to the security officer on site, the real test begins.<br><=
br>He gets through, which in real life would mean a <br>terrorist was heade=
d toward a plane with a bomb.<br><br>To be clear, the TSA allowed CNN to se=
e and <br>record this test, and the agency is not concerned <br>with CNN sh=
owing it. The TSA says techniques such <br>as the one used in Tampa are kno=
wn to terrorists <br>and openly discussed on known terror Web sites.<br><br=
>Even before the September 11, 2001, terror <br>attacks, government agencie=
s deployed "red teams" <br>such as this one to look for holes in airport <b=
r>security.
The tests have resulted in a torrent of <br>reports criticizing the govern=
ment for failing to <br>staff, train, manage and equip properly the <br>scr=
eener work force, which numbers 43,000.<br><br>While test results are class=
ified and rarely leak <br>out, those that have been disclosed typically <br=
>don't inspire confidence. In tests conducted in <br>2006 and disclosed to =
USA Today last year, <br>investigators successfully smuggled 75 percent of =
<br>fake bombs through checkpoints at Los Angeles <br>International Airport=
, 60 percent through <br>Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and 20 <br>=
percent at San Francisco International Airport.<br><br>The TSA has disputed=
some test methodologies and <br>test results. But instead of running from =
tests, <br>the agency has embraced the idea that testing has <br>a value th=
at goes beyond measuring the performance of individual screeners.<br><br>Te=
sts,the TSA says, can show systemwide security <br>vulnerabilities. When us=
ed frequently
-- as was <br>the case with San Francisco in 2006 -- they can <br>heighten=
screener awareness. Tests can show areas <br>that need increased attention=
. And tests can be <br>used to determine whether terrorist plots <br>uncove=
red by intelligence agencies or being <br>discussed on terrorist Web sites =
are lunatic rants, or are plausible.<br><br>As a result, the TSA says it be=
lieves its work <br>force is the most tested in the federal <br>government,=
with checkpoint drills of various <br>sophistication occurring in every ch=
eckpoint at every airport daily.<br><br>Almost an hour before Jason approac=
hed the <br>checkpoint, a fellow red team member had gone <br>through the c=
heckpoint. It's this member's job to <br>make sure the test is conducted sa=
fely.<br><br>Five minutes before the test begins, he uses a <br>cell phone =
to call Tampa's federal security <br>director, the airport's top security o=
fficial.<br><br>"Sir, the reason we're calling today is to tell <br>you tha=
t we will be
conducting covert testing at <br>your airport," the red team leader says. =
"But I <br>would ask that you not speak to anyone on your <br>staff to aler=
t them of this test."<br><br>The message is clear: Don't tell anyone. Teste=
rs <br>say they will scratch a test if they believe <br>anyone has been ale=
rted. The TSA was embarrassed <br>several years ago when word of one test l=
eaked <br>out, and an internal auditor is investigating other possible leak=
s.<br><br>But in Tampa, everything goes smoothly as Jason <br>steps through=
the metal detector portal. The <br>detector alarm goes off, as Jason expec=
ts it to, <br>not because of the nonmetallic device strapped to <br>his bac=
k but due to his metal knee.<br><br>It's the perfect tool for ensuring he g=
ets to <br>"secondary," where more extensive searches are conducted.<br><br=
>Soon Jason is in a posture familiar to air <br>travelers. He is standing, =
legs apart, with his <br>arms extended. A screener "wands" him with a <br>h=
and-held
metal detector, and it beeps as it <br>passes his metal knee, his necklace=
and the rivets on his bluejeans.<br><br>The screener then pats him down, r=
unning <br>latex-gloved hands over Jason's legs, arms and <br>torso. And he=
pats down Jason's back, including <br>the lower part where the device is c=
oncealed.<br><br>But Jason explains away the back support. He <br>tells the=
screener that he has a bum back in addition to having a metal knee.<br><br=
>With the patdown over, the screener releases <br>Jason. He picks up his be=
longings and walks <br>freely into the airport, the fake bomb still fastene=
d to his back.<br><br>TSA officials say the Tampa test demonstrates the <br=
>type of systemic vulnerability that the agency is <br>working to expose an=
d address.<br><br>Screeners have cultural sensitivities toward <br>traveler=
s' handicaps, and they are sometimes <br>hesitant to perform intrusive sear=
ches, officials <br>said. Terrorists could exploit that reluctance, they
said.<br><br>The TSA screener could have used other relatively <br>unobtru=
sive means to check Jason's back brace. But he didn't.<br><br>After leaving=
the screening checkpoint, Jason <br>returns with other members of his red =
team and <br>informs the screener he has failed a test. A fake <br>bomb has=
just entered their airport.<br><br>The screener appears devastated.<br><br=
>The reaction is common, says Jason, adding that <br>notifying screeners of=
failed tests can be the toughest part of his job.<br><br>On occasions, he =
says, testers have appeared <br>indifferent. In those rare instances, Jason=
says, <br>he gets "nasty," stressing the importance of the <br>tests. The =
stakes are too high to tolerate indifference.<br><br>Regardless of their re=
actions, screeners who fail <br>to detect contraband are "pulled off the li=
ne" <br>and retrained before being allowed back.<br><br>The test CNN witnes=
sed was conducted by the TSA's <br>Office of Inspection, which the agency c=
alls the
<br>most sophisticated of its covert tests. But there are others.<br><br>F=
or starters, every TSA X-ray machine has a <br>Threat Image Projection syst=
em, which digitally <br>inserts images of guns, knives and bombs into the <=
br>X-rays of luggage, to keep screeners alert. This <br>system library cont=
ains "tens of thousands" of <br>images, said TSA spokesman Christopher Whit=
e.<br><br>If screeners observe a suspicious object, they <br>can check with=
the simple click of a computer <br>mouse. If they detect a threat object, =
the <br>computer congratulates them. Successes and <br>failures are recorde=
d for use in a screener's <br>performance evaluation and are factors in det=
ermining pay.<br><br>Some 69,929 threat image tests are conducted on <br>an=
average day, or more than 25 million tests per <br>year. An array of other=
tests also are conducted <br>to assess screeners, including the red team o=
nes.<br><br>The TSA declines to give test results, which are <br>classified=
. But it says
the agency is getting <br>better at finding bomb parts. And test scores <b=
r>won't demonstrate that, it says, because as <br>success rates improve, te=
sts are made more difficult.<br><br>"We're designing our tests not so much =
to <br>indicate or to show or highlight performance," <br>says Dave Holmes,=
who runs the Office of <br>Inspection, "but we're highlighting where the v=
ulnerabilities exist."<br><br>The elaborate test at the Tampa airport, Holm=
es <br>says, is not to identify individuals performing <br>below par. It's =
intended to provide data that, <br>together with other information, will re=
veal the whole system's performance.<br><br>Back at the Tampa checkpoint, a=
member of Jason's <br>red team is holding court with a group of <br>screen=
ers, including the one who missed the fake bomb.<br><br>"Today ... was a sc=
rimmage," the red team leader <br>says. "Every day, every time a passenger =
is <br>coming through -- that is game
day."<br><br><br><br>-----------------------------------------------------=
-----------------------------------------------<br> World Class, Professi=
onal, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and<br>Wiretap Detection using Sop=
histicated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment.<br>----------------------------=
------------------------------------------------------------------------<br=
> James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803<br=
> Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467<b=
r> 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web:
http://www.tscm.com/<br=
> Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com<br=
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--------------------------<br> We perform bug sweeps like it's a full cont=
act sport, we take no prisoners,<br>and we give no quarter. Our goal is to =
simply, and completely stop the
spy.<br>------------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------------------<br><br><br><br><br> <hr size=3D1>Be=
a better friend, newshound, and=20
know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. <a href=3D"
http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=3D517=
33/*
http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=3DAhu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ "> Try it =
now.</a>
--0-352272536-1201580904=:75597--
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:22 CST