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INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
_______
BOOK II
_______
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976
E. POLITICAL ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
MAJOR FINDING
The Committee finds that information has been collected and
disseminated in order to serve the purely political interests of an
intelligence agency or the administration, and to influence social
policy and political action.
Subfindings
(a) White House officials have requested and obtained politically
useful information from the FBI, including information on the
activities of political opponents or critics.
(b) In some cases, political or personal information was not
specifically requested, but was nevertheless collected and
disseminated to administration officials as part of investigations
they had requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated
in these cases between national security or law enforcement
information and purely political intelligence.
(c) The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their
staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to
curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has
assembled intelligence on its critics and on political figures it
believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
(d) The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert
efforts to influence social policy and political action.
Elaboration of Findings
The FBI's ability to gather information without effective restraints
gave it enormous power. That power was inevitably attractive to
politicians, who could use information on opponents and critics for
their own advantage, and was also an asset to the Bureau, which
depended on politicians for support. In the political arena, as in
other facets of American life touched by the intelligence community,
the existence of unchecked power led to its abuse.
By providing politically useful information to the White House and
congressional supporters, sometimes on demand and sometimes
gratuitously, the Bureau buttressed its own position in the political
structure. At the same time, the widespread -- and accurate -- belief
in Congress and the administration that the Bureau had available to
it, derogatory information on politicians and critics created what
the late Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs,
called a "fear" of the Bureau:
Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of action for men in
public life can be compromised quite as effectively by the fear of
surveillance as by the fact of surveillance. 1
Information gathered and disseminated to the White House ranged from
purely political intelligence, such as lobbying efforts on bills ail
administration opposed and the strategy of a delegate challenge at a
national political convention, to "tidbits" about the activities of
politicians and public figures which the Bureau believed "of
interest" to the recipients.
Such participation in political machinations by an intelligence
agency is totally improper. Responsibility for what amounted to a
betrayal of the public trust in the integrity of the FBI must be
shared between the officials who requested such information and those
who provided it.
The Bureau's collection and dissemination of politically useful
information was not colored by partisan considerations; rather its
effect was to entrench the Bureau's own position in the political
structure, regardless of which party was in power at the time.
However, the Bureau also used its powers to serve ideoIogical
purposes, attempting covertly to influence social policy and and
political action.
In its efforts to "protect society," the FBI engaged in activities
which necessarily affected the processes by which American citizens
make decisions. In doing so, it distorted and exaggerated facts, made
use of the mass media, and attacked the leadership of groups which it
considered threats to the social order.
Law enforcement officers are, of course, entitled to state their
opinions about what choices the people should make on contemporary
social and political issues. The First Amendment guarantees their
right to enter the marketplace of ideas and persuade their fellow
citizens of the correctness of those opinions by making speeches,
writing books, and, within certain statutory limits, supporting
political candidates. The problem lies not in the open expression of
views, but in the covert use of power or position of trust to
influence others. This abuse is aggravated by the agency's control
over information on which the public and its elected representatives
rely to make decisions.
The essence of democracy is the belief that the people must be free
to make decisions about matters of public policy. The FBI's actions
interfered with the democratic process, because attitudes within the
Bureau toward social change led to the belief that such intervention
formed a part of its obligation to protect society. When a
governmental agency clandestinely tries to impose its views of what
is right upon the American people, then the democratic process is undermined.
Subfinding (a)
White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful
information from the FBI, including personal life information on the
activities of political opponents or critics.
Presidents and White House aides have asked the FBI to provide
political or personal information on opponents and critics, including
"name checks" of Bureau files. 2 They have also asked the Bureau to
conduct electronic surveillance or more limited investigations of
such persons. The FBI appears to have complied unquestioningly with
these requests, despite occasional internal doubts about their propriety. 3
Precedents for certain political abuses go back to the very outset of
the domestic intelligence program. In 1940 the FBI complied with
President Roosevelt's request to file the names of people sending
critical telegrams to the White House. 4 There is evidence of
improper electronic surveillance for the White House in the 1940s. 5
And an aide to President Eisenhower asked the FBI to conduct a
questionable name check. 6 In 1962, the FBI complied unquestioningly
with a request from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a steel
executive and several reporters who had written stories about a
statement by the executive. 7 As part of an investigation of foreign
lobbying efforts on sugar quota legislation in 1961 and 1962,
Attorney General Kennedy requested wiretaps on a Congressional aide,
three executive officials, and two American lobbyists, including a
Washington law firm. 8
Nevertheless, the political misuse of the FBI under the Johnson and
Nixon administrations appears to have been more extensive than in
previous years.
Under the Johnson administration, the FBI was used to gather and
report political intelligence on the, administration's partisan
opponents in the last days of the 1964 and 1968 Presidential election
campaigns. In the closing days of the 1964 campaign, Presidential
aide Bill Moyers asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks" on all
persons employed in Senator Goldwater's Senate office, and
information on two staff members was reported to the White House. 9
Similarly, in the last two weeks of the 1968 campaign, the Johnson
White House requested an investigation (including indirect electronic
surveillance and direct physical surveillance) of Mrs. Anna
Chennault, a prominent Republican leader, and her relationships with
certain South Vietnamese officials. 10 This investigation also
included an FBI check of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew's
long distance telephone call records, apparently at the personal
request of President Johnson. 11
Another investigation for the Johnson White House involved executive
branch officials who took part in the criminal investigation of
former Johnson Senate aide Bobby Baker. When Baker's trial began in
1967, it was revealed that one of the government witnesses had been
"wired" to record his conversations with Baker. Presidential aide
Marvin Watson told the FBI that Johnson was quite "exercised," and
the Bureau was ordered to conduct a discreet "run down" on the former
head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division and four Treasury
Department officials who had been responsible for "wiring" the
witness. The Bureau was specifically insisted to include any
associations between those persons and Robert Kennedy. 12
Several Johnson White House requests were directed at critics of the
war in Vietnam, at newsmen, and at other opponents. According a
Bureau memorandum, White House aide Marvin Watson attempted to
disguise his, and the President's interest in such requests asking
the FBI to channel its replies through a lower level White House
staff member. 13
In 1966, Watson asked the FBI to monitor the televised hearings of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam policy and prepare
a memorandum comparing statements of the President's Senate critics
with "the Communist Party line." 14 Similarly, in 1967 when seven
Senators made statements criticizing the bombing of North Vietnam,
Watson requested (and the Bureau delivered) a "blind memorandum"
setting forth information from FBI files on each of the Senators.
Among the data supplied were the following items:
Senator Clark was quoted in the press as stating that the three major
threats to America are the military-industrial complex, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator McGovern spoke at a rally sponsored by the Chicago, Committee
for a Sane Nuclear Policy, a pacifist group. Senator McGovern stated
that the "United States was making too much of the communist
take-over of Cuba."
[Another Senator now deceased] has, on many occasions, publicly
criticized United States policy toward Vietnam. He frequently speaks
before groups throughout the United States on this subject. He has
been reported as intentionally entering into controversial areas so
that his services as a speaker for which he receives a fee, will be
in demand. 15
The Johnson administration also requested information on contacts
between members of Congress and certain foreign officials known to
oppose the United States presence in Vietnam. According to FBI
records, President Johnson believed these foreign officials had
generated "much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy,
particularly the hearings in the Senate." 16
White House requests were not limited to critical Congressmen.
Ordinary citizens who sent telegrams protesting the Vietnam war to
the White House were also the subject of Watson requests for FBI name
check reports. 17 Presidential aide Jake Jacobsen asked for name
checks on persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record as
signers of a letter to Senator Wayne Morse expressing support for his
criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy. 18 On at least one occasion, a
request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who
supplied Watson (at the latter's request) with a summary of
information on the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. 19
Other individuals who were the subject of such name check requests
under the Johnson Administration included NBC Commentator David
Brinkley, 20 Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett, 21 columnist
Joseph Kraft, 22 Life magazine Washington bureau chief Richard
Stolley, 23 Chicago Daily News Washington bureau chief Peter Lisagor,
24 and Ben W. Gilbert of the Washington Post. 25 The Johnson White
House also requested (and received) name check reports on the authors
of books critical of the Warren Commission report; some of these
reports included derogatory information about the personal lives of
the individuals. 26
The Nixon administration continued the practice of using the FBI to
produce political information. In 1969 John Ehrlichman, counsel to
President Nixon, asked the FBI to conduct a "name check" on Joseph
Duffy, chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. Data in Bureau
files covered Duffy's "handling arrangements" for an antiwar teach-in
in 1965, his position as State Coordinator of the group "Negotiation
Now" in 1967, and his activity as chairman of Connecticut Citizens
for McCarthy in 1968. 26a
Presidential aide H. R. Haldeman requested a name check on CBS
reporter Daniel Schorr. In this instance, the FBI mistakenly
considered the request to be for a full background investigation and
began to conduct interviews. These interviews made the inquiry
public. Subsequently, White House officials stated (falsely) that
Schorr was under consideration for an executive appointment. 27 In
another case, a Bureau memorandum states that Vice President Agnew
asked the FBI for information about Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, then
head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, for use in
"destroying Abernathy's credibility." 28 (Agnew has denied that he
made such a request, but agrees that he received the information.) 29
Several White House requests involved the initiation of electronic
surveillance. Apparently on the instructions of President Nixon's
aide John Ehrlichman and Director Hoover, FBI Assistant Director
William C. Sullivan arranged for the microphone surveillance of the
hotel, room of columnist Joseph Kraft while be was visiting a foreign
country. 30 Kraft was also the target of physical surveillance by the
FBI. 31 There is no record of any specific "national security"
rationale for the surveillance.
Similarly, although the "17" wiretaps were authorized ostensibly to
investigate national security "leaks," there is no record in three of
the cases of any national security claim having been advanced in
their support. Two of the targets were domestic affairs advisers at
the White House, with no foreign affairs duties and no access to
foreign policy materials. 32 A third was a White House speechwriter
who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a
reporter with background on a presidential speech concerning, not
foreign policy, but revenue sharing and welfare reform. 33
Subfinding (b)
In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically
requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to
administration officials as part of investigations they had
requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these
cases between national security or law enforcement information and
purely political intelligence.
In some instances, the initial request for or dissemination of
information was premised upon law enforcement or national security
purposes. However, pursuant to such a request, information was
furnished which obviously could serve only partisan or personal
interests. As one Bureau official summarized its attitude, the FBI
"did not decide what was political or what represented potential
strife and violence. We are an investigative agency and we passed on
all data." 34
Examples from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
administrations illustrate this failure to distinguish between
political and nonpolitical intelligence. They include, the FBI's
reports to the White House in 1956 on NAACP lobbying activities, the
intelligence about the legislative process produced by the "sugar
lobby" wiretaps in 1961-1962, the purely political data disseminated
to the White House on the credentials challenge in the 1964
Democratic Convention, and dissemination of both political and
personal information from the "leak" wiretaps in 1969-1972.
(i) The NAACP
In early 1956 Director Hoover sent the White House a memorandum
describing the "potential for violence" in the current "racial
situation". 35 Later reports to the White House, however, went far
beyond intelligence about possible violence; they included extensive
inside information about NAACP lobbying efforts, such as the following:
A report on "meetings held in Chicago" in connection with a planned
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to be held in Washington under
the sponsorship of the NAACP. 36
An extensive report on the Leadership Conference, based on the
Bureau's "reliable sources" and describing plans of Conference
delegations to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne
Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and John Bricker. The report also summarized
a speech by Roy Wilkins, other conference proceedings, and the report
of "an informant" that the United Auto Workers was a "predominant
organization" at the conference. 37
Another report on the conference included an account of what
transpired at meetings between conference delegations and Senators
Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen. 38
A report including the information that two New Jersey congressmen
would sign a petition to the Attorney General. 39
A presidential aide suggested that Hoover brief the Cabinet on
"developments in the South." 40 Director Hoover's Cabinet briefing
also included political intelligence. He covered not only the NAACP
conference, but also the speeches and political activities of
Southern Senators and Governors and the formation of the Federation
for Constitutional Government with Southern Congressmen and Governors
on its advisory board. 41
(ii) The Sugar Lobby
The electronic surveillance of persons involved in a foreign
country's lobbying activities on sugar quota legislation in
1961-1962, authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the
White House, also produced substantial political intelligence
unrelated to the activities of foreign officiaIs. 42 Such information
came from wiretaps both on foreign officials and on American
citizens, as well as from the microphone surveillance of the chairman
of the House Agriculture Committee when he met with foreign officials
in a New York hotel room. 43 The following are examples of the purely
political (and personal) by-product:
A particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working on the Senate and has
the Republicans all lined up." 44
The same lobbyist said that "he had seen two additional
representatives on the House Agriculture Committee, one of whom was
'dead set against us' and who may reconsider, and the other was
neutral and 'may vote for us.' " 45
The Agriculture Committee chairman believed "he had accomplished
nothing" and that "he had been fighting over the Rules Committee and
this had interfered with his attempt to organize." 46
The "friend" of a foreign official "was under strong pressure from
the present administration, and since the 'friend' is a Democrat, it
would be very difficult for him to present a strong front to a
Democratic Administration." 17
A lobbyist stated that Secretary of State Rusk "had received a
friendly reception by the Committee and there appeared to be no
problem with regard to the sugar bill." 48
A foreign official was reported to be in contact with two
Congressmen's secretaries "for reasons other than business." The
official asked one of the secretaries to tell the other that he
"would not be able to call her that evening" and that one of his
associates "was planning to take [the two secretaries and another
Congressional aide] to Bermuda." 49
The FBI's own evaluation of these wiretaps indicates that they
"undoubtedly ... contributed heavily to the Administration's success"
in passing the legislation it desired. 50
(iii) The 1964 Democratic Convention
Political reports were disseminated by the FBI to the White House
from the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City. These reports,
from the FBI's "special squad" at the convention, apparently resulted
from a civil disorders intelligence investigation which got out of
hand because no one was willing to shut off the partisan by-product.
51 They centered on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's
credentials challenge. Examples of the political intelligence which
flowed from FBI surveillance at the 1964 convention include the following: 52
Dr. Martin Luther King and an associate "were drafting a telegram to
President Johnson . . . to register a mild protest. According to
King, the President pledged complete neutrality regarding the
selecting of the proper Mississippi delegation to be seated at the
convention. King feels that the Credentials Committee will turn down
the Mississippi Freedom Party and that they are doing this because
the President exerted pressure on the committee along this line." 53
Another associate of Dr. King contacted a member of the MFDP who
"said she thought King should see Governor Endicott Peabody of
Massachusetts, Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City, Governor Edmund
G. (Pat) Brown of California, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, and
Governor John W. King of New Hampshire." The purpose was "to urge
them to call the White House directly and put pressure on the White
House in behalf of the MFDP." 54
"MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Governor Egan of
Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an attempt to enlist their
support. According to the MFDP spokesman, the Negro Mississippi Party
needs these two states plus California and New York for the roll call
tonight." 55
An SCLC staff member told a representative of the MFDP: "Off the
record, of course, you know we will accept the Green compromise
proposed." This referred to "the proposal of Congresswoman Edith
Green of Oregon." 56
In a discussion between Dr. King and another civil rights leader, the
question of "a Vice- Presidential nominee came up and King asked what
[the other leader] thought of Hugh [sic] Humphrey, and [the other
leader] said Hugh Humphrey is not going to get it, that Johnson needs
a Catholic ... and therefore the Vice-President will be Muskie of Maine." 57
An unsigned White House memorandum disclosing Dr. King's strategy in
connection with a meeting to be, attended by President Johnson
suggests that there was political use of these FBI reports. 58
(iv) The "17" Wiretaps.
The Nixon White House learned a substantial amount of purely
political intelligence from wiretaps to investigate "leaks" of
classified information placed on three newsmen and fourteen executive
officials during 1969-1971. 59 The following illustrate the range of
data supplied:
One of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an hour with
Senator Kennedy's Vietnam man, as Senator Kennedy is giving a speech
on the 15th." 60
Another target said that Senator Fulbright postponed congressional
hearings on Vietnam because he did not believe they would be popular
at that time. 61
A well-known television news correspondent "was very distressed over
having been 'singled out' by the Vice President." 62
A friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star planned to do
an article critical of Henry Kissinger. 63
One of the targets helped former Ambassador Sargent Shriver write a
press release criticizing a recent speech by President Nixon in which
the President "attacked" certain Congressmen. 64
One of the targets told a friend it "is clear the Administration will
win on the ABM by a two-vote margin. He said 'They've got [a Senator]
and they've got [another Senator].'." 65
A friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a Senator would "buy
a new amendment" and stated that "they" were "going to meet with"
another Senator. 66
A friend of one of the targets described a Senator as "marginal" on
the Cooper-Church Amendment and stated that another Senator might be
persuaded to support it. 67
One of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma" over the
"trade bill." 68
A friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to former President
Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator Muskie for the Presidency
as he intended to stay out of politics." 69
There is at least one clear example of the political use of such
information. After the FBI Director informed the White House that
former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford planned to write a
magazine article criticizing President Nixon's Vietnam policy, 70
White House aide Jeb Stuart Magruder advised John Ehrlichman and H.
R. Haldeman that "we are in a position to counteract this article in
any number of ways." 71 It is also significant that, after May 1970,
the FBI Director's letters summarizing the results of the wiretaps
were no longer sent to Henry Kissinger, the President's national
security advisor, but to the President's political advisor, H. R. Haldeman. 72
These four illustrations from administrations of both political
parties indicate clearly that direct channels of communication
between top FBI officials and the White House, combined with the
failure to screen out extraneous information, and coupled with overly
broad investigations in the first instance, have been sources of
flagrant political abuse of the intelligence process. 73
Subfinding (c)
The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their
staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to
curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has
assembled information on its critics and on political figures it
believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
There have been numerous instances over the past three decades where
the FBI volunteered to its superiors purely political or personal
information believed by the FBI Director to be "of interest" to them. 74
The following are examples of the information in Director Hoover's
letters under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. 75
To Major General Harry Vaughn, Military Aide to President Truman, a
report on the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to
influence the Truman administration's appointments. 76
To Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, a report from
a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper
representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing
organized crime and corrupt politicians. 77
To Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, the
advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader. 78
To Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, a report
of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold
a reception for the head of a civil rights group. 19
To Attorney General Robert Kennedy, information from a Bureau
"source" regarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the
President's personal life. 80
To Attorney General Kennedy, a summary of material in FBI files on a
prominent entertainer which the FBI Director thought "may be of interest". 81
To Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson, a summary
of data in Bureau files on the author of a play satirizing the President. 82
As these illustrations indicate, the FBI Director provided such data
to administrations of both political parties without apparent
partisan favoritism. 83
Additionally, during the Nixon Administration, the FBI's INLET
(Intelligence Letter) Program for sending regular short summaries of
FBI intelligence to the White House was used on one occasion to
provide information on the purely personal relationship between an
entertainer and the subject of an FBI domestic intelligence
investigation. 84 SACs were instructed under the INLET program to
submit to Bureau headquarters items with an "unusual twist" or
regarding "prominent" persons.
One reason for the Bureau's volunteering information to the White
House was to please the Administration and thus presumably to build
high-level political support for the FBI. Thus, a 1975 Bureau report
on the Atlantic City episode states:
One [agent said], "I would like to state that at no time did I ever
consider (it) to be a political operation but it was obvious that
DeLoach wanted to impress Jenkins and Moyers with the Bureau's
ability to develop information which would be of interest to them."
Furthermore, in response to a question as to whether the Bureau's
services were being utilized for political reasons, [another]
answered, "No. I do recall, however, that on one occasion I was
present when DeLoach held a lengthy telephone conversation with
Walter Jenkins. They appeared to be discussing the President's
'image.' At the end of the conversation DeLoach told us something to
the effect, 'that may have sounded a little political to you but this
doesn't do the Bureau any harm.'" 86
In addition to providing information useful to superiors, the Bureau
assembled information on its own critics and on political figures it
believed might influence public attitudes or congressional support.
FBI Director Hoover had massive amounts of information at his
fingertips. As indicated above, he could have the Bureau's files
checked on anyone of interest to him. He personally received
political information and "personal tidbits" from the special agents
in charge of FBI field offices. 87 This information, both from the
files and Hoover's personal sources, was available to discredit critics.
The following are examples of how the Bureau disseminated information
to discredit its opponents:
In 1949 the FBI provided Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and
Presidential aide Harry Vaughn inside information on plans of the
Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance so they would have an
opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected
criticism. 88
In 1960, when the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council in Tennessee
charged that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination, the Bureau
conducted name checks on members of the Council's board of directors
and sent the results to Attorney General William Rogers, including
derogatory personal allegations and political affiliations from as
far back as the late thirties and early forties. 89
When a reporter wrote stories critical of the Bureau, he was not only
refused any further interviews, but an FBI official in charge of
press relations also spread derogatory personal information about him
to other newsmen. 90
The Bureau also maintained a "not to contact list' of "those
individuals known to be hostile to the Bureau." Director Hoover
specifically ordered that "each name" on the list "should be the
subject of memo." 91
This request for "a memo" on each critic meant that, before someone
was placed on the list, the Director received, in effect, a "name
check" report summarizing "what we had in our files" on the individual. 92
In addition to assembling information on critics, name checks were
run as a matter of regular Bureau policy on all "newly elected
Governors and Congressmen." The Crime Records Division instructed the
field offices to submit "summary memoranda" on such officials,
covering both "public source information" and "any other information
that they had in their files." 93 These "summary memoranda" were
provided to Director Hoover and maintained in the Crime Records
Division for use in "congressional liason" -- which the Division head
said included "selling" hostile Congressmen on "liking the FBI." 94
It has been widely believed among Members of Congress that the Bureau
had information on each of them. 95 The impact of that belief led
Congressman Boggs to state:
Our apathy in this Congress, our silence in this House, our very fear
of speaking out in other forums has watered the roots and hastened
the growth of a vine of tyranny which is ensnaring that Constitution
and Bill of Rights which we are each sworn to uphold.
Our society can survive many challenges and many threats.
It cannot survive a planned and programmed fear of its own government
bureaus and agencies. 96
Subfinding (d)
The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to
influence social policy and political action.
The FBI's interference with the democratic process was not the result
of any overt decision to reshape society in conformance with
Bureau-approved norms. Rather, the Bureau's actions were the natural
consequence of attitudes within the Bureau toward social change,
combined with a strong sense of duty to protect society -- even from
its own "wrong" choices.
The FBI saw itself as the guardian of the public order, and believed
that it had a responsibility to counter threats to that order, using
any means available. 97 At the same time, the Bureau's assessment of
what constituted a "threat" was influenced by its attitude toward the
forces of change. In effect, the Bureau chose sides in the major
social movements of the last fifteen years, and then attacked the
other side with the unchecked power at its disposal.
The clearest proof of the Bureau's attitude toward change is its own
rhetoric. The language used in internal documents which were not
intended to be disseminated outside the Bureau is that of the highly
charged polemic revealing clear biases.
For example, in one of its annual internal reports on COINTELPRO, the
Bureau took pride in having given "the lie" to what it called "the
Communist canard" that "the Negro is downtrodden and has no
opportunities in America." This was accomplished by placing a story
in a newspaper in which a "wealthy Negro industrialist" stated that
"the Negro will have to earn respectability and a responsible
position in the community before he is accepted as an equal." It is
significant that this view was expressed at about the same time as
the civil rights movement's March on Washington, which was intended
to focus public attention on the denial of opportunities to black
Americans, and which rejected the view that inalienable rights have
to be "earned." 98
The rhetoric used in dealing with the Vietnam War and those in
opposition to it is even more revealing. The war in Vietnam produced
sharply divided opinions in the country; again, the Bureau knew which
side it was on. For instance, fifty copies of an article entitled
"Rabbi in Vietnam Says Withdrawal Not The Answer" were anonymously
mailed by the FBI to members of the Vietnam Day Committee to
"convince" the recipients "of the correctness of the U.S. foreign
policy in Vietnam." 99
The Bureau also ordered copies of a film called "While Brave Men Die"
which depicted "communists, left-wing and pacifist activities
associated with the so-called 'peace movement' or student agitational
demonstrations in opposition to the United States position in
Vietnam." The film was to be used for training Bureau personnel in
connection with "increased responsibilities relating to communist
inspired student agitational activities." 100
In the same vein, a directive to the Chicago field office shortly
after the 1968 Democratic Convention instructed it to "obtain all
possible evidence" that would "disprove" charges that the Chicago
police used undue force in dealing with antiwar demonstrations at the
Convention:
Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces
on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago
surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police
and organized law enforcement agencies.... We should be mindful of
this situation and develop all possible evidence to expose this
activity and to refute these false allegations. 101
The Bureau also attempted to enforce its view of sexual morality. For
example, two students became COINTELPRO targets when they defended
the use of a four-letter word, even though the demonstration in which
they participated "does not appear to be inspired by the New Left,"
because it "shows obvious disregard for decency and established
morality." 102 An anonymous letter purportedly from an irate parent
and an article entitled "Free Love Comes to Austin" were mailed to a
state senator and the chairman of the University of Texas Board of
Regents to aid in "forcing the University to take action against
those administrators who are permitting an atmosphere to build up on
campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left." 103 And a
field office was outraged at the distribution on campus of a
newspaper called SCREW, which was described as "containing a type of
filth that could only originate in a depraved mind. It is
representative of the type of mentality that is following the New
Left theory of immorality on certain college campuses." 104
As these examples demonstrate, the FBI believed it had a duty to
maintain the existing social and political order. Whether or not one
agrees with the Bureau's views, it is profoundly disturbing that an
agency of the government secretly attempted to impose its views on
the American people.
(i) Use of the Media
The FBI attempted to influence public opinion by supplying
information or articles to "confidential sources" in the news media.
The FBI's Crime Records Division 105 was responsible for covert
liaison with the media to advance two main domestic intelligence
objectives: 106
(1) providing derogatory information to the media intended to
generally discredit the activities or ideas of targeted groups or
individuals; and (2) disseminating unfavorable articles, news
releases, and background information in order to disrupt particular
activities.
Typically, a local FBI agent would provide information to a "friendly
news source" on the condition "that the Bureau's interest in these
matters is to be kept in the strictest confidence." 107 Thomas E.
Bishop, former Director of the Crime Records Division, testified that
he kept a list of the Bureau's "press friends" in his desk. 108
Bishop and one of his predecessors indicated that the FBI sometimes
refused to cooperate with reporters critical of the Bureau or its
Director. 109
Bishop stated that as a "general rule," the Bureau disseminated only
"public record information" to its media contacts, but this category
was viewed by the Bureau to include any information which could
conceivably be obtained by close scrutiny of even the most obscure
publications. 110
Within these parameters, background information supplied to reporters
"in most cases [could] include everything" in the Bureau files on a
targeted individual; the selection of information for publication
would be left to the reporter's judgment. 111
There are numerous examples of authorization for the preparation and
dissemination of unfavorable information to discredit generally the
activities and ideas of a target; 112
-- FBI headquarters solicited information from field offices "on a
continuing basis" for "prompt ... dissemination to the news media ...
to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." Headquarters
requested, among other things, that:
specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and
depraved nature of many of the characters, activities, habits and
living conditions representative of New Left adherents.
Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible
embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored." 113
-FBI headquarters authorized a Field Office to furnish a media
contact with "background information and any arrest record" on a man
affiliated with "a radical New Left element" who had been "active in
showing films on the Black Panthers and police in action at various
universities during student rioting." The media contact had requested
material from the Bureau which "would have a detrimental effect on
[the target's] activities." 114
-- Photographs depicting a radical group's apartment as "a shambles
with lewd, obscene and revolutionary slogans displayed on the walls"
were furnished to a free-lance writer. The directive from
headquarters said: "As this publicity will be derogatory in nature
and might serve to neutralize the group, it is being approved." 115
-- The Boston Field Office was authorized to furnish "derogatory
information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source
[name excised]":
Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are good.
Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for violence, preaching of
race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be exposed. Material furnished
[name] should be either public source or known to enough people as to
protect your sources. Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is
completely protected by [name]. 116
One Bureau-inspired documentary on the NOI reached an audience of
200,000. 117 Although the public was to be convinced that the NOI was
"violent", the Bureau knew this was not in fact true of the
organization as a whole. 118
-- The Section which supervised the. COINTELPRO against the Communist
Party intended to discredit a couple "identified with the Community
Party movement" by preparing a news release on the drug arrest of
their son, which was to be furnished to "news media contacts and
sources on Capitol Hill." A Bureau official observed that the son's
"arrest and the Party connections of himself and his parents presents
an excellent opportunity for exploitation.'' The news release noted
that "the Russian-born mother is currently under a deportation order"
and had a former marriage to the son of a prominent Communist Party
member. The release added: "the Red Chinese have long used narcotics
to help weaken the youth of target countries." 119
-- When the wife of a Communist Party leader purchased a new car, the
FBI prepared a news item for distribution to "a cooperative news
media source" mocking the leader's "prosperity" "as a disruptive
tactic." The item commented sarcastically that "comrades of the
self-proclaimed leader of the American working class should not allow
this example of [the leader's] prosperity to discourage their
continued contributions to Party coffers." 120
-- After a public meeting in New York City, where "the handling of
the [JFK assassination] investigation was criticized," the FBI
prepared a news item for placement "with a cooperative news media
source" to discredit the meeting on the grounds that "a reliable
[FBI] source" had reported a "convicted perjurer and identified
espionage agent as present in the audience." 121
-- As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, the FBI sent a letter under a
fictitious name to Life magazine to "call attention to the unsavory
character" of the editor of an underground magazine, who was
characterized as "one of the moving forces behind the Youth
International Party, commonly known as the Yippies." To counteract a
recent Life "article favorable" to the Yippie editor, the FBI's
fictitious letter said that "the cuckoo editor of an unimportant
smutty little rag" should be "left in the sewers." 122
Much of the Bureau's use of the media to influence public opinion was
directed at disrupting specific activities or plans of targeted
groups or individuals:
-- In March 1968, FBI Headquarters granted authority for furnishing
to a "cooperative national news media source" an article "designed to
curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising" for the poor
people's march on Washington, D.C. by asserting that "an
embarrassment of riches has befallen King . . . and King doesn't need
the money." 123 To further this objective, Headquarters authorized
the Miami Office "to furnish data concerning money wasted by the Poor
People's Campaign" to a friendly news reporter on the usual condition
that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source." 124
The Section Chief in charge of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO also
recommended that "photographs of demonstrators" at the march should
be furnished; he attached six photographs of Poor People's Campaign
participants at a Cleveland rally, accompanied by the note: "These
show the militant, aggressive appearance of the participants and
might be of interest to a cooperative news source." 125
-As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, authority was granted to the
Atlanta Field Office to furnish a newspaper editor who had "written
numerous editorials praising the Bureau" with "information to
supplement that already known to him from public sources concerning
subversive influences in the Atlanta peace movement. His use of this
material in well-timed articles would be used to thwart the
[upcoming] demonstrations." 126
-- An FBI Special Agent in Chicago contacted a reporter for a major
newspaper to arrange for the publication of an article which was
expected to "greatly encourage factional antagonisms during the SDS
Convention" by publicizing the attempt of "an underground communist
organization" to take over SDS. This contact resulted in an article
headlined "Red Unit Seeks SDS Rule." 127
-- FBI Director Hoover approved a Field Office plan "to get
cooperative news media to cover closed meetings of Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS) and other New Left groups" with the aim of
"disrupting them." 128
-- Several months after COINTELPRO operations were supposed to have
terminated, the FBI attempted to discredit attorney Leonard Boudin at
the time of his defense of Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers
case. The FBI "called to the attention" of the Washington bureau
chief of a major news service information on Boudin's alleged
"sympathy" and "legal services" for "communist causes." The reporter
placed a detailed news release on the wires which cited Boudin's
"identification with Leftist causes" and included references to the
arrest of Boudin's daughter, his legal representation of the Cuban
government and "Communist sympathizer" Paul Robeson, and the
statement that "his name also has been connected with a number of
other alleged communist front groups." In a handwritten note, J.
Edgar Hoover directed that copies of the news release be sent to
"Haldeman, A. G., and Deputy." 129
The Bureau sometimes used its media contacts to prevent or postpone
the publication of articles it considered favorable to its targets or
unfavorable to the FBI. For example, to influence articles which
related to the FBI, the Bureau took advantage of a close relationship
with a high official of a major national magazine, described in an
FBI memorandum as "our good friend." Through this relationship, the
FBI "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" written
by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation; "postponed
publication" of an article on another FBI case; "forestalled
publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and
received information about proposed editing of King's articles. 130
The Bureau also attempted to influence public opinion by using news
media sources to discredit dissident groups by linking them to the
Communist Party:
-- A confidential source who published a "self -described
conservative weekly newspaper" was anonymously mailed information on
a church's sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on
Un-American activities. This prompted an article entitled "Locals to
Aid Red Line," naming the minister, among others, as a local sponsor
of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot" to abolish HUAC. 131
-- The Bureau targeted a professor who had been the president of a
local peace center, a "coalition of anti-Vietnam and anti-draft
groups." In 1968, he resigned temporarily to become state chairman of
Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign organization. Information on
the professor's wife, who had apparently associated with Communist
Party members in the early 1950's, was furnished to a newspaper
editor to "expose those people at this time when they are receiving
considerable publicity in order" to "disrupt the members" of the
peace organization. 132
-- Other instances included an attempt to link a school boycott with
the Communists by alerting newsmen to the boycott leader's plans to
attend a literary reception at the Soviet mission; 133 furnishing
information to the media on the participation of the Communist Party
presidential candidate in the United Farm Workers' picket line; 134
"confidentially" informing established sources in three northern
California newspapers that the San Francisco County Communist Party
Committee had stated that civil rights groups were to "begin working"
on the area's large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater
employment of Negroes;" 135 and furnishing information to the media
on Socialist Workers Party participation in the Spring Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "discredit" the antiwar group. 136
(ii) Attacks on Leaders
Through covert propaganda, the FBI not only attempted to influence
public opinion on matters of social policy, but also directly
intervened in the people's choice of leadership both through the
electoral process and in other, less formal arenas.
For instance, the Bureau made plans to disrupt a possible "Peace
Party" ticket in the 1968 elections. One field office noted that
"effectively tabbing as communists or as communist-backed the more
hysterical opponents of the President on the Vietnam question in the
midst of the presidential campaign would be a real boon to Mr. Johnson." 137
In the FBI's COINTELPRO programs, political candidates were targeted
for disruption. The document which originated the Socialist Workers
Party COINTELPRO noted that the SWP "has, over the past several
years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis
through running candidates for public office." The Bureau decided to
"alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another
socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx,
Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." Several SWP
candidates were targeted, usually by leaking derogatory information
about the candidate to the press. 138
Other COINTELPRO programs also included attempts to disrupt
campaigns. For example, a Midwest lawyer running for City Council was
targeted because he and his firm had represented "subversives". The
Bureau sent an anonymous letter to several community leaders which
decried his "communist background" and labelled him a "Charlatan."
139 Under a fictitious name, the Bureau sent a letter to a television
on which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of questions
about his clients and his activities which it believed should be
asked. 140 The candidate was defeated. He later ran (successfully, as
it happened) for a judgeship. The Bureau attempted to disrupt this
subsequent, successful campaign for a judgeship by using an
anticommunist group to distribute fliers and write letters opposing
his candidacy. 141
In another instance, the FBI attempted to have a Democratic Party
fundraising affair raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission. The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the
candidates who would be present. One, a state assemblyman running for
reelection, was active in the Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the
Democratic candidate for Congress, had been a sponsor of the National
Committee to Abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities
and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture of napalm bombs. 142
Although the disruption of election campaigns is the clearest
example, the FBI's interference, with the political process was much
broader. For example, all of the COINTELPRO programs were aimed at
the leadership of dissident groups. 143
In one case, the Bureau's plans to discredit a civil rights leader
included an attempt to replace him with a candidate chosen by the
Bureau. During 1964, the FBI began a massive program to discredit Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and to "neutralize" his effectiveness as the
leader of the civil rights movement. 144 On January 8, 1964,
Assistant Director William C. Sullivan proposed that the FBI select a
new "national Negro leader" as Dr. King's successor after the Bureau
had taken Dr. King "off his pedestal":
When this is done, and it can and will be done . . . the Negroes will
be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling
personality to steer them in the right direction. This is what could
happen, but need not happen if the right kind of Negro leader could
at this time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr. King and
be in the position to assume the role of leadership of the Negro
people, when King has been completely discredited.
I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in
any way became involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader to
overshadow Martin Luther King.... But I do propose that I be given
permission to explore further this entire matter....
If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way
becoming directly involved, I think it would not only be a great help
to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large. While
I am not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which
the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and
development. There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be
very helpful to further such a step . . . . 145
The Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr. King are discussed more fully
elsewhere. 146 It is, however, important to note here that some of
the Bureau's efforts coincided with Dr. King's activities and
statements concerning major social and political issues.
(iii) Exaggerating The Threat
The Bureau also used its control over the infomiation-gathering
process to shape the views of government officials and the public on
the threats it perceived to the social order. For example, the FBI
exaggerated the strength of the Communist Party and its influence
over the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements.
Opponents of civil rights legislation in the early 1960s had charged
that such legislation was "a part of the world Communist conspiracy
to divide and conquer our country from within." The truth or falsity
of these charges was a matter of concern to the administration,
Congress, and the public. Since the Bureau was assigned to compile
intelligence on Communist activity, its estimate was sought and,
presumably, relied upon. Accordingly, in 1963, the Domestic
Intelligence Division submitted a memorandum to Director Hoover
detailing the CPUSA's "efforts" to exploit black Americans, which it
concluded were an "obvious failure." 147
Director Hoover was not pleased with this conclusion. He sent a sharp
message back to the Division which, according to the Assistant
Director in charge, made it "evident that we had to change our ways
or we would all be out on the street." 148 Another memorandum was
'therefore written to give the Director "what Hoover wanted to hear." 149
The memorandum stated, "The Director is correct;" it called Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. "the most dangerous Negro of the future in
this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national
security;" and it concluded that it was "unrealistic" to "limit
ourselves" to "legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evidence"
that the Communist Party wields "substantial influence over Negroes
which one day could become decisive." 150
Although the Division still had not said the influence was decisive,
by 1964 the Director testified before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee that the "Communist influence" in the "Negro movement"
was "vitally important." "I Only someone with access to the
underlying information would note that the facts could be interpreted
quite differently. 151a
A similar exaggeration occurred in some of the Bureau's statements on
communist influence on the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations.
In April 1965 President Johnson met with Director Hoover to discuss
Johnson's "concern over the anti-Vietnam situation." According to
Hoover, Johnson said he had "no doubt" that Communists were "behind
the disturbances." 152 Hoover agreed, stating that upcoming
demonstrations in eighty-five cities were being planned by the
Students for a Democratic Society and that SDS was "largely
infiltrated by communists and [it] has been woven into the civil
rights situation which we know has large communist influence." 153
Immediately after the meeting, however, Hoover told his associates
that the Bureau might not be able to "technically state" that SDS was
"an actual communist organization." The FBI merely knew that there
were "communists in it." Hoover instructed, however, "What I want to
get to the President is the background with emphasis upon the
communist influence therein so that he will know exactly what the
picture is." The Director added that he wanted "a good, strong
memorandum" pinpointing that the demonstrations had been "largely
participated in by communists even though they may not have initiated
them;" the Bureau could "at least" say that they had "joined and
forced the issue." According to the Director, President Johnson was
"quite concerned" and wanted "prompt and quick action." 154
Once again, the Bureau wrote a report which made Communist "efforts"
sound like Communist success. The eight page memorandum detailed all
of the Communist Party's attempts to "encourage" domestic dissent by
"a crescendo of criticism aimed at negating every effort of the
United States to prevent Vietnam from being engulfed by communist
aggressors." Twice in the eight pages, for a total of two and a half
sentences, it was pointed out that most demonstrators were not Party
members and their decisions were not initiated or controlled by the
communists. Each of these brief statements moreover, was followed by
a qualification: (1) "however, the Communist Party, USA ... has
vigorously supported these groups and exerted influence;" (2) "While
the March [on Washington] was not Communist initiated ... Communist
Party members from throughout the nation participated." [Emphasis added.] 155
The rest of the memorandum is an illustration of what former
Assistant Director Sullivan called "interpretive" memo writing in
which Communist efforts and desires are emphasized without an
evaluation of whether they had been or were likely to be successful.
The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI and
White House staff members relying on FBI reports, 156 could only have
had the effect of reinforcing President Johnson's original tendency
to discount dissent against the Vietnam War as "Communist inspired"
-- a belief shared by his successor. 157 It is impossible to measure
the full effect of this distorted perception at the very highest
policymaking level.
Footnotes:
1 Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol.
117, Part 9, P. 11565.
2 A "name check" is not an investigation, but a search of existing
FBI files through the use of the Bureau's comprehensive general name
index. Requests for FBI "name checks" were peculiarly damaging
because no new investigation was done to verify allegations stored
away for years in Bureau files. A former FBI official responsible for
compliance with such requests said that the Bureau "answered ... by
furnishing the White House every piece of information in our files on
the individuals requested." Deposition of Thomas E. Bishop, former
Assistant Director, Crime Records Division, 12/2/75, p. 144.)
3 Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach, who was FBI liaison with the
White House during part of the Johnson administration, has stated, "I
simply followed Mr. Hoover's instructions in complying with White
House requests and I never asked any questions of the White House as
to what they did with the material afterwards." (DeLoach deposition,
11/25/75, p. 28.) On at least one occasion, when a White House aide
indicated that President Johnson did not want any record made by the
FBI of a request for a "run-down" on the links between Robert Kennedy
and officials involved in the Bobby Baker investigation, the Bureau
disregarded the order. DeLoach stated that he "ignored the specific
instructions" in this instance because he "felt that any instructions
we received from the White House should be a matter of record."
(DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 89.)
Former Assistant Director Bishop stated, "Who am I to ask the
President of the United States what statutory basis he has if he
wants to know what Information is in the files of the FBI?" It was a
"proper dissemination" because it was "not a dissemination outside
the executive branch" and because there was "no law, no policy of the
Department of Justice. . . . no statute of the United States that
says that was not permissible." But even if there had been a statute
laying down standards, Bishop said "it wouldn't have made a bit of
difference . . . when the Attorney General or the President asks for it."
Bishop recalled from his "own knowledge" instances where President
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon had "called over and asked Mr. Hoover for
a memo on certain people." (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 153-154.)
4 Memoranda from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to
Hoover, 5/21/40 and 6/17/40.
5 FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 3/26/76; See pp. 36-37.
6 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to
the President, 4/13/54.
7 Courtney Evans deposition, 12/1/75, p. 39.
8 See pp. 64-65. The tap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on
another high executive official was not related to political
considerations, nor apparently was the tap authorized by Attorney
General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anti-communist
newsletter who had published a book alleging impropriety by Robert
Kennedy a year earlier.
9 Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary
memorandum, 1/31/75.
10 Bureau files indicate that the apparent "reason" for the "White
House interest" was to determine "whether the South Vietnamese had
secretly been in touch with supporters of Presidential candidate
Nixon, possibly through Mrs. Chennault, as President Johnson was
apparently suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to
sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the
election and then take a harder line towards North Vietnam." (FBI
memorandum, subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault. 2/1/75.) The FBI has
claimed that its investigation of Mrs. Chennault was "consistent with
FBI responsibilities to determine if her activities were in violation
of certain provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of
the Neutrality Act."
Direct electronic surveillance of Mrs. Chennault was rejected,
according to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum, because FBI executive
Cartha DeLoach pointed out that "it was widely known that she was
involved in Republican political circles and, if it became known that
the FBI was surveilling her this would put us in a most untenable and
embarrassing position." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 10/30/68.)
Electronic surveillance was, however, directed at the South
Vietnamese officials and was approved by Attorney General Ramsey
Clark. Clark has testified that he did not know of the physical
surveillance aspect of the FBI's investigation, but that he did
authorize the electronic surveillance of the South Vietnamese
officials. (Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 252.)
11 FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated that a White House aide
made the initial request for the check of telephone company records
late one night. According to DeLoach, the request was "to find out
who, either Mr. Agnew or Mr. Nixon, when they had been in Albuquerque
(New Mexico) several days prior to that, had called from Albuquerque
while they were there." When DeLoach refused to contact the telephone
company "late in the evening," President Johnson "came on the phone
and proceeded to remind me that he was Commander in Chief and he
should get what he wanted, and he wanted me to do it immediately."
DeLoach then talked with Director Hoover, who told him to "stand your
ground." The next day, however, Hoover ordered that the records be
checked, but the only calls identified were "made by Mr. Agnew's
staff." These wore reported to the White House. (DeLoach Deposition.
11/25/75, pp. 74-7.5.) Agnew's arrival and departure times in and out
of Albuquerque were also "verified at the request of the White
House." (FBI summary memorandum. subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault, 2/1/75).
12 FBI Director Hoover brought the matter to the attention of the
White House in a letter describing why the FBI had refused to "wire"
the witness (there was not adequate "security") and how the Criminal
Division had then used the Bureau of Narcotics to do so. (Memorandum
from Hoover to Watson, 1/12/67.) This was the instance where FBI
executive Cartha DeLoach made a record, after Watson told him that
"the President does not want any record made." (Memorandum from
DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67; see also FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)
13 According to this memorandum, Watson told Cartha DeLoach in 1967
that "he and the President" wanted all "communications addressed to
him by the Director" to be addressed instead to a lower level White
House staff member. Watson told DeLoach that the "reason for this
change" was that the staff member "did not have the direct connection
with the President that he had and, consequently, people who saw such
communications would not suspicion (sic) that Watson or the President
had requested such information, nor were interested in such
information." (memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 3/17/67.)
14 FBI summary memorandum, subject: Coverage of Television
Presentation, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1/31/75. Former FBI
executive Cartha DeLoach has stated, regarding this incident. "We
felt that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the FBI, but obviously
Mr. Hoover felt that this was a request by the President and he
desired it to be done." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 58.)
15 Blind FBI memorandum, 2/10/67.
16 President Johnson's request also went beyond "legislators," and
included contacts by any "prominent U.S. citizens." (FBI summary
memorandum, subject: Information Concerning Contacts Between [Certain
Foreign officials] and Members or Staff of the United States Congress
Furnished to the White House at the Request of the President,
2/3/75.) The FBI's reports indicated that its information came
"through coverage" of the foreign officials and that the Bureau, in
this case, had "conducted no investigation of members of Congress."
(FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.) FBI "coverage" apparently included
electronic surveillance.
President Nixon also requested information on contacts between
foreign officials and Congressmen, but his request does not appear to
have related to Presidential critics. Rather, the Nixon request grew
out of concern about "an increase in [foreign] interest on Capitol
Hill" which had been expressed to President Nixon by at least one
Senator; and the FBI's report "included two examples of [foreign]
intelligence initiatives directed against Capitol Hill without
identifying the [foreigners] or American involved." (FBI summary
memorandum, 2/3/75.)
17 Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 6/4/65 and 7/30/65.
18 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/15/66, citing Jacobsen request.
19 Memorandum from Clark to Watson, 4/8/67, enclosing memorandum from
Director, FBI to the Attorney General. 4/7/67. (LBJ Library.)
20 Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 2/15/65 and 5/29/65.
21 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/22/65.
22 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/27/67.
23 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.
24 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 2/24/66.
25 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.
26 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 11/8/66; DeLoach, 12/3/75,
Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 180-182.
26a Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69;
letter from Clarence M. Kelly to Joseph Duffy, 7/14/75, enclosing FBI
records transmitted under Freedom of Information Act.
27 House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Book VII, White House
Surveillance Activities (1974), p. 1111.
28 According to Director Hoover's memorandum of the conversation,
Agnew asked Hoover for "some assistance" in obtaining information
about Rev. Abernathy. Hoover recorded: "The Vice President said he
thought he was going to have to start destroying Abernathy's
credibility, so anything I can give him would be appreciated. I told
him I would be glad to." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et a],
5/18/70.) Subsequently, the FBI Director sent Agnew a report on Rev.
Abernathy containing not only the by-product of Bureau
investigations, but also derogatory public record information.
(Letter from Hoover to Agnew, 5/19/70.)
29 Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.
30 Memoranda from Sullivan to Hoover, 6/30/69 and 7/2/69.
31 Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 11/5/69. The Kraft
surveillance Is also discussed in Part II, pp. 121-122.
32 Coverage in these two cases was requested by neither Henry
Kissinger nor Alexander Haig (as most of the "17" were), but by other
White House officials. Attorney General Mitchell approved the first
at the request of "higher authority." (Memorandum from Hoover to
Mitchell, 7/23/69.) The second was specifically requested by H. R.
Haldeman. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 12/14/70.
33 This tap was also apparently requested by White House officials
other than Kissinger or Haig. (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach,
8/1/69.) The "17" wiretaps are also discussed at p. 122.
34 DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6. p. 180.
35 Memorandum from Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to
the President. 1/3/56. This report was also provided to the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Defense. and military intelligence.
36 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/2/56.
37 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson. 3/5/56.
38 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.
39 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/7/56. A National Security
Council staff member responsible for Internal security matters
summarized these reports as providing information "regarding attempts
being made by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People to send instructed delegations to high-ranking Government
officials 'to tactfully draw out their positions concerning civil
rights."' (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 3/6/56.)
40 After consulting the Attorney General, this aide advised the
Secretary to the Cabinet that the FBI had "reported developments in
recent weeks in several southern States, indicating a marked
deterioration in relationships between the races, and in some
instances fomented by communist or communist-front organizations."
(Memorandum from Anderson to Maxwell Rabb, 1/16/56.) The Secretary to
the Cabinet, who had "experience in handling minority matters" for
the White House, agreed that "each Cabinet Member should be equipped
with the plain facts." (Memorandum from Rabb to Anderson, 1/17/56.) A
National Security Council staff member who handled internal security
matters reported shortly thereafter that the FBI Director was
"prepared to brief the Cabinet along the general lines" of his
written communications to the White House. (Memorandum from J.
Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 2/1/56.)
41 Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the
Attorney General, 3/9/56, enclosing FBI memorandum described as the
"basic statement" used by the Director "in the Cabinet Briefing this
morning on Racial Tension and Civil Rights.'' For a further
discussion of the exaggeration of Communist influence on the NAACP in
this briefing, see pp. 250-257, note 151a.
42 The electronic surveillances were generally related to foreign
affairs concerns. See pp. 64 - 65.
43 The Americans include three Agriculture Department officials, the
secretary to the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, and two
registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. For Attorney
General Kennedy's relationship to the microphone surveillance of the
Congressman, see p. 61, note 233. One of the wiretaps directed at a
registered lobbying agent was placed on the office telephone of a
Washington law firm. (See p. 201)
44 FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
45 FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
46 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61. This
information came from the Bureau's "coverage" (by microphone
surveillance) of the Congressman's hotel room meeting.
47 FBI memorandum, 2/15/62.
48 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
49 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
50 Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.
According to a Bureau memorandum of a meeting between Attorney
General Kennedy and FBI Assistant Director Courtney Evans, Kennedy
stated in April 1961 that "now the law has passed he did not feel
there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation."
(Memorandum from Evans to Parsons, 4/15/61.)
51 There is no clear evidence as to what President Johnson had in
mind when, as a contemporaneous FBI memorandum indicates, he directed
"the assignment of the special squad to Atlantic City." (DeLoach to
Mohr 8/29/64) Cartha DeLoach has testified that Presidential aide
Walter Jenkins made the original request to him, but that he said it
should be discussed with Director Hoover and that "Mr. Jenkins or the
President, to the best of my recollection, later called Mr. Hoover
and asked that this be done." DeLoach claimed that the purpose was to
gather "intelligence concerning matters of strife, violence, etc."
which might arise out of the credentials challenge. (DeLoach,
12/3/75. hearings, Vol. 6, p. 175.)
52 The operations of the FBI in Atlantic City are described in
greater detail in Section II, pp. 117-119.
53 Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins. 8/24/64.
54 Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
55 Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
56 Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
57 Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
58 Blind memorandum from LBJ Library bearing handwritten date 8/26/64
and the typewritten date 8/19/64, Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 68-2, p. 713.
59 In at least two instances. the wiretaps continued on targets after
they left the Executive Branch and became advisers to Senator Edmund
Muskie, then the leading Democratic prospect for the Presidency. See
Part II, p. 122.
60 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 10/9/69.
61 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 12/3/69.
62 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 2/26/70.
63 Memorandum from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/2/70.
64 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman. 9/4/70.
65 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 7/18/69.
66 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 5/18/70.
67 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 6/23/70.
68 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 11/24/70.
69 Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 12/22/70.
70 Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 12/29/69.
71 Memorandum from Magruder to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 1/15/70.
Ehrlichman advised Haldeman, "This is the kind of early warning we
need more ofyour game planners are now in an excellent position to
map anticipatory action." (Memorandum from "E" (Ehrlichman) to "H"
(Haldeman), undated.) Haldeman responded, "I agree with John's point.
Let's get going." (Memorandum from "H" to "M" (Magruder), undated).
72 Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 147.
73 It should be noted, however, that in at least one case the Bureau
did distinguish between political and non-political information. In
1968, when an aide to Vice President Humphrey asked that a "special
squad" be sent to the Demoeratic National Convention in Chicago,
Director Hoover not only declined, but he also specifically
instructed the SAC in Chicago not "to get into anything political"
but to confine his reports to "extreme action or violence."
(Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson., et al, 8/15/68.) There were no
comparable instructions at Atlantic City.
74 Former Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled in his
autobiography how J. Edgar Hoover shared with him some of the
"intimate details" of what his fellow Cabinet members did and said,
"their likes and dislikes, their weaknesses and their associations."
Biddle confessed that he enjoyed hearing these derogatory and
sometimes "embarrassing" tidbits and that Hoover "knew how to flatter
his superior." (Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority [Garden City:
Doubleday, 1962], pp. 258-259.)
A former FBI official has described one aspect of the Bureau's practice:
"Mr. Hoover would say what do we have in our files on this guy? Just
what do we have? Not blind memorandum, not public source information,
everything we've got. And we would maybe write a 25 page memo. When
he got it and saw what's in it, he'd say we'd better send that to the
White House and the Attorney General so they can have in one place
everything that the FBI has now on this guy. . . . (Bishop
deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 141-142.)"
75 None of these letters indicate that they were in response to
requests, as is the case with other similar letters examined by the
Committee. All were volunteered as matters which Director Hoover
considered to be "of interest" to the recipients.
76 Memorandum from Hoover to Vaughn, 2/15/47.
77 Memorandum from Hoover to Connelly, 1/27/50.
78 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 4/21/55.
79 Memorandum from Hoover to Cutler, 2/13/58.
80 Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 11/20/63.
81 Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 2/10/61.
82 Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.
83 For additional examples, See Section II, pp. 51-53.
84 Staff memorandum: Review of INLET letters, 11/18/75.
85 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/26/69.
86 Memorandum from Bassett to Callahan, 1/29/75.
87 Former FBI official Mark Felt has stated that the SAC's could have
sent personal letters to Hoover containing such "personal tidbits"
"to curry favor with him," and on one occasion he did so himself with
respect to a "scandalous" incident. (W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, p. 91.)
The following excerpt from one SAC's letter is an example of
political information fed to the Director: "I have heard several
comments and items which I wanted to bring to your attention. As I
imagine is true in all States at this time, the political situation
in [this state] is getting to be very interesting. As you know,
Senator [deleted] is coming up for re-election as is Representative
[deleted]. For a long time it appeared that [the Senator] would have
no opposition amount to anything in his campaign for re-election. The
speculation and word around the State right now is that probably [the
Representative] will file for the U.S. Senate seat now held by [the
Senator]. I have also been informed that [the Senator's] forces have
offered [the Representative] $50,000 if he will stay out of the
Senate race and run for re-election as Congressman." (Letter from SAC
to Hoover, 5/20/64.)
88 Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49;
letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 1/14/50.
89 Memorandum from Hoover to Rogers, 5/25/60.
90 Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 211. Bishop stated that he acted on
his own, rather than at the direction of higher Bureau executives.
However, Director Hoover did have a memorandum prepared on the
reporter summarizing everything in the Bureau's files about him,
which he referred to when he met with the reporter's superiors.
(Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 215.)
91 Memorandum from Executives Conference to Hoover, 1/4/50. Early
examples included historian Henry Steele Commager, "personnel of
CBS," and former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. (Memorandum from
Mohr to Tolson, 12/21/49.) By the time it was abolished in 1972, the
list included 332 names, including mystery writer Rex Stout, whose
novel 'The Doorbell Rang" had "presented a highly distorted and most
unfavorable picture of the Bureau." (Memorandum from M. A. Jones to
Bishop, 7/11/72.)
92 Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 207.
93 The field office was also expected to send to headquarters any
additional allegations about the Congressman or Governor which might
come to its attention in future investigations, even if the
Congressman or Governor was not himself the "subject" of the
investigation. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 194-200.)
94 Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 206-7.
95 The FBI is not the only agency believed to have files on
Congressmen. According to Rep. Andrew Young, "in the freshman
orientation" of new House members, "one of the things you are told is
that there are seven agencies that keep files on private lives of
Congressmen." (Rep. Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, P. 48.)
96 Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, House of Representatives, 4/22/71,
Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part 9, p. 11562.
97 The means used are discussed in the finding on "Covert Action to
Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups", as well as the Detailed
Reports on COINTELPRO, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black
Panther Party.
98 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, et al., 8/13/63.
99 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/11/65
100 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office et al., 3/9/66.
101 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Chicago Field Office 8/28/68.
102 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
103 Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field
Office, 8/27/68.
104 The field office also disapproved of the "hippy types"
distributing the newspaper, with their "unkempt clothes", "wild
beards", and "other examples of their nonconformity". Accordingly, an
anonymous letter was sent to a state legislator protesting the
distribution of such "depravity" at a state university, noting that
"this is becoming a way of campus life. Poison the minds of the
young, destroy their moral being, and in less than one generation
this country will be ripe for its downfall." (Memorandum from New
York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69; memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 1/69.
105 The Crime Records Division also had responsibility for
disseminating information to cultivate a favorable public image for
the FBI -- a practice common to many government agencies. This
objective was pursued in various ways. One section of the Crime
Records Division was assigned to assemble "material that was needed
for a public relations program." This section "developed information
for television shows, for writers, for authors, for newspapermen,
people who wanted in-depth information concerning the FBI." The
section also "handled scripts" for public service radio programs
produced by FBI Field Offices; reviewed scripts for television and
radio shows dealing with the FBI; and handled the "public relations
and publicity aspect" of the "ten most wanted fugitives program." The
Bureau attempted to assert control over media presentations of
information about its activities. For example, Director Hoover's
approval was necessary before the Crime Records Division would
cooperate with an author intending to write a book about the FBI
(Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 6-8, 18.)
106 Memoranda recommending use of the media for COINTELPRO purposes
sometimes bore the designation "Mass Media Program," which appeared
mereIy to signify the function of the Crime Records Division as a
"conduit'' for disseminating information at the request of the
Domestic Intelligence Division. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 63,
68, 88.) The dissemination of derogatory information to the media was
usually reviewed through the Bureau's chain of command and received
final approval from Director Hoover. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, p. 89.)
107 For example, Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field
Office, 10/22/68.
108 Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 33.
109 Cartha DeLoach, who handled media contacts for several years,
testified that this technique was not actually used as much as the
Director desired:
If any unfair comment appeared in any segment of the press concerning
Mr. Hoover or the FBI ... Mr. Hoover ... would say do not contact
this particular newspaper or do not contact this person or do not
cooperate with this person.... If I had complied strictly to the
letter of the law to Mr. Hoover's instructions, I think I would be
fair in saying that we wouldn't be cooperating with hardly a single
newspaper in the United States.... The men down through the years had
to overlook some of those instructions and deal fairly with all
segments of the press. (DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, pp. 213-214.)
110 Bishop stated that the Crime Records Division was "scrupulous" in
providing information which could be cited to a "page and paragraph"
in a public source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 24, 177-178.)
111 Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 135-136.
112 T. E. Bishop stated that from the FBI documents available to the
Committee, it was impossible to determine whether an article was
actually printed after a news release or a draft article had been
supplied to a media source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 86.)
113 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
114 Memorandum to Director from SAC Miami, 3/10/70. Bishop testified
that he "would hope'' that in response to the directive to
disseminate the target's "arrest record" the Division would have
disseminated only conviction records. Bishop said that under the
Attorney General's guidelines then in effect only conviction records
or arrests which were a matter of public record in a particular
jurisdiction were to be disseminated. Bishop stated that his policy
was not to disseminate an arrest record "especially if that arrest
record resulted in an acquittal or if the charge was never completed
... because that is not, to my mind, anything derogatory against a
guy, until he actually gets convicted." (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75,
pp. 163-167, 173.)
115 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 1/13/68.
116 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/27/68.
117 Memorandurn from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/7/69.
118 Deposition of Black Nationalist COINTELPRO supervisor, 10/17/75,
p, 21; Deposition of George C. Moore, Chief of the Racial
Intelligence Section, 11/3/75. p. 36.
119 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 6/3/63.
120 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 8/9/65.
121 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/24/64.
122 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/16/68.
123 Memorandum from G. C. 'Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.
124 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Meld Office, 7/9/68.
125 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/76.
126 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 10/22/68.
127 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/69.
128 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 6/17/68.
129 FBI Memorandum from Bishop to Mohr, 7/6/71; Bishop testimony,
12/2/75, pp.148-151.
Two years earlier the Crime Records Division prepared a sixteen-page
memorandum containing information on "Leonard B. Boudin, Attorney for
Dr. Benjamin Spock," written at the time of Spock's indictment for
conspiring to violate the Selective Service Act. (FBI Memorandum from
M. A. Jones to T. E. Bishop, 2/26/68) The memorandum described
"alleged associations and activities of Boudin" related to
organizations or individuals considered "subversive" by the FBI,
(Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 134-135) and included: names of many of
Boudin's clients; citations to magazines and journals in which Boudin
had published articles; references to petitions he had signed; and
notes on rallies and academic conferences at which he had spoken. The
memorandum indicated that "the White House and Attorney General have
been advised" of the information on Boudin's background. Notations on
the cover sheet of the memorandum by high Bureau officials indicate
that approval was granted for "furnishing the attached information to
one of our friendly news contacts" but the information was not used
until after the "results of appeal in Spock's case." Bishop did not
recall distributing the Boudin memorandum. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 125-126)
The head of the Crime Records Division speculated that the memorandum
was prepared at the request of a reporter because he did not remember
a request from Hoover or from the Domestic Intelligence Division,
which was the normal route for assignments to the Crime Records
Division. Division Chief Bishop testified that he probably instructed
the Division "to get up any public source information that we have
concerning Boudin that shows his connection with the Communist Party
or related groups of that nature." (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 131-133)
130 Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to C. D. DeLoach, 11/5/64.
131 Memorandum from Cleveland Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/28/64; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
132 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office, 6/11/68.
133 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/4/64.
134 The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers, but a
local college professor expected to participate in the picket line.
The Bureau had unsuccessfully directed "considerable efforts to
prevent hiring" the professor. Apparently, the Bureau did not
consider the impact of this technique on the United Farm Workers'
efforts. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI
Headquarters, 9/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San
Francisco Field Office, 9/13/68.)
135 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/16/64.
136 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/10/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field
Office, 3/14/67.
138 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/67.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/12/61.
139 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/1/65;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 9/22/61,
140 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/28/65; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/1/65.
141 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/67.
142 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office,
11/14/66. The attempt was unsuccessful; a prior raid on a fire
department's fund raiser had angered the local District Attorney, and
the ABC decided not to raid the Democrats because of "political
ramifications."
143 The originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO
ordered field offices to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or
otherwise neutralize" the "leadership" and "spokesmen" of the target
groups. The "New Left" originating memo called for efforts to
"neutralize" the New Left and the "Key Activists," defined as "those
individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left;" the
letter to field offices made it clear that the targets were the
"leadership" of the "New Left" -- a term which was never defined.
(Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.)
144 Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 5/9/68; memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to all SAC's, 5/10/68.
145 Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64. Although this
proposal was approved by Director Hoover, there is no evidence that
any steps were taken to Implement the plan.
146 See Martin Luther King, Jr. Report: Sec. V, The FBI's Efforts to
Discredit Dr. Martin Luther King: 1964, Sec. VII, The FBI Program
Against Dr. King: 1965-1968.
147 Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/23/63, p. 1.
148 Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 20.
149 Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 29.
150 Memorandum from Sullivan to, Director, FBI, 8/30/63. Sullivan
described this process of "interpretive" memo writing to lead a
reader to believe the Communists were influential without actually
stating they were in control of a movement: "You have to spend years
in the Bureau really to get the feel of this.... You came down here
to 'efforts', these 'colossal efforts'. That was a key word of ours
when we are getting around the facts.... You will not find anywhere
In the memorandum whether the efforts were successful or
unsuccessful.... Here is another one of our words that we used to
cover up the facts, 'efforts to exploit', that word 'exploit'.
Nowhere will you find in some of these memos the results of the
exploitation. [Like] 'planning to do all possible', you can search in
vain for a statement to the effect that their plans were successful
or unsuccessful, partly successful or partly unsuccessful."
(Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 15-16.)
151 Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), p. 309. Director Hoover's statement was
widely publicized. (E.g., "Hoover Says Reds Exploit Negroes," New
York Times, 4/22/64, p. 30) it caused serious concern among civil
rights leaders who feared that it would hurt the prospects for
passage of the 1964 civil rights bill.
151a Director Hoover had included similar exaggerated statements
about Communist influence in a briefing to the Eisenhower Cabinet in
1956. Hoover had stated, regarding an NAACP-sponsored conference:
"The Communist Party plans to use this conference to embarrass the
Administration by causing a rift between the Administration and
Dixiecrats who have supported it, by forcing the Administration to
take a stand on civil rights legislation with the present Congress.
The Party hopes through a rift to affect the 1956 elections."
[Emphasis added.] (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive
Assistant to the Attorney General, 3/9/56, and enclosure.)
Director Hoover did not include in his prepared briefing statement
the information reported to the White House separately earlier that
there was "no indication" the the NAACP had "allowed the Communist
Party to infiltrate the conference." (Hoover to Dillon Anderson,
Special Assistant to the President, 3/5/56.) According to one
historical account, Hoover's Cabinet briefing "reinforced the
President's inclination to passivity" on civil rights legislation.
(J. W. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The Tangled
Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956-57 [University of Alabama
Press, 1964], p. 34.)
152 Memorandum from Hoover to subordinate FBI officials, 4/28/65.
153 Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.
154 Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.
155 Letter from Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President (National Security), 4/28/65, enclosing FBI memorandum,
Subject: Communist Activities Relative to United States Policy on Vietnam.
156 See, e.g., a memorandum from Marvin (Watson) to the President,
5/16/67, quoting from a Bureau report that: "the Communist Party and
other organizations are continuing their efforts to force the United
States to change its present policy toward Vietnam."
157 The report prepared by the intelligence agencies as the basis for
the 1970 "Huston Plan" included the following similar emphasis on the
potential threat (and downplaying of the actual lack of success) :
"Leaders of student protest groups" who traveled abroad were
"considered to have potential for recruitment and participation in
foreign-directed intelligence activity."
"Antiwar activists" who had "frequently traveled abroad" were
considered "as having potential for engaging in foreign directed
intelligence collection."
The CIA was "of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence
services are committed at the political level to exploit all domestic
dissidents wherever possible."
Although there was "no hard evidence" of substantial foreign control
of "the black extremist movement," there was "a marked potential" and
the groups were "highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile
foreign intelligence services." "Communist intelligence services are
capable of using their personnel, facilities, and agent personnel to
work in the black extremist field."
While there were "no substantial indications that the communist
intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest," their
"capability" could not "be minimized."
"The dissidence and violence in the United States today present
adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled for
forty years." [Emphasis added.] (Special Report, Interagency
Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970; substantial portions
of this report appear in Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 141-188.)
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