NSA Retention and Collection of Crypto Data

From: John Young <j..._at_pipeline.com>
Date: Mon, 04 Sep 2006 11:48:41 -0700

http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.htm

[Excerpt 1]

2. Retention

(S/SI) Foreign communications of, or concerning, United States persons that
are
intercepted by the United States Signals Intelligence System may be retained
in their original form or as transcribed only:

  (a) if processed so as to eliminate any reference to United States persons;

  (b) if necessary to the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for
  this purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough
  exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably
believed
  likely to become, relevant to a current or future intelligent requirement.
  Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. In the
  context of a cryptanalytic effort, sufficient duration may consist of a
period
  of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
  cryptanalysis. In the case of international commercial communications that
  may contain the identity of United States persons and that are not
enciphered
  or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one
  year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, National Security Agency,
  determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to
respond
  to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements; or

[End excerpt 1]

[Excerpt 2]

D. (C) Signals Intelligence: Search and Development.

The United States Signals Intelligence System may conduct search and
development activities with respect to signals throughout the radio spectrum
under the following limitations:

1. Collection. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying
those
signals that:

  (a) may contain information related to the production of foreign
intelligence
  or counterintelligence;

  (b) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;

  (c) are necessary to ensure efficient signals intelligence collection or
  to avoid the collection of unwanted signals; or

  (d) reveal vulnerability of United States communications security.

[End excerpt 2]
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:23 CST

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