Russia bugged Australian embassy

From: James M. Atkinson <jm..._at_tscm.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2009 13:31:22 -0500

Russia bugged Australian embassy
1/01/2009 1:00:00 AM

Russian intelligence bugged Australia's embassy in Moscow, cabinet
documents published by the National Archives today show.

The major security breach is revealed for the first time in a cabinet
minute recording that foreign minister Andrew Peacock briefed cabinet
on July 25, 1978, on ''the present situation in regard to the
discovery of listening devices in the Australian chancery in Moscow''.

The chancery was the most secure part of the embassy where the
ambassador, Murray Bourchier, and his diplomatic staff worked.

Use of listening devices in the area would have compromised
Australian diplomatic secrets and potentially also communications and
cypher machines.

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet's secret police, the KGB, was
actively engaged in espionage against foreign embassies.

It was not the first occasion that listening devices had been found
at the Australian embassy in Moscow.

An extensive array of microphones were found in the newly established
chancery in late 1946.

Australian embassies in other Eastern bloc countries were also
subject to ''technical attack'' by communist intelligence services.

A recently declassified Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
report revealed previously secret details of the attempted bugging of
the newly established Australian embassy in Warsaw.

''During an inspection of the premises of the Australian embassy in
Warsaw on November 23, 1973, technical security inspectors discovered
numerous concealed wired microphones installed in the premises,'' the
report reads.

''These devices were installed in the communications area of the
chancery (21st floor).

''Of the devices discovered, three were installed under the metal
window frames embedded in the brick rendering, and two were installed
over the window frames.

''Five other devices were found on the second floor, which was
planned for the ambassador's temporary residence.''

For its part, Australia also collected intelligence from the Soviet
embassy in Canberra, routinely tapping all the official and private
telephones of diplomats and using listening devices in their
residences and within the embassy itself.

In both cases Warsaw in 1973 and Moscow in 1978 the Australian
government was anxious to avoid a diplomatic incident.

The Fraser cabinet agreed in July 1978 that ''no decision be taken
about making public the discovery until a response has been received
from the Soviet ambassador in Canberra and analysed''.

The government was also concerned about Soviet espionage in Australia.

A 1978 cabinet submission from Mr Peacock on bilateral relations with
Russia noted that ''the scope for political dialogue with the USSR is
limited''.

''We believe we should express our opinions frankly when there are
points of difference between us and Moscow, especially on issues of
importance to Australia such as the US/Soviet negotiations on force
limitations in the Indian Ocean.''

It was thought there was potential for expanded trade with the
possibility of ''some form of fish. Beef deal''.

However, with the balance of trade running overwhelmingly in
Australia's favour, it was thought this would mainly involve an
expansion of Soviet trade and commercial activity in Australia with
consequent espionage risks.

''A more concerted Soviet effort to expand its trade could result in
an increase in Soviet personnel in Australia,'' Mr Peacock noted.

''ASIO have pointed out that any significant staff increases would
undoubtedly be exploited by the Soviet intelligence services.

''In this context clear security risks must be weighed against
possible commercial benefits.''

Unsurprisingly, the Fraser cabinet took no early action to boost
bilateral trade with Moscow. Philip Dorling


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