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INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
_______
BOOK II
_______
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976
B. THE OVERBREADTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
MAJOR FINDING
The Committee finds that domestic intelligence activity has been
overbroad in that (1) many Americans and domestic groups have been
subjected to investigation who were not suspected of criminal
activity and (2) the intelligence agencies have regularly collected
information about personal and political activities irrelevant to any
legitimate governmental interest.
Subfindings
(a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups
have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.
(b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence, investigations
of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact
statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence
agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence
activity. The executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney
General Stone -- that the government's concern was not with political
opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the
United States." Intelligence agencies' superiors issued
over-inclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that
was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather
than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as to collect general
intelligence on lawful political and social dissent.
(c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and
overinclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence
investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond
"subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals
subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no
"potential" for violence.
(d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to
intelligence collection -- drawing in all available information about
groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and
details of their personal lives.
(e) Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for
excessively long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental
monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of
criminal conduct or "subversion."
Elaboration of Findings
The central problem posed by domestic intelligence activity has been
its departure from the standards of the law. This departure from law
has meant not only the violation of constitutional prohibitions and
explicit statutes, but also the adoption of criteria unrelated to the
law as the basis for extensive investigations of Americans.
In 1917-1924, the federal government, often assisted by the private
vigilante American Protective League, conducted sweeping
investigations of dissenters, war protesters, labor organizers, and
alleged "anarchists" and "revolutionaries." These investigations led
to mass-arrests of thousands of persons in the 1920 "Palmer raids."
Reacting to these and other abuses of investigative power, Attorney
General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924 confined the Bureau of
Investigation in the Justice Department to the investigation of
federal crimes. Attorney General Stone articulated a clear and
workable standard:
The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other
opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and
then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. 1
Nevertheless, his restriction lasted for little more than a decade.
In the mid-1930s the FBI resumed domestic intelligence functions,
carrying out President Roosevelt's vague order to investigate
"subversive activities." The President and the Attorney General
authorized FBI and military intelligence investigations of conduct
explicitly recognized as "not within the specific provisions of
prevailing statutes." As a result, ideas and associations, rather
than suspicion of criminal offenses, once again became the focus of
federal investigations.
The scope of domestic intelligence investigations consistently
widened in the decades after the 1930s, reaching its greatest extent
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Domestic intelligence investigations were permitted under criteria
which more nearly resembled political or social labels than standards
for governmental action. Rather than Attorney General Stone's
standard of investigating "only such conduct as is forbidden by the
laws of the United States," domestic intelligence used such labels as
the following to target intelligence investigations:
--"rightist" or "extremist" groups in the "anticommunist field
--persons with "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" or who were
"espousing the line of revolutionary movements"
--"general racial matters"
--"hate organizations"
--"rabblerousers"
--"key activists"
--"black nationalists"
--"white supremacists"
--"agitators"
--"key black extremists"
These broad and imprecise labels reflect the ill-defined mission of
domestic intelligence, which resulted from recurring demands for
progressively wider investigations of Americans. Without the firm
guidance provided by law, intelligence activities intruded into areas
of American life which are protected from governmental inquiry by the
constitutional guarantees of personal privacy and free speech and assembly.
Subfinding (a)
Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups
have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.
Some domestic intelligence activity has focused on specific illegal
conduct or on instances where there was tangible evidence that
illegal conduct was likely to occur. But domestic intelligence has
gone far beyond such matters in collecting massive amounts of data on
Americans. For example:
FBI Domestic Intelligence. -- The FBI has compiled at its
headquarters over 480,000 files on its "subversion" investigations
and over 33,000 files on its "extremism" investigations. 2 During the
twenty years from 1955 to 1975, the FBI conducted 740,000
investigations of "subversive matters" and 190,000 investigations of
"extremist matters." 3
The targets for FBI intelligence collection have included:
--the Women's Liberation Movement
--the conservative Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers of Father
Coughlin;
--the conservative American Christian Action Council of Rev. Carl McIntyre;
--a wide variety of university, church and political groups opposed
to the Vietnam war;
--those in the non-violent civil rights movement, such as Martin
Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Council, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the
Council on Racial Equality (CORE).
Army Surveillance of Civilians. -- The Army's nationwide intelligence
surveillance program created files on some 100,000 Americans and an
equally large number of domestic organizations, encompassing
virtually every group seeking peaceful change in the United States including:
--the John Birch Society;
--Young Americans for Freedom;
--the National Organization of Women;
--the NAACP;
--the Urban League;
--the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; and Business Executives
to End the War in Vietnam. 4
CIA's CHAOS Program. -- The CIA's extensive CHAOS program -- which
compiled intelligence on domestic groups and individuals protesting
the Vietnam war and racial conditions -- amassed some 10,000
intelligence files on American citizens and groups and indexed
300,000 names of Americans in CIA computer records. 5
IRS Selective Tax Investigations of Dissenters. -- Between 1969 and
1973, the Internal Revenue Service, through a secret "Special Service
Staff" (SSS), targeted more than 10,000 individuals and groups for
tax examinations because of their political activity. 6 The FBI and
the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department gave SSS
lists of taxpayers deemed to be "activists" or "ideological
organizations;" the FBI, in providing SSS with a list of over 2,000
groups and individuals classified as "Right Wing," "New Left," and
"Old Left," expressed its hope that SSS tax examinations would "deal
a blow to dissident elements." 7 A smaller though more intensive
selective enforcement program, the "Ideological Organization
Project," was established in November 1961 in response to White House
criticism of "right-wing extremist" groups. 8 On the basis of such
political criteria, 18 organizations were selected for special audit
although there was no evidence of tax violation. 9 In 1964, the IRS
proosed to expand its program to make "10,000 examinations of tax
exempt organizations of all types including the extremist groups." 10
Although this program never fully materialized, the "Ideological
Organizations Project" can be viewed as a precursor to SSS.
CIA and FBI Mail Opening. -- The 12 mail opening programs conducted
by the CIA and FBI between 1940 and 1973 resulted in the illegal
opening of hundreds of thousands of first-class letters. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, the international correspondence of large numbers of
Americans who challenged the condition of racial minorities or who
opposed the war in Vietnam was specifically targeted for mail opening
by both the CIA and FBI.
The overbreadth of the longest CIA mail opening program -- the 20
year (1953-1973) program in New York City -- is shown by the fact
that of the more than 28 million letters screened by the CIA, the
exteriors of 2.7 million were photographed and 214,820 letters were
opened. 11 This is further shown by the fact that American groups and
individuals placed on the Watch List for the project included:
--The Federation of American Scientists;
--authors such as John Steinbeck and Edward Albee;
--numerous American peace groups such as the American Friends Service
Committee and Women's Strike for Peace; and
--businesses, such as Praeger Publishers. 12
By one CIA estimate, random selection accounted for 75 percent of the
200,000 letters opened, including letters to or from American
political figures, such as Richard Nixon, while a presidential
candidate in 1968, and Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy. 13
IV NSA's Watch List and SHAMROCK Programs. -- The National Security
Agency's SHAMROCK program, by which copies of millions of telegrams
sent to, from, or through the United States were obtained between
1947 and 1973, involved the use of a Watch List 1967-1973. The watch
list included groups and individuals selected by the FBI for its
domestic intelligence investigations and by the CIA for its Operation
CHAOS program. In addition, the SHAMROCK Program resulted in NSA's
obtaining not only telegrams to an from certain foreign targets, but
countless telegrams between Americans in the United States and
American or foreign parties abroad. 14
In short, virtually every element of our society has been subjected
to excessive government-ordered intelligence inquiries. Opposition to
government policy or the expression of controversial views was
frequently onsidered sufficient for collecting data on Americans.
The committee finds that this extreme breadth of intelligence
activity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution
which protact the rights of speech, political activity, and privacy
against un"Justified governmental intrusion.
Subfinding (b)
The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of
Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes
precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or
defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity. The
Executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone
-- that the government's concern was not with political opinions but
with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States."
Intelligence agencies' superiors issued overinclusive directives to
investigate "subversion" (a term that was never defined in
presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely
criminal conduct, as well as to collect general intelligence on
lawful political -and social dissent.
Congress has never set out a specific statutory charter for FBI
domestic intelligence activity delineating the standards for opening
intelligence investigations or defining the purpose and scope of
domestic intelligence activity. 15
Nor have the charters for foreign intelligence agencies -- the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency --
articulated adequate standards to insure that those agencies did not
become involved in domestic intelligence activity. While the 1947
National Security Act provided that the CIA shall have no "police,
subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions," 16
the Act was silent concerning whether the CIA was authorized to
target Americans abroad or to gather intelligence in the United
States on Americans or foreign nationals in connection with its
foreign intelligence responsibilities. By classified presidential
directive, the CIA was authorized to conduct counterintelligence
operations abroad and to maintain central counterintelligence files
for the intelligence community." Counterintelligence activity was
defined in the directive to include protection of the nation against
"subversion," a term which, as in the directives authorizing FBI
domestic intelligence activity, was not defined.
In the absence of specific standards for CIA activity and given the
susceptibility of the term "subversion" to broad interpretation, the
CIA conducted Operation CHAOS -- a large scale intelligence program
involving the gathering of data on thousands of Americans and
domestic groups to determine if they had "subversive connections"and
illegally opened the mail of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
Moreover, the Act does not define the scope of the authority granted
to CIA's Director to protect intelligence "sources and methods." 18
This authority has been broadly interpreted to permit surveillance of
present and former CIA employees in the United States as well as
domestic groups thought to be a threat to CIA installations in the
United States.
No statute at all deals with the National Security Agency. That
Agency -- one of the largest of the intelligence agencies -- was
created by Executive Order in 1952. Although NSA's mission is to
obtain foreign intelligence from "foreign" communications, this has
been interpreted to permit NSA to intercept communications where one
terminal -- the sender or receiver -- was in the United States.
Consequently when an American has used telephone or telegraph
facilities between this country and overseas, his message has been
subject to interception by NSA. NSA obtained copies of millions of
private telegrams sent from, to or through the United States in its
SHAMROCK program and complied with requests to target the
international communications of specific Americans through the use of
a watch list.
In addition to the failure of Congress to enact precise statutory
standards, members of Congress have put pressure on the intelligence
agencies for the collection of domestic intelligence without adequate
regard to constitutional interests. 19 Moreover, Congress has passed
statutes, such as the Smith Act, which, although not directly
authorizing domestic intelligence collection, had the effect of
contributing to the excessive collection of intelligence about Americans.
Three functional policies, established by the Executive branch and
acquiesced in by Congress, were the basis for the overbreadth of
intelligence investigations directed at Americans. These policies
centered on (1) so-called "subversion investigations" of attempts by
hostile foreign governments and their agents in this country to
influence the course of American life; (2) the investigation of
persons and groups thought to have a "potential" for violating the
law or committing violence; and (3) the collection of general
intelligence on political and social movements in the interest of
predicting and controlling civil disturbances.
Each of these policies grew out of a legitimate concern. Nazi
Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts in
this country before World War II; and Soviet operations continued
after the war. In the 1960s and early 1970s, racist groups used force
to deprive Americans of their civil rights, some American dissidents
engaged in violence as a form of political protest, and there were
large-scale protest demonstrations and major civil disorders in
cities stemming from minority frustrations.
The Committee recognizes that the government had a responsibility to
act in the face of the very real dangers presented by these
developments. But appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions
on intelligence collection were not devised; distinctions between
legitimate targets of investigations and innocent citizens were
forgotten; and the Government's actions were never examined for their
effects on the constitutional rights of Americans, either when
programs originated or as they continued over the years.
The policies of investigating Americans thought to have a "potential"
for violence and the collection of general intelligence on political
and social movements inevitably resulted in the surveillance of
American citizens and domestic groups engaged in lawful political
activity. "Subversive" was never defined in the presidential
directives from Presidents Roosevelt to Kennedy authorizing FBI
domestic intelligence activity. Consequently, "subversive"
investigations did not focus solely on the activities of hostile
foreign governments in this country. Rather, they targeted Americans
who dissented from administration positions or whose political
positions were thought to resemble those of "subversive" groups. An
example of the ultimate result of accepting the concept of
"subversive" investigations is the Johnson White House, instruction
to the FBI to monitor public hearings on Vietnam policy and compare
the extent to which Senators' views "followed the Communist Party line." 20
Similarly, investigations of those thought to have the "potential"
for violating laws or committing violence and the collection of
general intelligence to prepare for civil disturbances resulted in
the surveillance of Americans where there was not reasonable
suspicion to believe crime or violence were likely to occur. Broad
categories of American society -- conservatives, liberals, blacks,
women, young people and churches -- were targeted for intelligence collection.
Domestic intelligence expanded to cover widespread political protest
movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in
September 1967, Attorney General Ramsey Clark called for a "new area
of investigation and intelligence reporting" by the FBI regarding the
possibility of "an organized pattern of violence" by groups in the
"urban ghetto." He Instructed FBI Director Hoover:
... we must make certain that every attempt is being made to get all
information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible
to determine whether the rioting is preplanned or organized.... As
apart of the broad investigation which must be conducted ... sources
or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC and other less
publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the
size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups. 21
Such instructions did not limit investigation to facts pointing to
particular criminal or violent activity but called for intensive
intelligence surveillance of a broad category of black groups (and
their connections with other groups) to determine their "size and purpose."
Similarly, the Army's broad domestic surveillance program reflected
administration pressure on the Army for information on groups and
individuals involved in domestic dissent. 22 As a former Assistant
Secretary of Defense testified, the Army's sweeping collection plan
"reflected the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for
information directed at the Department of the Army." 23
Presidents Johnson and Nixon subjected the CIA to intensive pressure
to find foreign influence on the domestic peace movements, resulting
in the establishment of Operation CHAOS. 24 When the Nixon
Administration called for an intensification of CIA's effort, the CIA
was instructed to broaden its targeting criteria and strengthen its
collection efforts. CIA was told that "foreign Communist support"
should be "liberally construed." 25 The White House stated further
that "it appears our present intelligence collection capabilities in
this area may be inadequate" and implied that any gaps in CIA"s
collection program resulting from "inadequate resources or a low
priority of attention" should be corrected. 26
In short, having abandoned Attorney General Stone's standard that
restricted Government investigations to "conduct and then only such
conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," the
Government's far-reaching domestic intelligence policies inevitably,
produced investigations and surveillance of large numbers of
lawabiding Americans.
Subfinding (c)
The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and
over-inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence
investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond
"subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals
subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no
"potential" for violence.
Having been given vague directions by their superiors and subjected
to substantial pressure to report on a broad range of matters, the
intelligence agencies themselves often established overinclusive
targeting criteria. The criteria followed in the major domestic
intelligence programs conducted in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the
breadth of intelligence targeting:
"General Racial Matters". -- The FBI gathered intelligence about
proposed "civil demonstrations" and related activities of "officials,
committees, legislatures, organizations, etc." in the "racial field."
FBI Field Offices were directed to report the "general programs" of
all "civil rights organizations" and "readily available personal
background data" on leaders and individuals "in the civil rights
movement," as well as any "subversive association" that might be
recorded in Field Office files. 28 In addition, the FBI reported "the
objectives sought by the minority Community." 29
These broad criteria were also reflected in the FBI's targeting of
"white militant groups" in the reporting of racial matters. Those who
were "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against
the busing of Negro students to white schools" were to be investigated. 30
"New Left" Intelligence. -- In conducting a "comprehensive study of
the whole New Left movement" (rather than investigating particular
violations of law), the FBI defined its intelligence target as a
"loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement." 31
Organizations to be investigated were those who fit criteria phrased
as the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft
organizations." 32
The use of such imprecise criteria resulted in investigations of such
matters as (1) two university instructors who helped support a
student newspaper whose editorial policy was described by the FBI as
"left-of-center, antiestablishment, and opposed to the University
Administration" ; 33 (2) a dissident stockholder's group planning to
protest a large corporation's war production at the annual
stockholder's meeting; 34 and (3) "Free Universities" attached to
college campuses, whether or not there were facts indicating any
actual or potential violation of law. 35
"Rabble Rouser'' Index. -- Beginning in August 1967, the FBI
conducted intensive intelligence investigations of individuals
identified as "rabble rousers."" The program was begun after a member
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders asked the FBI
at a meeting of the Commission "to identify the number of militant
Negroes and Whites." 36 This vague reference was subsequently used by
the FBI as the basis for instructions implementing a broad new
program: persons were to be investigated and placed on the "rabble
rouser" index who were "racial agitators who have demonstrated a
potential for fomenting racial discord." 37
Ultimately, a "rabble rouser" was defined as:
A person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to
their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue. 38
Thus, rather than collecting information on those who had or were
likely to commit criminal or violent acts, a major intelligence
program was launched to identify "demagogues."
Army Domestic Surveillance of "Dissidents." -- Extremely broad
criteria were used in the Army's nationwide surveillance program
conducted in the late 1960s. Such general terms as "the civil rights
movement" and the "anti- Vietnam/anti-draft movements" were used to
indicate targets for investigation." In collecting information on
these "Movements" and on the "cause of civil disturbances," Army
intelligence was to investigate "instigators," "group participants"
and "subversive elements" -- all undefined.
Under later revisions, the Army collection plan extended even beyond
"subversion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were
"friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic with
their plans." 40
These imprecise criteria led to the creation of intelligence files on
nearly 100,000 Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Major
General Edwin Walker, Julian Bond, Joan Baez, Dr. Benjamin Spock,
Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Congressman Abner Mikva, Senator Adlai
Stevenson III, 41 as well as clergymen, teachers, journalists,
editors, attorneys, industrialists, a laborer, a construction worker,
railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a taxi driver, a chiropractor, a
doctor, a chemist, an economist, a historian, a playwright, an
accountant, an entertainer, professors, a radio announcer, athletes,
business executives and authors -- all of whom became subjects of
Army files simply because of their participation in political
protests or their association with those who were engaged in such
political activity. 42
The IRS Computerized Intelligence Index. -- In 1973, IRS established
a central computer index -- the "Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval
System" -- for general intelligence data, much of it unrelated to tax
law enforcement. More than 465,000 Americans were indexed in the IRS
computer system, including J. Edgar Hoover and the IRS Commissioner,
as well as thousands of others also not suspected of tax violation.
Names in newspaper articles and other published sources were indexed
wholesale into the IRS computer. Under the system, intelligence
gathering preceded any specific allegation of a violation, and
possible "future value" was the sole criterion for inclusion of
information into the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System.
CIA's Operation CHAOS. -- In seeking to fulfill White House requests
for evidence of foreign influence on domestic dissent, the CIA gave
broad instructions to its overseas stations. These directives called
for reporting on the "Radical Left" which included, according to the
CIA, "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and
deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New
Leftists'." 43 CIA built its huge CHAOS data base on the assumption
that to know whether there was significant foreign involvement in a
domestic group "one has to know whether each and every one of these
persons has any connection to foreigners." 44 CIA instructed its
stations that even "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest"
between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements"
were deemed to "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest"
between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements"
were deemed to constitute "subversive connections." 45 Similarly,
CIA's request to NSA for materials on persons targeted by the NSA
Watch List called for all information regardless of how innocuous it
may seem." 46
The Committee's investigation has shown that the absence of precise
statutory standards and the use of overbroad criteria for domestic
intelligence activity resulted in the extension of intelligence
investigations beyond their original "subversive" or violent targets.
Intelligence investigations extended to those thought to be subject
to "subversive influence." Moreover, those thought to have a
"potential" for violence were also targeted and, in some cases,
investigations extended even to those engaged in wholly non-violent
lawful political expression.
FBI "COMINFIL" Investigations. -- Under the FBI's COMINFIL
("communist infiltration") program, large numbers of groups and
individuals engaged in lawful political activity have been subjected
to informant coverage and intelligence scrutiny. Although COMINFIL
investigations were supposed to focus on the Communist Party's
alleged efforts to penetrate domestic groups, in practice the target
often became the domestic groups themselves.
FBI COMINFIL investigations reached into domestic groups in virtually
every area of American political life. The FBI conducted COMINFIL
investigations in such areas as "religion," "education," "veterans'
matters," "women's matters," "Negro question," and "cultural
activities." 47 The "entire spectrum of the social and labor
movement" was covered. 48
The overbreadth that results from the practice of investigating
groups for indications of communist influence, or infiltration is
illustrated by the following FBI COMINFIL intelligence investigations:
NAACP. -- An intensive 25 year long surveillance of the NAACP was
conducted, ostensibly to determine whether there was Communist
infiltration of the NAACP. This surveillance, however, produced
detailed intelligence reports on NAACP activities wholly unrelated to
any alleged communist "attempts" to infiltrate the NAACP, and despite
the fact that no evidence was ever found to contradict the FBI's
initial finding that the NAACP was opposed to communism. 48a
Northern Virginia Citizens Concerned About the ABM. -- In 1969, the
FBI conducted an intelligence investigation and used informants to
report on a meeting held in a public high school auditorium at which
the merits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System were debated by,
among others, Department of Defense officials. The investigation was
apparently opened because a communist newspaper had commented on the
fact that the meeting was to be held. 49
National Conference on Amnesty for Vietnam Veterans. -- In 1974, FBI
informants reported on a national conference sponsored by church and
civil liberties groups to support amnesty for Vietnam veterans. The
investigation was based on a two-step "infiltration" theory. Other
informants had reported that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War
(which was itself the subject of an intelligence investigation
because it was thought to be subject to communist or foreign
influence) might try to "control" the conference. 50 Although the
conference was thus twice removed from the original target, it was
nevertheless subjected to informant surveillance.
FBI intelligence investigations to find whether groups are subject to
communist or "subversive" influence result in the collection of
information on groups and individuals engaged in wholly legitimate
activity. Reports on the NAACP were not limited to alleged communist
infiltration. Similarly, the investigation of the National Amnesty
Conference produced reports describing the topics discussed at the
conference and the organization of a steering committee which would
include families of men killed in Vietnam and congressional staff
aides. 51 The reports on the meeting concerning the ABM system
covered the past and present residence of the person who applied to
rent the high school auditorium, and plans for a future meeting,
including the names of prominent political figures who planned to attend. 52
The trigger for COMINFIL-type investigations -- that subversive
attempts" to infiltrate groups were a substantial threat -- was
greatly exaggerated. According to the testimony of FBI officials, the
mention in a communist newspaper of the citizens' meeting to debate
the ABM was sufficient to produce intelligence coverage of that
meeting. 53 A large public teach-in on Vietnam, including
representatives of Catholic, Episcopal, Methodist and Unitarian
churches, as well as a number of spokesmen for antiwar groups, was
investigated because a Communist Party official had "urged" party
members to attend and one speaker representing the W. E. B. DuBois
Club was identified as a communist. 54 The FBI surveillance of the
teach-in resulted in a 41-page intelligence report based on coverage
by 13 informants and sources. 55 And the FBI's investigation of all
Free Universities near colleges and universities was undertaken
because "several" allegedly had been formed by the Communist Party
"and other subversive groups." 56
Similarly, the FBI's broad COMINFIL investigations of the civiI
rights movement in the South were based on the FBI's conclusion that
the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of racial
unrest and had "endeavored" to pressure U.S. Government officials
"through the press, labor unions and student groups. 57 [Emphasis
supplied.] No mention was made of the general failure of these attempts."
The Committee finds that COMINFIL investigations have been based on
an exaggerated notion of the threat posed by "subversives" and
foreign influence on American political expression. There has been
unjustified belief that Americans need informants and government
surveillance to protect them from "subversive" influence in their
unions, churches, schools, parties and political efforts.
Investigations of Wholly Non-Violent Political Expression. --
Domestic intelligence investigations have extended from those who
commit or are likely to commit violent acts to those thought to have
a "potential" for violence, and then to those engaged in purely
peaceful political expression. This characteristic was graphically
described by the White House official who coordinated the
intelligence agencies' recommendations for "expanded" (and illegal)
coverage in 1970. He testified that intelligence investigations risked moving
from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the
kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the
opposing candidate. And you just keep going down the line. 53
Without precise standards to restrict their scope, intelligence
investigations did move beyond those who committed or were likely to
commit criminal or violent acts. For example:
--Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was targeted for the FBI's COINTELPRO
operations against "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" on the theory,
without factual justification, that Dr. King might "abandon" his
adherence to nonviolence. 59
--The intensive FBI investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement
was similarly predicated on the theory that the activities of women
in that Movement might lead to demonstrations and violence. 60
--The FBI investigations of Black Student Unions proceeded from the
concern of the FBI and its superiors over violence in the cities.
Yet, the FBI opened intelligence investigations on "every Black
Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or present
involvement in disorders." 61 [Emphasis added.]
--The nationwide Army Intelligence surveillance of civilians was
conducted in connection with civil disorders. However, the Army
collection plan focused not merely on those likely to commit violence
but was "so comprehensive . . . that any category of information
related even remotely to people or organizations active in a
community in which the potential for violence was present would fall
within their scope." 62
The Committee finds that such intelligence surveillance of groups and
individuals has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the
government in law enforcement and the prevention of violence. Where
unsupported determinations as to "potential" behavior are the basis
for surveillance of groups and individuals, no one is safe from the
inquisitive eye of the intelligence agency.
Subfindings (d)
Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to
intelligence collection -- drawing in all available information about
groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and
details of their personal lives.
Intelligence agencies collect an excessive amount of information by
pursuing a "vacuum cleaner" approach that draws in all available
information, including lawful political activity, personal matters,
and trivia. Even where the theory of the investigation is that the
subject is likely to be engaged in criminal or violent activity, the
overbroad approach to intelligence collection intrudes into personal
matters unrelated to such criminal or violent activity.
FBI officials conceded to the Committee that in conducting broad
intelligence investigations to determine the "real purpose" of an
organization, they sometimes gathered "too much information." 63
The FBI's intelligence investigation of the "New Left," for example,
was directed towards a "comprehensive study of the whole movement"
and produced intensive monitoring of such subjects as "support of
movement by religious groups or individuals," "demonstrations aimed
at social reform," "indications of support by mass media," "all
activity in the labor field," and "efforts to influence public
opinion, the electorate and Government bodies." 64
Similar overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of
intelligence on "white militant groups." In 1968 FBI field offices
were instructed not to gather information solely on actual or
potential violations of law or violence, but to use informants to
determine the "aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders,
approximate membership" and other "background data" relating to the
group's "militancy." In 1971 the criteria for investigating
individuals were widened. Special Agents in Charge of FBI field
offices were instructed to investigate not only persons with "a
potential for violence," but also anyone else "who in judgment of SAC
should be subject of investigation due to extremist activities." 66
Even in searching for indications of potential violence in black
urban areas or in collecting information about violence prone Ku Klux
Klan chapters, there was marked overbreadth. In black urban areas,
for example, FBI agents were instructed to have their informants
obtain the names of "Afro-American type bookstores" and their
"owners, operators and clientele." 67 The activities of civil rights
and black groups as well as details of the personal lives of Klan
members, were reported on by an FBI intelligence informant in the Ku
Klux Klan. 67a Under this approach, the average citizen who merely
attends a meeting, signs a petition, is placed on a mailing list, or
visits a book store, is subject to being recorded in intelligence files.
A striking example of informant reporting on all they touch was
provided by an FBI informant in an antiwar group with only 55 regular
members and some 250 persons who gave occasional support. The
informant estimated she reported nearly 1,000 names to the FBI in an
18-month period -- 60-70 percent of whom were members of other groups
(such as the United Church of Christ and the American Civil Liberties
Union) which were engaging in peaceful, lawful political activity
together with the antiwar group or who were on the group's mailing
list. 68 Similarly in the intelligence investigation of the Women's
Liberation Movement, informants reported the identities of individual
women attending meetings (as well as reporting such matters as the
fact that women at meetings had stated "how they felt oppressed,
sexually or otherwise."). 69
Such collection of "intelligence" unrelated to specific criminal or
violent activity constitutes a serious misuse of governmental power.
In reaching into the private lives of individuals and monitoring
their lawful political activity -- matters irrelevant to any proper
governmental interest -- domestic intelligence collection has been
unreasonably broad.
Subfinding (e)
Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively
long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental monitoring
of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal
conduct or "subversion."
One of the most disturbing aspects of domestic intelligence
investigations found by the Committee was their excessive length.
Intelligence investigations often continued, despite the absence of
facts indicating an individual or group is violating or is likely to
violate the law, resulting in long-term government monitoring of
lawful political activity. The following are examples:
(i) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the NAACP (1941-1966). --
The investigation of the NAACP began in 1941 and continued for at
least 25 years. Initiated according to one FBI report as an
investigation of protests by 15 black mess attendants about racial
discrimination in the Navy, 70 the investigation expanded to
encompass NAACP chapters in cities across the nation. Although the
ostensible purpose of this investigation was to determine if there
was "Communist infiltration" of the NAACP, the investigation
constituted a long-term monitoring of the NAACP's wholly lawful
political activity by FBI informants. Thus:
--The FBI New York Field Office submitted a 137-page report to FBI
headquarters describing the national office of the NAACP, its
national convention, its growth and membership, its officers and
directors, and its stand against Communism. 71
--An FBI informant in Seattle obtained a list of NAACP branch
officers and reported on a meeting where signatures were gathered on
a "petition directed to President Eisenhower" and plans for two
members to go to Washington, D.C., for a "Prayer Pilgrimage." 72
--In 1966, the New York Field Office reported the names of all NAACP
national officers and board members, and summarized their political
associations as far back as the 1940s. 73
--As late as 1966, the FBI was obtaining NAACP chapter membership
figures by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being
interested in joining that branch of the NAACP." 74
--Based on the reports of FBI informants, the FBI submitted a
detailed report of a 1956 NAACP-sponsored Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights and described plans for a Conference delegation to visit
Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey,
and John Bricker. 75 Later reports covered what transpired at several
of these meetings with Senators. 76 Most significantly, all these
reports were sent to the White House. 77
(ii) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the Socialist Workers
Party (1940 to date). -- The FBI has investigated the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP) from 1940 to the present day on the basis of that
Party's revolutionary rhetoric and alleged international links.
Nevertheless, FBI officials testified that the SWP has not been
responsible for any violent acts nor has it urged actions
constituting an indictable incitement to violence. 77a
FBI informants have been reporting the political positions taken by
the SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam War," "racial
matters," "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," and any SWP
efforts to support a non-SWP candidate for political office. 78
Moreover, to enable the FBI to develop "background information" on
SWP leaders, informants have been reporting certain personal aspects
of their lives, such as marital status. 79 The informants also have
been reporting on SWP cooperation with other groups who are not the
subject of separate intelligence investigations. 80
(iii) The Effort to Prove Negatives. -- Intelligence investigations
and programs have also continued for excessively long periods in
efforts to prove negatives. CIA's Operation CHAOS began in 1967. From
that year until the program's termination in 1974, 81 the CIA
repeatedly reached formal conclusions that there was negligible
foreign influence on domestic protest activity. In 1967, the CIA
concluded that Communist front groups did not control student
organizations and that there were no significant links with foreign
radicals; 82 in 1968, the CIA concluded that U.S. student protest was
essentially homegrown and not stimulated by an international
conspiracy; 83 and in 1971 the CIA found "there is no evidence that
foreign governments, organizations, or intelligence services now
control U.S. New Left Movements ... the U.S. New Left is basically
self-sufficient and moves under its own impetus." 84
The result of these repeated findings was not the termination of
CHAOS's surveillance of Americans, but its redoubling. Presidents
Johnson and Nixon pressured the CIA to intensify its intelligence
effort, to find evidence of foreign direction of the U.S. peace
movement. As Director Helms testified:
When a President keeps asking if there is any information, "how are
you getting along with your examination," "have you picked up any
more information on this subject," it isn't a direct order to do
something, but it seems to me it behooves the Director of Central
Intelligence to find some way to im prove his performance, or improve
his Agency's performance. 85
In an effort to prove its negative finding to a skeptical White House
-- and to test its validity each succeeding year -- CIA expanded its
program, increasing its coverage of Americans overseas and building
an ever larger "data base" on domestic political activity.
Intelligence was exchanged with the FBI, NSA, and other agencies and
eventually CIA agents who had infiltrated domestic organizations for
other purposes supplied general information on the groups'
activities. 86 Thus, the intelligence mission became one of continued
surveillance to prove a negative, with no thought to terminating the
program in the face of the negative findings.
As in the CHAOS operation, FBI intelligence investigations have often
continued even in the absence of any evidence of "subversive"
activities merely because the subjects of the investigation have not
demonstrated their innocence to the FBI's satisfaction. The long term
investigations of the NAACP and the Socialist Workers Party described
above are typical examples.
A striking illustration of FBI practice is provided by the
intelligence investigation of an advisor of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. The advisor was investigated on the theory that he might be a
communist "sympathizer." The Bureau's New York office concluded he
was not. 87 Using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent," FBI
headquarters directed that the investigation continue:
The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York
office that [ ] 88 is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there
may not be any evidence that [ ] is a Communist neither is there any
substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist. 89
Where citizens must demonstrate not simply that they have no
connection with an intelligence target, but must exhibit "substantial
evidence" that they are in opposition to the target, intelligence
investigations are indeed open ended.
Footnotes:
1 New York Times, 5/10/24. Attorney General Stone implemented this
policy by issuing a directive to Acting Director J. Edgar Hoover of
the Bureau of Investigation: "The activities of the Bureau are to be
limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my
direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General
regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice."
(Memorandum from Attorney General Stone to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/13/24,
cited in Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law
[New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 151.]
2 Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/6/75.
3 Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, Re: Investigative Matters,
received 11/12/75. These statistics include as separate "matters"
investigative leads pursued by different FBI offices in the same case.
4 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, "Federal
Data Banks, Computers, and Bill of Rights," 1971, p. 264.
5 See CHAOS Report: See. II D, "Operation of the CHAOS Program and
Related CIA Projects."
6 See IRS Report: Part II, See. II, "Special Service Staff."
7 Memorandum from D. J. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.
8 Memorandum from William Loeb to Dean Barron, 11/30/61.
9 Memorandum from Mitchell Rogovin to Dean Barron, 12/20/61.
10 Memorandum from Commissioner, IRS to Myer Feldman, 7/11/63.
11 See Mail Report: Part I, "Domestic CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs."
12 See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."
13 See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."
14 See "National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans",
NSA Report: Sec. II A, "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity".
15 The FBI's statutory authority provides that the Attorney General
may appoint officials: "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against
the United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the President;
and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding official matters
under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of
State as may be directed by the Attorney General." (28 U.S.C. 533.)
Attorney General Edward H. Levi told the Select Committee "that the
statutory basis for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be
fully satisfactory." (Edward H. Levi testimony, 12/11/75, Hearings,
Vol. 6, p. 313.)
16 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3).
17 National Security Intelligence Directive No. 5.
18 50 U. S.C. 403 (d) (3).
19 See Finding on Deficiencies in Control and Accountability, pp. 277-279.
20 FBI summary memorandum, 1/31/75.
21 Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67.
22 See Military Surveillance Report: See. II C.
23 Robert F. Froehkle testimony, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, 1971, cited hereinafter as 1971 Hearings.
24 See pp. 99-101.
25 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69 p. 1.
26 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA,
6/20/69, p. 1.
27 1964 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1.
28 FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66, p. 8-9.
29 FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66; p. 8-9.
30 SAC Letter, 68-25,4/30/68.
31 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68.
32 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68.
33 Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.
34 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/23/70.
35 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
36 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 8/1/67.
37 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC
Letter 67-56, 9/12/67.
38 SAC Letter No. 67-70, 11/28/67.
39 1971 Hearings, pp. 1120-1121.
40 1971 Hearings, pp, 1123-1138.
41 Stein testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 266.
42 "Military surveillance of Civilian Politics," Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on constitutional Rights Report, 1973, p. 57, cited
hereafter as 1973 Report.
43 Book cable from Thomas Karamessines to various European Stations,
June 1968.
44 Richard Ober testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 88-89.
45 Cable from CIA Headquarters to field stations, November 1967, pp. 1-2.
46 Memorandum from Richard Ober to NSA, 9/14/71.
47 1960 FBI Manual, Section 87, pp. 5-11.
48 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p. 195.
48a See History of Domestic Intelligence, Report, Part II at note 139.
49 James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 137-138.
FBI documents indicate that another factor in the opening of the
investigation was the role of the wife of a Communist in assisting in
publicity work for the meeting (Memorandum from Washington Field
Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69, memorandum from Alexandria Field
Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/69) See Findings 6(a), p. 10, for the
broad dissemination of reports that resulted from this inquiry.
50 Raymond W. Wannall testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 139.
51 Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74.
52 Memoranda from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
53 Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 138.
54 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
55 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
56 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
57 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental
intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report,
Status of U.S. internal Security Programs. See Findings on Political
Abuse, p. 225 for discussion on the larger impact of such FBI terminology.
58 Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
59 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68.
60 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/28/69. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54.)
61 Memorandum from Executives Conference to Tolson, 10/29/70.
62 Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 384.
63 Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 69 p. 135.
64 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/68.
65 SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.
66 1971 Manual, Section 122.
67 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68.
67a Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
68 Mary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 112, 120.
69 Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70; memorandum New
York Field Office, 5/28/69; memorandum from Baltimore Field Office,
5/11/70 to FBI Headquarters. CIA agents in the United States also
reported on Women's Liberation activities in the course of their
preparation for overseas duty in Operation CHAOS. (Agent 1, Contact
Report, Vol. 11, Agent 1 file.)
70 Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI headquarters, 3/11/41.
71 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12/57.
72 Memorandum from Seattle Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/57.
73 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.
74 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
75 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56.
76 Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.
77 See Findings on "Political Abuse."
77a Robert Shackelford testimony, 2/2/76; pp. 89-90.
78 Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
79 Shackelford, 2/2/76; p. 90.
80 Shackleford, 2/2/76, p. 92.
81 See Findings, "Deficiencies in Control and Accountability", p. 265.
82 CIA memorandum, "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S.", 1/5/68.
83 CIA Report, "Restless Youth," Conclusions, p. 1, 9/4/68.
84 CIA Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal
Security Threat-Foreign," 1/5/71, pp. 1-3.
85 Richard Helms testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, pp.
2434-2435. Helms further testified: "President Johnson was after this
all the time ... this was something that came up almost daily and
weekly." Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 1/13/75, pp. 163-164.
86 See CHAOS Report: Section II D, "Operations of the CHAOS Program
and Related CIA Projects," and II E, "1969 Expansion of CHAOS."
87 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.
88 Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
89 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/24/64.
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