Re: [TSCM-L] RSA compromise via the processor branch prediction module
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From
: coderman <
code..._at_gmail.com
>
Date
: Tue, 21 Nov 2006 11:09:03 -0800
reason #43,756 to use a hardware crypto implementation[0]. reminds me
of the AES cache timing side channels[1]. (although to be fair, some
architectures can do these algorithms safely in software, just very
few[2]).
0. "VIA PadLock Security Engine"
http://www.via.com.tw/en/initiatives/padlock/hardware.jsp
1. "Cache-timing attacks on AES"
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20041111.pdf
2. "Cell Broadband Engine Architecture"
http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/power/library/pa-cellperf/
best regards,
Received on
Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:24 CST
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