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Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2010 00:57:29 -0500
From: ed <ber..._at_netaxs.com>
To: tscm-l2006_at_googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {4605} Solution for Secure Land Line?
References: <F962412CD9A0404EAC61A89AD817F5A9_at_pcnicolas>
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<978CAA7E685B473AA1A782DF04F9C476_at_pcnicolas>
<20100123145426.169923bllw21mj9c_at_webmail.uslec.net>
<bc77f6b21001231329je02225fxbfe5db4fc42340ad_at_mail.gmail.com>
<20100124222022.20833cq2mt3q5u68_at_webmail.uslec.net>
<E1NZP59-0005sS-00_at_pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
<20100125133828.32575mb8mt0p3eis_at_webmail.uslec.net>
<Pine.LNX.4.64.1001252125360.15740_at_lakka.kapsi>
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Quoting Sampo Syreeni <de..._at_iki.fi>:
> On 2010-01-25, ed wrote:
>
>> Even if a Cryptophone's communications is recorded, a new random
>> encryption key is used for each call and discarded when it ends
>> (one-time pad.)
>
> That is likely to be not true. Otherwise every single bit of
> surprisal sent out by phone would have to be encrypted with a singly
> used, random, secret bit shared by both. What you likely really mean
> is that you negotiate a randomly derived session key, used for
> symmetric encryption. Then we have to hope that the randomness is
> strong, the key negotiation secure, and the symmetric cipher strong
> enough.
The Cryptophone manual explains this better than I can:
www.cryptophone.de/support/downloads/CPG10manual.pdf
>> Would you trust a COMSEC vendor whose primary source of income is
>> from government agencies?
>> History proves that's a bad bet if one is concerned about
>> government eavesdropping.
>
> Does it? Take DES. It was one solid cipher for its time.
Take Crypto AG, please!
IBM developed DES to have a 64-bit key; NSA insisted it be
watered-down to 56 bits.
> Truly Government Grade.
Indeed.
-ed
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:25 CST