One end of these wires went to a speak that someone was using as a
microphone, and they had merely twisted old phone wires into the speak
like you see in order to use the old phone wires to patch the audio to a
pre-amp and subcarrier circuit, and then to patch the signal into the
building power system. The eavesdropping listening post was found (when
it was later found) to have a receiver that matched the transmitter tied
into the power-lines, but not turned on, which means it likely was done
early in the eavesdropping project, and while they had stopped using it,
they had not actually disconnected it.
As the project progressed and I located the "easy bugs" and the "easy
wiretaps" I immediately noted that there were two more easy ones to
find, and then there would likely be two or three very difficult to
find, so it was a matter of exhausting every possible test, examination,
test, measurement, and tracing, until there was utterly nothing more
that could be done to further the examination.
A professional TSCM person does not stop merely because something was
found, and indeed will re-double the effort as they know bugs and
wiretaps lead to more devices, and that a "simple" bug or wiretap like
this merely ignites a fervor in the people performing the inspection.
The old wiring was certified to have been fully removed by the .gov
contractor, who got paid to rip out every inch of wire and strip the
area of all conductors, and then rewire form scratch. They did the
later, but not the former, which made the very real eavesdropper life an
utter picnic.
The eavesdroppers set up a serious of easy to find taps and other
things, all of which drew focus away from the real bugs or wiretaps and
the real areas of interest.
The really sad thing is that the area had previously been subjected to
.gov sweep teams on several occasions, but due to the "matters" handled
in this facility they asked an outside firm to come in and exhaustively
scrub every inch of wire, cable, power, furniture, etc. But they did
not want the regular .gov sweep people to know that they were bringing
me in to check the work, and it was sheer pandaemonium when I turned in
my initial report and made notification of my initial findings within a
few hours of setting up my ladder and lights.
The location had to be retired, and decertified as even after I ripped
though it and documented everything, and then removed all that I found,.
Indeed, prior sweeps by .gov TSCM "experts" found nothing, and indeed
the review of the records of those prior sweeps revealed that the TSCM
inspectors never actually bothered to look in the areas I checked, or to
perform the measurements I took. In fact, there was quite a bit of
scandal as, if the sweep was performed in line with the government
standards that were in place at the time, then 3-4 minor security screw
up would have been discovered and quietly resolved,. The fact that these
were not found, and in fact the "plethora of additional things" were
not found by the .gov people put the client into a bit of a concern that
the .gov program was essentially worthless and a "pod of comprised,
inept operators" and there was some very strong words used that can not
be repeated in polite company.
The best sweeps are always provided when a high level executive engages
someone from outside the normal channels, and facilitates access in a
way that allows the project to be performed properly, with not
interference, and well documented, and then to use that extensive
documentation to harpoon the ineptitude of the .gov "certified" TSCM
people.
Security is indeed undermined by most "certified" practitioners as the
opposition knows what to expect, when to expect it, what will be used,
and who to pay off to subvert the whole project. and indeed most .gov
bug sweeps actually find anything due to the teams being so poorly
staffed, ripe with graft, poorly trained, and usually poorly equipped.
-jma
John Young wrote:
> Are these meant to be found, to divert from the ones
> not so obvious. How many are fake?
>
> These seem pretty obviously a security scam to lull the
> room occupants into thinking they are protected. As with
> all security promises, what is never revealed is what is
> not shown to the target, that is, the person paying for
> protection.
>
> A seriously threatened target would never trust a security
> system or the countermeasures unless based on, say, a
> decade of experience testing and retesting the faithful
> promisers. With a watch system paralleling the operation.
>
> Security betrayal usually pays more than fidelity. An
> absolutely trustworthy system most likely the least.
>
> Inept security practitioners are a wily bunch. Never
> what they appear to be. Same goes double for the best.
>
>
>
>
>
--
James M. Atkinson
President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
Granite Island Group
jm..._at_tscm.com
http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:26 CST