http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/03/grigory_pasko_speak_up_were_ea.htm
Grigory Pasko: Speak Up, We're Eavesdropping!
Speak Up, WeÂ’re Eavesdropping!
A technician “under the roof”
Conversation with an FSB officer (ret.) about the
ins and outs of information gathering and information security
By Grigory Pasko, journalist
From Russia, with Tradecraft
My interview subject and I spent a long time
discussing whether we should or shouldnÂ’t use his
real name. On the one hand, heÂ’s still
technically a reserve chekist. On the other hand,
the “reserve” status of former FSB officers is a
very relative term. In the end we decided that
weÂ’d change his name. According to the principle
of “you never know…”. After all, his current job
– heading a firm that uncovers information leaks
and protects information – does depend on whether
or not the “senior comrades” renew his license.
Pavel Mikhailov came to the KGB after graduating
from the radioelectronics department of a
polytechnical university. Administration «R»
(fighting crimes in the sphere of technology and
communications intercept intelligence), where he
ended up, was engaged in discovering information
leaks in state structures, as well as electronic
eavesdropping of foreign representations and
discovering working “enemy” listening devices.
HeÂ’s already been retired for several years. And
all these years heÂ’s been inspecting various
organizations with colleagues – primarily the
offices of entrepreneurs – for the presence of possible information leaks.
Before offering our readers my interview with the
technician working “under the roof”, I probably
ought to say a few words about the subject of our
discussion – mining and protecting information.
In recent years, the method of electronic
eavesdropping has been used actively in Russia in
the economic and political struggle. Internet
sites have literally begun to teem with articles
on this subject. They offer surveys of the
Russian market for devices that let you know if
your phone is being tapped, advise you to visit a
“special technology” store to see what’s on offer
(microphones, “noiseotrons”, stethoscopes,
mini-transmitters (with schematics), or provide
commentary on surveillance equipment, as well as
reminding of certain facts from the history of
listening devices (the most popular of which
concerns the “dreadful betrayal” of the former
head of the KGB of the USSR, Vadim Bakatin: his
colleagues accused him of having passed on
documentation on the listening devices embedded
in the new American embassy building to a
representative of the American embassy).
You can also find quite a few examples of the
vigilance of the valiant chekists in interdicting
the criminal activity of self-taught Kulibins [an
18th century Russian scientist and
tinkerer—Trans.] trading in everything from
sunflower seeds to various kinds of listening devices, scanners, and bugs.
And thatÂ’s where weÂ’ll start our talk, with bugs.
Pavel, there is a prevailing opinion that you can
just stick a bug on whatever you want and
wherever you want, and then just sit back and
record the patter of the individuals of interest to youÂ…
The fact of the matter is that only an
unprofessional place bugs for a long period of
time. And unprofessionals donÂ’t sweep their
workplaces for the presence of listening devices
for a long period of time. Smart people use our
services periodically. And by the way, weÂ’re not
really that expensive compared with the loss that
could accrue to their business by ill-wishers – competitors.
Back when you used to work at Administration «R»,
did you engage in wiretapping apartments, houses, offices?
Other people engaged in wiretapping apartments.
We dealt with communications intelligence, radio
intercepts, identifying unknown transmission
devices working on the territory of a region. In
the main, these were training exercises, because
there were no instances of actual radio electronic espionage in our region.
But that doesn't mean there wasn't anything like this going on at all?
Maybe there was, and maybe there wasnÂ’t. At any
rate, the equipment we had was used effectively.
We trained together with the neighboring region:
we would set up devices on their territory,
simulate their operation, and await a reaction.
Usually, the neighbors reacted. But in the event
of an error, punishment would follow without delay and most severely.
I recall a textbook case when bugs were
discovered in the office of Primorsky Kray
governor Nazdratenko back when he was involved in
a standoff with FSB general KondratovÂ…
That was a murky story. Supposedly, the police,
under the control of the governor, had placed the
bugs in order to discredit the FSB by throwing
the blame on it. And then the police themselves
found them and, in violation of all the laws,
invited journalists over and showed them these
bugs. And only then did they invite specialists from Administration «R».
In actuality, there is a multitude of incidents
similar to this one. The special services and
their work methods have been and continue to be
used to the hilt for attaining some kind of
political objectives. It is enough to recall the
“sauna stories” with the procurators-general…
It is known that during the time of the reform of
the FSB, many specialists left for commercial,
banking, and other “oligarchic” structures,
creating their own mini–special-services there:
with units for gathering information and
protecting channels of information. It is enough
to recall GusinskyÂ’s Media-Most with general
Bobkov. How widespread was this phenomenon in Russia?
The same thing that was going on in the capital
was going on in the regions. And the structures
created on the model of the special services
still exist today. Not as well-equipped
technically as in Moscow, with more modest needs
and appetites, butÂ… with the same connections and
practically the same capabilities that existed
before. Of course, there are now fewer of these
structures, because this business isnÂ’t cheap.
And only high-class professionals have remained in this market.
Was Russia lagging far behind the foreign special
services in terms of technical equipment?
It was behind, and it remains behind. Moreover,
in recent years the lag has increased. Because
the specialized institutes have fallen apart;
there wasnÂ’t enough fundingÂ… The only thing
keeping them afloat was their talent and
enthusiasm. Under Putin, the process has moved in
the other direction: the technical equipment has
started to improve, money is being appropriatedÂ…
Â…The number of chekists is growing. But there
havenÂ’t been, and still arenÂ’t any preventive
measures against terrorism in place. What can and
should the FSB technical services be doing to
support the FSB in its duty to prevent terrorism in the country?
-The certainly should be doing thisÂ…
What law are you governed by in the work you do?
- Activities in the realm of information security
– that’s really what we’re doing now – is
regulated by the law “On information,
informatization and protection of information”.
It says that any information the unauthorized use
of which may cause harm to its owner shall be
subject to protection. In addition, it indicates
that control over information security in the
structures of state shall be implemented by the
organs of state power. We arenÂ’t part of the
power, so thatÂ’s why we work only with non-state
structures and private persons who are not
associated with state secrets or limited-access
information. For example, private banks, the
editorial boards of newspapers and magazinesÂ…
Structures of state are handled by the same kind
of organizations as ours, only theyÂ’re state
themselves. TheyÂ’ve got different licensing, too,
and are funded out of the state budget.
How do clients feel about your past – service in the KGB?
I never hide where I come from. And the client
understands that a person who is not from there
may not have the license or the work experience.
That is, formally speaking, just anyone off the
street could try to organize such a business. But
for this he will need a recommendation from the
head of the FSB of a Subject of the Federation [a
Russian province, such as an Oblast or
Krai—Trans.] If he can get that, it’s full steam
ahead. But I am not aware of such cases.
What guarantees do you give clients that
information about their activities wonÂ’t become
known to competitors or to the FSB?
Just my word of honor.
I’ll be honest – that seems a bit thin.
All I can say is shop around. Try to find someone
cheaper and more reliable. The fact is that my
entire business depends on my reputation. If it
goes, my business goes. ItÂ’s enough for one
person to say, to insinuate, to start a rumor,
that I’m handing over clients to “the office”,
and I can just close up shop. But there havenÂ’t
been instances like that yet. Furthermore, I warn
a client right from the start that information –
if such becomes known to me – about his
participation in distributing narcotics,
preparing the murder of a person, trading in
state secrets and other such things will be
reported by me to the proper authorities.
And letÂ’s say heÂ’s engaged in fraud in the sphere of entrepreneurship?
Let those who know without me that this is what
he is engaged in engage in this.
Do you have a “handler” at the FSB?
I retired from such a high post that thereÂ’s no
need to even talk about a “handler”. My “handler”
is my convictions and my work experience.
How much do you charge for your services to check if information is secure?
On average, to sweep a facility, for example, of
20 square meters [roughly 200 square
feet—Trans.], for all possible kinds of
information leaks costs the client from 300 to
600 dollars. But there is also an individual
approach. If I see that an entrepreneur is trying
to save his money, and that he works hard and
honestly to earn it, then the price can be reduced by half.
What is the frequency with which people call on you for help?
We donÂ’t keep statistics like that, but there is
one peculiarity: the quantity of calls to us
increased after the elections to the State Duma.
There were fewer before the electionsÂ… And when
the change of the membership of the Duma took
place, there came a wave of calls. I think that
the next change of rotation in the parliament
will also entail an increase in the number of
calls to such organizations as ours.
Who places bugs?
The siloviki structures – the UBOPs, the RUBOPs,
the OBNONsÂ… [Administrations for Fighting
Organized Crime, District/Regional/Republican
Administrations for Fighting Organized Crime,
Branches for Fighting the Unlawful Turnover of
Narcotics—Trans.] There’s a total of eight
structures that have the right to do this, just
in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs—Trans.]
system. The things the FSB places are practically
impossible to find. And thenÂ… Anybody at all can
place a bug. The main thing is how to make use of
this later. The FSB needs this to present in
court. That means you need to do everything
legally, get permission through a court. ThatÂ’s
why “the office” doesn’t waste time on trivial
stuff. But the cops do fool around with this.
Either for kompromat, or out of some other
self-interested considerations. But we figure out
their bugs quickly. At the same time, let me
note: we work in the interests of the client
absolutely within the confines of the law.
What is the first question you ask a client?
Who could be working against you? If itÂ’s the
MVD, then theyÂ’ve got their techniques and
methods. If it’s gangsters – they’ve got their
own “signature”. The siloviki structures have
their own equipment, the gangsters use other kindsÂ… Not necessarily worse.
Why do you get requests from the editorial boards of newspapers and magazines?
To determine if theyÂ’ve got information leaks.
WeÂ’ve had that several times in our practice. And
each time it was already too late. We calculated
that the information had already been taken out,
that is before our arrival. That sort of thing
happens when the editorial board, for example,
has a conflict with the administration of the
region. Or when, with their publications,
journalists have stepped on the toes of some
commercial structure that can afford to organize a wiretap.
Can the FSB listen to everybody and everything,
to monitor electronic dispatches?
You canÂ’t have total eavesdropping. This is,
first of all, constrained by financial reasons.
The equipment for total control would cost a
fortune. Besides, someone needs to service this
equipment. That is, again, you need people. Their
labor needs to be remunerated. And thatÂ’s money
again. To monitor email, the internet, is
possible in principle. But the possibilities are
limited by financial considerations, the
availability of the necessary quantity of people.
But you could always recruit a hundred hackersÂ…
And the likelihood of information leaks would
increase a hundred-fold. Even in the USA, with
the financial potential of the NSA, total control didnÂ’t work out.
What are the sources of information leaks?
Data on hard disks is stolen, as a rule, by the
system administrator. Sometimes he gets himself
hired on purpose and then takes his time skimming
off the information and selling it. This is
physical theft of strategic information. Then
there is tactical information – necessary today,
at this hour, day. For example, a firm is in
litigation with someone, and information is
needed for counteraction in court. Or a
transaction is about to take place at any moment,
while competitors have decided to sabotage it.
We once swept an office and decided to trace how
the telephone wire leading out from the building
was laid. It turned out that on one of the floors
of the building, it passed through the office of
competitors. It makes sense that the competitors
were regularly in the know about all the affairs
and operations of their hapless colleagues, many steps ahead.
The means for skimming information can be
anything at all. First of all, this is installing
a wiretap on the telephone. Then – a wireless
radio transmitter bug in the office. It works
like a radio telephone from which information is
recorded. In neighboring offices – next door,
upstairs – you can set up electronic stethoscopes
to listen in on conversations. What works
especially well for these purposes is ventilation
shafts, drop ceilings, an abundance of furniture in the office.
As always, an effective method remains installing
a small portable recording device. A visitor
comes in, inconspicuously sticks a microphone
under the desk or chair with a piece of tape or
chewing gum, and goes away. Later, all you have
to do is record the conversations on tape. The
power supply resource for an «Olympus» digital
sound recorder is 17 hours. More than enough.
You can leave a recording device in the seams of upholstered furniture.
I want to especially point out that such a use of
the equipment is perfectly legal. After all, you
can always say that youÂ’d accidentally dropped
your recorder. Or forgotten it. The equipment is
bought openly, in stores, the laws do not
prohibit it. There is an abundance of equipment
sold openly or semi-legally, and all the more so illegally – a huge quantity.
Wireless radio bugs can be placed in electronic
devices, clocks, souvenirsÂ… Anywhere thatÂ’s
convenient, really. ThatÂ’s why I always advise
giving these gift horses a good look in the mouth.
Electronic stethoscopes with infrared channels
serve for gathering information through the
vibration of windows. One disadvantage is that
theyÂ’re very noisy. But an effective thing.
The actual cost of a radio bug is around 15
dollars. You can pick up a perfectly decent
selection of listening devices at any market for a relatively small price.
What do you think, is your business ever going to die?
In a country like Russia, it will either live
forever or, as happened before, the state, as
represented by the security service, will take it into its own hands.
Several stories from Pavel MikhailovÂ’s experience:
“I once got an order from the wife of a big
businessman. She asked me to install video
surveillance cameras in the apartment to find out
if her husband was cheating on her. For several
hours, while we were installing the equipment,
she was fooling around with her lover… practically right before our eyes.”
“There was this time we were sweeping the office
of a businessman – a big place and littered with
all kinds of junk all over the place. He was
walking around despondently because he had lost
his bank card. When we went through a mound of
paper, the scanning device suddenly went off. In
order to find the source of the electronic
radiation, we had to literally take apart this
mountain sheet by sheet. And that’s how we found the bank card.”
“I advised one entrepreneur to have less
furniture in the office and apartment for
security purposes. After sweeping his office, I
went to sweep his apartment at his request. Can
you imagine my amazement when I sawÂ… absolutely
bare rooms. It turns out that he and his wife had
rigorously followed my advice and were using a
minimum of furniture and furnishings in the apartment.”
“Here’s one thing that’s etched in my memory. In
the desk of a businessman, one of those “new
Russians”, there was a book. Now, that’s already
something highly unusual for this type of person.
And the name of the book was – “Jokes About the Intelligentsia”.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and
Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web:
http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We perform bug sweeps like it's a full contact sport, we take no prisoners,
and we give no quarter. Our goal is to simply, and completely stop the spy.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:26 CST