INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
_______
BOOK II
_______
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976
G. DEFICIENCIES IN CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY
MAJOR FINDING
The Committee finds that those responsible for overseeing,
supervising, and controlling domestic activities of the intelligence
community, although often unaware of details of the excesses
described in this report, made those excesses possible by delegating
broad authority without establishing adequate guidelines and
procedural checks; by failing to monitor and coordinate sufficiently
the activities of the agencies under their charge; by failing to
inquire further after receiving indications that improper activities
may have been occurring; by exhibiting a reluctance to know about
secret details of programs; and sometimes by requesting intelligence
agencies to engage in questionable practices. On numerous occasions,
intelligence agencies have, by concealment, misrepresentation, or
partial disclosure, hidden improper activities from those to whom
they owed a duty of disclosure. But such deceit and the improper
practices which it concealed would not have been possible to such a
degree if senior officials of the Executive Branch and Congress had
clearly allocated responsibility and imposed requirements for
reporting and obtaining prior approval for activities, and had
insisted on adherence to those requirements.
Subfindings
(a) Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to
collect information concerning "subversive activities" of American
citizens, but have failed until recently to define the limits of
domestic intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of
American citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding
intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.
(b) Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to
engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of
intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones,
and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or
establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing
adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.
(c) Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have
requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby
contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic
intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
(d) Presidents, Attorneys General, and other Cabinet officers have
neglected until recently to make inquiries in the face of clear
indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper
domestic activities.
(e) Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic
intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and
oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its
responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of
domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection
techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions.
Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of
which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.
(f) Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without
authorization with insufficient authorization, or in disregard of
express orders.
(g) The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be
seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence
operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or
threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.
Elaboration of Findings
The Committee has found excesses committed by intelligence agencies
-- lawless and improper behavior, intervention in the democratic
process, overbroad intelligence targeting and collection, and the use
of covert techniques to discredit and "neutralize" persons and groups
defined as enemies by the agencies. But responsibility for those acts
does not fall solely on the intelligence agencies which committed
them. Systematic excesses would not have occurred if lines of
authority had been clearly defined; if procedures for reporting and
review had been established; and if those responsible for supervising
the intelligence community had properly discharged their duties.
The pressure of events and the widespread confidence in the FBI help
to explain the deficiencies in command and authorization discovered
by the Committee. Most of the activities examined in this report
occurred during periods of foreign or domestic crisis. There was
substantial support from the public and all branches of government
for some of the central objectives of domestic intelligence policy,
including the search for "Fifth Columnists" before World War II; the
desire to identify communist "influence" in the Cold War atmosphere
of the 1950s; the demand for action against Klan violence in the
early 1960s; and the reaction to violent racial disturbances and
anti-Vietnam war activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was
in this heated environment that President and Attorneys General
ordered the FBI to investigate "subversive activities". Further, the
Bureau's reputation for effectiveness and professionalism, and
Director Hoover's ability to cultivate political support and to
inspire apprehension, played a significant role in shaping the
relationship between the FBI and the rest of the Government.
With only a few exceptions, the domestic intelligence activities
reviewed by the Committee were properly authorized within the
intelligence agencies. The FBI epitomizes a smoothly functioning
military structure: activities of agents are closedly supervised;
programs are authorized only after they have traveled a well-defined
bureaucratic circuit; and virtually all activities -- ranging from
high-level policy considerations to the minutia of daily reports from
field agencies -- are reduced to writing. These characteristics are
commendable. All efficient law enforcement and intelligence-gathering
machine, acting consistently with law, can greatly benefit the
nation. However, when used for wrongful purposes, this efficiency can
pose a grave danger.
It appears that many specific abuses were not known by the Attorney
General, the President, or other Cabinet-level officials directly
responsible for supervising domestic intelligence activities. But
whether or not particular activities were authorized by a President
or Attorney General, those individuals must -- as the chief executive
and the principal law enforcement officer of the United States
Government -- bear ultimate responsibility for the activities of
executive agencies under their command. The President and his Cabinet
officers have a duty to determine the nature of activities engaged in
by executive agencies and to prevent undesired activities from taking
place. This duty is particularly compelling when responsible
officials have reason to believe that undesirable activity is
occurring, as has often been the case in the context of domestic intelligence.
The Committee's inquiry has revealed a pattern of reckless disregard
of activities that threatened our Constitutional system. Intelligence
agencies were ordered to investigate "subversive activities," and
were then usually left to determine for themselves which activities
were "subversive" and how those activities should be investigated.
Intelligence agencies were told they could use investigative
techniques -- wiretaps, microphones, informants -- that permitted
them to pry into the most valued areas of privacy and were then given
in many cases the unregulated authority to determine when to use
those techniques and how long to continue them. Intelligence agencies
were encouraged to gather "pure intelligence," which was put to
political use by public officials outside of those agencies. This was
possibly because Congress had failed to pass laws limiting the areas
into which intelligence agencies could legally inquire and the
information they could disseminate.
Improper acts were often intentionally concealed from the Government
officials responsible for supervising the intelligence agencies, or
undertaken without express authority. Such behavior is inexcusable.
But equally inexcusable is the absence of executive and congressional
oversight that engendered an atmosphere in which the heads of those
agencies believed they could conceal activities from their superiors.
Attorney General Levi's recent guidelines and the recommendations of
this Committee are intended to provide the necessary guidance.
Whether or not the responsible Government officials knew about
improper intelligence activities, and even if the agency heads failed
in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that Presidents
and the appropriate Cabinet officials should have known about those
activities. This is a demanding standard, but one that must be
imposed. The future of democracy rests upon such accountability.
Subfinding (a)
Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect
information concerning "subversive activities" of American citizens,
but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic
intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American
citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding
intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.
As emphasized throughout this report, domestic intelligence
activities have been undertaken pursuant to mandates from the
Executive branch, generally issued during times of war or domestic
crisis. The directives of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and
Eisenhower to investigate "subversive activities," or other equally
ill-defined targets, were echoed in various orders from Attorneys
General, who themselves encouraged the FBI to undertake domestic
intelligence activities with vague but vigorous commands.
Neither Presidents nor their chief legal officers, the Attorneys
General, have defined the "subversive activities" which may be
investigated or provided guidelines to the agencies in determining
which individuals or groups were engaging in those activities. No
reporting procedures were established to enable Cabinet-level
officials or their designees to review the types of targets of
domestic investigations and to exercise independent judgment
concerning whether such investigations were warranted. No mechanisms
were established for monitoring the conduct of domestic
investigations or for determining if and when they should be
terminated. If Presidents had articulated standards in these areas,
or had designated someone to do the job for them, it is possible that
many of the abuses described in this report would not have occurred.
Considering the proliferation of agencies engaging in domestic
intelligence and the overlapping jurisdictional lines, it is
surprising that no President has successfully designated one
individual or body to coordinate and supervise the domestic
intelligence activities of the various agencies. The half-hearted
steps that were taken in that direction appear either to have been
abandoned or to have resulted in the concentration of even more power
in individual agency heads. For example, in 1949 President Truman
attempted to establish a control mechanism -- the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference -- to centralize authority for supervising
domestic intelligence activities of the FBI and military intelligence
agencies in a committee chaired by the Director of the FBI. The
Committee reported to the National Security Council, and an NSC staff
member was assigned responsibility for internal security. 1 The
practical effect of the IIC was apparently to increase the power of
the FBI Director and to remove control further from the Cabinet
level. In 1962, the functions of the IIC were transferred to the
Justice Department, and the Attorney General was put in nominal
charge of domestic intelligence. 2 While in theory supervision
resided in the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department,
that Division deferred in large part to the FBI and provided little
oversight. 3 The top two executives of the Internal Security Division
were former FBI officials. They appeared sympathetic to the Bureau,
and like the Bureau, emphasized threats of Communist "influence"
without mentioning actual results. 4
Another opportunity to coordinate intelligence collection was missed
in 1967, when Attorney General Ramsey Clark established the
Interdivisional Intelligence Unit (IDIU) to draw on virtually the
entire Federal Government's intelligence collecting capability for
information concerning groups and individuals "who may play a role,
whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil
disorders, or in preventing or checking them." 5 In the rush to
obtain intelligence, no efforts were made to formulate standards or
guidelines for controlling how the intelligence would be collected.
In the absence of such guidelines and under pressure for results, the
agencies undertook some of the most overly broad programs encountered
by the Committee. For example, the FBI's "ghetto" informant program
was a direct response to the Attorney General's broad requests for
intelligence.
The need for centralized control of domestic intelligence was again
given serious consideration during the vigorous demonstrations
against the war in Vietnam in 1970. The intelligence community's
program for dealing with internal dissent -- the Huston Plan --
envisioned not only relaxing controls on surveillance techniques, but
also coordinating intelligence collection efforts. According to Tom
Charles Huston's testimony, the President viewed the suggestion of a
coordinating body as the most important contribution of the plan. 8
Although the President quickly revoked his approval for the Huston
Plan, the idea of a central domestic intelligence body had taken
root. Two months later, with the encouragement of Attorney General
John Mitchell, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was established
in the Justice Department. That Committee, like its precursor, the
IDIU, compiled and evaluated raw intelligence; it did not exercise
supervision. 9
The growing sophistication of intelligence collection techniques
underscores the present need for central control and coordination of
domestic intelligence activities. Although the Executive Branch has
recognized that need in the past, it has not, until recently, faced
up to its responsibilities. President Gerald Ford's joint effort with
members of Congress to place further restrictions on wiretaps is a
welcome step in the right direction. Congress must act expeditiously
in this area.
Subfinding (b)
Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to
engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of
intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones,
and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or
establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing
adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.
The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the
United States and the Cabinet-level officer formally in charge of the
FBI. 10 The Justice Department, until recently, has failed to issue
directives to the FBI articulating the grounds for opening domestic
intelligence investigations or the standards to be followed in
carrying out those investigations. The Justice Department has
neglected to establish machinery for monitoring and supervising the
conduct of FBI investigations, for requiring approval of major
investigative decisions, and for determining when an investigation
should be terminated. Indeed, in 1972 the Attorney General said he
did not even know whether the FBI itself bad formulated guidelines
and standards for domestic intelligence activities, was not aware of
the FBI's manual of instructions, and had never reviewed the FBI's
internal guidelines. 11
The Justice Department has frequently levied specific demands on the
FBI for domestic intelligence, but has not accompanied these demands
with restrictions or guidelines. Examples include the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division's requests for reports on
demonstrations in the early 1960's (including coverage of a speech by
Governor elect George Wallace 11a and coverage of a civil rights
demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation
Proclamation 12 ): Attorney General Kennedy's efforts to expand FBI
infiltration of the Ku Klux Klan in 1964; 13 Attorney General Clark's
sweeping instructions to collect intelligence about civil disorders
in 1967; 14 and the Internal Security Division's request for more
extensive investigations of campus demonstrations in 1969. 15 While a
limited investigation into some of these areas may have been
warranted, the improper acts committed in the course of those
investigations were possible because no restraints had been imposed.
The Justice Department also cooperated with the FBI in defying the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950 by approving the Bureau's Security
Index criteria for the investigation of "potentially dangerous"
persons. 16 Even after Congress repealed the Detention Act, the
Justice Department allowed the Bureau to continue listing
"potentially dangerous" persons on a new Administrative Index. The
Department stopped reviewing the names on the FBI's index, and
apparently endorsed the FBI's view that the list could, contrary to
law, be used for detention purposes in an "emergency."
The FBI's autonomy has been a prominent and long-accepted feature of
the Federal bureaucratic terrain. As early as the 1940s the FBI could
oppose Justice Department inquiries into its internal affairs by
raising the specter of "leaks." 17 The Department acquiesced in the
Bureau's claim that it was entitled to withhold its raw files,
conceal the identities of informants, and, in a number of cases,
refuse to give the Justice Department evidence supporting broad
allegations and characterizations. Former Attorney General Katzenbach
has pointed out that there were both positive and negative sides to
the Bureau's autonomy:
Keeping the Bureau free from political interference was a powerful
argument against efforts by politically appointed officials, whatever
their motivations, to gain a greater measure of control over
operations of the Bureau.... [Director Hoover also] found great value
in his formal position as subordinate to the Attorney General and the
fact that the FBI was a part of the Department of Justice.... In
effect, he was uniquely successful in having it both ways; he was
protected from public criticism by having a theoretical superior who
took responsibility for his work, and was protected from his superior
by his public reputation. 18
As a consequence of its autonomy, the Bureau could plan and implement
many of the abusive operations described in this report. Former
Attorneys General have told the Committee that they would never have
permitted the more unsavory aspects of the New Left or Racial
COINTELPROs if they had been aware of the Bureau's plans. To the
extent that Attorneys General were ignorant of the Bureau's
activities, it was the consequence not only of the FBI Director's
independent political position, but also of the failure of the
Attorneys General to establish procedures for finding out what the
Bureau was doing and for permitting an atmosphere to evolve in which
Bureau officials believed that they had no duty to report their
activities to the Justice Department, and that they could conceal
those activities with little risk of exposure. 20
Attorneys General have not only neglected to establish procedures for
reviewing FBI programs and activities, but they have at the same time
granted the FBI authority to employ highly intrusive investigative
techniques with inadequate guidelines and review procedures, and in
some instances with no external restraints whatsoever. Before 1965,
wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance,
but once the Attorney General had authorized wiretap coverage of a
subject, the Bureau could continue the surveillance for as long as it
judged necessary.
This permissive policy was current in October 1963 when Attorney
General Robert Kennedy authorized the FBI to wiretap the phones of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "at his current address or at any future
address to which he may move" and to wiretap the New York and Atlanta
SCLC offices. 21 Reading the Attorney General's wiretap authorization
broadly, the FBI construed Dr. King's "residence" so as to permit
wiretaps on three\, of his hotel rooms and the homes of friends with
whom he stayed temporarily. 22 The FBI was still relying on Attorney
General Kennedy's initial authorization when it sought
reauthorization for the King wiretaps in April 1965 in response to
new procedures formulated by Attorney General Katzenbach. Although
Attorney General Kennedy's authorizing memorandum in October 1963
said that the FBI should provide him with an evaluation of the
wiretaps after 60 days, he failed to complain when the FBI neglected
to send him the evaluation. Apparently the Attorney General never
mentioned the wiretaps to the FBI again, even though he received FBI
reports from the wiretaps until he resigned in September, 1964. 23
The Justice Department's policy toward the use of microphones has
been even more permissive than for wiretaps. Until 1965, the FBI was
free to carry out microphone surveillance in national security cases
without first seeking the approval of the Attorney General or
notifying him afterward. The total absence of supervision enabled the
FBI to hide microphones in Dr. Martin Luther King's hotel rooms for
nearly two years for the express purpose of not only determining
whether he was being influenced by allegedly communist advisers. but
to "attempt" to obtain information about the private "activities of
Dr. King and his associates" so that Dr. King could be "completely
discredited." 21 Attorney General Kennedy was apparently never told
about the microphone surveillances of Dr. King, although he did
receive reports containing unattributed information from that
surveillance from which he might have concluded that microphones were
the source. 25
The Justice Department imposed external control over microphones for
the first time in March 1965, when Attorney General Katzenbach
applied the same procedures to wiretaps and microphones, requiring
not only prior authorization but also formal periodic review. 26 But
irregularities were tolerated even with this standard. For example,
the FBI has provided the Committee three memoranda from Director
Hoover, initialed by Attorney General Katzenbach, as evidence that it
informed the Justice Department of its microphone surveillance of Dr.
King after the March 1965 policy change. These documents, however,
show that Katzenbach was informed about the microphones only after
they had already been installed. 27 Such after-the-fact approval was
permitted under Katzenbach's procedures. 27a There is no indication
that Katzenbach inquired further after receiving the notice. 28
The Justice Department condoned, and often encouraged, the FBI's use
of informants -- the investigative technique with the highest
potential for abuse. However, the Justice Department imposed no
restrictions on informant activity or reporting, and established no
procedures for reviewing the Bureau's decision to use informants in a
particular case.
In 1954 the Justice Department entered into an agreement with the CIA
in which the CIA was permitted to withhold the names of employees
whom it had determined were "almost certainly guilty of violations of
criminal statutes" when the CIA could "devise no charge" under which
they could be prosecuted that would not "require revelation of highly
classified information." 29 This practice was terminated by the
Justice Department in January, 1975. 29a
Despite the failure of Attorneys General to exercise the supervision
that is necessary in the area of domestic intelligence, several
Attorneys General have taken steps in the right direction. Of note
were Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach's review procedures for
electronic surveillance in 1965; Ramsey Clark's refusal to approve
electronic surveillance of domestic intelligence targets and his
rejection of repeated requests by the FBI for such surveillance;
Acting Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus' inquiries into
the Bureau's domestic intelligence program; Deputy Attorney General
Laurence Silberman's inquiry into political abuses of the FBI in
early 1975; and Attorney General Saxbe's decision to make the Justice
Department's COINTELPRO report public.
During the past year, Attorney General Edward H. Levi has exercised
welcome leadership by formulating guidelines for FBI investigations;
developing legislative proposals requiring a judicial warrant for
national security wiretaps and microphones; establishing the Office
of Professional Responsibility to inquire into departmental
misconduct; initiating investigations of alleged wrongdoing by the
FBI; and cooperating with this Committee's requests for documents on
FBI intelligence operations. 30 The Justice Department's concern in
recent years is a hopeful sign, but long overdue.
Subfinding (c)
Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have
requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby
contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic
intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
The separate finding on "political abuse" sets forth instances in
which the FBI was used by White House officials to gather politically
useful information, including data on administration opponents and
critics. This misuse of the Bureau's powers by its political
superiors necessarily contributed to the atmosphere in which abuses
flourished.
If the Bureau's superiors were willing to accept the fruits of
excessive intelligence gathering, to authorize electronic
surveillance, for political purposes, and to receive reports on
critics which included intimate details of their personal lives, they
could not credibly hold the Bureau to a high ethical standard. If
political expediency characterized the decisions of those expected to
set limits on the Bureau's conduct, it is not surprising that the FBI
considered the principle of expediency endorsed.
Subfinding (d)
Presidents, Attorneys General, and other cabinet officers have
neglected, until recently, to make inquiries in the face of clear
indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper
domestic activities.
Executive branch officials contributed to an atmosphere in which
excesses were possible by ignoring clear indications of excesses and
failing to take corrective measures when directly confronted with
improper behavior. The Committee's findings on "Violating and
Ignoring the Law" illustrate that several questionable or illegal
programs continued after higher officials had learned partial details
and failed to ask for additional information, either out of the naive
assumption that intelligence agencies would not engage in lawless
conduct, or because they preferred not to be informed. 31
Some of the most disturbing examples of insufficient action in the
face of clear danger signals were uncovered in the Committee's
investigation of the FBI's program to "neutralize" Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. as the leader of the civil rights movement. The Bureau
informed the Committee that its files contain no evidence that any
officials outside of the FBI "were specifically aware of any efforts,
steps, or plans or proposals to 'discredit' or 'neutralize' King." 32
The relevant executive branch officials have told the Committee that
they were, unaware of a general Bureau program to discredit King.
Former Attorney General Katzenbach, however, told the Committee:
Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil Rights could
possibly have been unaware of Mr. Hoover's feelings [against Dr.
King]. Nobody could have been unaware of the potential for disaster
which those feelings embodied. But, given the realities of the
situation, I do not believe one could have anticipated the extremes
to which it was apparently carried. 34
The evidence before the Committee confirms that the "potential for
disaster" was indeed clear at the time. There is no question that
officials in the White House and Justice Department, including
President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, knew that the
Bureau was taking steps to discredit Dr. King, although they did not
know the full extent of the Bureau's efforts.
-- In January 1964 the FBI gave Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins
an FBI report unfavorable to Dr. King. According to a contemporaneous
FBI memorandum, Jenkins said that he "was of the opinion that the FBI
could perform a good service to the country if this matter could
somehow be confidentially given to members of the press." Jenkins, in
a staff interview, denied having made such a suggestion. 35
-- In February 1964 a reporter informed the Justice Department that
the FBI had offered to "leak" information unfavorable to Dr. King to
the press. The Justice Department's Press Chief, Edwin Guthman, asked
Cartha DeLoach, the FBI's liaison with the press, about this
allegation and DeLoach denied any involvement. The Justice Department
took no further action. 36
-- Bill Moyers, an Assistant to President Johnson, testified that he
learned sometime in early 1964 that an FBI agent twice offered to
play a tape recording for Walter Jenkins that would have been
personally embarrassing to Dr. King and that Jenkins refused to
listen to the tape on both occasions. 36a Moyers testified that he
never asked the FBI why it had the tape or was offering to play it in
the White House. 37 When asked if he had ever questioned the
propriety of the FBI's disseminating information of a personal nature
about Dr. King within the Government, he replied, "I never questioned
it, no." When he was asked if he could recall anyone in the White
House ever questioning the propriety of the FBI disseminating this
type of material, Moyers testified. "I think . . . there were
comments that tended to ridicule the FBI's doing this, but no." 38
-- Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division, testified that sometime in 1964 a reporter told him
that the Bureau had offered information unfavorable to Dr. King.
Marshall testified that he repeated this allegation to a Bureau
official and asked for a report. The Bureau official subsequently
informed him "The Director wants you to know that you're a . . .
damned liar." 39
-- In November 1964 the Washington Bureau Chief of a national news
publication told Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney
General Marshall that one of his reporters had been approached by the
FBI and offered the opportunity to hear some "interesting" tape
recordings involving Dr. King. Katzenbach testified that, he had been
"shocked," and that he and Marshall had informed President Johnson,
who "took the matter very seriously" and promised to contact Director
Hoover. 40 Neither Marshall nor Katzenbach knew if the President
contacted Hoover. 41 Katzenbach testified that, during this same
period, he learned of at least one other reporter who had been
offered tape recordings by the Bureau, and that he personally
confronted DeLoach, who was reported to have made the offers. 42
DeLoach told Katzenbach that be had never made such offers. 43 The
only record of this episode in FBI files is a memorandum by DeLoach
stating that Moyers had informed him that the newsman was "telling
all over town" that the FBI was making allegations concerning Dr.
King, and that Moyers had "stated that the President felt that [the
newsman] lacked integrity...." 44 Moyers could not recall this
episode, but told the Committee that it would be fair to conclude
that the President had been upset by the fact that the newsman
revealed the Bureau's conduct rather than by the Bureau's conduct itself. 45
The response of top White House and Justice Department officials to
strong indications of wrongdoing by the FBI was clearly inadequate.
The Attorney General went no further than complaining to the
President and asking a Bureau official if the charges were true.
President Johnson apparently not only failed to order the Bureau to
stop, but indeed warned it not to deal with certain reporters because
they had complained about the Bureau's improper conduct.
In 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Director Hoover if he had
"any information as to how" facts about Attorney General Kennedy's
authorization of the wiretap on Dr. King had leaked to columnists
Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Clark requested the FBI Director to
"undertake whatever investigation you deem feasible to determine how
this happened. 45a Director Hoover's reply, drafted in the office of
Cartha DeLoach, expressed "dismay" at the leak and offered no
indication of the likely source. 45b
In fact, DeLoach had prepared a memorandum ten days earlier stating
that a middle-level Justice Department official with knowledge of the
King wiretap met with him and admitted having "discussed this matter
with Drew Pearson." According to this memorandum, DeLoach attempted
to persuade the official not to allow the story to be printed because
"certain Negro groups would still blame the FBI, whether we were
ordered to take such action or not." 45c Thus, DeLoach and Hoover
deliberately misled Attorney General Clark by withholding their
knowledge of the source of the "leak."
Subfinding (e)
Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic
intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and
oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its
responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of
domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection
techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions.
Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of
which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.
Congress, unlike the Executive branch, does not have the function of
supervising the day-to-day activities of agencies engaged in domestic
intelligence. Congress does, however, have the ability through
legislation to affect almost every aspect of domestic intelligence
activity: to erect the framework for coordinating domestic
intelligence activities; to define and limit the types of activities
in which executive agencies may engage; to establish the standards
for conducting investigations; and to promulgate guidelines for
controlling the use of wiretaps, microphones, and informants.
Congress could also exercise a great influence over domestic
intelligence through its power over the appropriations for
intelligence agencies' budgets and through the investigative powers
of its committees.
Congress has failed to establish precise standards governing domestic
intelligence. No congressional statutes deal with the authority of
executive agencies to conduct domestic intelligence operations, or
instruct the executive in how to structure and supervise those
operations. No statutes address when or under what conditions
investigations may be conducted. Congress did not attempt to
formulate standards for wiretaps or microphones until 1968, and even
then avoided the issue of domestic intelligence wiretaps by allowing
an exception for an undefined claim of inherent executive power to
conduct domestic security surveillance, which was subsequently held
unconstitutional. 45d No legislative standards have been enacted to
govern the use of informants.
Congress has helped shape the environment in which improper
intelligence activities were possible. The FBI claims that sweeping
provisions in several vague criminal statutes and regulatory measures
enacted by Congress provide a basis for much of its domestic
intelligence activity. 45e Congress also added its voice to the
strong consensus in favor of governmental action against Communism in
the 1950's and domestic dissidents in the 1960's and 1970's.
Congress' failure to define intelligence functions has invited action
by the executive. If the top officials of the executive branch are
responsible for failing to control the intelligence agencies, that
failure is in part due to a lack of guidance from Congress.
During most of the 40-year period covered in this report,
congressional committees did not effectively monitor domestic
intelligence activities. For example, in 1966, a Senate Judiciary
subcommittee undertook an investigation of electronic surveillance
and other intrusive techniques by Federal agencies. According to an
FBI memorandum, its chairman told a delegation from the FBI that he
would make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI,"
and acceded in the FBI's request that the subcommittee refrain from
calling FBI witnesses. 46
Another example of the deficiencies in congressional oversight is
seen in the House Appropriations Committee's regular approval of the
FBI's requests for appropriations without raising objections to the
activities described in the Director's testimony and off-the-record
briefings. There is no question that members of a House
Appropriations subcommittee were aware not only that the Bureau was
engaged in broad domestic intelligence investigations, but that it
was also employing disruptive tactics against domestic targets.
In 1958, Director Hoover informed the subcommittee that the Bureau
had an "intensive program" to "disorganize and disrupt" the Communist
Party, that the program had existed "for years" and that Bureau
informants were used "as a disruptive tactic." 47 The next year, the
Director informed the subcommittee that informants in 12 field offices
have been carefully briefed to engage in controversial discussions
with the Communist Party so as to promote dissention, factionalism
and defections from the communist cause. This technique has been
extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint.
Under another phase of this program, we have carefully selected 28
items of anticommunist propaganda and have anonymously mailed it to
selected communists, carefully concealing the identity of the FBI as
its source. More than 2,800 copies of literature have been placed in
the hands of active communists. 48
Hoover described more aggressive "psychological warfare" techniques in 1962:
During the past year we have caused disruption at large Party
meetings, rallies and press conferences through various techniques
such as causing the last-minute cancellation of the rental of the
hall, packing the audience with anticommunists, arranging adverse
publicity in the press and making available embarrassing questions
for friendly reporters to ask the Communist Party functionaries.
The Appropriations subcommittee was also told during this briefing
that the FBI's operations included exposing and discrediting
"communists who are secretly operating in legitimate organizations
and employments, such as the Young Men's Christian Association, Boy
Scouts, civic groups, and the like." 49
In 1966 Director Hoover informed the Appropriations subcommittee that
the disruptive program had been extended to the Ku Klux Klan. 50
The present Associate Director of the FBI, Nicholas Callahan, who
accompanied Director Hoover during several of his appearances before
the Appropriations subcommittee, said that members of the
subcommittee made "no critical comment" about "the Bureau's efforts
to neutralize groups and associations." 51
Subcommittee Chairman John Rooney's statements in a televised
interview in 1971 regarding FBI briefings about Dr. Martin Luther
King are indicative of the subcommittee's attitude toward the Bureau:
Representative ROONEY. Now you talk about the F.B.I. leaking
something about Martin Luther King. I happen to know all about Martin
Luther King, but I have never told anybody.
Interviewer. How do you know everything about Martin Luther King?
Representative ROONEY. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Interviewer. They've told you -- gave you information based on taps
or other sources about Martin Luther King.
Representative ROONEY. They did.
Interviewer. Is that proper?
Representative ROONEY. Why not? 52
Former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson recalled that in 1967
the Justice Department averaged "fifty letters a week from Congress"
demanding that "people like [Stokely] Carmichael be jailed." Vinson
said that on one occasion when he was explaining First Amendment
limits at a congressional hearing, a Congressman "got so provoked he
raised his hand and said, 'to hell with the First Amendment."' Vinson
testified that these incidents fairly characterized "the atmosphere
of the time." 53
The congressional performance has improved, however, in recent years.
Subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee have initiated
inquiries into Army surveillance of domestic targets and into
electronic surveillance by the FBI. House Judiciary Committee
subcommittees commissioned a study of the FBI by the General
Accounting Office and have inquired into FBI misconduct and
surveillance activities. Concurrent with this Committee's
investigations, the House Select Committee on Intelligence considered
FBI domestic intelligence activities.
Our Constitution envisions Congress as a check on the Executive
branch, and gives Congress certain powers for discharging that
function. Until recently, Congress has not effectively fulfilled its
constitutional role in the area of domestic intelligence. Although
the appropriate congressional committees did not always know what
intelligence agencies were, doing, they could have asked. The
Appropriations subcommittee was aware that the FBI was engaging in
activities far beyond the mere collection of intelligence, yet it did
not inquire into the details of those programs. 54 If Congress had
addressed the issues of domestic intelligence and passed regulatory
legislation, and if it had probed into the activities of intelligence
agencies and required them to account for their deeds, many of the
excesses in this Report might not have occurred.
Subfinding (f)
Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without
authorization, with insufficient authorization, or in defiance of
express orders.
The excesses detailed in this report were due in part to the failure
of Congress and the Executive branch to erect a sound framework for
domestic intelligence, and in part to the dereliction of
responsibility by executive branch officials who were in charge of
individual agencies. Yet substantial responsibility lies with
officials of the intelligence agencies themselves. They had no
justification for initiating major activities without first seeking
the express approval of their superiors. The pattern of concealment
and partial and misleading disclosures must never again be allowed to occur.
The Committee's investigations have revealed numerous instances in
which intelligence agencies have assumed programs or activities were
authorized under circumstances where it could not reasonably be
inferred that higher officials intended to confer authorization.
Sometimes far-reaching domestic programs were initiated without the
knowledge or approval of the appropriate official outside of the
agencies. Sometimes it was claimed that higher officials had been
"notified" of a program after they had been informed only about some
aspects of the program, or after the program had been described with
vague references and euphemisms, such as "neutralize," that carried
different meanings for agency personnel than for uninitiated
outsiders. Sometimes notice consisted of references to programs
buried in the details of lengthy memoranda; and "authorization" was
inferred from the fact that higher officials failed to order the
agency to discontinue the program that had been obscurely mentioned.
The Bureau has made no claim of outside authorization for its
COINTELPROs against the Socialist Workers Party, Black Nationalists,
or New Left adherents. After 1960, its fragile claim for
authorization of the COINTELPROs against the Communist Party USA and
White Hate Groups was drawn from a series of hints and partial,
obscured disclosures to the Attorneys General and the White House.
The first evidence of notification to higher government officials of
the FBI's COINTELPRO against the Communist Party USA consists of
letters from Director Hoover to President Eisenhower and Attorney
General William Rogers in May 1958 informing them that "in August of
1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed to promote disruption
within the ranks of the Communist Party (CP) USA." 55 There is no
record of any reply to these letters.
Later that same year, Director Hoover told President Eisenhower and
his Cabinet:
To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United
States, we have a ... program designed to intensify any confusion and
dissatisfaction among its members.
During the past few years, this program has been most effective.
Selected informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial
issues within the Party.... The Internal Revenue Service was
furnished names and addresses of Party functionaries who had been
active in the underground apparatus ... ; Anticommunist literature
and simulated Party documents were mailed anonymously to carefully
chosen members . . . . 56
The FBI's only claim to having notified the Kennedy Administration
about COINTELPRO rests upon a letter written shortly before the
inauguration in January 1961 from Director Hoover to Attorney
General-designate Robert Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General-designate
Byron R. White, and Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk. One
paragraph in the five-page letter stated that the Bureau had a
"carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA which
keeps it off balance," and which was "carried on from both inside and
outside the party organization." The Bureau claimed to have been
"successful in preventing communists from seizing control of
legitimate, mass organizations" and to have "discredited others who
were secretly operating inside such organizations." 67 Specific
techniques were not mentioned, and no additional notice was provided
to the Kennedy Administration. Indeed, when the Kennedy White House
formally requested of Hoover a report on "Internal Security
Programs," the Director described only the FBI's "investigative
program," and made no reference to disruptive activities. 58
The only claimed notice of the COINTELPRO against the Ku Klux Klan
was given after the program had begun and consisted of a partial
description buried within a discussion of other subjects. In
September 1965, copies of a two page letter were sent to President
Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, describing the Bureau's
success in solving a number of cases involving racial violence in the
South. That report contained a paragraph stating that the Bureau was
"seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan
organizations," and briefly described the exposure of a Klan member's
"kickback" scheme involving insurance company premiums. 59 More
questionable tactics, such as sending a letter to a Klansman's wife
to destroy their marriage, were not mentioned. The Bureau viewed
Katzenbach's reply to its letter -- which praises the investigative
successes which are the focus of the FBI's letter -- as constituting
authorization for the White Hate COINTELPRO. 60
The claimed notification to Attorney General Ramsey Clark of the
White Hate COINTELPRO consisted of a ten-page memorandum captioned
"Ku Klux Klan Investigations -- FBI Accomplishments" with a buried
reference to Bureau informants "removing" Klan officers and
"provoking scandal" within the Klan organization 61, Clark told the
Committee that he did not recall reading those phrases or
interpreting them as notice that the Bureau was engaging in
disruptive tactics. 62 Cartha DeLoach, Assistant to the Director
during this period, testified that he "distinctly" recalled briefing
Attorney General Clark "generally ... concerning COINTELPRO." 63
Clark denied havingbeen briefed. 64
The letters and briefings described above, which constitute the
Bureau's entire claim to notice and authorization for the CPUSA and
White Hate COINTELPROs, failed to mention techniques which risked
physical, emotional, or economic harm to their targets. In no case
was an Attorney General clearly told the nature and extent of the
programs and asked for his approval. In no case was approval expressly given.
Former Attorney General Katzenbach cogently described another
misleading form of "authorization" relied on by the Bureau and other
intelligence agencies:
As far as Mr. Hoover was concerned, it was sufficient for the Bureau
if at any time any Attorney General had authorized [a particular]
activity in any circumstances. In fact, it was often sufficient if
any Attorney General had written something which could be construed
to authorize it or had been informed in some one of hundreds of
memoranda of some facts from which he could conceivably have inferred
the possibility of such an activity. Perhaps to a permanent head of a
large bureaucracy this seems a reasonable way of proceeding. However,
there is simply no way an incoming Cabinet officer can or should be
charged with endorsing every decision of his predecessor . . . . 65
For example, the CPUSA COINTELPRO was substantially described to the
Eisenhower Administration, obliquely to the Kennedy Administration
designees, but continued -- apparently solely on the strength of
those assumed authorizations -- through the Johnson Administration
and into the Nixon Administration. The idea that authority might
continue from one administration to the next and that there is no
duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision making.
Circumstances may change and judgments may differ. New officials
should be given -- and should insist upon -- the opportunity to
review significant programs.
The CIA's mail opening project illustrates an instance in which an
intelligence agency apparently received authorization for a limited
program and then expanded that program into significant new areas
without seeking further authorization. In May 1954, DCI Allen Dulles
and Richard Helms, then Chief of Operations in the CIA's Directorate
of Plans, briefed Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield about the
CIA's New York mail project, which at that time involved only the
examination of envelope exteriors. CIA memoranda indicate that
Summerfield's approval was obtained for photographing envelope
exteriors, but no mention was made of the possibility of mail opening. 66
The focus of the CIA's project shifted to mail opening sometime
during the ensuing year, but the CIA did not return to inform
Summerfield and made no attempt to secure his approval for this
illegal operation.
Intelligence officers have sometimes withheld information from their
superiors and concealed programs to prevent discovery by their
superiors. The Bureau apparently ignored the Attorney General's order
to stop classifying persons as "dangerous" in 1943; unilaterally
decided not to provide the Justice Department with information about
communist espionage on at least two occasions "for security reasons;"
and withheld similar information from the Presidential Commission
investigating the government's security program in 1947. 67 More
recently, CIA and NSA concealed from President Richard Nixon their
respective mail opening and communications interception programs.
These incidents are not unique. The FBI also concealed its Reserve
Index of prominent persons who were not included on the Security
Index reviewed by the Justice Department; its other targeting
programs against "Rabble Rousers," "Agitators," "Key Activists," and
"Key Extremists;" and its use of intrusive mail opening and
surrepititious entry techniques. Indeed, the FBI institutionalized
its capability to conceal activities from the Justice Department by
establishing a regular "Do Not File" procedure, which assured
internal control while frustrating external accountability.
Subfinding (g)
The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen
in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence
operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or
threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.
The lack of vigorous oversight and internal controls on domestic
intelligence activity frequently left the termination of improper
programs to the ad hoc process of public exposure or threat of
exposure by Congress, the press, or private citizens. Less
frequently, domestic intelligence projects were terminated solely
because of an agency's internal review of impropriety.
The Committee is aware that public exposure can jeopardize
legitimate, productive, and costly intelligence programs. We do not
condone the extralegal activities which led to the exposure of some
questionable operations.
Nevertheless two points emerge from an examination of the termination
of numerous domestic intelligence activities: (1) major illegal or
improper operations thrived in an atmosphere of secrecy and
inadequate executive control; and (2) public airing proved to be the
most effective means of terminating or reforming those operations.
Some intelligence officers and Executive branch administrators sought
the termination of questionable programs as soon as they became aware
of the nature of the operation -- the Committee praises their
actions. However, too often we have seen that the secrecy that
protected illegal or improper activities and the insular nature of
the agencies involved prevented intelligence officers from
questioning their actions or realizing that they were wrong.
There are several noteworthy examples of illegal or abusive domestic
intelligence activities which were terminated only after the threat
of public exposure:
-- The FBI's widesweeping COINTELPRO operations were terminated on
April 27, 1971, in response to disclosures about the program in the press. 73
-- IRS payments to confidential informants were suspended in March
1975 as a result of journalistic investigation of Operation Leprechaun. 74
-- The Army's termination of several major domestic intelligence
operations, which were clearly overbroad or illegal, came only after
the programs were disclosed in the press or were scheduled as the
subject of congressional inquiry. 75
-- On one occasion, FBI Director Hoover insisted that electronic
surveillance be discontinued prior to his appearance before the House
Appropriations Committee so that he could report a relatively small
number of wiretaps in place. 76 Contrary to frequent allegations,
however, no general pattern of temporary suspensions or terminations
during the Director's appearances before the House Appropriations
Committee is revealed by Bureau records.
-- Following the report of a Presidential committee which had been
established in response to news reports in 1967, the CIA terminated
its covert relationship with a large number of domestically based
organizations, such as academic institutions, student groups, private
foundations, and media projects aimed at an international audience. 78
Other examples of curtailment of domestic intelligence activity in
response to the prospect of public exposure include: President
Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan out of concern for
the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions proposed and
the fact that "their sensitivity would likely generate media
criticism if they were employed;" 79 J. Edgar Hoover's cessation of
the bugging of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s hotel rooms after the
initiation of a Senate investigation chaired by Edward V. Long of
Missouri; 80 and the CIA's consideration of suspending mail-opening
until the Long inquiry abated and eventual termination of the program
"in the Watergate climate." 81 More recently, several questionable
domestic intelligence practices have been terminated at least in part
as a result of Congressional investigation. 82
There are several prominent instances of terminations which resulted
from an internal review process:
-- In August 1973, shortly after taking office, Internal Revenue
Service Commissioner Donald Alexander abolished the Special Service
Staff upon learning that it was engaged in political intelligence
activities which he considered "antithetical to proper tax administration." 83
-- An internal legal review in 1973 prompted the termination of the
joint effort by NSA and CIA to monitor United States - South American
communications by individuals named on a drug traffic "watch list." 84
-- On May 9, 1973, newly appointed CIA Director James Schlesinger
requested from CIA personnel an inventory of all "questionable
activities" which the Agency had undertaken. The 694 pages of
memoranda received in response to this request -- which became known
at the CIA as "The Family Jewels" -- prompted the termination or
limitation of a number of programs which were in violation of the the
Agency's mandate, notably the CHAOS project involving
intelligence-gathering against American citizens. 85
-- In the early 1960s, the CIA's MKULTRA testing program, which
involved surreptitiously administering drugs to unwitting persons,
was "frozen" after the Inspector General questioned the morality and
lack of administrative control of the program. 85a
-- Several mail-opening operations were terminated because they
lacked sufficient intelligence value, which was often measured in
relation to the "flap potential" -- or risk of disclosure -- of an
operation. However, both the CIA and the FBI continued other
mail-opening operations after these terminations. 86
The Committee's examination of the circumstances surrounding
terminations of a wide range of improper or illegal domestic
intelligence activities clearly points to the need for more effective
oversight from outside the agencies. In too many cases, the impetus
for the termination of programs of obviously questionable propriety
came from the press or the Congress rather than from intelligence
agency administrators or their superiors in the Executive Branch.
Although there were several laudable instances of termination as a
responsible outgrowth of an agency's internal review process, the
Committee's record indicates that this process alone is insufficient
-- intelligence agencies cannot be left to police themselves.
Footnotes:
1 National Security Council memorandum 17/5,6/15/49.
2 National Security Action memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
3 For example, the FBI continued an investigation of one group in
1964 after the internal Security Division told the Bureau there was
"insufficient evidence" of any legal violations. (Memorandum from
Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/64.) Two years later, an FBI intelligence
official suggested that it would be "in the Bureau's best interest to
put the Department on record again." The Department approved the
FBI's request for permission to continue the investigation even
though there had been "no significant changes as to the character and
tactics of the organization." The FBI did not request further
instructions in this investigation until 1973. (Memorandum from
Baumgardner to Sullivan, 7/15/66; memorandum from Yeagley to Hoover, 7/28/66.)
4 For example, the annual report of Assistant Attorney General J.
Walter Yeagley for Fiscal Year 1959 emphasized Communist attempts to
wield influence, without pointing out the lack of tangible results:
"Despite the 'thaw,' real or apparent, in the Cold War, and despite
[its] losses, the [Communist] Party has continued as an organized
force, constantly seeking to repair its losses and to regain its
former position of influence. In a number of fields its activities
are directed ostensibly toward laudable objectives, such as the
elimination of discrimination by reason of race, low cost housing for
the economically underprivileged, and so on. These activities are
pursued in large part as a way of extending the forces and currents
in American life, and with the hope of being able to 'move in' on
such movements when the time seems propitious." [Emphasis added.]
(Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-248.)
The same executives headed the Internal Security Division from 1959
until 1970, through the administrations of five Attorneys General and
four Presidents. In 1971 a new Assistant Attorney General for the
Internal Security Division, Robert Mardian, actively encouraged FBI
surveillance and collaborated with FBI executive William C. Sullivan
in transferring the records of the "17" wiretaps from the Bureau to
the Nixon White House.
5 Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin Maroney, et al., 11/9/67.
6 & 7 omitted in original.
8 Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
9 Staff summary of interview of Colonel Werner E. Michel, 5/12/75.
10 Despite the formal line of responsibility to the Attorney General,
Director J. Edgar Hoover in fact developed an informal channel to the
White House. During several administrations beginning with President
Franklin Roosevelt the Director and the President circumvented the
Justice Department and dealt directly with each other.
11 Memorandum from St. John Barrett to Marshall, 6/18/63.
11a Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall, 12/4/62.
12 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke
13 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1965, pp. 185-186.
14 Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67.
15 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/69.
16 Memorandum from Belmont to Ladd, 10/15/52.
17 Memorandum from Hoover to L. M. C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Laws
Unit, 11/28/40.
18 Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 201.
20 The Justice Department's investigation of the FBI's COINTELPRO
illustrates the reluctance of the Justice Department to interfere in
or even inquire about Internal Bureau matters. Although the existence
of COINTELPRO was made public in 1971, the Justice Department did not
initiate an investigation until 1974. The Department's Committee,
headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, which conducted
the investigation, agreed to use only summaries of documents prepared
by the Bureau instead of examining the Bureau documents themselves.
Those summaries were often extremely misleading. For example, one
summary stated:
"it was recommended that an anonymous letter be mailed to the leader
of the Blackstone Rangers, a black extremist organization in Chicago.
The letter would hopefully drive a wedge between the Blackstone
Rangers and the Black Panthers Party. The anonymous letter would
indicate that the Black Panther Party in Chicago blamed the leader of
the Blackstone Rangers for blocking their programs."
The document from which this summary was derived, however, stated
that the Blackstone Rangers were prone to "violent type activity,
shooting, and the like." The anonymous letter was to state that "the
Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to
be a hit out for you." The memorandum concluded that the letter "may
intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and "lead
to reprisals against its leadership." (Memorandum from Chicago Field
Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/69.)
21 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, 10/7/63; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, 10/18/63.
22 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4-5.
23 See M. L. King Report: "Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin
Luther King and the Christian Leadership Conference." It should be
noted, however, that President Kennedy was assassinated a month after
the wiretap was installed which may account for Attorney General
Kennedy's failure to inquire about the King wiretaps, at least for
the first few months.
24 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
25 The FBI informed the Committee that it has no documents indicating
that Attorney General Kennedy was told about the microphones. His
associates in the Justice Department testified that they were never
told, and they did not believe that the Attorney General had been
told about the microphones. (See memorandum from Charles Brennan to
William Sullivan, 12/19/66; Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20;
Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.)
The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected that the
FBI was using microphones to gather information about Dr. King must
be viewed in light of the Attorney General's express authorization of
wiretaps in the King case on national security grounds, and the FBI's
practice -- known to the Attorney General -- of installing
microphones in such national security cases without notifying the Department.
26 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/65, p. 2.
The Attorney General's policy change occurred during a period of
publicity and Congressional inquiry into the FBI's use of electronic
surveillance.
27 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65;
Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 10/19/65;
Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 12/1/65.
27a Katzenbach advised Director Hoover in September 1965 that "in
emergency situations [wiretaps and microphones] may be used subject
to my later ratification." (Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover,
9/27/65.) Nevertheless, there is no indication that these microphone
surveillances of Dr. King presented "emergency situations."
28 Katzenbach testified that he could not recall having seen the
notices, although he acknowledged the initials on the memoranda as in
his handwriting and in the location where he customarily placed his
initials. (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 227.)
29 Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Deputy Attorney General, 3/1/54.
29a Memorandum for the Record by General Counsel, CIA, 1/31/75.
30 The Committee's requests also provided the Department of Justice
with the opportunity to see most of these FBI documents for the first time.
31 One cabinet official, when told that the CIA wanted to tell him
something secret, replied, "I would rather not know anything about
it." The "secret" matter was CIA's illegal mail opening program. (J.
Edward Day testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45.)
32 Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 11/6/75.
34 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 209.
35 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64; Staff
summary of Walter Jenkins Interview, 12/1/75, pp. 1-2. Mr. Jenkins
subsequently said that he was unable to testify formally because of
illness and has failed to answer written interrogatories submitted to
him by the Committee for response under oath.
36 Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/65; Edwin Guthman
testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 20-23.
36a Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19.
37 Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19; staff summary of Bill Moyers
interview, 11/24/75.
In an unsworn staff interview, Jenkins denied that he ever received
an offer to listen to such tapes. (Staff summary of Walter Jenkins
interview, 12/1/75.)
38 Moyers, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.
39 Marshall, 3/8/76, pp. 4647.
40 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
41 Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 43; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
42 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
43 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210. DeLoach testified
before the Committee that he did not recall conversations with
reporters about tape recordings of Dr. King. (Cartha DeLoach
testimony, 11/25/75, p. 156.)
44 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64.
45 Moyers, 3/2/76. p. 9.
45a Memorandum from Clark to Hoover, 5/27/69. The story was published
in the midst of Robert Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic
presidential nomination.
45b Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 5/29/68.
45c Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/17/68. Four days
later DeLoach had a phone conversation with Jack Anderson in which,
according to partment [sic] official "had advised him concerning
specific information involving an old wire tap on King." (Memorandum
from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/21/68.) Both of these memoranda
were initialed by Hoover.
45d U.S. V. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
45e These include the Smith Act of 1940 and the Voorhis Act of 1941.
In addition to reliance on these statutes to buttress its claim of
authority for domestic intelligence operations, the FBI has also
placed reliance on a Civil War seditious conspiracy statute and a
rebellion and insurrection statute passed during the Whiskey
Rebellion of the 1790's. FBI Director Clarence Kelley, in a letter to
the Attorney General, stated that these later statutes were designed
for past centuries, "not the Twentieth Century." (memorandum from
Director, FBI, to Attorney General, Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 53.)
The Committee agrees.
46 Memorandum from DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 1/21/66.
47 1958 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House
Appropriations Committee.
48 1959 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House
Appropriations Committee.
49 1962 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House
Appropriations Committee.
50 1966 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House
Appropriations Committee.
51 Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 1/12/76.
52 Interview with Congressman Rooney, NBC News' "First Tuesday," 6/1/71.
53 Fred Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 34.
54 Director Hoover appears to have told the subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee more about COINTELPRO operations and
techniques than he told the Justice Department or the White House.
55 Memorandum from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
56 Excerpt from FBI Director's Briefing of Cabinet, 11/6/58.
57 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
1/10/61, copies to White and Rusk.
58 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, 7/25/61, and
attached I.I.C. Report: "Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs."
59 Letters from Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the
President, and Attorney General Katzenbach, 9/17/65.
60 Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/3/65.
61 Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 12/18/67.
62 Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 235.
63 DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 183.
64 Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 232.
65 Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6, p. 202.
66 Memorandum from Richard. Helms, Chief of Operations, DDP, to
Director of Security, 5/17/54.
67 See Part II, pp. 35-36, 55-56.
68-72 omitted in original.
73 Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 4/27/71; letter from
Director, FBI, to all Field Offices, 4/28/71. Even after the
termination of COINTELPRO, it was suggested that "counterintelligence
action" would be considered "in exceptional instances" so long as
there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy" (Sullivan
memorandum, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI to all Field Offices, 4/28/71.)
74 See IRS Report: "Operation Leprechaun."
75 The Army made its first effort to curb its domestic collection of
"civil disturbance" intelligence on the political activities of
private citizens in June 1970, only after press disclosures about the
program which prompted two Congressional committees to schedule
hearings on the matter, (Christopher Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence: The
Army Watches Civilian Politics" Washington Monthly, January 1970.)
Despite legal opinions, both from inside and outside the Army, that
domestic radio monitoring by the Army Security Agency was illegal,
the Army did not move to terminate the program until after the media
revealed that the Army Security Agency had monitored radio
transmissions during the 1968 Democratic National Convention
(Memorandum from Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to
the Army General Counsel re: UPASA Covert Activities in Civil
Disturbance Control Operations.) Department of Defense controls on
domestic surveillance were not imposed until March 1971, after NBC
News reported that the Army had placed Senator Adlai Stevenson III
and Congressman Abner Mikva under surveillance. (NBC News, "First
Tuesday", 12/1/70.)
76 This involved nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February
1971. (Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 8/20/75, pp. 148, 149.)
77 omitted in original.
78 This included nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February
1971. In response to the storm of public and congressional criticism
engendered by a press account of CIA support for a student
organization, President Johnson appointed a Committee, chaired by
then Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review
government activities that "endanger the integrity and independence"
of United States educational and private voluntary organizations
which operate abroad. In March 1967, the Committee recommended "that
no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or
support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or
private voluntary organizations." The CIA responded with a major
review of such projects.
The question of the nature and extent of the CIA's compliance with
the Katzenbach guidelines is discussed in the Committee's Foreign
Intelligence Report.
79 Response by Richard Nixon to interrogatory Number 17 posed by
Senate Select Committee.
80 On January 7, 1966, in response to Associate Director Tolson's
recommendation, Director Hoover "reserve[d] final decision" about
whether to discontinue all microphone surveillance of Dr. King "until
DeLoach sees [Senator Edward V.] Long." (Memorandum from Sullivan to
DeLoach, 1/21/66.) The only occasion on which the FBI Director
rejected a recommendation for bugging a hotel room of Dr. King's was
January 21, 1966, the same day that Assistant Director DeLoach met
with an aide to Senator Long to try to head off the Long Committee's
hearings on the subject of FBI "bugs" and taps. (Memorandum from
DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.) When DeLoach returned from the meeting,
he reported:
"While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the
Long Subcommittee, we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which
might be created as a result of newspaper pressure on Long. We
therefore must keep on top of this situation at all times."
(Memorandum, Executives Conference to the Director, 1/7/66.)
Another possible explanation for Hoover's cessation of the King hotel
bugging is found in the impact of a memorandum from the Solicitor
General in the Black case which Hoover apparently interpreted as a
restriction upon the FBI's authority to conduct microphone
surveillance. (Supplemental memorandum for the United States, U.S. v.
Black, submitted by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 7/13/66;
Katzenbach, 10/11/75. p. 58.)
81 In 1965, the Long Subcommittee investigation caused the CIA to
consider whether its major mail opening "operations should be
partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations
are completed." When the CIA contacted Chief Postal Inspector Henry
Montague and learned that he believed that the Long investigation
would "soon cool off," it was decided to continue the operation.
(Memorandum to the files by "CIA officer." 4/23/65.)
Despite continued apprehensions about the "flap potential" of
exposure and repeated recognition of its illegality, the actual
termination of the CIA's New York mail-opening project came,
according to CIA Office of Security Director Howard Osborn because:
"I thought it was illegal and in the Watergate climate we had
absolutely no business doing this." (Howard Osborn deposition,
8/28/75, p. 89.) He discussed the matter with William Colby who
agreed that the project was illegal and should not be continued,
"particularly in a climate of that type." (Osborn deposition, 8/28/75, p. 90.)
82 Shortly after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities held hearings on the laxity of the system for disclosure
of tax return information to United States attorneys, the practice
was changed. In October 1975, U.S. Attorneys requesting tax return
information were required by the IRS to provide a sufficient
explanation of the need for the information and the intended use to
which it would be put to enable IRS to ascertain the validity of the
request. Operation SHAMROCK, NSA's program of obtaining millions of
international telegrams, was terminated in May 1975, according to a
senior NSA official, primarily because it was no longer a valuable
source of foreign intelligence and because the Senate Select
Committee's investigation of the program had increased the risk of
exposure. (Staff summary of "senior NSA official" interview, 9/17/75, p. 3.)
83 Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 8.
Alexander testified, however, that in a meeting with IRS
administrators on the day after he took office, the SSS was
discussed, and "full disclosure" was not made to him. Prior to the
Leprechaun revelations, Commissioner Alexander had also initiated a
general review of IRS information-gathering and retrieval systems,
and he had already suspended certain types of information-gathering
due to discovery of vast quantities of non-tax-related material.
(Alexander, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 8-10.)
Another termination due to internal review took place at IRS in 1968.
The Chief of the Disclosure Branch terminated what he considered the
"illegal" provision of tax return information to the FBI by another
IRS Division. (IRS Memorandum, D. O. Virdin to Harold Snyder,
5/2/68.) During this same period, the CIA was also obtaining returns
in a manner similar to the FBI (though in much smaller numbers), yet
no one in the Intelligence Division or elsewhere in the Compliance
Division apparently thought to examine that practice in light of the
change being made in the practice with respect to the FBI. (Donald 0.
Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.)
84 The CIA suspended its participation in the program as a result of
an opinion by its General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, that the
intercepts were illegal. (Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief of
Division, 1/29/73.) Shortly thereafter, NASA reviewed the legality
and appropriateness of its own involvement in what was essentially a
law enforcement effort by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
rather than a foreign intelligence program, which is the only
authorized province for NSA operations. ("Senior NSA official
deposition,'' 9/16/75, p. 10.) In June 1973 the Director of NSA
terminated the drug watch list, several months after the CIA had
terminated its own intercept program. NSA's drug watch list activity
had been in operation since 1970. (Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 23.)
In the fall of 1973, NSA terminated the remainder of its watch list
activity, which had involved monitoring communications by individuals
targeted for NSA by other agencies including CIA, FBI, and BNDD. In
response to the Keith case and to another case which threatened to
disclose the existence of the NSA watch list, NSA and the Justice
Department had begun to reconsider the propriety of the program. The
review process culminated in termination. See NSA Report: Termination
of Civil Disturbance Watch List.
85 Schlesinger described his review of "grey area activities" which
were "perhaps legal, perhaps not legal" as a part of "the enhanced
effort that came in the wake of Watergate" for oversight of the
propriety of Government activities. (Schlesinger testimony.
Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, pp. 114,116.) Schlesinger testified
that his request for the reporting of "questionable activities" came
after learning that "there was this whole set of relationships"
between the CIA and White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt, Jr., about
which Schlesinger had not been briefed completely upon assuming his
position. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller Commission testimony, p. 115.)
"As a consequence," Schlesinger "insisted that all people come
forward" with "anything to do with the Watergate affair" and any
other arguably improper or illegal operations. (Schlesinger,
Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, p. 116.)
85a After the Inspector General's survey of the Technical Services
Division, he recommended termination of the testing program. (Earman
memorandum, 5/5/63.) The program was then suspended pending
resolution at the highest levels within the CIA of the issues
presented by the program -- "the risks of embarrassment to the
Agency, coupled with the moral problem." (Memorandum from DDP Helms
to DCI McCone, 9/4/65.) In response to the IG Report, DDP Helms
recommended to DCI McCone that unwitting testing continue. Helms
maintained that the program could be conducted in a "secure and
effective manner" and believed it "necessary that the Agency maintain
a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities
in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive
capability." (Memorandum from Helms to DCI McCone, 8/19/63.) The
Acting DCI deferred decision on the matter and directed TSD in the
meantime to "continue the freeze on unwitting testing." (CIA
memorandum to Senate Select Commitee, received 9/4/75.) According to
a CIA report to the Select Committee:
"With the destruction of the MKULTRA files in early 1973, It is
believed that there are no definitive records in CIA that would
record the termination of the program for testing behavioral drugs on
unwitting persons. . . . There is no record to our knowledge, that
[the] freeze was ever lifted." (CIA memorandum to Senate Select
Committee, received 9/4/75.)
Testimony from the CIA officials involved confirmed that the testing
was not resumed. (See Foreign and Military Intelligence Report.)
86 Two FBI mail-opening programs were suspended for security reasons
involving changes in local postal personnel and never reinstituted,
on the theory that the value of the programs did not justify the risk
involved. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI
Headquarters, 5/19/66.) The CIA's San Francisco mail-opening project
"was terminated since the risk factor outweighed continuing an
activity which had already achieved its objectives." (Memorandum to
Chief, East Asia Division, June 1973.) The lack of any significant
intelligence value to the CIA apparently led to the termination of
the New Orleans mail-opening program. (Memorandum from "Identity 13"
to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.) Three other programs were
terminated because they had produced no valuable counterintelligence
information, while diverting manpower needed for other operations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and
Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web:
http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We perform bug sweeps like it's a full contact sport, we take no prisoners,
and we give no quarter. Our goal is to simply, and completely stop the spy.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:29 CST