



2009

A Tales of Reversing & Keygenning Two MD5 Registration Schemas



Author: 2kAD, Nieylana

Graphic Editor: Shub-Nigurrath

ARTeam

February 2009

DISCLAIMER

All code included with this tutorial is free to use and modify; we only ask that you mention where you found it. This tutorial is also free to distribute in its current unaltered form, with all the included supplements.

All the commercial programs used within this tutorial have been used only for the purpose of demonstrating the theories and methods described. No distribution of patched applications has been done under any media or host. The applications used were most of the times already been patched by other fellows, and cracked versions were available since a lot of time. ARTeam or the authors of the papers shouldn't be considered responsible for damages to the companies holding rights on those programs. The scope of this document as well as any other ARTeam tutorial is of sharing knowledge and teaching how to patch applications, how to bypass protections and generally speaking how to improve the RCE art. We are not releasing any cracked application.

VERIFICATION

ARTeam.esfv can be opened in the ARTeamESFVChecker to verify all files have been released by ARTeam and are unaltered. The ARTeamESFVChecker can be obtained in the release section of the ARTeam site: <http://releases.accessroot.com>



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer.....	2
Verification	2
1 KEYGENNING MD5 – 2KAD	4
1.1 Forewords	4
1.1.1 Tools used:.....	4
1.2 Before we start.....	4
1.3 Starting up and getting ready	7
1.4 Analyzing the algorithm	10
1.5 Figuring out a valid key.....	19
1.6 Reversing the algorithm	24
1.7 Final words.....	24
2 KEYGENNING MD5, NIEYLANA	25
2.1 Abstract.....	25
2.2 Target.....	25
2.3 Analyzing Target.....	25
2.4 Finding the Verification Routine.....	26
2.5 Finding the Beginning of the MD5 Routine.....	27
2.6 Finding the String Being Hashed	28
2.7 Use of the MD5 Hash.....	28
2.8 Summary.....	29
2.9 Greetings.....	30
2.10 Conclusion.....	30

1 KEYGENNING MD5 – 2KAD

1.1 FOREWORDS

I have been on the computer scene for a long time... Since 1984 to be exact, and have been reversing or cracking (so it was called back then) since that time. I have seen many protections come and go, and I have unpacked pretty much every protection known to man. However, keygenning is new to me.... Or serious keygenning is. In this tutorial I will show you how I reversed what I will describe as my first serious keygen. The tutorial is not a complete walk through, because it would take months to write. It's written so that reversers with some knowledge should be able to see how I figured out this protection. If you are a complete newbie it's not a tutorial for you yet.

1.1.1 TOOLS USED:

A PC, Olly debugger v1.10, a working brain.

1.2 BEFORE WE START...

In the following tutorial you will see my comments in the disassembly, that the target uses MD5 hashing. But how do I know ? Well, of course one will have to trace the target and eventually you will stumble upon certain code snippets that for sure will give you the answer.

Here is the first clue:

00CFAS40	8B4424 04	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
00CFAS44	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX
00CFAS46	C700 0123456	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX],67452301
00CFAS4C	C740 04 89AB	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4],EFCDA889
00CFAS53	C740 08 FEDC	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+8],98BADCFE
00CFAS5A	C740 0C 7654	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C],10325476
00CFAS61	8948 10	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+10],ECX
00CFAS64	8948 14	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+14],ECX
00CFAS67	8948 58	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+58],ECX
00CFAS6A	C3	RETN
00CFAS6B	00	NOB

This taken from RFC 1351 (<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1321>):

```

/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context.
*/
void MD5Init (context)
MD5_CTX *context;                                /* context */
{
    context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
    /* Load magic initialization constants.
*/
    context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
    context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
    context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
    context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
}

```

Here is the final proof:

00CFA570	885424 0C	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]	
00CFA574	8B4C24 04	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]	
00CFA578	53	PUSH EBX	
00CFA579	8BC2	MOV EAX,EDX	
00CFA57B	8B59 08	MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+8]	
00CFA57E	55	PUSH EBP	
00CFA57F	8B69 04	MOV EBP,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4]	
00CFA582	4A	DEC EDX	
00CFA583	56	PUSH ESI	
00CFA584	8B71 0C	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+C]	
00CFA587	85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
00CFA589	0F84 C606000	JE 00CFAC55	
00CFA58F	8B4424 14	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+14]	
00CFA593	57	PUSH EDI	
00CFA594	83C0 38	ADD EAX,38	
00CFA597	42	INC EDX	
00CFA598	895424 18	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+18],EDX	
00CFA59C	8B78 C8	MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-38]	
00CFA59F	8B06	MOV EDX,ESI	
00CFA5A1	33D3	XOR EDX,EBX	
00CFA5A3	23D5	AND EDX,EBP	
00CFA5A5	33D6	XOR EDX,ESI	
00CFA5A7	03D7	ADD EDX,EDI	
00CFA5A9	8BFB	MOV EDI,EBX	
00CFA5AB	8BF2	MOV ESI,EDX	
00CFA5AD	8B11	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX]	
00CFA5AF	33FD	XOR EDI,EBP	
00CFA5B1	8D9416 78A46	LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+EDX+D76AA478]	Look at this
00CFA5B8	8B70 CC	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-34]	
00CFA5BB	C1C2 07	ROL EDX,7	
00CFA5BE	03D5	ADD EDX,EBP	
00CFA5C0	23FA	AND EDI,EDX	
00CFA5C2	33FB	XOR EDI,EBX	
00CFA5C4	03FE	ADD EDI,ESI	
00CFA5C6	8B71 0C	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+C]	
00CFA5C9	8D8437 56B7C	LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+ESI+E8C7B756]	Look at this
00CFA5D0	8BFD	MOV EDI,EBP	
00CFA5D2	C1C6 0C	ROL ESI,0C	
00CFA5D5	03F2	ADD ESI,EDX	
00CFA5D7	33FA	XOR EDI,EDX	
00CFA5D9	23FE	AND EDI,ESI	
00CFA5DB	33FD	XOR EDI,EBP	
00CFA5DD	8B68 D0	MOV EBP,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-30]	
00CFA5E0	03FD	ADD EDI,EBP	
00CFA5E2	8BEE	MOV EBP,ESI	
00CFA5E4	33EA	XOR EBP,EDX	
00CFA5E6	8D8C1F DB70B	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+EBX+242070DB]	Look at this
00CFA5E8	03F2 04	ADD EDI,EBP	

Again this taken from RFC 1351:

```
/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block.
 */
static void MD5Transform (state, block)
UINT4 state[4];
unsigned char block[64];
{
    UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16];

    Decode (x, block, 64);

    /* Round 1 */
    FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S11, 0xd76aa478); /* 1 */
    FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, 0xe8c7b756); /* 2 */
    FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, 0x242070db); /* 3 */
    FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 3], S14, 0xc1bdceee); /* 4 */
    FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S11, 0xf57c0faf); /* 5 */
    FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 5], S12, 0x4787c62a); /* 6 */
    FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S13, 0xa8304613); /* 7 */
    FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7], S14, 0xfd469501); /* 8 */
    FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S11, 0x698098d8); /* 9 */
    FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9], S12, 0x8b44f7af); /* 10 */
    FF (c, d, a, b, x[10], S13, 0xfffff5bb1); /* 11 */
    FF (b, c, d, a, x[11], S14, 0x895cd7be); /* 12 */
    FF (a, b, c, d, x[12], S11, 0x6b901122); /* 13 */
    FF (d, a, b, c, x[13], S12, 0xfd987193); /* 14 */
    FF (c, d, a, b, x[14], S13, 0xa679438e); /* 15 */
    FF (b, c, d, a, x[15], S14, 0x49b40821); /* 16 */
}
```

It's evident that we're in the first round of MD5. Also you can use IDA findcrypt plugin. This will identify it for you. There are other tools out there that will do the same job, but being able to identify MD5 yourself will save you time.

1.3 STARTING UP AND GETTING READY

Execute “drag2pdf.exe” and go to the registration dialog. Below you will see what I typed in. Don’t mind the strange language displayed in the picture, it’s just my native language.



Once you typed in a name and serial, press OK.

You will get a messagebox saying the that serial is not valid. So I decided to set breakpoints on **MessageBoxA**, **MessageBoxExA**, **MessageboxExW** and run it again.

We trap it at **MessageboxExW**. Back trace until you end up in a code-section.

00C72B76	. 8D4D EC	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]	
00C72B79	. 8845 F3	MOV BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-D],AL	
00C72B7C	. 6A 11	PUSH 11	
00C72B7E	. E8 BEBB1600	CALL 00DDE741	[Arg1 = 00000011 edocpdfp.00E1E741
00C72B83	. 399E AC000000	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+AC],EBX	
00C72B89	~ 76 6D	JBE SHORT 00C72BF8	From here
00C72B8B	. 385D F3	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-D],BL	
00C72B8E	~ 74 68	JE SHORT 00C72BF8	From here
00C72B90	. 8B86 C4000000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C4]	
00C72B96	. 3D 88000000	CMP EAX,88	
00C72B9B	~ 74 0E	JE SHORT 00C72BAB	
00C72B9D	. 3D 80160000	CMP EAX,1680	
00C72BA2	~ 75 54	JNZ SHORT 00C72BF8	From here
00C72BA4	. 68 FD000000	PUSH 0FD	
00C72BA9	~ EB 45	JMP SHORT 00C72BF0	
00C72BAB	> 68 FE000000	PUSH 0FE	
00C72BB0	~ EB 3E	JMP SHORT 00C72BF0	
00C72BB2	> 8B45 B8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-48]	
00C72BB5	. 3BC3	CMP EAX,EBX	
00C72BB7	~ 75 05	JNZ SHORT 00C72BBE	
00C72BB9	. B8 EC88E000	MOV EAX,00E088EC	
00C72BBE	> 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72BBF	. 6A 06	PUSH 6	[Arg1 = 00000006 edocpdfp.00CA1347
00C72BC1	. E8 81E7FEFF	CALL 00C61347	
00C72BC6	. 59	POP ECX	
00C72BC7	. 8BF8	MOV EDI,EAX	
00C72BC9	. 59	POP ECX	
00C72BCA	. E8 29990500	CALL 00CCC4F8	
00C72BCF	. 85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
00C72BD1	~ 75 39	JNZ SHORT 00C72C0C	
00C72BD3	. 81FF 37300000	CMP EDI,3037	
00C72BD9	~ 74 10	JE SHORT 00C72BEB	
00C72BDB	. 81FF 38300000	CMP EDI,3038	
00C72BE1	~ 74 08	JE SHORT 00C72BEB	
00C72BE3	. 81FF 3E300000	CMP EDI,303E	
00C72BE9	~ 75 21	JNZ SHORT 00C72C0C	
00C72BEB	> 68 CE000000	PUSH 0CE	
00C72BF0	. 8D4D EC	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]	
00C72BF3	. E8 49BB1600	CALL 00DDE741	[edocpdfp.00E1E741
00C72BF8	> 6A 30	PUSH 30	
00C72BFA	. 8BCE	MOV ECX,ESI	
00C72BFC	. FF75 E8	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]	
00C72BFF	. FF75 EC	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]	
00C72C02	. E8 339E1600	CALL 00DDCA9A	
00C72C07	~ E9 95000000	JMP 00C72CA1	
00C72C0C	> 6A 10	PUSH 10	[Arg1 = 00000010
00C72C0E	. 8D4D EC	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]	
00C72C11	. E8 29990500	CALL 00CCC4F8	[edocpdfp.00E1E741

Jumps from 00C72B89, 00C72B8E, 00C72BA2

Notice that the BAD BOY call originates from either 3 positions. So lets back trace a little until we hit gold.

00C72B38	. 8D45 D4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B3B	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B3C	. 8D45 C4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72B3F	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B40	. E8 EEEBFEFF	CALL 00C61733	Let the fun begin
00C72B45	. 83C4 20	ADD ESP,20	
00C72B48	~ EB 14	JMP SHORT 00C72B5E	
00C72B4A	> 8D45 B4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C]	
00C72B4D	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B4E	. 8D45 D4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B51	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B52	. 8D45 C4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72B55	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B56	. E8 7EE8FEFF	CALL 00C613D9	
00C72B5B	. 83C4 0C	ADD ESP,0C	
00C72B5E	> 3AC3	CMP AL,BL	
00C72B60	~ 75 50	JNZ SHORT 00C72BB2	
00C72B62	. 8D45 B4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C]	
00C72B65	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B66	. 8D45 D4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B69	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B6A	. 8D45 C4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72B6D	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B6E	. E8 66E8FEFF	CALL 00C613D9	
00C72B73	. 83C4 0C	ADD ESP,0C	
00C72B76	. 8D4D EC	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]	
00C72B79	. 8845 F3	MOV BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-D],AL	
00C72B7C	. 6A 11	PUSH 11	
00C72B7E	. E8 BEBB1600	CALL 00DDE741	[Arg1 = 00000011 edocpdfp.00E1E741
00C72B83	. 399E AC000000	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+AC],EBX	
00C72B89	~ 76 6D	JBE SHORT 00C72BF8	From here
00C72B8B	. 385D F3	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-D],BL	
00C72B8E	~ 74 68	JE SHORT 00C72BF8	From here
00C72B90	. 8B86 C4000000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C4]	
00C72B96	. 3D 88000000	CMP EAX,88	
00C72B9B	~ 74 0E	JE SHORT 00C72BAB	
00C72B9D	. 3D 80160000	CMP EAX,1680	
00C72BA2	~ 75 54	JNZ SHORT 00C72BF8	
00C72BA4	. 68 FD000000	PUSH 0FD	
00C72BA9	~ EB 45	JMP SHORT 00C72BF0	From here

The call at 0C72B40 is our wonder call. So let go to the beginning of this procedure and find out what happens.
Do not trace into the call at 0C72B40 yet.

1.4 ANALYZING THE ALGORITHM

Once we find out where we are directed we end up here:

00C72AD4	. 8BCF	MOV ECX,EDI	Get Navn
00C72AD6	. E8 76541600	CALL 000D7F51	
00C72ADB	. 8B3F	MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI]	
00C72ADD	. 8D4D C4	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72AE0	. FF77 F8	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EDI-8]	
00C72AE3	. 57	PUSH EDI	
00C72AE4	. E8 51CBFEFF	CALL 00C5F63A	Name to Unicode
00C72AE9	. 8B86 A0000000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+A0]	
00C72AEF	. 8D4D A4	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-5C]	
00C72AF2	. FF70 F8	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-8]	
00C72AF5	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72AF6	. E8 3FCBFEFF	CALL 00C5F63A	Companyname to Unicode
00C72AFB	. 8B86 98000000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+98]	
00C72B01	. 8D4D D4	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B04	. FF70 F8	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-8]	
00C72B07	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B08	. E8 2DCBFEFF	CALL 00C5F63A	Serial to Unicode
00C72B0D	. 399E AC000000	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+AC],EBX	
00C72B13	. 76 35	JBE SHORT 00C72B4A	
00C72B15	. 8A86 C8000000	MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+C8]	
00C72B18	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B1C	. 8D45 B4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C]	
00C72B1F	. FFB6 C4000000	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C4]	
00C72B25	. FFB6 C0000000	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C0]	
00C72B2B	. FFB6 BC000000	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+BC]	
00C72B31	. FFB6 B8000000	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+B8]	
00C72B37	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B38	. 8D45 D4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B3B	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B3C	. 8D45 C4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72B3F	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B40	. E8 EEEBFEFF	CALL 00C61733	Let the fun begin
00C72B45	. 83C4 20	ADD ESP,20	
00C72B48	. EB 14	JMP SHORT 00C72B5E	
00C72B4A	. 8D45 B4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C]	
00C72B4D	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B4E	. 8D45 D4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2C]	
00C72B51	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B52	. 8D45 C4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3C]	
00C72B55	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00C72B56	. E8 7EE8FEFF	CALL 00C613D9	
00C72B5B	. 83C4 0C	ADD ESP,0C	
00C72B5E	. 3AC3	CMP AL,BL	
00C72B60	. 75 50	JNZ SHORT 00C72BB2	

Some of the comments are just my own comments added while I debugged the target. I will not go into details. You can trace them yourself.

The interesting part is the CALL at 0C72B40 and the CMP at 0C72B5E. If you trace over the call at 0C72B40 you will see that the call returns FALSE. This returned BOOL is then checked at 0C72B5E. So.... The call at 0C72B40 has to return TRUE in order to on.

Tracing into the call at 0C72B40 we first end up here:

00C617A7	. 8B7D 0C	MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
00C617AA	. C645 FC 04	MOV BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-4],4
00C617AE	. 837F 08 40	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+8],40
00C617B2	. 73 07	JNB SHORT 00C617BB
00C617B4	. 32DB	XOR BL,BL
00C617B6	. E9 FA020000	JMP 00C61AB5
00C617BB	. 6A 20	PUSH 20

Take a look at 0C617AE. This compares the length of our name-string with 40h (64 bytes). So we can conclude that our name-string has to be at least 64 bytes long. Set a breakpoint at 0C617AE and press F9. Reenter a 64 byte long name-string. I recommend you type in