

# Reversing Xilisoft

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## Introduction:

In this tutorial I will discuss the encryption routine used by Xilisoft, this tutorial will not in any way show you how to crack/keygen Xilisoft products. But will show you how to retrieve the serial number you have already registered your program with.

When you register your program, the app stores this serial number in the registry, but first it encrypts it with the name you registered with. So let's get started.


## Target:

- Xilisoft Products
- Tools Used:
- RegEdit
- OllyDbg

## Key in the Registry:

Open up the Registry Editor by clicking Start->Run and then typing 'regedit' without the quotes.

Next navigate to HKCU\Software\Xilisoft\<<Product Name>\RegInfo, you should see keys like this:



(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
Code	REG_SZ	47 73 23 D7 F4 72 42 F0 D0 3F 7C 85 CB AD FE AD 7B 22 71 32 C4 31 99 1F CA 28 3A D4 DD...
Name	REG_SZ	Nieylana
Serial	REG_SZ	

- The Code value seems to contain encrypted data (the serial number).
- The Name value contains the Name you registered with (Decryption Key)
- The Serial Value is ALWAYS empty


## Find the Loading of Encrypted Data:

Open up <Product's exe>.exe (Xilisoft <Product Name> main EXE) in OllyDbg.

Now, if you have followed my Keygenning MD5 tutorial, you will know that all registration stuff is handled in the UILib DLL. So for Sound Recorder they use UILib8\_MFCDLL.dll. Open up the Executable Modules window and select UILib8\_MFCDLL and press [ENTER].

Once you have the UILib's code in the CPU window search for all referenced text strings by right clicking and selecting Search For->All referenced text strings.

Next, search for the word 'code' to find where it reads the encrypted data from the registry.



You will find the first one at 0038C3B8 set a BP here, press Ctrl+L to search for others, place a BP on every reference to 'code'. (Should be a total of 3 references). Now run the application.

OllyDbg should pause at 0038D1B6 on the push statement we Bpd earlier. Go ahead and step up to the CALL ESI statement:

0038D1B4	. 6A 00	PUSH 0	
0038D1B6	. 68 FC083D00	PUSH 003D08FC	UNICODE "Code"
0038D1B8	. 5B	PUSH EBX	
0038D1BC	. FF06	CALL ESI	ADVAPI32.RegOpenValueExW

You can see here that it's going to get the encrypted data from the registry. So we have found where the app loads the encrypted data. Next is to find a point at which it's been decrypted. Then we will search in-between to find the Encrypt/Decrypt routine.

## Find Decrypted Data

From the CALL ESI Statement, step with F8 until you see the decrypted data on the stack (Decrypted data will be the key you registered with). You should see this at 0038D238:

0038D22F	. 8D4C24 50	LEA ECX, [ESP+50]	UILib8_M.003BC6D0
0038D233	. E8 98F40200	CALL 003BC6D0	rArg1 = FFFFFFFF
0038D238	. 6A FF	PUSH -1	

Now look at your stack:

0012F6A4	49A57256		
0012F6A8	00D96340		
0012F6AC	011B38D8	UNICODE "8X23-███-RX0J-███-8CFF-███-E380-███"	
0012F6B0	00000000		
0012F6B4	011B43E8	UNICODE "47 73 23 D7 F4 72 42 F0 D0 3F 7C 85 CB AD FE AD 7B 22 71 32	
0012F6B8	011B3B88	UNICODE "Neylana"	

(Note: I blacked out parts of mine, as to not give a serial away, due to legality issues)

So now that we have found a point that the data has been decrypted, let's make a note of all CALL statements we stepped over that are NOT system APIs.

- CALL 0038C000
- CALL 003BC290
- CALL 003BC6D0

Next, we need to dig into these routines and find out what role each one plays in the decryption of the data.

## The Fist CALL (0038C000):

By taking a quick look at this routine, we see that they call wcslen:

0038C044	. 8D4C24 0C	LEA ECX, [ESP+C]	
0038C048	. FF15 A4F53C00	CALL [(&MFC71U.#293)]	MFC71U.7C274E6D
0038C04E	. 56	PUSH ESI	[ s wcs len
0038C04F	. 897C24 30	MOV [ESP+30], EDI	
0038C053	. FF15 08F93C00	CALL [(&MSUCR71.wcs len)]	

According to the MSDN

Each of these functions returns the number of characters in *string*, not including the terminating null character. **wcslen** is a wide-character version of **strlen**; the argument of **wcslen** is a wide-character string. **wcslen** and **strlen** behave identically otherwise.

So, we need to find what string it's passing, go ahead and set a BP on the call to wcslen. You will see that the encrypted data is what's being passed.

Later on down the routine we see a loop with a call to `swscanf` with the format string being `"%2X"` which means to convert a hex string to it's numeric value. Set a BP after the loop at the `MOV ESI, [ESP+8]` statement.

```

0038C075 > 6A 03          PUSH 3
0038C077 . 33D2          XOR EDX,EDX
0038C079 . 8D4424 18    LEA EAX,[ESP+18]
0038C07D . 895424 18    MOV [ESP+18],EDX
0038C081 . 56           PUSH ESI
0038C082 . 50           PUSH EAX
0038C083 . 895424 24    MOV [ESP+24],EDX
0038C087 . FF03        CALL EBX
0038C089 . 8D4C24 1C    LEA ECX,[ESP+1C]
0038C08D . 51           PUSH ECX
0038C08E . 8D5424 24    LEA EDX,[ESP+24]
0038C092 . 68 E8083D00 PUSH 003D08E8
0038C097 . 52           PUSH EDX
0038C098 . FF15 14F93C00 CALL [MSUCR71.swscanf]
0038C09E . 8B4424 28    MOV EAX,[ESP+28]
0038C0A2 . 83C4 18     ADD ESP,18
0038C0A5 . 50           PUSH EAX
0038C0A6 . 8D4C24 10    LEA ECX,[ESP+10]
0038C0AA . FF15 34F33C00 CALL [MFC71U.#894]
0038C0B0 . 83C6 06     ADD ESI,6
0038C0B3 . 4F          DEC EDI
0038C0B4 . ^ 75 BF     JNZ SHORT 0038C075
0038C0B6 > 8B75 08     MOV ESI,[EBP+8]
  
```

Continue running the routine, until you get to the BP set on the `MOV ESI` statement, step once with F8. You should now be on a `LEA ECX, [ESP+C]` statement, go ahead and step this statement and then follow the address loaded into `ECX` in the dump.

```

011D38E0 47 00 73 00 23 00 07 00  00 00 72 00 42 00 F0 00  G.s.#.t. .x.B.=.
011D38F0 00 00 3F 00 00 00 95 00  CB 00 AD 00 00 00 AD 00  . . !.ã.Ï.+. .+.
011D3900 7B 00 22 00 71 00 32 00  C4 00 31 00 99 00 1F 00  (.".q.2.-.1.0.Ï.
011D3910 CA 00 28 00 3A 00 04 00  00 00 27 00 83 00 05 00  .(.!.: .b. .ã.f.
011D3920 30 00 F7 00 BF 00 78 00  41 00 C8 00 00 00 00 00  0. .- .x.A.ã. . .
  
```

(Note: Some bytes have been blacked out because of the possibility to obtain a valid serial number from it)

So we can see that this routine takes the encrypted data loaded from the registry and converts the unicode string into the hexadecimal equivalent.

## The Second CALL (003BC290)

This routine is not of much value to us, although it would seem so, this routine appears to be setting some constants prior to the encryption, but I assure you we don't need these constants right now:

```

003BC294 . 894D FC     MOV [EBP-4],ECX
003BC297 . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
003BC29A . C700 C0443D00 MOV DWORD PTR [EAX],003D44C0
003BC2A0 . 8B4D FC     MOV ECX,[EBP-4]
003BC2A3 . C741 08 DF9B5713 MOV DWORD PTR [ECX+8],13579BDF
003BC2AA . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,[EBP-4]
003BC2AD . C742 0C E0AC6824 MOV DWORD PTR [EDX+C],2468ACE0
003BC2B4 . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
003BC2B7 . C740 10 3175B9FD MOV DWORD PTR [EAX+10],FDB97531
003BC2BE . 8B4D FC     MOV ECX,[EBP-4]
003BC2C1 . C741 14 62000080 MOV DWORD PTR [ECX+14],80000062
003BC2C8 . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,[EBP-4]
003BC2CB . C742 18 20000040 MOV DWORD PTR [EDX+18],40000020
003BC2D2 . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
003BC2D5 . C740 1C 02000010 MOV DWORD PTR [EAX+1C],10000002
003BC2DC . 8B4D FC     MOV ECX,[EBP-4]
003BC2DF . C741 20 FFFFFFFF MOV DWORD PTR [ECX+20],FFFFFFFF
003BC2E6 . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,[EBP-4]
003BC2E9 . C742 24 FFFFFFFF MOV DWORD PTR [EDX+24],FFFFFFFF
003BC2F0 . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
003BC2F3 . C740 28 FFFFFFFF MOV DWORD PTR [EAX+28],FFFFFFFF
003BC2FA . 8B4D FC     MOV ECX,[EBP-4]
003BC2FD . C741 2C 00000080 MOV DWORD PTR [ECX+2C],80000000
003BC304 . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,[EBP-4]
003BC307 . C742 30 000000C0 MOV DWORD PTR [EDX+30],C0000000
003BC30E . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
003BC311 . C740 34 000000F0 MOV DWORD PTR [EAX+34],F0000000
003BC318 . 8B4D FC     MOV ECX,[EBP-4]
003BC31B . C741 04 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR [ECX+4],0
003BC322 . 8B45 FC     MOV EAX,[EBP-4]
  
```

## The Third CALL (003BC6D0):

For this final call before everything is decrypted, we should probably note what parameters are pushed to it. Set a BP on this call statement and then run until the BP.

Once you hit the BP look at the stack, there are 2 values passed to it, follow each in the dump and you will notice that one of them contains the Encrypted data that was converted from String to Hex by first call, and the other contains the decryption key (in the case the Name we registered with)

003BC6D0	. 55	MOV EBP,ESP	mov stack pointer to EBP
003BC6D1	. 8BEC	SUB ESP,10	sub 10 from stack
003BC6D3	. 894D F0	MOV [EBP-10],ECX	mov name to EAX
003BC6D6	. 8B45 08	PUSH EAX	PUSH NAME
003BC6DC	. 50	MOV ECX,[EBP-10]	mov pointer to
003BC6E0	. 8B11	MOV EDI,[ECX]	
003BC6E2	. 8B4D F0	MOV ECX,[EBP-10]	
003BC6E5	. FF52 02	CALL [EDX+8]	Init Key Routine
003BC6E8	. 8B45 0C	MOV EAX,[EBP+C]	
003BC6EB	. 50	PUSH EAX	
003BC6EC	. FF15 08F93C00	CALL [<&MSUCR71.wcslen>]	[s wcslen
003BC6F2	. 83C4 04	ADD ESP,4	
003BC6F5	. 8945 FC	MOV [EBP-4],EAX	MOV into EBP-4 len of encrypted code
003BC6F8	. C745 F8 00000000	MOV DWORD PTR [EBP-8],0	zero out EBP-8
003BC6FF	EB 09	JNB SHORT 003BC706	
003BC701	> 8B4D F0	MOV ECX,[EBP-8]	mov EBP-8 to EDI
003BC704	. 83C1 01	ADD ECX,1	
003BC707	. 894D F8	MOV [EBP-8],ECX	cmp EBP-8 (current char) to EBP-4 (code length)
003BC70A	> 8B55 F8	MOV EDI,[EBP-8]	if we've decrypted whole thing then jump
003BC70D	. 3B55 FC	CMP EDI,[EBP-4]	mov current char offset to EAX
003BC710	^ 73 2D	JNB SHORT 003BC73F	mov encrypted code to ECX
003BC712	. 8B45 F8	MOV EAX,[EBP-8]	mov current char offset to EAX
003BC715	. 8B4D 0C	MOV ECX,[EBP+C]	mov encrypted code to ECX
003BC718	. 66:8B1441	MOV DX,[ECX+EAX*2]	mov DX, next char
003BC71C	. 66:8955 F4	MOV [EBP-C],DX	mov current char to EBP-C
003BC720	. 8D45 F4	LEA EAX,[EBP-C]	
003BC723	. 50	PUSH EAX	
003BC724	. 8B4D F0	MOV ECX,[EBP-10]	
003BC727	. 8B11	MOV EDI,[ECX]	
003BC729	. 8B4D F0	MOV ECX,[EBP-10]	
003BC72C	. FF52 10	CALL [EDX+10]	decrypt current byte
003BC72F	. 8B45 F8	MOV EAX,[EBP-8]	
003BC732	. 8B4D 0C	MOV ECX,[EBP+C]	
003BC735	. 66:8B55 F4	MOV DX,[EBP-C]	
003BC739	. 66:891441	MOV [ECX+EAX*2],DX	
003BC73D	EB C2	JNB SHORT 003BC761	
003BC73F	> 8BE5	MOV ESP,EBP	
003BC741	. 5D	POP EBP	
003BC742	. C2 0800	RET 8	

(This is the entire routine, we will now dissect it as small as we need to understand what's going on)

The first part of interest in this routine is the PUSH EAX statement followed by the CALL [EDX+8], set a BP on the CALL [EDX+8], so we can see what's passed to it with the PUSH EAX statement. After getting to the CALL [EDX+8] statement, look at EAX, it contains our decryption key (Nieylana in my case).

Let's step into the CALL [EDX+8]:

### CALL [EDX+8]

This routine is quite long so I won't go and explain every single line, but only the lines that need special mention. The first line to mention is the call to wcslen which returns the length of the decryption key. (so mine will return 8).

003BC3C8	. 51	PUSH ECX	
003BC3C9	. FF15 08F93C00	CALL [<&MSUCR71.wcslen>]	[s wcslen
003BC3CF	. 83C4 04	ADD ESP,4	
003BC3D2	. 8945 F4	MOV [EBP-C],EAX	
003BC3D5	. 837D F4 0C	CMP DWORD PTR [EBP-C],0C	

(It then compares the key length to 12d)

After this CMP is a JNB, meaning if the key length is NOT BELOW 12, jump, otherwise continue on.

If it didn't jump (your key is less than 12 chars long), you will enter some loops that will pad the key to 12 characters, so my "Nieylana" becomes "NieylanaNiey"

After the key has been padded to 12 characters long, it then continues with the rest of the routine.

The main work of this function is done at 003BC461, the way they coded it makes it quite hard to understand so what I recommend is to go to the highlighted line:

```

003BC482 . 8B4D F8          MOV ECX,[EBP-8]
003BC485 . 0FB71441        MOVZX EDX,WORD PTR [ECX+EAX*2]
003BC489 . 8B45 EC          MOV EAX,[EBP-14]
003BC48C . 0B50 08          OR EDX,[EAX+8]
003BC48F . 8B4D EC          MOV ECX,[EBP-14]
003BC492 . 8951 08          MOV [ECX+8],EDX

```

Follow the address in [EAX+8] in dump, and then set a BP on the line after the loop which should be MOV EAX, [EBP-14]. Press F9 and run to BP.

The dump pane for my Key now looks like this:

```

0012F6F4 79 65 69 4E 61 6E 61 6C 79 65 69 4E 62 00 00 80 yeiNanaiyeiNb..
0012F704 20 00 00 40 02 00 00 10 FF FF FF 7F FF FF FF 3F ..@0..> Δ ?
0012F714 FF FF FF 0F 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 C0 00 00 00 F0 *...Ç...L...E
0012F724 18 EE 90 7C 70 05 91 7C FF FF FF FF 6D 05 91 7C †e!p*z! m*z!
0012F734 8A 21 32 00 00 00 D9 00 00 00 00 00 8F 21 32 00 é!2...J.....A!2.

```

It appears they have set 3 DWORDS to values based on the Key... the pattern for such is

- DWORD1 = First 4 bytes of Key
- DWORD2 = Middle 4 bytes of Key
- DWORD3 = Last 4 bytes of Key

These DWORD (from now on referred to as Key1, Key2, and Key3) will be used later on. Just remember how they set these.

## The Third CALL (003BC6D0) Again:

After these 3 values have been set, the following lines are executed:

```

003BC6E8 . 8B45 0C          MOV EAX,[EBP+C]
003BC6EB . 50              PUSH EAX
003BC6EC . FF15 08F93C00  CALL [;&MSUCR71.wcslen]

```

This moves the address of the Encrypted Data to EAX, and the calls wcslen on that string which returns the length of it, should be 0x27 (or 39 decimal)

```

003BC6F2 . 83C4 04          ADD ESP,4
003BC6F5 . 8945 FC          MOV [EBP-4],EAX
003BC6F8 . C745 F8 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR [EBP-8],0

```

Next, we move the length of the string into [EBP-4] (this serves as the counter so we know when we've looped for the whole encrypted string). And then we zero out whatever is in [EBP-8]