

The Mida: defeating ring 0 deroko/ARTeam

Version 1.0 – May 2006

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Keywords

Themida, unpacking



1. Abstract

TheMida 1.0.0.5 with offensive ring0 driver is not very used nowadays. But still it doesn't mean that we shouldn't pay attention to it. Even more, when something is not researched and written about it is more fun to play with such protection. I have nothing more to say about it, I will show you my research and all I have done to repair dump.

My target is Advanced Submitter 4.1.4 [3]

Of course, to play with themida 1.0.0.5 we are going to use some tools:

- IDA
- LiveKd
- wARK
- hiew
- tasm32

Forget about debugger it is not useful while playing with themida 1.0.0.5 and ring0 hooks.

S verom u Boga, deroko/ARTeam

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2. Know your enemy and dump it

Protection implemented by oreans.sys is weird it hooks some SSDT entries, IDT and some exports of ntoskrnl.exe:

```
SSDT entry 0035 hooked by : 0xF3B7ACBE - NtCreateThread
SSDT entry 003A hooked by : 0xF3B7B1A0 - NtDebugContinue
SSDT entry 00B2 hooked by : 0xF3B7AACA - NtQueryVirtualMemory
SSDT entry 00BA hooked by : 0xF3B7A014 - NtReadVirtualMemory
SSDT entry 0101 hooked by : 0xF3B7A9D0 - NtTerminateProcess
SSDT entry 0115 hooked by : 0xF3B7A000 - NtWriteVirtualMemory
```

Now we will check hooks in exports of ntoskrnl.exe:

```
C:\>scanhook.exe
scanhook - (c) 2006 deroko/ARTeam
Hooked : KeAttachProcess
Hooked : vsprintf
C:\>
```

Well KeAttachProcess is hooked because themida want to deny any pte changing from ring0 and process dumping from ring0. Well it doesn't hook KeStackAttachProcess so we can still attach to process from ring0 and dump it, but we are also able to emulate KeAttachProcess very simple.

Now let's see what we have in IDT:

```
      01h
      0008:FFFFFFFF
      Interrupt
      32 bit
      03
      0

      03h
      0008:FFFFFFFF
      Interrupt
      32 bit
      03
      0

      0Bh
      0008:EBF0E3E8
      Interrupt
      32 bit
      00
      1

      0Eh
      0008:EBF0E000
      Interrupt
      32 bit
      00
      1
```

Oki, int1 and int3 are "hooked" with 0xFFFFFFF, the reason why themida hooks int 0eh is to catch 0xFFFFFFF memory access and according to instruction that caused access to 0xFFFFFFF to transfer execution to KiTrap01 or KiTrap03, in other words, default handlers. Of course if it finds int3h in themida protected process, my best guess is BSOD because I didn't want to experiment and to cause another BSOD just to learn in hard way to do not mess with themida hooks J

If you try to remove any of these hooks you will get BSOD.

So to understand themida hooks I used one small home made ring0 memory dumper to dump hooks. But before we move to hook dumps I will show you hooks for KeAttachProcess and vsprintf in ntoskrnl.exe dumped with LiveKd:

```
kd> u KeAttachProcess
nt!KeAttachProcess:
                                   f8ab8000
804e3173 e9884e5d78
                           jmp
804e3178 56
                           push
                                   esi
804e3179 57
                           push
                                   edi
kd> u ntoskrnl!vsprintf
nt!vsprintf:
8050716b 33c0
                           xor
                                   eax,eax
8050716d c3
                           ret
```

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Oki, if we dump memory content of hook stored in KeAttachProcess we will see this code:

```
push
              ebp
         mov
              ebp, esp
         pusha
         call
              $+5
         pop
              edx
              edx, 940FB78h
         sub
         push fs
                                ; save FS
         mov
              eax, 30h
                                ; make it point to kpcr
         mov
              fs, ax
         mov
              mov
              eax, [eax+44h]
                                ; grab EPROCESS from ETHREAD
         mov
              [edx+940FC00h], eax ; save EPROCESS struct
              fs
                                ; restore fs
         qoq
         mov
              eax, [ebp+4]
                                ; now it takes saved EIP from stack
              eax, [edx+940FBF0h] ; this part is not interesting for us
short loc_F8AB8040 ; because it is junk
         cmp
         jbe
              eax, [edx+940FBF4h]
         cmp
                               ;
              short loc_F8AB8040
         jnb
              short loc_F8AB807D
         jmp
loc_F8AB8040:
              eax, [edx+940FBF8h]
                               still junk;
         cmp
              short loc_F8AB8052
         jbe
              eax, [edx+940FBFCh]
         cmp
              short loc_F8AB8052
         jnb
              short loc_F8AB807D
         jmp
loc_F8AB8052:
         mov
              eax, [ebp+8]
                                ; oki now we get to good stuff
              eax, [edx+940FC00h] ; cmp passed EPROCESS to KeAttachProcess
         cmp
              short loc_F8AB8076     ;with EPROCESS of protected process
         jz
              esi, 0F8AAC000h
                               ;themida internal struct
         mov
              esi, 4
                                ;esi points to EPROCESS field in
         add
                                ;internal struct
loc F8AB8065:
              dword ptr [esi], 47616420h ;is it signature?
         cmp
              short loc F8AB807D ; if so end of loop
         jz
                               ; EPROCESS of protected process
         cmp
              [esi], eax
                              ;compared to saved one
              short loc_F8AB8076
         jz
         add
              esi, 4
                                ;go to next entry in struct
              short loc_F8AB8065
         jmp
                                ;loop
; dumped structure comes here so it is easier to follow code
                                ;signature (' daG'
         dd 47616420h
                                ; EPROCESS of protected process
         dd 81B58DA0h
         dd 47616420h
                                ;signature again
         dd 0
loc_F8AB8076:
                                 ;return w/o attaching to target process
         popa
```

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```
pop
                   ebp
            xor
                  eax, eax
            retn
loc F8AB807D:
                                           ; call some code in oreans.sys
            popa
                   ebp
            pop
                  short loc_F8AB8095
            jmp
loc_F8AB8095:
                  edi, edi
            mov
                  ebp
            push
                  ebp, esp
            mov
                                           ;KeAttachProcess+5
                  near ptr 804E3178h
            jmp
```

To write driver that will be able to use KeAttachProcess we have to write small procedure that will be wrapper for KeAttachProcess, but this is completely unnecessary work because we may attach using KeStackAttachProcess but what the hell, we are doing this for fun and to learn something, at least that's the only reason why I'm playing with themida.

```
KeAttachProcessWraper:
```

```
mov edi, edi
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
iMOV eax, KeAttachProcess
add eax, 5
jmp eax ;execute KeAttachProcess+5
```

Simple isn't it J

This is very important instruction in above code:

```
mov esi, 0F8AAC000h ;themida internal struct
```

If we take a look in disassembly of hook in IDA we might see that this instruction is located at hook_base + 5Dh:

```
        seg000:0000005B
        jz
        short loc_76

        seg000:0000005D
        mov
        esi, 0F8AAC000h

        seg000:00000062
        add
        esi, 4
```

This structure is very important because it describes state of protected process, it has simple structure:

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If we examine address 81B58DA0h in livekd we may notice that it is actually EPROCESS of protected application:

```
kd> dt nt!_EPROCESS 81b58da0
...
+0x168 PageDirectoryPte : _HARDWARE_PTE
+0x168 Filler : 0
+0x170 Session : 0xf8a55000
+0x174 ImageFileName : [16] "AdvanceSubmitte" <--- application name
+0x184 JobLinks : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x0 - 0x0 ]
...
kd>
```

Voila we have researched internal themida struct.

Next important thing is that themida will remove hooks once protected application is done with its executing. To accomplish this themida uses hook of NtTerminateProcess so we are going to dump that memory region and analyze NtTerminateProcess hook:

```
push ebp
           mov
                ebp, esp
           pusha
           call $+5
           pop edx
           sub edx, 94552AFh
           push edx
           push 0
           lea eax, [edx+945531Fh]
           push eax
           push 0
           mov eax, 80559CD8h
                                               ;PsProcessType
                                               ;eax set to 0
           xor eax, eax
           push eax
           push 10h
           push dword ptr [ebp+8]
           mov eax, 8055D468h
           call eax
                                                ;ObReferenceObjectByHandle
                edx
           pop
           cmp dword ptr [edx+945531Fh], 0
                short loc_F364BA3A
           jz
           mov eax, [edx+945531Fh]
                                               ;EPROCESS of cur process
                ebx, eax
           mov
           and ebx, 7FFFFFFh
                esi, 0F8AAC000h
                                               ; internal struct
           mov
loc_F364BA1D:
           add
                esi, 4
                dword ptr [esi], 47616420h
           cmp
                short loc_F364BA3A
           jz
           cmp
                [esi], eax
                short loc_F364BA32
           jz
           cmp
                [esi], ebx
                short loc F364BA32
           jz
           jmp
                short loc_F364BA1D
```

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