                 A GUIDE TO CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS
                                
                               By
                                
                         Bruce A. Wind
                         Officer-Member
                   Hostage Negotiations Team
             Seattle, Washington, Police Department

 
    Incidents involving barricaded subjects, hostage takers, or
persons threatening suicide represent especially trying and
stressful moments for law enforcement personnel who respond to
them. Officers first responding to the scene must quickly assess  
the totality of the situation, secure the area, gauge the threat
to hostages or bystanders, and request additional units as
appropriate. Crisis negotiators must establish contact with
subjects, identify their demands, and work to resolve tense and
often volatile standoffs without loss of life. Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) teams must prepare to neutralize subjects
through swift tactical means. Field commanders assume ultimate
responsibility for every aspect of the police response.

    For such a coordinated response to be successful, each
component needs to understand clearly the functions of the
others. This article clarifies the role of crisis negotiators
for field commanders, of whatever rank, who find themselves in
command of hostage or other critical incidents. Supervisors who
understand the purpose behind the actions taken by negotiators
will avoid delays at the scene that occur when negotiators must
stop and explain or justify their intended courses of action.

    Such understanding has taken on particular importance in
recent years. Negotiators have become very active, due in part to
the reputations they have established for the successful,
peaceful resolution of various types of critical incidents. For
example, in 1993, the Hostage Negotiations Team of the Seattle,
Washington, Police Department resolved 21 incidents, expending a
total of 263 negotiator hours. In 1994, negotiators resolved 32
incidents, spending 407 hours in negotiations. 

TRAINING

    Although it might appear that negotiators and tactical teams 
work at cross-purposes during a crisis, nothing could be further  
from the truth. Society requires that law enforcement exhausts
all means available prior to launching a tactical resolution to
an incident. If these means prove unsuccessful, then the
transition from negotiation to tactical assault must be a smooth
one.

    To enhance cooperation, negotiators and personnel from
tactical teams should train together on a regular basis. In
Seattle, the Hostage Negotiations Team and the Emergency Response
Team conduct joint training exercises four to six times a year.
These training sessions include four fully enacted crisis
scenarios. Members of the department's command staff are
encouraged to participate, and through this training, have
learned how the two teams work together.

    Law enforcement agencies generally place a premium on the
training provided to tactical teams. Administrators should place
no less emphasis on the training provided to their negotiations
teams. At a very minimum, negotiators should complete the FBI's
Basic Hostage/Crisis Negotiations course. Because the
department's training qualifications may become subject to
critical review in the courts should negotiations fail,
negotiators should further their training through advanced
courses, seminars, basic psychology classes, and detailed
critical analysis of past incidents.

TYPES OF INCIDENTS

    Most negotiations teams group incidents into three main
categories--hostage takings, barricade situations, and suicide
attempts. Traditionally, hostage takings assume the highest
profile. However, in recent years, the Seattle Police
Department's Hostage Negotiations Team has responded to an
increasing number of high-profile barricade situations. Field
commanders should remember that the peaceful resolution of a
barricade situation is as important to negotiators as the
resolution of an incident involving a person threatening to jump
from a bridge or a hostage taking with extensive media coverage.

THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS

    In negotiations, as in most endeavors, no absolutes exist.
Each incident takes on a personality of its own. Field commanders
can be sure of only one thing:  Their decisions will be
scrutinized by every "Monday morning quarterback" from city hall
to the city desk. Therefore, they should base their decisions on
an understanding of the negotiations process and the many factors
that affect it.

Untrained Personnel

    A successful negotiations process requires a good
foundation. Often, circumstances force the first responding
officers to initiate some type of negotiation with the
subject(s). However, once line officers or first-line supervisors
realize that an incident appears to be heading for something
other than a prompt resolution, they should immediately terminate
negotiations and call in trained negotiators.

    Too many tragedies in communities across America demonstrate
how negotiations should not be initiated. A bad start by
well-intentioned, but untrained, personnel can have negative
effects throughout the process. Simply put, personnel who are not
trained negotiators should not negotiate.

Time

    A negotiator's most important ally in all situations is
time. Field commanders should not rush anything unless the loss
of life appears imminent. Although it may seem as if nothing is
happening because a suspect is not negotiating, this is not so.
During these quiet times, many things occur that will eventually
lead to a peaceful resolution.

    Negotiators refer to these quiet intervals as "dynamic
inactivity." As long as time passes without any harm to persons
involved, then negotiators are making progress. The passing of
time works for the police in many ways and only means that a
resolution is closer at hand. Field commanders should keep in 
mind that patience is a virtue.

The Negotiations Team

    Generally, the negotiations team consists of at least three
main negotiators. Each team member plays a vital role in the
successful resolution of critical incidents. 

    The primary negotiator actually communicates with the
subject. The secondary (or backup) negotiator assists the primary
negotiator by offering advice, monitoring the negotiations,
keeping notes, and ensuring that the primary negotiator sees and
hears everything in the proper perspective. The intelligence
negotiator interviews persons associated with the suspect to
compile a criminal history and a history of mental illness, as
well as to gather other relevant information.

    Often, an additional negotiator will act as the chief
negotiator, whose primary responsibility is to act as a buffer
between command personnel and the negotiations team. Invariably,
and understandably, field commanders want to offer their advice
to the negotiations team. Whenever possible, suggestions should
be routed to the negotiations team via the chief negotiator.

The Negotiations Area

    Typically, the negotiations team sets up away from the rest
of the activity and maintains communications with the command
post via a liaison. In Seattle, a member of the Emergency
Response Team generally monitors the negotiations and provides
tactical intelligence to the arrest, entry, and perimeter teams. 

Only the Police Should Negotiate

    Often, well-meaning civilians offer to negotiate with
subjects. Sometimes, these civilians insist that they be allowed
to negotiate. A wide range of individuals--from parents, spouses,
and lovers to friends, members of the clergy, attorneys,
counselors, and mental health professionals--might offer to do
the talking. As a general rule, direct civilian participation in
negotiations is entirely unacceptable. The tactical negotiations
process is a police operation.

    When faced with these offers, field commanders should keep
in mind that the individual now so willing to help might have
played a large part in driving the subject over the edge. While
these individuals might be a useful source of information, only
in very rare circumstances should they be allowed to speak
directly with subjects. Instead, they should be escorted to the
intelligence negotiator and kept well clear of the actual
negotiations process.

Containment and Control

    Basic police procedure dictates that any crisis incident be
contained using both inner and outer perimeters established and
maintained by the police. Critical incidents such as hostage
takings, barricade situations, or suicide attempts must be
contained prior to the start of negotiations. Mobile negotiations
should not be attempted.

    While the need for a secure inner perimeter is obvious,
crisis incidents also require an emphasis on a well-controlled
outer perimeter. When arriving at the scene of a hostage taking,
barricade situation, or suicide intervention, negotiators often
encounter a large crowd made up of bystanders, the press, and the
subject's family members. It is important that the subject not be
given an audience to "play to." Negotiation cannot succeed if
negotiators must compete with outside influences for the
subject's attention.

    Individuals with potentially helpful information about a
subject should be secured in an area where they can provide
details to the intelligence negotiator. Likewise, the press
should be provided a designated gathering area away from the
perimeter and be briefed regularly regarding the status of the
negotiations process.

    Field commanders should remember that reporters have a job
to do. They will do that job, with or without the help of the
police. It is far more preferable to provide them with the
accurate information they need than to force them to gather it
for themselves. The relationship need not be confrontational. In
Seattle, the police generally enjoy good relations with the
on-scene press. During protracted incidents, supervisors should
request the assistance of the department's media relations
personnel to help deal with the press.

    The highly unstable nature of these incidents also makes it
imperative that an arrest team be prepared to take the subject(s)
into custody at a moment's notice. In fact, the surrender phase
represents the most critical stage in any negotiated incident. In
some cases, surrender can occur very rapidly. Depending on the
severity of the incident, the arrest team can be made up of
patrol officers or members of specialized teams. Once the SWAT
team sets up at a scene, it should assume this duty. 

Control of Phone Lines

    During a protracted crisis, it is essential that the police
control the phone lines. Generally, one of the first actions
negotiators take when arriving at an incident is to arrange with
the telephone company to deny origination to telephones at the
subject's disposal. Once origination is denied, the subject's
telephones will no longer get a dial tone. 

    At the negotiators' request, the telephone company then
establishes a new number that serves as a direct line between
negotiators and the subject. Restricting telephone access in this
way prohibits the subject from talking to family, friends,
attorneys, and most important, the press. It also prevents the
suspect from gathering intelligence about police maneuvers from
associates. 

The Throw Phone

    When there is no telephone accessible to the subject, or the 
telephone has been disabled as a tactical move by SWAT, the
police must reestablish a means of communication. Because of the
potential danger posed to negotiators, face-to-face negotiations
do not represent an acceptable option. 

    In these situations, the SWAT team often tactically delivers
a "throw phone"--a standard telephone linked to a hardline system
connected to the hostage phone system. Because telephone delivery
places members of the SWAT team in dangerous situations, it
should be practiced regularly during joint negotiator-SWAT
training exercises.

Controlling Utilities

    In Seattle, control of the phone lines generally can be
secured without supervisory approval. However, in many instances,
the negotiations team might determine a need to control the
electricity and water, as well. Only the on-scene commander can
make the final decision to interrupt these services.

    Negotiators will bring the specific reasons for
disconnecting utilities to the attention of the on-scene
commander. Some of the most common reasons include taking away a
subject's ability to monitor the incident on television;
darkening the environment to provide a tactical advantage for
SWAT; and eliminating comforts, such as toilet facilities.

    Tactical teams also might call for disconnection of plumbing
services to deny subjects the ability to neutralize chemical
agents, as has occurred in several recent incidents in Seattle.
For whatever reason, the denial (or resumption) of utilities
provides negotiators with an effective bargaining tool.

    Different perspectives exist concerning the appropriate time
to deny subjects utility services. Some experts believe that
utilities should be disconnected before negotiations begin.
Others believe negotiators should save such steps for use as
bargaining tools later. While this is a matter of individual
agency policy, administrators should ensure that the department
adopts well-established policy guidelines in this pivotal area.

Demands and Deadlines

    It is preferable for field commanders to resist the tendency
to monitor the negotiations process personally. Supervisors who
monitor negotiations or hear demands, deadlines, and death
threats related during briefings should not become overly
concerned. They should remember that the negotiating team is
trained to deal with such scenarios. When a subject demands "$1
million," the negotiators actually hear "a 6-pack of soda."

    Likewise, if the on-scene commander hears a subject say, "If
I don't get the car by 2:00, I'll kill a hostage," negotiators
actually hear, "Good, now we are really negotiating." Remarkably
few hostages have ever been harmed as a result of missed
deadlines. Of course, negotiators take deadlines and demands very
seriously; however, skilled negotiators generally can work around
them and even make them work to law enforcement's advantage.

    During an incident, a member of the negotiations team keeps
the field commander informed of the negotiations. Commanders who
find it absolutely necessary to monitor the negotiations need to
inform the negotiations team, which should have the capability to
wire a speaker to the command post to enable supervisors to
listen to exchanges with the subject. 

    However, field commanders' decisions should be based on the
law, departmental policy, and the need for preservation of life
and property. They should not make decisions based on exchanges
they overhear between subjects and negotiators. The
decisionmaking ability of commanders who personally monitor the
negotiations process may be affected by any number of factors
that have little actual bearing on the situation.

Psychology

    Much of the insight into the minds of troubled subjects
comes from the specialized psychological training that crisis
negotiators receive. As part of their training, negotiators learn
a great deal about personality types, personality disorders, and
the psychological motivations of hostage takers, suicidal
persons, and subjects who barricade themselves. This training
enables negotiators to manipulate a subject through their
understanding of that person's state of mind. Accordingly,
negotiators rely primarily on mental rather than physical tactics
to resolve conflicts.

Checklist

    Each field commander with the Seattle Police Department
carries a pocket-sized checklist of actions that must be
performed during a negotiated crisis. The checklist assists
on-scene commanders to accomplish in an orderly fashion the
various tasks required during a crisis. Other agencies might
benefit from a similar checklist. (1)

    During times of extreme pressure, even the most prepared and
composed professionals might not always remember to do everything
at the right time. A checklist can prove invaluable in assisting
supervisors to keep tense situations under control.

Debriefings

    Agencies should conduct debriefings after the resolution of
any crisis incident. Whenever possible, these debriefings should
take place immediately following an incident, when details are
still fresh in the participants' minds.

    The debriefing should focus on how the various units handled
their roles during the incident. Each component must be
represented, and officers should feel free to offer
criticism--both positive and negative. However, debriefings of
this type should not be confused with or conducted in place of
critical incident stress debriefings. Both serve valuable but
distinct purposes.

CONCLUSION

    Despite moves toward proactive policing methodologies, law
enforcement remains an inherently reactive profession. When
violent or troubled subjects create a crisis, they force the
police to react to a situation in which the offenders already
hold many of the cards. The press and the public judge the police
by how well they respond to such situations. Generally, concerns
for hostage and officer safety, in addition to the well-being of
often mentally disturbed subjects, dictate that the police
respond at the lowest force level possible. 

    Therefore, on-scene commanders should be prepared to
supervise a negotiated settlement. The negotiations process can
be tedious, complex, and at times, confusing. The better field
commanders understand the many factors that affect it, the more
likely that negotiators will get the support necessary to resolve
critical incidents peacefully.


ENDNOTE

    Agencies interested in receiving a copy of the checklist
developed by the Seattle Police Department should send a request
on agency letterhead to the author in care of the Seattle Police
Department, 610 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98104-1886.
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