              SUPREME COURT CASES: 1994-1995 TERM
                                
                               By
                                
                       Charlene M. Keller
                         Honors Intern
                     Legal Instruction Unit
                     Third-year Law Student
                Temple University School of Law
                                
                              and
                                
                  Daniel L. Schofield, S.J.D.
                             Chief
                     Legal Instruction Unit


    During its 1994-1995 term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on
six cases of particular interest to law enforcement officers and
managers. The cases involved the scope of the exclusionary rule
for errors made by court employees, the fourth amendment's "knock
and announce" requirements, and the constitutionality of a
Federal statute prohibiting possession of a firearm in a school
zone.

    Other legal issues addressed by the Court included the
effect of after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing in
litigation under Federal antidiscrimination laws, the right of
local government entities to appeal a denied motion for summary
judgment in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for
alleged unconstitutional police conduct, and the right of law
enforcement officers to appeal immediately a court's denial of
qualified immunity in cases involving a factual dispute. This
article summarizes these six cases and their impact on law
enforcement.

ARIZONA v. EVANS, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)

    In Evans, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence gained
during arrests made on the basis of computer errors by clerical
court employees. In this case, a Phoenix police officer arrested
the defendant during a routine traffic stop when the patrol car's
computer data terminal showed an outstanding misdemeanor warrant
for his arrest. When a subsequent search of the defendant's car
revealed a bag of marijuana, the police officer charged him with
possession. The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana as
fruit of an unlawful search because the misdemeanor warrant had
been quashed before his arrest but court employees had
erroneously left the warrant in the computer database.

    The Arizona Supreme Court granted the motion to suppress the
marijuana, reasoning that the application of the exclusionary
rule would serve to improve the efficiency of recordkeepers in
the criminal justice system. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that the exclusion of evidence was not required
because court personnel were responsible for the computer's
inaccurate records.

    The Court reaffirmed its decision in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the Court held that exclusion is
not required where officers act in "objectively reasonable
reliance" on a properly issued search warrant that later is ruled
invalid. The Court in Evans created an additional exception to
the exclusionary rule for the errors of court employees, using
the Leon rationale that the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. The
Court concluded that application of the exclusionary rule would
have no significant effect on court employees responsible for
informing police that a warrant has been quashed because court
clerks are not members of the law enforcement team and therefore
have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.

    Likewise, applying the exclusionary rule for the clerk's
mistake would not alter the arresting officer's behavior.
Unfortunately, the Court did not address in this decision whether
the exclusionary rule would apply if a police employee made the
computer error.

    Evans, however, does not relieve officers of their
responsibility to assess the reliability and potential for error
of information obtained from a computer system. In this regard, a
concurring opinion in Evans suggested exclusion would be required
if officers blindly rely on information in their data system,
regardless of their knowing the information is inaccurate or that
the system is not generally reliable.

WILSON v. ARKANSAS, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995)

    The Court in Wilson ruled that "knock and announce"
requirements are part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
fourth amendment. In evaluating the scope of the constitutional
right to be secure in one's home, the Court adopted the common
law protection of announcing one's presence and authority before
entering a dwelling as a factor to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of a search.

    Police officers in this case arrived at the defendant's home
with a search warrant after receiving an informant's tip that
drugs were being sold there. Upon arriving, the police found the
main door open, but the screen door closed and unlocked. They
identified themselves as police officers as they entered the
residence, where they subsequently seized marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the search was invalid due to the
officers' failure to knock and announce their presence before
entering.

    The lower courts denied the defendant's motion to suppress,  
noting that the officers did identify themselves as they entered
the residence. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held
that the fourth amendment's reasonableness inquiry requires
officers to knock and announce prior to entry.

    In its reasoning, the Court looked to the traditional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded
by English common law at the time the fourth amendment was
framed. The Court determined that the framers of the Constitution
implied that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may
depend, in part, on whether law enforcement officers announce
their presence and authority prior to entering.

    The Court did recognize, however, that in some
circumstances, an officer's unannounced entry might be reasonable
if counter-vailing law enforcement interests exist. For example,
an officer's failure to knock and announce could be considered
reasonable when a prior announcement would increase the threat of
physical harm to the police or others, increase the likelihood of
escape, or increase the risk that evidence would be destroyed.

    The Court acknowledged that the police in Wilson may have
reasonably believed that a prior announcement would have placed
them in peril and increased the risk that the defendant would
destroy easily disposable drug evidence. Consequently, the Court  
remanded the case to allow the State courts to determine whether
such relevant countervailing factors existed.

    Wilson is an important case for law enforcement because it
clarifies the constitutional requirement that officers balance
law enforcement interests against fourth amendment knock and
announce requirements. Officers carefully must evaluate each
entry situation with an awareness that the exclusion of evidence
could be the result of failing to knock and announce prior to
entering a residence.

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)

    In Lopez, the Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause authority when it criminalized an individual's knowing
possession of a firearm in a school zone under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990. A 12th grade student challenged the
constitutionality of his conviction under Section 922(q) of this
Federal statute for carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun to
his high school.

    The Court reviewed the authority of the Federal Government
under the Commerce Clause and concluded that Section 922(q) could
not  be sustained under the power of Congress to regulate an
activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce. First,
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that, by its terms, has
nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise
and, therefore, is not a regulation of a commercial transaction
that substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, there was
no indication the defendant had moved in interstate commerce, or
that his possession of the handgun had moved in or had any
connection with interstate commerce.

    The Court reaffirmed that the States possess primary
authority in defining and enforcing the criminal law in matters
of State interest, such as education. It then concluded that this
particular Federal statute inappropriately displaced the historic
police powers reserved to the States by the U.S. Constitution.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995)

    The issue before the Court in McKennon was whether an
employee, discharged because of age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), was barred from all
relief because the employer subsequently discovered evidence of
wrongdoing that would have led to her termination on lawful and
legitimate grounds. The employer discharged McKennon after 30
years as part of a workforce reduction plan necessitated by
cost considerations. At 62, McKennon claimed she was
discriminated against due to her age.

    After the discharge, the employer learned that while
employed, McKennon had copied and taken home several confidential
financial documents in violation of her job responsibilities. The
lower Federal courts concluded that this after-acquired evidence
of her wrongdoing, which would have resulted in her discharge,
bars her from any relief under the ADEA.

    The Supreme Court reversed and held that after-acquired
evidence cannot operate to bar all relief under the ADEA, but it
can limit the remedy. The Court reasoned that Federal laws
intended to eradicate discrimination in the workplace are
designed to compensate employees for injuries incurred and to
deter employers from engaging in such discrimination. Such
deterrence and compensation objectives would not be adequately
served if after- acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have
resulted in termination bars all relief for an employer's earlier
violation.

    The Court distinguished cases where the sole basis for
discharge is discriminatory from those cases involving mixed
motives. In mixed motives cases, the employer's lawful reason
alone at the time of the discharge would sufficiently justify the
firing. Consequently, the legitimate factor for discharge would
serve as an absolute bar to the employee's discrimination claim.
However, the employee may still bring a claim of discrimination
when legitimate justification either is acquired after the
dismissal, as in McKennon, or where the after-acquired
justification is not the motivating factor in the decision to
discharge. 

    The Court also considered the legitimate prerogatives of
employers in deciding that after-acquired evidence of employee
wrongdoing is relevant to determine the appropriate remedy for an
employer's discrimination. Accordingly, the Court decided that as
a general rule, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an
appropriate remedy, because it would be both inequitable and 
pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer
would have terminated on lawful grounds. Because an ADEA
violation did occur in McKennon, which must be deterred and
compensated without infringing on the employer's legitimate
interests, the Court held that an appropriate remedy would be to
calculate backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the
date the employer discovered the new information.

    The Court's decision in McKennon is of potential importance
to law enforcement organizations defending claims of employment
discrimination under Federal statutes such as the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
Section 621 et seq. (1988); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C.Section 2000e et seq. (1988); and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.
(1988). The Court's ruling will assist law enforcement officers
and managers in evaluating the importance of after-acquired
evidence and how the subsequent remedies in such cases will be
determined.

SWINT v. CHAMBERS COUNTY, 115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995)

    In Swint, patrons and proprietors of a nightclub brought a
civil rights action against a county commission (the county), the
city, and three individual police officers under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 for civil rights violations that allegedly occurred
during successive police raids on the nightclub. The county moved
for summary judgment, arguing that the sheriff, who authorized
the raids, was not a policymaker for the county in the area of
law enforcement but was a State of Alabama employee. When the
district court denied the motion for summary judgment, the county
immediately appealed. The Federal appellate court upheld the
county's motion on grounds that the sheriff was not a policymaker
for the county .

    The Supreme Court reversed and held that the county's appeal
of the district court's decision was inappropriate. The Court
reasoned that the county's assertion that the sheriff is not a
policymaker does not rank as an immunity from suit. Instead, it
acts as a mere defense to liability that can be reviewed   
effectively on appeal after a final judgment. The Court
distinguished the county's appeal in Swint from an officer's
appeal of a denial of a qualified immunity claim by noting that
qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like absolute immunity, it is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial."

    This case is significant to law enforcement because it
clarifies that entities of local government sued under Section
1983 for alleged unconstitutional police conduct do not have a
qualified right to be free from trial by being able to
immediately appeal a denial of a summary judgment motion.

JOHNSON v. JONES, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995)

    Johnson involved a civil action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against five named police officers for use of excessive force.
The plaintiff, a diabetic, alleged he was having an insulin
seizure when the police mistakenly arrested him, believing him to
be drunk. The plaintiff claimed the police beat him while in
custody at the station, breaking several of his ribs.
 
    Three of the officers moved for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, arguing that the record contained no evidence
that they used excessive force or were present with the other two
officers. The plaintiff responded by noting that the three
officers admitted in their depositions that they were present at
the arrest and in or near the booking room when the plaintiff was
there.

    A Federal district court denied the officers' summary
judgment motion based on this factual dispute, and the officers
immediately appealed. The Federal appellate court refused to
consider the appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction over an
issue of fact.

    The Supreme Court agreed that the officers in Johnson did
not have a right to an interlocutory appeal--an appeal before the
end of the court proceedings--of the district court's denial of
their claim of qualified immunity, when the denial is based on a
factual dispute. The Court reasoned that Federal appellate courts
have jurisdiction to hear such appeals, but only when the appeal
is based on the legal issue of whether the officer allegedly
violated a "clearly established" law.

    The Court relied on Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1995), which limits the right to an immediate appeal of denied
qualified immunity to cases where the claim of immunity is
conceptually distinct from the merits of the claim and relates
only to the legal question of whether the defendant's conduct
violated clearly established law. In that case, the Court held
that a district court's order denying a defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity was immediately
appealable, in part, because one important purpose of "qualified
immunity" was to protect public officials, not simply from
liability but also from standing trial.

    The Court noted that interlocutory appeals can make it more
difficult for trial judges to supervise trial proceedings. Such
appeals can delay the proceedings, which adds costs and
diminishes coherence. They also risk additional and unnecessary
work, because they present appellate courts with scant records or
introduce appeals that, had the trials simply proceeded, would
have turned out to be unnecessary. Therefore, Jones is important
to law enforcement employees because it clarifies that
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials are not
appropriate if denial is based on a fact-related dispute
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.

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