Holocaust Survivor William R. Perl Dies at 92
Scholar, Psychologist Helped Thousands of Jews Escape Nazi-Occupied Europe

By Louie Estrada
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 25, 1998; Page D08

William R. Perl, 92, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Holocaust survivor, scholar and founder of the Washington branch of the Jewish Defense League who organized a little-known rescue effort that smuggled thousands of Jews out of Nazi-occupied Europe and into Palestine in the late 1930s and '40s, died Dec. 24 at his home in Beltsville. He had Parkinson's disease.

Although Dr. Perl's exploits in wartime Europe were frequently honored abroad, he was better known in the United States as a spokesman for militant Jewish causes and a leader of protests and demonstrations at the old Soviet Embassy in Washington. The militant Jewish Defense League targeted the Soviet Embassy to symbolize its fight for the emigration rights of Russian Jews.

In recent years, however, Dr. Perl, a retired D.C. psychologist and expert on juvenile delinquency, lived a quiet life in a simple brick ranch-style house, still haunted by the nightmares of the genocide but surrounded by memorabilia of his heroic efforts. He won citations from President Ronald Reagan and Congress and numerous humanitarian service awards. In 1990, he was honored in Israel during a 50th-anniversary reunion of the passengers of the Sakarya, a ship he chartered that carried 2,175 Jewish refugees from Constanta, Romania, to Palestine.

"I guess I've been a militant almost all my life," Dr. Perl said in an interview with The Washington Post in 1978. "I always believed that it only takes a few people to accomplish something."

Dr. Perl, who was born in Prague, grew up in Vienna and had been a militant Zionist since his school days. In the 1930s, Dr. Perl, a follower of militant Zionist Revisionist Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, was a young Jewish lawyer and teacher in Vienna. Realizing what Adolf Hitler's rise to power meant, he began organizing the voyages to Palestine in the 1930s.

Persuading people to flee their homes in those early years was difficult, Dr. Perl said. The Jewish establishment "thought more would be accomplished by cooperating, by staying within the law," Dr. Perl recounted.

Despite being questioned and threatened by German officers, he continued with the clandestine voyages, using cattle boats and ramshackle freighters. In other cases, bribes were paid and forged documents were used because Britain stopped the legal immigration of Jews into Palestine in 1939. The other problem was Mother Nature. "Many ships never reached Palestine," he said.

The most painful memory was the job of selecting the evacuees for the limited space aboard the ship. Denying people access was, in effect, sentencing them to death, he said.

According to British statistics, about 20,000 Jews entered Palestine illegally from 1939 to the end of World War II. Dr. Perl said thousands more were rescued before 1939. By his calculations, the operation helped 40,000 Jews escape Europe.

His own escape from Europe was perilous. In 1940, he was arrested in Greece and placed on a train bound for Berlin. While on the train, he faked a suicide by cutting his wrists and, after being taken to a country farmhouse in Yugoslavia for medical treatment, he escaped to Lisbon. He then boarded a ship for Baltimore in 1941.

In the United States, he enlisted in the Army and eventually landed in Army intelligence. While serving as an adviser at the war crime trials at Nuremberg, he returned to Vienna to search for his wife, Lore, who escaped from a concentration camp in Ravensbruck late in 1944, when the Russians pushed into East Germany.

They were reunited and settled in Beltsville years later. After leaving active military duty in 1958 and armed with a doctorate degree in psychology from George Washington University, Dr. Perl began a 10-year career with what is now the D.C. Department of Health and Human Services, retiring in the late 1960s. He also worked as a professor of psychology at George Washington University in the 1960s and as a psychologist in private practice.

In 1971, Dr. Perl formed the Washington branch of the Jewish Defense League and became enmeshed in a number of controversial incidents. He was arrested and convicted on charges of conspiring to shoot into the Prince George's County apartments of two Soviet Embassy officials in 1976.

 

The conspiracy conviction was later overturned on appeal, but he was sentenced to three years' probation for illegal receipt of a firearm and attempting to damage property.

Dr. Perl focused on scholarly pursuits, writing books and articles on the Holocaust. His books include "The Four Front War," "Operation Action" and "Holocaust Conspiracy." Shortly before his death, he completed a collaboration on a biography.

Survivors include his wife, Lore Perl of Beltsville; two sons, Raphael Perl of Silver Spring and Solomon Perl of Olney; and four grandchildren.

 

Abraham H. Rosenfeld

A panel of high-ranking American army officers acted as both judge and jury. Seven members of the panel are shown in the photograph below. The president of the panel was Brigadier General Josiah T. Dalbey, who is the fourth man from the left in the photo. The dominant member of the panel, Col. Abraham H. Rosenfeld, was the "law member," who ruled on all motions and legal matters during the proceeding.

Col. Rosenfeld was Jewish, and a graduate of Yale. He had had experience in over 200 court martial cases before coming to Dachau in March 1946. "Rosenfeld" was a name that was very familiar to General Dietrich because his close friend, Adolf Hitler, always referred to President Franklin D. Roosevelt by that name, claiming that FDR was both a Communist and a Jew.

Captain Dwight Fanton, a graduate of Yale Law School,

 

 

Verdicts and aftermath

On July 16, 1946 the verdict was delivered on 73 members of the Kampfgruppe Peiper.

The sentences were commuted at the behest of a U.S. Senate armed services subcommittee led by Senator Robert Taft. In no case was a death penalty carried out.

Murray Bernays

     
 
   

The concept of the "common design" charge was the innovative idea of Lt. Col. Murray C. Bernays, a Lithuanian Jew who had emigrated to the United States at the age of 6. The following words, written by Bernays before the end of the war, while the war crimes trials were still in the planning stage, are quoted by Robert E. Conot in his book "Judgment at Nuremberg":

The crimes and atrocities were not single or unconnected, but were the inevitable outcome of the basic criminal conspiracy of the Nazi party. This conspiracy, based on the Nazi doctrine of racism and totalitarianism, involved murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations in violation of the laws of war. A conspiracy is criminal either because it aims at the accomplishment of lawful ends by unlawful means, or because it aims at the accomplishment of unlawful ends by lawful means. Therefore, such technicalities as the question whether the extermination of fellow Germans by Nazis perpetrated before there was a state of war, would be unimportant, if you recognize as the basic crime the Nazi conspiracy which required for success the killing of dissident liberal Germans and the extermination of German (and non-German) Jews before and after the war had begun.

Bernays was of the opinion that the German people should be made to feel a sense of their guilt and a realization of their responsibility for the crimes committed by the Nazis. The German people should come to understand the barbarism that they had supported and to realize the criminal nature of the Nazi regime. Bernays thought that it was necessary to prove the conspiracy of the Nazi leadership in the war crimes that were committed so that all the Nazi criminals, large and small, would be caught in the same web

A key member of Jackson's London staff was Colonel Murray C. Bernays, who was one of the first people who had been involved in war crimes problems. Graduated from Harvard in 1915, he established a law practice in New York. He was given a commission in the Army in 1942, and in October 1943, he was made chief of the Special Projects Branch, Personnel Division, Army General Staff. His major project in this position was the preparation of plans for trials of German "war criminals." After each stage of negotiations with the White House and others, he made the appropriate revisions in the plans being considered, although he was the author of the plan that was eventually settled on, if one is to credit his account. In any case, shortly after the appointment of Jackson, Bernays was awarded the Legion of Merit, the citation reading in part:

"Early recognizing the need for a sound basis in dealing with the problem of war criminals and war crimes, he formulated the basic concept of such a policy and initiated timely and appropriate action which assured its adoption as the foundation of national policy."

Bernays returned to the U.S. in November 1945 and immediately resigned from the Army. Because, as we have seen, there was considerable dialogue at higher levels relating to plans for war crimes trials, it is doubtful that one can take Bernays's claims at full value, but he no doubt had a great deal to do with the drafting of the plans for the trials. Moreover, he had certainly been an appropriate choice for something as novel as the formulation of the "legal" structure for the war crimes trials, since his views of justice were equally novel. After his return to the U.S., he had a chat with some editors (who characterized him as "the man behind the gavel"), and in answer to their queries as to "how the small fry are going to be hooked," he replied:[35]

"There are a good many Nazi criminals who will get off if the roundups aren't conducted efficiently. But if we establish that the SS, for example, was a criminal organization, and that membership in it is evidence per se of criminality, the Allies are going to get hold of a great many more criminals in one swoop. You know, a lot of people here at home don't realize that we are now the government of Germany in our zone and that no judicial system can exist other than one we approve. We are the law. If we wanted to, for instance, we could try Germans for crimes twenty, thirty, forty years old.

We'll be too busy with the current crop of war criminals, though, to have much time to look into ancient wrongdoings."

 

 
     

 

 

Marcus

     
 
   

David Daniel Mickey Marcus, a tough Brooklyn street kid, rose by virtue of his courage and intelligence to help save Israel in 1948 and become its first general since Judah Maccabee. After a distinguished career in military and public service to the United States, the 46-year-old Marcus wrote his name forever in the annals of Israeli history.

Born to immigrant parents in 1902, Marcus grew up in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn where, to defend himself against neighborhood toughs, he learned to box. His high school athletic and academic record won him admission to West Point in 1920, from which he graduated with impressive scores. After completing his required service, Marcus went to law school and spent most of the 1930s as a Federal attorney in New York, helping bring Lucky Luciano to justice. As a reward, Mayor LaGuardia named Marcus Commissioner of Corrections for New York City.

 

Convinced that war was imminent, Marcus voluntarily went back into Army uniform in 1940, and after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor served as executive officer to the military governor of Hawaii. In 1942, he was named commandant of the Army's new Ranger school, which developed innovative tactics for jungle fighting. Sent to England on the eve of D-Day, he voluntarily parachuted into Normandy with the troops of the 101st Airborne Division. Marcus helped draw up the surrender terms for Italy and Germany and became part of the occupation government in Berlin. Admiring colleagues identified him as one of the War Department's best brains. He had a bright future ahead of him as a member of the Army's top brass.

 

 
     

 

 

Sentences reduced

     
 
   

 

 

After the trial, Everett attempted to get the Supreme Court to hear the appeal of the Malmédy Case defendants. In May 1948 the Court's decision not to hear the appeal prompted the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, to order a stay of execution of the sentences pending further investigation.

One year after the trial ended, an Army office carried out a review of the trial and made large changes in the original sentences. Although no prisoner was released, twenty-five of the forty-three death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment, seventeen defendants had their life sentences reduced and those with shorter prison terms had them made even shorter. Many of these changes were made, the reviewing body said, because of the youthfulness of the defendants at the time. The charges with these changes were also reviewed a year later by the War Crimes Review Board, which, after declaring the pre-trial investigation flawed and saying the court had favored the prosecution, recommended to a higher body a further reducing of sentences. This higher body, the Military Governor of the American Zone, took some of the Review Board's suggestions into account, and its changes led to thirteen defendants being freed, and only twelve still facing execution. Still later, the Governor reduced the number sentenced to death to 6. As the end of the Malmedy affair approached, American military authorities reduced to life imprisonment the death sentences for the 6 remaining defendants

Appeals lasted more than 10 years and involved both the US Supreme Court and the Hague Court. The last prisoner, Peiper himself, was released in 1956.

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

 

Beatings

     
     
     
 

 

 

In the prison of the Swabisch Hall, he stated, officers of the S.S. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were flogged until they were soaked in blood, after which their sexual organs were trampled on as they lay prostrate on the ground. As in the notorious Malmedy Trials of private soldiers, the prisoners were hoisted in the air and beaten until they signed the confessions demanded of them.

On the basis of such "confessions" extorted from S.S. Generals Sepp Dietrich and Joachim Paiper, the Leibstandarte was convicted as a "guilty organisation". S.S. General Oswald Pohl, the economic administrator of the concentration camp system, had his face smeared with faeces and was subsequently beaten until he supplied his confession. In dealing with these cases, Senator McCarthy told the Press: "I have heard evidence and read documentary proofs to the effect that the accused persons were beaten up, maltreated and physically tortured by methods which could only be conceived in sick brains. They were subjected to mock trials and pretended executions, they were told their families would be deprived of their ration cards. All these things were carried out with the approval of the Public Prosecutor in order to secure the psychological atmosphere necessary for the extortion of the required confessions. If the United States lets such acts committed by a few people go unpunished, then the whole world can rightly criticise us severely and forever doubt the correctness of our motives and our moral integrity."

The methods of intimidation described were repeated during trials at Frankfurt-am-Mein and at Dachau, and large numbers of Germans were convicted for atrocities on the basis of their admissions. The American Judge Edward L. van Roden, one of the three members of the Simpson Army Commission which was subsequently appointed to investigate the methods of justice at the Dachau trials, revealed the methods by which these admissions were secured in the Washington Daily News, January 9th, 1949. His account also appeared in the British newspaper, the Sunday Pictorial, January 23rd, 1949. The methods he described were: "Posturing as priests to hear confessions and give absolution; torture with burning matches driven under the prisoners finger-nails; knocking out of teeth and breaking jaws; solitary confinement and near starvation rations." Van Roden explained: "The statements which were admitted as evidence were obtained from men who had first been kept in solitary confinement for three, four and five months ... The investigators would put a black hood over the accused's head and then punch him in the face with brass knuckles, kick him and beat him with rubber hoses ... All but two of the Germans, in the 139 cases we investigated, had been kicked in the testicles beyond repair.

 

 

However, a letter from Fiske H. Ventres to Royall, provides a different view:

… at Bremen, Germany, I was billeted with a member of the War Crimes Commission who had just resigned his post because of the methods employed by "Americans" to gain confessions and convictions. According to him confessions were the sole evidence against the accused and no methods were too brutal to employ in gaining the confessions.

Beaten to death

One defendant was beaten to death because of his refusal to sign a confession and as a lesson to his other unwilling fellow defendants. To prove his point the resigned agent produced from his trunk the blood-caked hood he, himself, had removed from the head of the murdered German.

From one end of Europe to the other, people are quite aware of the true character of these so-called trials, from Nuremberg to the Bulge. They know full well the identity of those conducting the proceedings and, I might add, a great many Europeans are more than a little suspicious that what is being done is more in the interest of another nation than to the United States.

The following allegations were made by defendant Hendel:

… on 4 April 1946 1 was led from my cell under a black hood, was put into a cell facing the door and was then beaten in the abdomen and face until I fell to the ground. When a moment later the hood was taken off, Lieutenant Perl and Mr. Thon stood before me. During the subsequent interrogation, I was also beaten several times. No notice was taken of my request to have the interrogation postponed since I was not in condition for it at that time. The facts described happened before my interrogation. During the interrogation, promises were made to me but since I did not know anything and today still do not know anything of an order, all sorts of threats were made to me and since things were immaterial to me and I wanted to avoid further beatings, etc., I wrote down everything that was dictated to me.

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

 

McGow

     
     
 
Harold McGown spent three days by Peiper's side, and was released in La Glieze, when Peiper ran out of gas

Joachim Peiper was a Standartenfuehrer in the Waffen SS who was renown for his bravery on the Russian Front, as well as the Western Front. The fact that Joachim Peiper had no culpability, as alleged by the Jews, in the Malmedy incident was best demonstrated by the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. McGown, commander of the American soldiers allegedly massacred at Malmedy, appeared at the Dachau show trials as a witness for Mr. Peiper. He testified that Joachim Peiper went out of his way to make sure many Americans were safe. source

 

 

He charged that Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. McGown, commander of the American soldiers massacred at Malmédy, had fraternized with SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, the German commander, and this explained why McGown had appeared at Dachau as a defense witness for Peiper and had testified that Peiper had held talks with him and had been responsible for saving a number of Americans.

As evidence for the fraternization, Rosenfeld claimed that McGown and Peiper had been "enatirely too friendly during those nights they spent talking together" and that,when Peiper and his men were later able to escape a US Army trap, "McGown was with them." Of coursIt will, of course, be argued that these nightmarish Dachau "trials" have little

Actual testimony from that day from Battle of La Gleize


As we came up a lane into LaGleize a Mark IV tank came toward us and the Tank Cmndr. swiveled his periscope (?) in order to get a good look at me.

I was turned over to an interrogation officer who was originally from Chicago and spoke perfect English. He had a shrapnel hole in his helmet. He was not happy either. From there I was taken to a house and sent downstairs into a basement. There were 30 to 40 American soldiers in the cellar.

Sometime much later, maybe 9 or 10pm, we heard fire crackling overhead in the house above us, compliment of the American artillery…
The guards ordered us out. Everyone went out in a good orderly manner. The scene in the street beside the house was chaotic. The town was on fire. 30 to 40 GIs huddled together, artillery shelling the town and a very wild SS soldier waving a sub machine gun from side to side yelling ‘Officer, Officer!’ Since he spoke with a heavy accent it took me some moment s to realize he meant me.

When I was recognized
I was taken to Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper’s command post. It was in a cellar that was entered from an outside cellarway. I think there was a blanket for a door. I went through and for some reason recognized who was in charge and snapped probably the best salute I have ever given. There were 4 or 5 other German officers. Peiper was wearing a type of coverall and no helmet. A very good-looking man who spoke slow, good but not perfect English. Shortly thereafter Major Hal McCown was brought in. He gave me a quick and very surprised handshake.

(At this point during the Ardennes Offensive. The advances of Peiper’s battlegroup were being halted. So Peiper had decided to concentrate his forces in and around the Belgian town of La Gleize. McGown, the ex commanding officer of the 2nd Bat of the 119th infantry regiment was captured 2 days earlier. He recalls Peiper and his men.)

An astonishing fact to me was the youth of the members of this organization-the bulk of the enlisted men were either 18 or 19, recently recruited, but from my observations thoroughly trained...

The officers for the most part were veterans but were also very young...The morale was high throughout the entire period I was with them despite the extremely trying conditions...

The physical condition of all the personnel was good, except for lack of proper food…The equipment was good and complete with the exception of some reconditioned half-tracks among the motorized equipment.

All the men wore practically new boots and had adequate clothing. Some men wore parts of American uniforms, mainly the knit cap, gloves, sweaters, overshoes and one or two overcoats. I saw no one however, in American uniforms or civilian clothing.

The relationship between the officers and men, particularly the commanding officer, Col. Peiper, was closer and friendlier than I would have expected.

Later on during the night on the 21st of December I was taken again to the cellar HQ of Col. Peiper… He and I talked together from 2300 until 0500 the next morning.- our subject being mainly his defense of Nazism and why Germany was fighting.

I have met few men who impressed me in as short a space of time as did this officer. He was 5ft 8inches, 140 lbs. in weight, long dark hair combed straight back, well shaped features with remarkable facial resemblance to the actor, Ray Milland…He was completely confident of Germany’s ability to whip the Allies.

He spoke of Himmler’s new reserve army quite at length saying that it contained so many new divisions, both armored and otherwise, that our G-2s would wonder where they all came from.

He did hid best to find out from me the success V1 and V2 rockets were having and told me that more secret weapons like those would be unloosed. The German Air force, he said, would now come forth with many new types and which, although inferior in number, would be superior in quality and would suffice their needs to cover the breakthru in Belgium and Holland and later to the French Coast!!
 

 

Col McGown

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

 

     
 
   

 

 

governor, General Lucius D. Clay, to request an investigation of the trials at

Dachau. On July 29, 1948, the Secretary of the Army appointed a commission

consisting of two American judges, Gordon Simpson of Texas and Edward

Van Roden of Pennsylvania, both JAG reserve colonels. They were assisted

by JAG Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lawrence, Jr. The commission submitted

its report to the Secretary of the Army in October 1948, and selected portions

were made public in January 1949.

German refugees." Steiner, Kirschbaum and Thon (later

chief of the evaluation section of the civil administration division of the US

military government) appeared later and denied all, but they were shaken by

the testimony of investigator Bruno Jacob, who admitted a few things.

One year after the trial ended, an Army office carried out a review of the trial and made large changes in the original sentences. Although no prisoner was released, twenty-five of the forty-three death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment, seventeen defendants had their life sentences reduced and those with shorter prison terms had them made even shorter. Many of these changes were made, the reviewing body said, because of the youthfulness of the defendants at the time. The charges with these changes were also reviewed a year later by the War Crimes Review Board, which, after declaring the pre-trial investigation flawed and saying the court had favored the prosecution, recommended to a higher body a further reducing of sentences. This higher body, the Military Governor of the American Zone, took some of the Review Board's suggestions into account, and its changes led to thirteen defendants being freed, and only twelve still facing execution. Still later, the Governor reduced the number sentenced to death to 6. As the end of the Malmedy affair approached, American military authorities reduced to life imprisonment the death sentences for the 6 remaining defendants

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

 

 

     
 
   

 

 

He said that the "most brutal" had been Lieutenant Perl, Frank Steiner and Harry W. Thon.

 

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

 

     
 
   

 

Search for more information on HighBeam Research for Lt. Col. Willis M. Everett%2C.

The author examines the war crime trial of defendants in the Malmedy Massacre. Topics include attorney Willis Mead Everett, Jr. defence, details of the crime and punishment.

The shooting of American prisoners of war on 17 December 1944 by German SS troops became one of the most notorious atrocities of World War II. Under the command of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel) Joachim Peiper, German soldiers surprised and captured an American motor convoy belonging to Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion at a road intersection south of the Belgian town of Malmedy. In what became known as the Malmedy Massacre, more than 100 prisoners were assembled in a field adjacent to the crossroads and mowed down by machine gun fire; approximately 30 survived. As a result of the massacre and ensuing international press coverage, Peiper became for many Americans the most hated man in the German armed forces. He and 73 of his comrades were tried by a U.S. Army court in 1946 for the Malmedy murders and other related war crimes. All were found guilty and 43, including Peiper, were sentenced to death. But none of the death sentences were carried out, the result in large part of the continuing efforts of Colonel Willis Everett Jr., an American lawyer from Georgia who was assigned to defend the accused war criminals.(1)

 

The case brought together former enemies whose involuntary association reflected the moral ambiguities of war and a shared sense of injustice at the manner in which the Allies conducted the trials of accused Germans, whose guilt often was assumed to be self-evident. The relationship of the Georgia colonel and the SS officer was nurtured by affinities both imagined and real. The story of Everett and Peiper juxtaposes two unlikely allies, one from the American South and the other from Nazi Germany, who found a small area of common ground in a world struggling to overcome the effects of history's most terrible war.

Willis Mead Everett Jr. was born on 25 January 1900 into a prosperous family in Atlanta, Georgia. His father, one of the city's leading attorneys, had been born during the Civil War in western New York. He married a young Georgia woman and settled in Atlanta, which by the mid-1880s had recovered from the ravages inflicted by Sherman's army 20 years earlier and was booming. Everett junior attended Atlanta's Boys' High School and graduated in 1921 from Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, where Robert E. Lee had served as president during his last years. Despite a lackluster academic record, he graduated from Atlanta Law School in 1924 and joined his father's successful law practice. With his wife, a young woman from a good Memphis family, Willis Everett settled into a comfortable life as a member of Atlanta's upper crust.(2)

Everett understood the importance of social responsibility. On his twenty-fifth birthday, his father wrote to him of the need to "help and live for others," and that he would discover "the purest gold among those who are always helping someone else and are thinking but little of themselves."(3) Evidence of Everett's sense of noblesse oblige can be seen in his later long and devoted service to the African American Gammon Theological Seminary, which is still remembered with respect and affection by older black Atlantans today.(4)

Everett also developed a lifelong interest in the military. Near the end of World War I, he took temporary leave from Washington and Lee for brief service in the U.S. Army. Although he failed to get closer to the battlefield than the Army's Coast Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the attraction clearly went beyond the hyper-patriotism of a popular war. While still a law student, Everett applied for a commission in the Army Reserve Corps and was appointed a second lieutenant of infantry in May 1923. Thus began a career that paralleled his practice of law for over 30 years. The Reserve Corps was a rather relaxed form of duty in peacetime, involving little more than occasional unit exercises and annual two-week excursions to summer training camp. Everett's service reflected an appreciation of both the military virtues and the status that being an officer carried in Southern society, as well as a generally conservative outlook characteristic of the officer corps. In applying for a transfer from the infantry to military intelligence in 1932, Everett noted that he had been "actively fighting in every way all forms of communism, socialism, pacifism, etc., in and around Atlanta" for the previous two years.(5)

Everett's comfortable background was similar to that of Joachim Peiper, who was born in 1915 in the Wilmersdorf section of Berlin. Peiper's father was born in the Prussian province of Silesia in 1878 to a family of Imperial Germany's Bildungsbuergertum (educated middle class). He served as an officer in the German army in prewar German Southwest Africa and in Turkey during World War I. Germany had been at war for six months when Joachim Peiper was born, only to be defeated less than four years later with the loss of almost two million men amidst starvation and political chaos.(6)

After the war, the elder Peiper took a position with the state lottery administration, which permitted the family to preserve a bourgeois existence. Joachim Peiper enrolled in Berlin/Wilmersdorf's Goethe Oberrealschule, a school that emphasized mathematics, modern languages, and the natural sciences and prepared its students for university work. But, perhaps stimulated by his father's tales of manly adventure in uniform and Germany's new militarism on the heels of Adolf Hitler's appointment as Reich chancellor, the younger Peiper decided on a military career shortly after his eighteenth birthday.(7)

Gravitating toward the Nazi dictatorship, Peiper joined the Hitler Youth in the spring of 1933, and the following October he joined the Schutzstaffel, or SS, headed by Heinrich Himmler. By 1933 Himmler had already established the first Nazi concentration camp at Dachau, which was to become a model and training center for the entire camp system. That year he also laid the foundation for a military branch of the SS that, as the Waffen-SS, would fight alongside the German army in World War II. To help establish its image as an elite body of Nazi activists, Himmler sought to attract "socially respectable" elements to his black-uniformed organization. The Reiter-SS, or SS cavalry, was designed to appeal to well-bred young men such as the 19-year-old Joachim Peiper, who applied for active SS membership as an officer candidate early in 1934. Peiper attended the SS officers' academy (SS-Junkerschule) at Braunschweig, where instruction in military tactics was combined with indoctrination in Nazi ideology. On 20 April 1936--Hitler's birthday--he was commissioned an SS-Untersturmfuehrer (2nd lieutenant) and immediately assigned to duty with the elite Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer's personal guard regiment and one of the original combat units of the SS. That Peiper was singled out as an unusually promising young SS officer was made clear in 1938 when he was transferred to Himmler's personal staff. The appointment not only provided opportunities to rub elbows with the mighty of the Third Reich, but introduced Peiper to his future wife, one of the Reichsfuehrer's secretaries.(8)

Willis Everett, meanwhile, continued to combine the practice of law in his father's firm with part-time Army reserve service. The board of officers who examined Everett for promotion to the rank of major in November 1935 noted approvingly that

    He is a particularly high-type civilian, well-known and prominent in  
    Atlanta and his Americanism is unquestioned; ... the applicant has on  
    various occasions investigated on his own initiative individuals and  
    organizations purportedly of an un-American or insidious character and made  
    reports of his findings to the civilian organizations who were interested  
    in activities of this nature.(9)  
  

Although Everett's military service may have been more benign than Peiper's, there is a certain parallel to be found in the eagerness with which both young men associated themselves with forces opposed to the political left; still, the similarities are limited. That Everett's conservatism was combined with racism is hardly surprising in one raised in early twentieth-century Georgia, but it was a racism tempered by a humanitarian perspective rejected by the Nazis. Everett believed Jews in general to be morally suspect and African Americans to be inferior to whites, but he was capable of friendship with individual Jews, and he regarded paternalistic support of blacks to be his Christian duty.

Peace in Europe ended on 1 September 1939 when Germany invaded Poland, and Britain and France quickly declared war on Germany. Peiper, still on Himmler's staff and soon to become first adjutant, accompanied the Reichsfuehrer to Poland aboard Himmler's personal train. The horror of Nazi extermination policies was first revealed in Poland, where, following the quick German victory, Poland's educated elite were slaughtered as a crucial step toward reducing the Polish people to total subservience. The SS was to be the instrument of annihilation, as another member of Himmler's staff later recalled Peiper informing him.(11) Whether this incident is true or not, Peiper could hardly have been unaware of SS atrocities. Indeed, after the war, Peiper admitted to having attended an early experiment in the use of poison gas on living subjects, although there was no evidence that he planned or participated in mass murder.(12)

Still, Peiper welcomed reassignment to a purely military post in the Leibstandarte in mid-May 1940, as the German blitzkrieg rolled into the Low Countries and France. Here he could see action and build the active military career for which he longed. The young SS-Obersturmfuehrer (1st lieutenant) quickly distinguished himself in combat, first as a platoon leader and later as a company commander, where he demonstrated a high degree of initiative and personal bravery. The operations in which he was involved during the spring of 1940 were of a traditional military nature, but Peiper's career again entered a region of moral ambiguity when he returned to Himmler's personal staff in July.(13)

As the United States moved toward active involvement in the war, Willis Everett's military career assumed a more serious character. In September 1940, Everett was called to active duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (intelligence) for the Fourth Corps Area (later Fourth Service Command), headquartered in Atlanta. The Fourth Service Command included a large segment of the U.S. Army's training facilities and, later, many prisoner of war camps. Important war production plants, including the Manhattan Project's U-235 production facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were located within it. Everett's charge as chief of the Fourth Service Command's Intelligence Branch, Security and Intelligence Division was to ferret out pro-Axis activity and provide security against Communist subversion, as well as vigilance against unrest among African Americans. While some cases were ludicrous, such as the woman who reported to one of Everett's counterintelligence officers that her neighbor's dog was giving the Fascist salute, the challenge of maintaining the surveillance system in the southeastern United States, for which Everett had primary administrative responsibility, was substantial.(14)

Peiper, meanwhile, experienced war at its most cataclysmic. He continued to serve as Himmler's adjutant from July 1940 until August 1941, the crucial period when preparations were being made for an ideologically charged war of annihilation against the purported "subhuman" population of the Soviet Union and steps were taken that would culminate in the Holocaust. While Peiper cannot be accused of framing policies of mass murder, he certainly supported them by his consensual presence. Although he was permanently reassigned to a combat role in August 1941 he remained a favorite of Himmler's and paid him friendly visits until near the end of the war.(15)

In Russia, Peiper proved himself a resourceful and courageous commander of mechanized forces and was awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight's Cross), the highest grade of the Iron Cross. He was given command of the Leibstandarte's armored regiment in November 1943, perhaps a reflection of his connections in high places as well as of his leadership talents. The Russian war was characterized by brutality on both sides; German forces commonly slaughtered both Russian prisoners of war and civilians, and Peiper must have participated in this aspect of the conflict. While in northern Italy following the Allied landings in Sicily in July 1943, a mechanized battalion Peiper commanded was involved in a brutal incident in the town of Bores. In response to the capture of two German soldiers by Italian partisans, Peiper's troops attacked the town with considerable loss of civilian life.(16)

By December 1944, Germany's armed forces in both east and west were shattered, and Allied aircraft controlled the European skies. Although defeat was certain, Hitler planned a massive offensive designed to split the Anglo-American forces, capture their primary supply port of Antwerp, and turn the war around for Germany. The Ardennes offensive was a desperate undertaking, depending on surprise, bad weather to neutralize Allied air supremacy, and the capture of American stores of gasoline to permit fuel-starved German tanks to reach Antwerp. Crucial to the operation's success was the quick capture of crossings over the Meuse river, an objective assigned to a battlegroup of the 1st SS Panzer Division that Peiper commanded.(17)

Although the offensive, known among the Allies as the Battle of the Bulge, temporarily threw the Allies off balance, ultimately it failed and even hastened Germany's collapse. It was also punctuated by the notorious event that would later bring Everett and Peiper together in a court of law, when on the afternoon of 17 December Peiper's battlegroup captured and fired on more than 100 members of an American motor convoy in a probable effort to rid themselves of inconvenient prisoners. By death camp standards, or even in comparison with the brutality that was commonplace in the war against the Soviet Union, it was a crime of modest scope. But it was the most serious violation of the laws of war perpetrated by Germans against Americans, and the incident received widespread publicity both within the U.S. Army and among civilians at home. Propelled by universal American outrage, the hunt for the murderers began almost immediately.(18)

Willis Everett must have read newspaper accounts of the massacre as the war entered its final months. When it finally ended with Japan's acceptance of surrender on 14 August 1945, American military priorities changed. There was intense political pressure to bring the "boys" home, and the U.S. forces in Europe that had contributed so effectively to the defeat of Nazi Germany were rapidly dismantled. But the United States was also committed to an ambitious policy to fundamentally reform the German nation, which twice within a quarter century had plunged Europe into catastrophic conflict and had carried out a program of genocide against the Jewish population. Such a reformation required a long-term Allied presence in the conquered country, initially in the form of a military government. Embarrassed at having passed the war years in domestic safety, Everett expressed no distress when in October 1945 he was ordered to a 14-week European Staff Officers Studies Course at Columbia University to prepare him for service in postwar Europe. Upon his arrival at USFET (United States Forces, European Theater) headquarters at Frankfurt am Main in March 1946, he was assigned to the Judge Advocate's Division, then hard pressed for legal personnel.(19)

The War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate's Division was responsible for the identification, trial, and punishment of Germans guilty of crimes committed under the Third Reich. When Everett arrived in Germany, the Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg had been in progress for four months and would continue for another six. These heavily publicized trials of major figures in the German government and military were the most visible of the postwar efforts to bring German war criminals to justice. Offenders of lesser stature were tried by military courts of the occupying Allied powers. Everett was assigned to such a court held at the former concentration camp at Dachau, where the defendants of the Malmedy massacre were to be tried. According to Deputy Theater Judge Advocate Colonel Claude B. Mickelwait, the Army was determined to make a "big show" for this particular case. Everett was appointed chief defense counsel for 74 Germans accused of responsibility for the Malmedy and other related atrocities, of whom the leading defendant was Joachim Peiper.(20)

Everett was horrified by the assignment. He had no experience in criminal law and found the prospect of organizing the defense of more than six dozen men in the space of six weeks daunting. Moreover, he had little sympathy for the defendants, writing to his wife that they seemed to be "the worst kinds of murderers," for whom "rope is probably too mild"(21) Within a week, however, his attitude changed dramatically. Initial interviews with the defendants through interpreters produced a lurid picture of the pretrial investigation at the War Crimes Branch prison at Schwaebisch Hall, which had identified this body of former Waffen SS members as the likely culprits. \

Everet Suspiscious

Everett wrote that he and his defense team "got steamed up" over the "underhanded methods" employed by Army investigators, whom he ironically characterized as a "gang of Nazi method boys" Some defendants told of having been subjected to what they now realized had been mock trials. They had been brought before a black-draped table with illuminated candles, on which stood a cross, and Army personnel acting as judges sat behind the table. Witnesses testified to the guilt of the prisoners, who were condemned and sentenced to hang but then were promised clemency if they signed confessions, as some did. Besides mock trials, there were allegations of beatings and other forms of duress employed to extract confessions. Everett concluded from the consistency of the defendants' stories that there was a core of truth. He was deeply disturbed, less by evidence of Army perfidy itself than by its likely impact on American public opinion should the press get wind of it.(22)

By April 1946, when Everett began to delve into the distressing complexities of the Malmedy case, Joachim Peiper had been a prisoner for almost a year. World War II had ended for Peiper and his troops while in hopeless combat against the Red Army in Austria. The disorganized fragments of his regiment fled westward to escape Soviet vengeance and ironically fell into American captivity. Peiper attempted to join his wife and three children in Bavaria, but he was seized by U.S. forces about 20 miles short of his goal. Although Peiper was not initially recognized, the staff of the service newspaper The Stars and Stripes discovered in August that "the American doughboy's number one war criminal" was in a POW compound.(23) Peiper joined the growing number of former SS men suspected of complicity in the Malmedy massacre being assembled for interrogation by Army investigators. In addition to the crossroads killings, the defendants were charged with many other murders of American prisoners and Belgian civilians during the Ardennes offensive.

Although in the absence of strong evidence against him the American War Crimes Branch concluded in early October that "it is very doubtful that he (Peiper) is guilty of any war crimes,"(24) six months later Peiper confessed at the Schwaebisch Hall prison to having received and transmitted orders to kill prisoners of war during the December 1944 offensive and to having ordered or acquiesced in the murder of American prisoners in several incidents. Written confessions by Peiper and many of the remaining defendants constituted the bulk of the case brought against them by Army prosecutors during the trial held from May until July 1946 at Dachau. On the basis of those confessions and the testimony of American survivors, and despite a vigorous if not always skillful defense by Everett and his defense team, all of the defendants were found guilty. Forty-three of them, including Peiper, were sentenced to death by hanging.(25)

 

For Everett, the verdict was devastating. The next day, he wrote to his wife that his heart was "crushed" and his head "whirling, splitting and hammered." He doubted the veracity of many of the sworn statements and believed that the procedural decisions made by the panel of Army officers who had judged the case had unfairly favored the prosecution. The verdict, he was convinced, had been dictated to the court by the Theater Judge Advocate. But he did not challenge the fact that American prisoners of war had been murdered. Immediately following the trial, he was chiefly distressed by what he perceived to be the injustice of condemning to death young men, some still in their teens, for having committed war crimes under superior orders that they could not reasonably have been expected to refuse. He believed it hypocritical to punish former enemy soldiers for violations of the laws of war of which American troops had also been guilty.(26) In this, he was on firm historical ground, for the killing of inconvenient or unwanted prisoners was far from rare on either side during World War II. But subjective factors were equally significant in Everett's reaction to the verdicts.

Jew black market

Everett was sympathetic to the German people's postwar degradation and material deprivation and may have been inclined to liken it, as did other Southerners, to the plight of the former Confederacy following the Civil War. Like the Germans themselves, he tended to hold the upper Nazi leadership echelons responsible for the crimes of the Third Reich while absolving ordinary Germans, both in and out of uniform. Moreover, he had very quickly become disillusioned with the moral character of the military government in the U.S. zone of occupation. The sexual license, drunkenness, black marketeering, and general inefficiency and lack of discipline that he observed among U.S. Army personnel in Germany offended his strict, teetotaling Presbyterian conscience. Most troubling in Everett's outlook was an obvious element of anti-Semitism. Although like many Americans Everett was quite capable of respect and affection for individual Jews, he shared the antiSemitism common in much of the United States during that period.(27)

shocked at jew brutality

The cultural anti-Semitism Everett brought with him to Germany was inflamed by what he believed to have been the role of Jews in the injustice of the Malmedy verdicts. Several members of the American investigation-prosecution team were Jewish. An officer alleged to have shot a prisoner during interrogation and against whom other accusations of physical brutality had been leveled was a Jewish refugee from Vienna. Colonel Abraham H. Rosenfeld, the "law member" of the Malmedy court whom Everett believed responsible for many procedural decisions that had hampered the defense, was Jewish. In Everett's mind, the injustices of the Malmedy proceedings were partly the products of Jewish vengefulness. The fact that a Jewish civilian member of the defense team shared Everett's critical assessment of the investigation and trial--although not his ethnically-based analysis--did not shake his conviction.(28)

Moreover, Everett was deeply impressed by Joachim Peiper. He may not have been aware of Peiper's close association with Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and all that that implied. To him, Peiper was simply a brave and capable commander whose spectacular military career the desk-bound Everett probably envied and admired. Having had the misfortune to be on the losing side, he was now a convenient scapegoat for the victors. Furthermore, Peiper could communicate with Everett in English, which he spoke and wrote in a stilted but often dramatic manner. To be sure, what he wrote to Everett was sometimes sharply evocative of the criminal regime he had served. In a letter written at the end of the trial, Peiper recalled the war as "a proud and heroic time! Where we were standing was Germany and as far as my tank gun reached was my kingdom! ... Our vision always has been the `Dream of Reich!'" He mourned the fact that at the end of the war, "when the Fuehrer was needing his Leibstandarte the most, the (sic) fate had separated us from him."(29) These sentiments may well have resonated in Everett, who from his letters had only a superficial understanding of what the "Dream of Reich" had implied and who had been raised in a culture that treasured memories of an earlier lost cause.

But if Peiper showed no remorse for German crimes, he could speak in intensely human terms. In the same letter, he wrote of his concern for his family after his death.

    Besides my charming children I leave my wife, the best and bravest comrade  
    I ever met. Unfortunately, I'm not able to do anything for her  
    protection.... The "thankful" population believes me to be a criminal, and  
    my family has to suffer from this fame.(30)  
  

Everett, a family man whose daffy letters to his Atlanta home expressed constant concern for the welfare of his wife and children, was deeply moved by such domestic sentiments. He was moved as well by Peiper's expressions of gratitude that Everett, an officer of an army recently at war with Germany, was capable of a full-blooded defense on behalf of Peiper and his comrades in a hostile court.

    In a time of deepest human disappointment, you ... have returned to me much  
    faith I already had lost. This will remain one of my best remembrance[s]  
    and was worth the whole of the Malmedy case.... Only men with your  
    character and chivalrous attitude are able to rebuild peace.... Perhaps our  
    end will contribute a little to this goal.(31)  
  

Peiper pictured Everett as Everett wanted to see himself, in sharp contrast to the allegedly vengeful and morally bankrupt U.S. occupation troops.

Everett felt personally responsible for the outcome of the trial. Although the odds would have been heavily against the defense under the best of circumstances, Everett felt keenly that his own professional inadequacies, his lack of experience in criminal cases in particular--although that shortcoming was shared with the prosecution--had contributed to the outcome.(32) As a result, a burning passion to nullify the verdicts of the Malmedy trial dominated Everett's life from that time on.

Everett's public position was not that innocent men had been convicted of crimes they had not committed but rather that the character of the trial, particularly the nature of the pretrial investigation, made it impossible to determine guilt or innocence. The core of the argument rested with the sworn pretrial confessions, many of which allegedly had been secured under various forms of psychological and physical duress. Some confessions contained blatantly fanciful material that could only encourage skepticism of the investigative procedure. Peiper did not claim gross physical abuse as the motivation for his own confessions, but he did claim to have been disoriented and depressed by a combination of solitary confinement, assurances that he might save his subordinates by assuming responsibility for the killings, and confrontations arranged by Army investigators with members of his command who, themselves subjected to duress, had testified to his guilt.(33)

The remedy for such supposed misfeasance in the domestic legal system would have been a new trial, and Everett repeatedly claimed that this was his primary objective.(34) While war crimes trials were not subject to formal appeals and retrials, internal review was required before sentences were confirmed, and Everett made his views known to the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Army analysts partially agreed with Everett's assessment of the pretrial investigation, although they did not recommend wholesale nullification of the trial.(35) General Lucius Clay, chief of military government in the U.S. zone of occupation who had final authority in these matters, became convinced that "improper methods" had been used in securing confessions. He freed 13 of the convicted Germans in 1948 and commuted many of the death sentences to terms of imprisonment, but he confirmed 12 death sentences (later reduced to six), including Peiper's.(36) In 1948, Everett appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice at The Hague, but both efforts were in vain. The Supreme Court divided 4-4 on accepting jurisdiction with Justice Robert Jackson abstaining, while the International Court of Justice adhered to its well-established principle of hearing only cases submitted by national governments.(37) His juridical avenues seemingly exhausted, Everett turned to politics.

Everett's unwillingness to abandon his "Malmedy boys" as he often called them, particularly those still under sentence of death, had become an obsession. When relieved of active duty by the Army in 1947, he returned to Atlanta, but the Malmedy case occupied most of his energy and kept him from fully resuming his general practice of law. As a prominent citizen of the community, Everett had connections, and he established many more as he revealed investigatory and judicial improprieties of the war crimes trial to the press. As a result, additional reviews of the investigation and trial were held, including a full-blown Senate probe in 1949, in which Senator Joseph McCarthy, best known for his determined pursuit of alleged communists, played a prominent and not altogether unconstructive role. Although the reviews were inconclusive, sufficient doubts were raised in regard to the case that in 1951 the remaining death sentences were commuted. By the end of 1956, the last of the men convicted for the Malmedy massacre, Joachim Peiper, was released from prison.(38)

Everett paid a substantial price for his obsession with the Malmedy affair. In addition to a neglected law practice and the economic consequences thereof, he later estimated that he had incurred expenses of some $40,000 in 1950s vintage dollars, for which a $5,000 honorarium from the West German government in 1958 was inadequate restitution.(39) In March 1949, moreover, he had suffered a major heart attack, which he attributed to the stress of fighting the Malmedy verdicts. His son recalls friendships strained as a consequence of years spent in the defense of convicted Nazi war criminals, not the most popular of causes in the postwar United States. Over ten years in prison, half of it under sentence of death, exacted a heavy physical and psychological toll on Peiper as well.(40)

Peiper and Everett communicated infrequently during Peiper's years in Landsberg prison, although Peiper was kept apprised of efforts to save him and his comrades from the gallows, and Everett was from time to time the recipient of Peiper's sardonic humor. In response to Everett's apparent recommendation that he write about his experiences with mobile warfare in Russia, probably to demonstrate that he would be more valuable to the U.S. Army alive than dead, Peiper replied that such an undertaking would take a long time, as the light in his cell was so poor that it took him two days to write a letter to his wife. But Peiper also expressed the hope that Everett "would grant his sympathy to an old, honest war criminal."(41) The news in 1951 that all of the remaining death sentences, including his own, had been commuted to life imprisonment, produced a rare burst of jubilation:

    We have received a great victory and next to God it is you [from] whom our  
    blessings flow. In all the long and dark years you have been the beacon  
    flame for the forlorn souls of the Malmedy boys, the voice and the  
    conscience of the good America, and yours is the present success against  
    all the well known overwhelming odds. May I therefore, Colonel, express the  
    everlasting gratitude of the red-jacket team (retired) as well as of all  
    the families concerned.(42)  
  

Although Everett remained intensely interested in the case, his precarious health and the fact that the remaining prisoners were no longer in danger of execution caused him to be less active on their behalf. Following Peiper's release, communication between the two ceased, and the former SS officer attempted to rebuild his life in a Germany far different from the one he had known. He secured a menial job with the Porsche company in Stuttgart cleaning cars but, due in part to his fluency in English, quickly rose to the position of sales manager for Porsche exports to the United States, a circumstance characterized by a friend as "a slight parody of fate." His three children had entered adolescence in his absence and initially regarded him as an intruder, but the tension was overcome as Peiper settled into what he called, with a hint of self-deprecation, a "bourgeois existence."(43)

Everett and Peiper reestablished contact in the fall of 1959 when a German friend and fellow Waffen-SS veteran, to whom Peiper had described Everett's fight against the Malmedy verdicts "with great admiration," discovered Everett's Atlanta address and wrote to him.(44) Everett's own well-established "bourgeois existence" was now based on his law practice, complemented by service on the board of trustees of Atlanta's black Gammon Theological Seminary and his role as adviser to his college fraternity's chapter at Georgia Tech. But an association from Peiper's new life also provided impetus for renewed communication. On 2 November 1959 William J. Sholar, executive secretary of the Porsche Club of America, wrote to Everett that he and other members had attended international meetings in Germany and had come to know and become very fond of Peiper and his "charming" family. They hoped that Peiper and his wife, along with other Germans, might attend a Porsche Club meeting scheduled for July 1960 in Aspen, Colorado. Securing a visa for a convicted war criminal presented a problem, however, and Sholar, knowing of Everett's association with Peiper, turned to the lawyer for help.(45)

Everett's long letter to Peiper of 24 November 1959, the first communication with him since long before his release from Landsberg, reveals a persistent sense of guilt for perceived inadequacies in the Dachau courtroom and his continued rage at what he believed to have been the Army's perfidy. These sentiments combined incongruously with impractical advice on securing a visa for a holiday in Aspen. Everett wrote that Peiper should simply include his application with those of other Germans intending to make the trip and hope his name was not recognized. If it were, Everett would "pull strings" with his senators and congressman.(46) It was not the most eccentric of Everett's schemes. While Peiper was still imprisoned, Everett had recommended to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace that he be brought to Fort Knox as an adviser on armored warfare to the U.S. Army.(47)

Peiper's response was one of polite restraint. If Everett was reliving the past, Peiper seemed intent on trying to forget it. He had received Everett's letter, he wrote, "with deep joy and sincere appreciation" adding that his lack of resentment toward the United States for having deprived him of "the best twelve years" of his life was due to Everett's "upright and unfailing example and the unsurpassed way in which you represented your country." "You have been America's best ambassador to Germany," he wrote, "setting an example that was respected and recognized far beyond the defendants of the Malmedy case" But he found Everett's suggestion for securing a visa "more than improbable" and reacted to Everett's reference to a trip he planned to make to Germany in the spring with something less than enthusiasm.(48)

In fact, Everett was a dying man. In his last letter to Peiper, dated February 1960, he repeated his intention to visit Stuttgart in April and asked Peiper to arrange for him to pick up a Porsche on his arrival although, he noted, he might have to delay his trip "a little" due to two months' treatment "for the uncommon malady of lymphoma" On 4 April he died.(49)

Although Peiper outlived Everett by 16 years, he was unable to escape his past. Opposition by labor unions and Italian "guest workers" who remembered the Bores atrocity in Italy cost him his positions with Porsche and later with Volkswagen. Thoroughly disillusioned with the "new Germany," he retired to rural seclusion in eastern France. In 1976, French communists orchestrated a campaign to drive him from the country. He refused to leave, and on the night of 14 July, Bastille Day, after having sent his wife to safety in Germany, he was killed in a fire-bomb attack on his home.(50)

Everett died believing that Peiper had finally found well-deserved security. From his somewhat naive perspective, a brave and honorable soldier had fallen victim to the victor's postwar vengefulness, but this had been a temporary aberration within an essentially moral universe. Matters ultimately had been put right and, Everett wrote to Peiper three months before his death, "I certainly believe that we all have much to thank God for."(51) Peiper knew better. Apart from what actually happened at the crossroads south of Malmedy, Peiper occupied a responsible position in a Nazi regime that fundamentally challenged western society's belief in a moral universe. During a wartime furlough in which he learned of the mass exterminations in death camps (perhaps from Himmler himself), he reportedly told an associate, "If we lose the war, we'll be in deep shit because of these things."(52) Peiper recognized how precarious was his position following his release from prison, observing that he sat on a "powderkeg" that could explode at any time.(53)

The relationship between Everett and Peiper was based on an unusual set of circumstances growing out of German battlefield criminality and American judicial malfeasance, but the two men were the products of worlds that, despite superficial similarities, were profoundly different. Their meeting in the spring of 1960, had it taken place, would likely have been awkward.

(1) See Trevor N. Dupuy, Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944-January 1945 (New York, 1994), 487-97.

(2) Biographical sketch of Willis M. Everett Sr., n.d., in Everett Papers, in possession of Willis M. Everett III.

(3) Willis M. Everett Sr. to Willis M. Everett Jr., 25 January 1925, Everett Papers.

(4) Telephone interview with Selma Richardson, 22 April 1997.

(5) Appointment certificate, 14 May 1923; Everett to instructor, 326th Infantry, 24 October 1932, both in Everett file, National Personnel Records Center, Overland, Mo. (hereafter National Personnel Records).

(6) "Personalangaben des SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Peiper"; and "Personal-Nachweis fuer Fuehrer der Waffen-SS" both in SS Files, Berlin Document Center, now Bundesarchiv Berlin-Zehlendorf (hereafter SS Biographical Files); Jens Westemeier, Joachim Peiper: Eine Biographie (Osnabrueck, 1996), 6-7.

(7) Westemeier, Peiper, 6-7.

(8) "Personal--Nachweis fuer Fuehrer der Waffen-SS"; "Personalangaben"; Peiper to SS-Oberabschnitt Ost, 17 February 1934; "An die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler," 30 June 1938; Himmler to Peiper, n.d., all in SS Biographical Files; Westemeier, Peiper, 7-15.

(9) proceedings of Board of Officers, 4 November 1935, National Personnel Records.

(10) Everett to family, 27 November 1945, 14 January 1946, and 6 September 1946, Everett Papers.

(11) Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution (New York, 1991), 95.

(12) Cross-examination of Peiper, 22 June 1946, U.S. v. Valentin Bersin et al., U.S. National Archives, record group 153, roll 3, frames 000189-90.

(13) Westemeier, Peiper, 29.

(14) Separation Qualification Record, 15 June 1947, National Personnel Records; Telephone interview with William Hartman, 23 April 1997; Records of the Fourth Service Command, Security and Intelligence Division, National Archives and Record Service, record group 338, National Archives, College Park, Md., boxes 66-73; see also Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 (New Haven, 1991), chap. 10.

(15) Westemeier, Peiper, 101.

(16) "Fernschreiben an Fuehrerhauptquartier. Vorschlag zur Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes an SS-Stubaf. Joachim Peiper, 7 March 1943"; "Vorschlag Nr. (?) fur die Verleihung des Deutschen Kreuzes in Gold, 26 February 1943"; "Eichenlaub fur Kommandeur SS-Pz. Rgt. `LSSAH,'" all in SS Biographical Files; Michael Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader (New York, 1995), 27-32; Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (London, 1985), passim.

(17) See Dupuy, Hitler's Last Gamble, 9-20.

(18) James J. Weingartner, Crossroads of Death: The Story of the Malmedy Massacre and Trial (Berkeley, 1979), 51-3, 65-7.

(19) War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Subject: Temporary Duty, 10 October 1945, National Personnel Records; Everett to family, 30 March 1946, Everett Papers; Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949 (New Haven, 1995), 1-5.

(20) Frank M. Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946-1955 (Westport, 1989), 1-3; Everett to family, 2 April 1946, Everett Papers.

(21) Everett to family, 16 April 1946, Everett Papers.

(22) Everett to family, 23 April 1946, Everett Papers.

(23) "SS Colonel, Malmedy Murderer, Captured" The Stars and Stripes, 20 August 1945.

(24) Internal Route Slip, Headquarters U.S. Forces European Theater, Subject: SS Lt. Col. Peiper, 1 October 1945, National Archives and Record Service, record group 319.

(25) Weingartner, Crossroads, 102-3, 161, 164.

(26) Everett to Family, 17 July 1946, Everett Papers.

(27) See, e.g., Everett's reference to the "over-production of Jews" in military government in Germany, ibid.

(28) Leon C. Standifer, Binding Up the Wounds: An American Soldier in Occupied Germany (Baton Rouge, 1997), 17-23; see also Leonard Dinnerstein, Anti-Semitism in America (New York, 1994), 128-49; and Everett to Ralph W. Pierce, 7 November 1949, Everett Papers.

(29) peiper to Everett, 14 July 1946, Everett Papers.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Everett deposition, Malmedy Massacre Investigation: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C., 1949), 1556.

(33) U. S. v. Valentin Bersin et al., 153/3/000107-8.

(34) Everett to General Thomas Green, 5 November 1948, Everett Papers; Weingartner, Crossroads, 130-31.

(35) Weingartner, Crossroads, 170-71, 176-82.

(36) Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, 1950), 253.

(37) United States Supreme Court Reports: Lawyers' ed., Advance Opinions, vol. 92 (Rochester, N.Y., 1948), 1051; E. Hambro to Everett, 5 March 1949, Everett Papers.

(38) Weingartner, Crossroads, chap. 8; Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant, 259; Dupuy, Hitler's Last Gamble, 487-97.

(39) Everett to Dr. Karl H. Schoenbach, 30 July 1958, Everett Papers.

(40) Interview with Willis M. Everett III, 6 June 1997; Westemeier, Peiper, 142.

(41) Peiper to Everett, 7 December 1946, Everett Papers.

(42) Peiper to Everett, 6 February 1951, Everett Papers. Red jackets were worn by German prisoners in Landsberg who were under sentence of death.

(43) Dr. Benno Mueller to Everett, 25 October 1959, Everett Papers.

(44) Dr. Benno Mueller to Everett, 9 October 1959, Everett Papers.

(45) William I. Sholar to Everett, 2 November 1959, Everett Papers.

 

 

 

(46) Everett to Peiper, 24 November 1959, Everett Papers.

(47) Everett to Congressman James Davis, 12 July 1951, Everett Papers.

(48) Peiper to Everett, 13 December 1959, Everett Papers.

(49) Everett to Peiper, 5 February 1960, Everett Papers.

(50) Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant, 260-61, 264-66.

(51) Everett to Peiper, 22 December 1959, Everett Papers.

(52) Westemeier, Peiper, 30.

(53) Quoted in ibid., 143.

James J. Weingartner is a professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville.3

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

 

     
 
   

 

Piper Killed

Peiper was, of course, released despite the outcry from "concerned citizens" and most of the veterans organizations. In 1964 he moved to France where he made a comfortable living as a translator. But in 1976 a sensational article on Peiper appeared in a French communist newspaper.

A two-week campaign of threats and harassment followed, during which time Peiper was preparing to leave France, and on the night of 14/15 July, he was killed in a fire-bomb attack on his house.

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

Jew guards

     
 
   

 

The guards at the prison where the interrogations took place were not under the control of the war crimes team. They also, for a time, included Polish refugees who harbored considerable resentment towards Germans-and especially SS men. Some defendants specifically mention physical abuse by these guards as they were being led between their cells and the interrogation rooms and while waiting in halls, all the time wearing black hoods over their heads. (The hoods were claimed to be necessary to keep the prisoners form recognizing each other and to prevent them form speaking to fellow soldiers.) Kicking, punching, beating about the arms, and pushing prisoners down stairs, in addition to verbal abuse, was conducted frequently, much to the amusement of the perpetrators.

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

 

 

Rosenfeld

     
 
   

 

The president of the panel was Brigadier General Josiah T. Dalbey, who is the fourth man from the left in the photo. The dominant member of the panel, Col. Abraham H. Rosenfeld, was the "law member," who ruled on all motions and legal matters during the proceeding.

Col. Rosenfeld was Jewish, and a graduate of Yale. He had had experience in over 200 court martial cases before coming to Dachau in March 1946

 

Another of the witnesses against Schäfer, Siegfried Jaenckel, made a similar sworn statement concerning the methods used to

 
     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Burton Ellis

     
 
   

The chief prosecutor, called the Trial Judge Advocate, was Lt. Col. Burton F. Ellis, a Jewish attorney who had no prior experience in a military courtroom. He took over the case which had been handled by another Jewish prosecutor, Dwight Fanton, during the interrogation phase. His chief assistant prosecutor was another Jew, Raphael Schumaker.

A week before World War II officially ended, Ellis was assigned to be an investigator at the Europe War Crimes Group, and subsequently was named Chief of Operations. As Chief of Operations, Ellis was in charge of the investigation of the Malmedy Massacre. Since I didn’t know much about the Malmedy Massacre, I had to do some research in Ellis’ papers (photographs and letters to his wife), in the library, and on the Internet.

This process has been quite a learning experience. I think the biggest thing I have learned is how tragic the Malmedy Massacre and the concentration camps were. The graphic photographs of death and prisoners dying hit me hard. I couldn’t imagine what these people went through. After studying the pictures, I wanted to learn more about this time in history.

The Malmedy Massacre happened at the Baugnez Crossroads in the Ardennes Forest in Belgium on December 17, 1944. The massacre took place on the second day of fighting of the “Battle of the Bulge,” which was the largest land battle the United States participated in. The battle went on for 40 days in the bitter December cold and was considered one of the bloodiest battles of World War II with over 81,000 U.S. casualties, 1,400 British killed or wounded, and 100,000 Germans killed, wounded or captured. Nearly 20,000 of the dead were Americans. In addition, a number of American soldiers were taken prisoner in this battle.

On the second day of the “Battle of the Bulge”, Hitler’s Waffen Schutzstaffel (armed defense squad) troops gathered up a group of unarmed American POW’s and opened fire on them. Some escaped, but the SS troops found them hiding in a café nearby. They lit the café on fire, and shot the people who ran out of the building. 72 American solders died in this massacre.

A year and a half later, on May 16, 1946, the Malmedy Massacre Trial began in Dachau, Germany, with Burton Ellis as the Chief Prosecutor. 73 members of the Waffen-SS were put on trial, accused of ordering or participating in the massacre. The verdicts were read on July 16, 1946 and all 73 accused were sentenced to death by hanging; however, the verdicts were later set aside.

After the Malmedy trial, Ellis was appointed Deputy Chief of War Crimes in Dachau, Germany, where he was placed in charge of 900 personnel. He operated eight trial courts and prosecuted 1,100 war crime defendants in a six-month period. The Ellis papers contain photographs and files of documents related to his war crimes prosecution.

The Malmedy Massacre trial is still relevant today. Recently, the University of Idaho College of Law put on the “Post-Conflict Justice: From Malmedy to Halabja” symposium in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. The symposium focused on the administration of post-conflict justice and the relevance of international law to the Idaho community; topics particularly relevant with U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. A related event was a series of films concerning the Malmedy Massacre shown at the Kenworthy Theatre in Moscow in March.

After the war crimes trials in Germany, Ellis was stationed at the Presidio in San Francisco from 1948 to 1950 as Executive Officer and Acting Army Staff Judge Advocate. He supervised all legal activities for the Army in eight western states. When the Korean War broke out, Ellis was transferred to I Corps in Korea for one year. Again, he supervised all legal activities, including war crimes.

Subsequently, Burton Ellis was stationed in Washington, D.C. and then Hawaii, representing defendants and later becoming Judge Advocate. In November of 1958, Ellis retired from the military as a Colonel. During his military career, he received the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, and the Korean Service medal.

After his military retirement, Burton Ellis and his wife moved to Merced, California, where he began a private legal practice. He had a ranch, raised cattle in Montana with his brother, and traveled extensively with his wife. His wife Dee passed away on May 26, 1998 at the age of 90. Burton Ellis passed away on December 29, 2000 at the age of 97. His entire estate was left to the University of Idaho Foundation to fund the Burton F. "Humpy" Ellis and Dee H. Ellis Academic Excellence Endowment, 20 percent of which is specifically designated to benefit the Law Dean's Development Fund. Included in the estate were his historic papers and photographs which were placed in the university library.

The University of Idaho Library is fortunate to have received this important group of historical documents from one of the university’s exceptional alumni. Working with the Ellis photographs has helped me gain more knowledge and appreciation of our country’s history.

 

 

 
     

 

 

     
 
   

 

On April 7, 1946, Mr. Harry W. Thon asked me at Schwäbisch Hall to write out an affidavit accusing myself, and showed me an affidavit signed by Sepp Dietrich admitting that there had been an order to murder the American prisoners. Mr. Thon said that what was wanted was the heads of the generals and that we little men had nothing to fear. I told him that I was prepared to write a report of my experiences in the Eiffel offensive, but that I was not aware of any offenses committed against the laws of war. Thereupon Mr. Thon gave me paper and pencil, told me I had a respite of one night and that, should I fail to make a statement admitting my guilt, my family would be deprived of their ration cards. He then had me shut up in the death cell.

That night I wrote a report of my experiences but it did not include any self-accusations.

 

Next morning Mr. Thon appeared in my cell, read my report, tore it up, swore at me and hit me. After threatening to have me killed unless I wrote what he wanted, he left. A few minutes later the door of my cell opened, a black hood incrusted with blood was put over my head and face and I was led to another room. In view of Mr. Thon's threats the black cap had a crushing effect on my spirits. . . . Four men of my company : Sprenger, Jaenckel, Neve, and Hoffmann accused me, although later they admitted to having borne false testimony. Nevertheless I still refused to incriminate myself. Thereupon Mr. Thon said that if I continued to refuse this would be taken as proof of my Nazi opinions, and he would have me charged together with the generals, in which event my death was certain. He said I would have no chance against four witnesses, and advised me for my own good to make a state-

ment after which I would be set free. . . . I still refused. I told Mr. Thon that although my memory was good, I was unable to recall any of the occurrences he wished me to write about and which to the best of my knowledge had never occurred.

Mr. Thon left but returned in a little while with Lieutenant Perl who abused me, and told Mr. Thon that, should I not write what was required within half an hour, I should be left to my fate. Lieutenant Perl made it clear to me that I had the alternative of writing and going free or not writing and dying. I decided for life and said I would sign anything they wanted. Mr. Thon then dictated a statement to tally with Sprenger's and ruled out all objections I raised.

On the 8th or 9th of April after I had apparently not replied in the manner the investigators desired, I was kicked in the hollow of the knee and on my backside and beaten with a stick across my shoulders and the back of my head. A black hood was again placed over my head and face so I cannot testify as to who inflicted this punishment.

I hereby testify that I never took part in any shootings of Prisoners of War, nor issued any such orders, nor watched any shootings. I stated this to the Military Court at Dachau.

The methods employed to obtain the false evidence used against Schäfer are described in an affidavit, dated January 20, 1948, at Landsberg prison, signed by Joachim Hoffmann, who states that :

For 3 1/2 months I was kept in solitary confinement without either writing or bathing allowed. Even when taken for a hearing a black hood was placed over my head. The guards who took me to my hearing often struck or kicked me. I was twice thrown down the stairs and was hurt so much that blood ran out of my mouth and nose. At the hearing, when I told the officers about the ill treatment I had suffered, they only laughed. I was beaten and the black cap pulled over my face whenever I could not answer the questions put to me, or gave answers not pleasing to the officers.

In March, 1946, I was taken before a Summary Court. Prior to this I was beaten and several times kicked in the genitals. At my trial I was sentenced to death and then locked up in a cell which contained nothing but a wooden chest and one blanket. Here I remained three weeks, after which the investigating officers came to my cell and promised me I should be released within two months, if I would write what they dictated. I was unable to resist the pressure. I often witnessed the ill treatment suffered by my comrades. Finally I agreed to write the false statement required. I believed that if I wrote it I would be set free, but this was an illusion.

Another of the witnesses against Schäfer, Siegfried Jaenckel, made a similar sworn statement concerning the methods used to

193


force him to bear false testimony. He too had been placed in solitary confinement while a prisoner of war and tortured until he agreed to sign a dictated statement. He was also one of those given a mock trial with a black hood over his face lifted to show him the crucifix, black cloth, and candles. The prosecutor, as usual, was Mr. Henry Thon and Jaenckel's "trial" lasted some twelve hours, after which he was told he would be "taken for a ride" in a jeep and hung from a tree since he was "not worth a bullet." Two days later he was again taken before a court and told by Lieutenant Perl that "in consideration of his youth" and the fact that he had acted in obedience to an order, he would be pardoned if he would "tell the truth." At this second "trial," according to Jaenckel's affidavit, Lieutenant Perl told him, "So you still don't want to confess? You have no money to pay for your defense so you will hang. Look at your comrades, they are to be released because they spoke the truth."

In his affidavit, signed two years later, Jaenckel says he can no longer remember how often he was questioned but he thinks a dozen times. And always he was told : "If you confess you will go free; you need only to say you had an order from your superiors. But if you won't speak you will be hung."

I was beaten and I heard the cries of the men being tortured in adjoining cells, [writes Jaenckel] and whenever I was taken for a hearing I trembled with fear. I was then only nineteen years old and had never had anything to do with courts or the law. Subjected to such duress I eventually gave in, and signed the long statement dictated to me, and copied the sketch maps as ordered. I could never have done it otherwise, as I have insufficient education. Captain Schumacher said to me : "The streets are to be the same as in the statement of the other witnesses, but the other details should be different because otherwise it will look too much like a copy."

Jaenckel concludes his affidavit as follows : "My charges against my comrades according to the statement dictated to me at Schwäbisch Hall which I was forced to sign are not true."

The names of the American investigators in these cases. Kirschbaum, Metzger, Enders (alias Andrews), Colombeck, and Egger, like those of Lieutenant Perl and W. Harry Thon, will be remembered in Germany as long, and with as much loathing, as the names of Himmler, Bormann and other Nazi bullies and criminals are remembered in America.

 

Witness brother

In one famous instance Kirschbaum brought forward a certain Einstein to prove that the accused Menzel had murdered Einstein's brother, but the prisoner pointed to the said brother sitting in the witness box. Kirschbaum, deeply embarrassed, turned to Einstein and hissed, "How can we bring this pig to the gallows, if you are so stupid as to bring your brother into the court."

Mr. Metzger grew furious, stripped up his sleeves and approached me threateningly saying he would kill me unless I signed. Seeing that his threats were lost on me, he added : "Well, surely I shall find an accusation against you. I shall succeed in bringing you before an American military court; and if you are hanged you owe it to me as surely as I am called Metzger."

 

 

 

 

 
     

 

     
 
   

 

 

 

 
     

Mr. Kirschbaum,

     
 
   

 

 

 

 

 
     

 

 

Simpson Commission

     
 
   

Kenneth C Royall

When the case came to the attention of Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, he ordered a stay of execution for the 12 men who were scheduled to be hanged in just a few days, and then directed General Lucius D. Clay, the highest authority of the American occupation in Germany to investigate Everett's charges against the prosecution.

Not satisfied with that, Royall then appointed a three-man commission, headed by Judge Gordon Simpson of the Texas Supreme Court, to investigate not only the Malmedy Massacre case, but other Dachau proceedings, which had involved the same Jewish interrogators. The other two members of the commission were Judge Edward L. Van Roden and Lt. Col. Charles Lawrence, Jr.

After a six-week investigation conducted from an office which they set up in Munich, the Simpson Commission made its recommendation to Royall. The Commission had looked at 65 mass trials of German war criminals in which 139 death sentences had been handed down. By that time, 152 German war criminals tried at Dachau had already been executed. The 139 men who were still awaiting execution were staff members of the Dachau concentration camp, SS soldiers accused of shooting POWs at Malmedy and German civilians accused of killing Allied pilots who were shot down on bombing missions over Germany. On January 6, 1949, they recommended that 29 of these death sentences, including the 12 death sentences in the Malmedy Massacre case, be commuted to life in prison. Van Roden Report

 

 

 
     

 

Van Roden

     
 
   

Kenneth C Royall

American Atrocities in Germany

By JUDGE EDWARD L VAN RODEN


AMERICAN investigators at the U. S. Court in Dachau, Germany, used the following methods to obtain confessions: Beatings and brutal kickings. Knocking out teeth and breaking jaws. Mock trials. Solitary confinement. Posturing as priests. Very limited rations. Spiritual deprivation. Promises of acquittal.

Complaints concerning these third degree methods were received by Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall last Spring. Royall appointed Justice Gordon Simpson of the Texas Supreme Court and me to go to Germany and check up on the reports.

Accompanied by Lt. Col. Charles Lawrence. Jr., we went to Munich, Germany, set up offices there, and heard a stream of testimony about the way in which American atrocities were committed.

But first, a bit of the background. Last Spring the Supreme Court refused the habeas corpus petition of Col. Willis N. Everett. Jr., an American lawyer, who had served as defense counsel for the 74 Germans accused in the famous Malmedy case. Everett is a very able lawyer, a conscientious and sincere gentleman. He is not a fanatic.

In his petition. Everett charged that the Germans had not received a fair trial. Everett did not claim that all the German defendants were innocent, but since they did not have a fair trial, there was no way of telling the innocent from the guilty.

The tragedy is that so many of us Americans, having fought and won the war with so much sweat and blood, now say. "All Germans should be punished". We won the war, but some of us want to go on killing. That seems to me wicked.

If Everett's shocking charges were true, they would be a blot on the American conscience for eternity. The fact that there were atrocities by the Germans during the war against Americans, or by Americans against Germans, would not in the least lessen our disgrace if such peacetime atrocities were to go unchallenged.

Our specific assignment was not only to examine Col. Everett's charges, but also to examine the cases of the 139 death sentences, which at that time remained unexecuted: 152 Germans had already been executed.

The 139 doomed men who were still alive fell into three groups. They were accused of involvement in the Dachau concentration camp crimes, in the killing of American fliers, or in the Malmedy massacres. Let me say that I believe the crimes for which these Germans were tried actually took place, and that some Germans were guilty of them.

But we should not let the indiscriminate hate of all Germans that was generated during and after the war, blind us to the necessity of punishing the guilty ones only.

After this investigation, and after talking to all sides, I do not believe that the German people knew what the German Government was doing. I am convinced the German populace had no idea what diabolical crimes that arch-fiend, Himmler, was committing in the concentration camps. From the atrocities we learned about, he must have been the very prince of devils.

But as for the Germans at large, they fought the war as loyal citizens with a fatherland to support, and a fatherland to defend.

Some American fliers, shot down on bombing raids over Germany. were killed by German civilians.

These Germans felt that the American fliers were the murderers of their defenseless wives, mothers, and children who were In the bombed cities’ - just as the English felt that German fliers were their murderers. That's war.

I felt deeply about these fliers. I had two sons in the Air Force. Jimmy made 35 missions over Germany and returned safe, thank God! Dick made 32 Missions and was finally shot down over Italy. He spent 12 months in a German prisoner-of-war camp and was fairly well treated. He is now in a sanitarium in Arizona recovering from TB he contracted in the camp.

The Malmedy massacres, in which a group of American prisoners of war were mown down after being captured during the Battle of the Bulge, actually happened. But can't we distinguish between the assertion that these atrocities did happen, and the assertion that they were committed by these 74 Germans who had been in or near Malmedy at that time?

Because some wicked sadistic German individuals did it, are we doing the right thing by saying any and all Germans we lay our hands on are guilty and should be destroyed? I personally don't believe that. That's not the way of thinking I learnt in my church, or you learned in your church.

On Russian insistence, the Americans couldn't retry these men. The Russian philosophy in these matters is that the investigators determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the judge merely sets the sentence. We accepted the Russian formula of no-retrial, but we won out on the presumption of innocence before trial.

The American prohibition of hear-say evidence had been suspended. Second and third-hand testimony was admitted, although the Judge Advocate General warned against the value of hearsay evidence, especially when it was obtained, as this was. two or three years after the act. Lt. Col. Ellis and Lt Perl of the Prosectution pleaded that it was difficult to obtain competant evidence. Perl told the court, "We had a tough case to crack and we had to use persuasive methods." He admitted to the court that the persuasive methods included various "expedients, including some violence and mock trials." He further told the court that the cases rested on statements obtained by such methods.

The statements which were admitted as evidence were obtained from men who had first been kept in solitary confinement for three, four, and, five months. They were confined between four walls, with no windows, and no opportunity of exercise. Two meals a day were shoved in to them through a slot in the door. They were not allowed to talk to anyone. They had no communication with their families or any minister or priest during that time.

This solitary confinement proved sufficient in itself in some cases to persuade the Germans to sign prepared statements. These statements not only involved the signer, but often would involve other defendants

Our investigators would put a black hood over the accused's head and then punch him in the face with brass knuckles, kick him, and beat him with rubber hose. Many of the German defendants had teeth knocked out. Some had their jaws broken.

All but two of the Germans, in the 139 cases we investigated, had been kicked in the testicles beyond repair. This was Standard Operating Procedure with American investigators.

Perl admitted use of mock trials and persuasive methods including violence and said the court was free to decide the weight to be attached to evidence thus received. But it all went in.

One 18 year old defendant, after a series of beatings. was writing a statement being dictated to him. When they reached the 16th page, the boy was locked up for the night. In the early morning, Germans in nearby cells heard him muttering. "I will not utter another lie." When the jailer came in later to get him to finish his false statement, he found the German hanging from a cell bar, dead. However the statement that the German had hanged himself to escape signing was offered and received in evidence in the trial of the others.

Sometimes a prisoner who refused to sign was led into a dimly lit room, where a group of civilian investigators, wearing U. S. Army uniforms. were seated around a black table with a crucifix in the center and two candles burning, one on each aide. "You will now have your American trial," the defendant was told.

The sham court passed a sham sentence of death. Then the accused was told, "You will hang in a few days, as soon as the general approves this sentence: but in the meantime sign this confession and we can get you acquitted." Some still wouldn't sign.

We were shocked by the crucifix being used so mockingly.

In another case, a bogus Catholic priest (actually an investigator) entered the cell of one of the defendants, heard his confession, gave him absolution, and then gave him a little friendly tip: "Sign whatever the investigators ask you to sign. It will get you your freedom. Even though it's false, I can give you absolution now in advance for the lie you'd tell."

Our final report on these trials has been turned over to Secretary of the Army Royall. In spite of the many instances like those I have described, we found no general conspiracy to obtain evidence improperly. With the exception of 29 cases, we saw no reason why the executions should not be carried out. For the 110 others, there was sufficient competent evidence from other sources to warrant the death penalty, exclusive of the evidence obtained by the third-degree.

The 29 men whose sentences we recommended for commutation certainly did not have a fair trial by American standards. Twenty-seven of them were to have their terms reduced to life, one of them was to get 10 years, and one would get two and one-half years, according to our recommendations. We also recommended a permanent program of clemency for reconsideration of the sentences of other prisoners convicted in war crimes cases.

Prosecute The Jews

 
 

 

Jew Interogator

Secretary Royall has saved our national conscience. Could we as Americans ever have held our heads up if he hadn't looked into it? He has saved our national prestige and our international reputation.

However, in spite of Secretary Royall's action in this matter, there is little real room for complacency on the part of Americans. Rather our report reveals, by implication, that we still have a serious situation in Germany to clear up. Moreover, five of the men for whom we recommended commutations have been hanged since we turned in our report. In all 100 of the 139 we set out to investigate are now dead.

The American investigators who committed the atrocities in the name of American Justice and under the American flag are going scot-free. At this point there are two objectives which should be aimed for:

1. Those prisoners whose death sentences have not been commuted and who have not yet been hanged should be saved, pending full judicial review.

2. American investigators who abused the powers of victory and prostituted justice to vengeance, should be exposed in a public process, preferably in the U. S., and prosecuted.

 

Unless these crimes committed by Americans are exposed by us at home, the prestige of America and American justice will suffer permanent and irreparable damage. We can partially atone for our own misconduct if we first search it out and publicly condemn and disavow it. If we wait for our enemies to blazon our guilt abroad, we can only bow our heads in shamed admission.

 


EDWARD L. VAN RODEN, a Pennsylvania judge, served in World War I and II, in the latter as Chief of the Military Justice Division for the European Theater where he saw service in Normandy, Belgium, the Rhineland, the Battle of the Bulge, and in the Ardennes. In 1946 he was reassigned to active duty and served on several important court martial trials in Germany. In 1948 Secretary of the Army Royall appointed him to an extraordinary commission charged with investigating the Dachau War Crimes program.

E. L. Van Roden, "American Atrocities in Germany", The Progressive. February 1949, p. 21f.

 

 

 
     

 

A civilian member of the defense staff, Herbert J. Strong, born and raised in Germany, was a Jew and refugee from Nazi Germany. Being fluent in German, he was an invaluable member of the defense staff. Later, during the Senate hearings on the trial, Strong criticized the Army's conduct of the investigation and trial. He also believed, that while some of the defendants were guilty, it had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And his testimony could not be easily brushed off as pro-Nazism or anti-Semitism.

 

 

This decision by Royall prompted at least some persons who had been close to the case to comment. A letter from James R. Rosenfeld, father of one of the American soldiers alleged to have been shot by Peiper's men at the Baugnez crossroads, to Senator Irving M. Ives, was in protest to Royall's decision. It stated in part:

It appears that the defense attorney for the Germans, Colonel Everett, does not ask that the sentences be set aside because of their innocence but solely because of the weird procedure allegedly used by the American prosecutors in seeking confessions.

I am altogether in favor of accused German soldiers being ably defended to the last ditch. However, I am certain that they received a fair trial and due justice rendered in their sentences. But in view of the fact that the act for which they were convicted was such an outrageous atrocity, I feel that the War Department would be indulging in mock sentimentality were their sentences to be remitted because of overly shrewd legal tactics or the invoking of minor technicalities of the law.

I would therefore appreciate anything that you can properly do in behalf of the memory of my son and those other American soldiers so cold-bloodedly massacred to the end that just law and not legal technicalities shall prevail.


One of the survivors, Virgil P. Lary, also protested, writing directly to Royall. He stated:

I was the only officer to survive this ordeal and I am now in a retired status due to disability received at that time. I mention this as I feel that it is necessary for you to know that I am competent to discuss this case. It was my pleasure to return to Dachau and to testify with other survivors.

Before the Malmédy Case was heard we spent three months in Europe awaiting the trial to begin. During this period I personally observed the techniques and methods used by the War Crime Teams in obtaining confessions... only the fairest methods were used in the interrogations. No group of Army personnel have ever, in my opinion, conducted their investigation more thorougly or efficiently. Any criticism from an individual that did not have an opportunity to observe this work is unfair, unkind to the parents, wives and children of those American men and is not based on truth. I am certain that you will quickly find that what I say here is correct when you conduct your investigation.

If you so desire I would be happy to present a true, unquestionable picture to you or your investigating group.

However, a letter from Fiske H. Ventres to Royall, provides a different view:

… at Bremen, Germany, I was billeted with a member of the War Crimes Commission who had just resigned his post because of the methods employed by "Americans" to gain confessions and convictions. According to him confessions were the sole evidence against the accused and no methods were too brutal to employ in gaining the confessions. One defendant was beaten to death because of his refusal to sign a confession and as a lesson to his other unwilling fellow defendants. To prove his point the resigned agent produced from his trunk the blood-caked hood he, himself, had removed from the head of the murdered German.

From one end of Europe to the other, people are quite aware of the true character of these so-called trials, from Nuremberg to the Bulge. They know full well the identity of those conducting the proceedings and, I might add, a great many Europeans are more than a little suspicious that what is being done is more in the interest of another nation than to the United States.

The first two letters characterize the general mood of the country towards the trial and its defendants. Not until the Senate investigation did that mood begin to change. After the investigation, things quieted down. But then in 1956, after Dietrich had been released from prison and Peiper's release was imminent, the call for vengeance was renewed.

Articles in magazines and newspapers retold the story of the atrocities and the trial-too often glossing over, or totally ignoring, the irregularities in the interrogations and trial. And it made little difference that the facts in these articles were often grossly inaccurate.

One article in particular, written by Emile C. Schurmacher and published in the May 1956 issue of a sensationalistic pulp magazine called Real Adventure, was titled, "Who Turned the Killers Loose?" Schurmacher's account of the incident reads more like fiction; the majority of his errors could have been corrected had he examined the trial records.

Peiper was, of course, released despite the outcry from "concerned citizens" and most of the veterans organizations. In 1964 he moved to France where he made a comfortable living as a translator. But in 1976 a sensational article on Peiper appeared in a French communist newspaper. A two-week campaign of threats and harassment followed, during which time Peiper was preparing to leave France, and on the night of 14/15 July, he was killed in a fire-bomb attack on his house.

A CIA agent in Bern, Switzerland, claimed to have unmasked Peiper and put the information of his whereabouts in the hands of his killers. Yet Peiper's residence was not a real secret. A group calling themselves the "Avengers" (supposedly composed of former members of the French resistance) claimed responsibility for Peiper's death. But it is believed that Israel's Massed was actually responsible; they were operating in France at the time against Palestinians; they were the only ones with the motivation and means to kill him, and Simon Wiesenthal had also suddenly started up a campaign against Peiper.

There are still, however, many unanswered, and even unasked, questions:

Why are the statements and testimony of a handful of the survivors continuously repeated as evidence of a massacre? What about the statements made by the other survivors?

In the initial attack on the American column at the Baugnez crossroads, some GIs were wounded. Descriptions of the attack indicate that the column was fired on by all manner of tank cannon, mortars, machine gun and small arms fire. Photos clearly show the destroyed, burned-out, and bullet-and-shrapnel-riddled vehicles of the column. It would seem highly unlikely that no one would be killed in such a battle. Were any Americans killed in the battle, prior to the alleged massacre? If so, how many-and are they included in the number of dead alleged to have been murdered by Peiper's men?

What was the "new information" Everett wired Peiper he was on his way over with? (Everett died before he could make the trip.)

The big question seems to be whether or not an order existed that prisoners were to be shot. No proof of a written order has ever been found. Many of the defendants claimed orders to such effect were given by their superiors, prior to and during the Offensive.

The prosecution's claim that such an order had been given by Hitler or at least some higher authority above Dietrich could not be conclusively proven, although some comments made by Dietrich and others to their subordinates could be interpreted in different ways.

If such an order was given by any higher authority above Peiper, why was his unit the only one to carry them out? If the order originated with Peiper, why did they kill only some prisoners and not others?

U.S. troops not only brutalized and killed German prisoners on their own-before, during and after the Battle of the Bulge--but orders to that effect had been given. An order issued on 21 December 1944 by Headquarters of the U S. 328th Infantry Regiment stated:

"No SS troops or paratroops will be taken prisoner, and will be shot on sight."

Isn't just the issuance of such an order a war crime? Weren't some of the Malmédy Case defendants being accused of the exact same crime? How many German bodies littered the battlefields who had been the victims of American and Allied war crimes? Where is their justice?

And there are many more questions that need to be asked. More importantly, they need to be answered, although many will probably never be satisfactorily answered.

For those who desire to do some further reading on this subject, I can recommend James J. Weingartner's Crossroads of Death: The Story of the Malmédy Massacre and Trial, published last year by the Unversity of California Press. This work, above all others that I have examined to date, is the most complete and, perhaps, the most objective account, but it is still far from the final word on the subject.

Another account which I have been informed is somewhat objective is Charles Whiting's Massacre at Malmédy, originally published in 1971 by Stein and Day. Some groups thought the book too objective and apparently forced the publisher to stop selling it; copies of that edition have proven hard to find. However, earlier this year Stein and Day's new catalog included a listing of this title in a paperback edition. At the trial Everett concluded his closing summary with a quote from Tom Paine:

He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent which will reach himself.

And finally, a personal interview with Peiper had been arranged for Weingartner. Unfortunately, Peiper's untimely death occurred before the interview took place. Ultimately, Weingartner concludes his book with:

"In some sense, Peiper was one more victim of the crossroads of death. May he be the last."

Judge Gordon Simpson (unlike Van Roden, trying to put the best interpretation,

even if very strained, on the sorry facts that had come out) conceded

that this was probably "a poor team," and explained that the shortage of German-

speaking American lawyers and interpreters had forced the Army to

"draw on some of the German refugees." Steiner, Kirschbaum and Thon (later

chief of the evaluation section of the civil administration division of the US

military government) appeared later and denied all, but they were shaken by

the testimony of investigator Bruno Jacob, who admitted a few things.

Speaking

for the press, investigators Dwight Fanton and Morris Elowitz also denied

all. Colonel Rosenfeld denied almost all. He charged that Lieutenant Colonel

Harold D. McGown, commander of the American soldiers massacred at

Malmédy, had fraternized with SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, the German commander,

and this explained why McGown had appeared at Dachau as a defense

witness for Peiper and had testified that Peiper had held talks with him

and had been responsible for saving a number of Americans. As evidence for

the fraternization, Rosenfeld claimed that McGown and Peiper had been "en-

36 New York Times (Jul. 30, 1948), 5; (Oct. 7, 1948), 15; (Jan. 7, 1949), 1, 9; (Mar. 2,1949), 1,

14; (Mar. 5, 1949), 1, 4; (May 5, 1949), 8.

Chapter 1: Trials, Jews and Nazis

49

tirely too friendly during those nights they spent talking together" and that,

when Peiper and his men were later able to escape a US Army trap, "McGown

was with them." Of course, McGown was Peiper’s prisoner.37

It will, of course, be argued that these nightmarish Dachau "trials" have little

to do with our subject because the standard maintained in the trials at Nuremberg

were not comparable and because the bearers of the extermination

legend do not cite any of the "evidence" produced at these trials. There is partial

truth to these contentions; brutality and coercion were not nearly as extensive

at the prominent Nuremberg trials as they were at the Dachau trials, and

mass exterminations were not emphasized in the Dachau trials (although gas

chambers made occasional appearances in testimony). However the Dachau

trials cannot be waved aside so easily because the administering agency, the

War Crimes Branch, was also deeply involved in the Nuremberg trials, as we

have noted, and as we are to reconfirm shortly in a particularly striking respect.

In addition coercion was, in fact, employed in order to get evidence at

the Nuremberg trials, but that subject is discussed in a later chapter.

None of the four powers was happy with the IMT arrangement and after

the "big trial" they split up and held the kinds of trials they were interested in.

The British trials reflected a general interest but on points of relatively minor

significance here. The only major French trial was of Saar industrial magnate

Hermann Röchling, whom the French had also tried, in absentia, after World

War I. Planning for the American NMT trials had actually started in 1945, and

in March 1946 a division of Jackson’s office, headed by Telford Taylor, had

been created for this purpose.

birds talk otherwise […] It was a trick, and it worked like a charm."35

The Malmédy defendants had had a competent defense attorney, Lieutenant

Colonel Willis M. Everett, Jr. It was Everett’s repeated appeals to, among

others, the US Supreme Court, plus a chorus of protests from German clergy-

35 New York Times (Apr. 31, 1946),Utley, 185-200; Chicago Tribune (Apr. 30, 1948),12; (Feb.

13, 1949), 3; (Feb. 14, 1949), 3; (Feb. 17, 1949), 8; New York Times (Oct. 31, 1948), sec. 4,

8.

Arthur R. Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century

48

men and others, plus such details regarding what was going on that managed

to get into the press by various routes, that persuaded the American military

governor, General Lucius D. Clay, to request an investigation of the trials at

Dachau. On July 29, 1948, the Secretary of the Army appointed a commission

consisting of two American judges, Gordon Simpson of Texas and Edward

Van Roden of Pennsylvania, both JAG reserve colonels. They were assisted

by JAG Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lawrence, Jr. The commission submitted

its report to the Secretary of the Army in October 1948, and selected portions

were made public in January 1949.

Subsequent public remarks by Van Roden and also, to some extent, by

Simpson, plus an independent investigation by a review board appointed by

Clay, decisively exposed the whole affair, to the point where the defenders of

the trials could only haggle about the numbers of German prisoners subjected

to brutalities. The review board confirmed all that Van Roden claimed, taking

exception only in respect to the frequencies of the brutalities.36 Oddly, in his

book, Decision in Germany, Clay denies the brutalities, but he is contradicted

by his own review board.

The cases, especially the Malmédy case, attracted a good deal of attention

through 1949, and a subcommittee headed by Senator Baldwin conducted an

investigation. One witness, formerly a court reporter at the Dachau trials, testified

that he was so repelled by what had gone on there that he quit the job. He

said that the "most brutal" had been Lieutenant Perl, Frank Steiner and Harry

W. Thon. He explained that both Perl and his wife had been in Nazi concentration

camps, and that the Nazis had killed Steiner’s mother.

The "American" investigators responsible (and who later functioned as the prosecution in the trials) were: Lt.-Col. Burton E Ellis (chief of the War Crimes Committee) and his assistants, Capt. Raphael Shumacker, Lt. Roberf E. Byme, Lt. William R. Perl, Mr. Morris Ellswitz, Mr. Harry Thon and Mr. Kirschbaum. The legal adviser of the court was Col. A. H. Rosenfeld. The reader will immediately appreciate from their names that the majority of these people were "biased on racial grounds'' in the words of Justice Wenersturm - that is, were Jewish, and therefore should never have been involved in any such investigation.

73 soldiers were executed that day. Amazingly, about 40 American soldiers SURVIVED the massacre by playing dead. They waited about an hour for the Germans to leave before extricating themselves from the pile of dead friends that had saved their lives. They made a run for the woods, but some German soldiers had remained in the area and many more soldiers were killed before they could get away. Still, there were about 30 survivors of the event.

Appeals lasted more than 10 years and involved both the US Supreme Court and the Hague Court. The last prisoner, Peiper himself, was released in 1956.

Jew Liar

Apart from some minor inconsistencies, such as Lieutenant Lary saying on December 18 that after escaping from the field he got a lift into Malmédy in a truck, but later changing his story to one of two Belgian women helping him to get there on foot aided by a makeshift crutch, the only real point in contention is whether or not there was any attempt to escape that might have caused the Germans to open fire.

However, the fact that Peiper's men sent scores of prisoners to the rear in the normal manner during their advance earlier on the 17th belies the no-prisoners theory, and attempts by the Americans to produce written evidence of such an order for use at the Dachau war crimes trial came to nothing

On May 16, 1946, Peiper and 70 members of his Kampfgruppe, plus his army commander, chief of staff and corps commander, were arraigned before a U.S. military court in the former concentration camp at Dachau, charged that they did "willfully, deliberately and wrongfully permit, encourage, aid, abet and participate in the killing, shooting, ill treatment, abuse and torture of members of the armed forces of the United States of America." The location chosen for the trial and the number of defendants was clearly significant, and it surprised no one when all the Germans were found guilty. The court of six American officers presided over by a brigadier general took an average of less than three minutes to consider each case. Forty-three of the defendants, including Peiper, Christ, Rumpf, Sievers and Sternebeck, were sentenced to death by hanging (Poetschke had been killed in March 1945), 22 to life imprisonment and the rest to between 10 and 20 years. "The Law of the Victors," as it has been called in postwar Germany, had prevailed. But none of the death sentences was ever carried out, and all the prisoners had been released by Christmas 1956. Peiper was the last to leave prison. Sadly, incomplete and rushed investigations, suspicions about the methods used to obtain confessions, and inadequate or flawed evidence ensured that guilty men escaped proper punishment, and there can be little doubt that some innocent men were punished during the trial. In the final analysis, justice itself became another casualty of the incident.

The Malmédy Massacre and Trial

RAY MERRIAM

In 1977, I received a newspaper clipping from a reader of my Own publication, The Military Journal. The clipping contained an interview with Paul Martin, a survivor of the so-called "Malmédy Massacre," and had apparently been published on the previous anniversary of the incident.

Martin's comments are quite interesting. It is readily apparent that he has no grudge against the men of Peiper's unit for what they did, and he states:

"They were just doing their job. Besides, we did the same later on. I talked to men in the hospital who said we killed unarmed prisoners of war."

However, based on what I had read about the "massacre" previously, some points made by Martin and the interviewer did not seem quite correct. This led to my re-reading just about everything I had on the subject (which, at the time, was limited to other historians' published accounts). I not only discovered some points where the interview did not seem factual, but also that the other accounts could not agree on certain important points. Thus, I added some editorial notes in several places when I published the interview in early 1979.

A number of people wrote in to comment on this interview. Though I did not feel my editorial notes were especially controversial, since they were based entirely on fairly standard works, I did expect to receive some mail from irate readers.

However, out of over a dozen letters and brief comments made by readers concerning the Martin interview, only three, surprisingly, questioned my editorial comments. Two were strictly emotional outbursts. The third, however, was considerably less emotional and attempted to refute my comments by utilizing two sources I had not consulted.

The publication of that letter, and rebuttals to it by Mr. Landwehr and myself, produced additional responses, largely favorable to our point of view. The publication of the Martin interview and the subsequent debate in the letters column of my journal, led to Mr. Brandon of the Institute for Historical Review inviting me to this convention to speak on the subject of the "massacre," the trial and its aftermath.

However, in the short time I had available (about four months), I was unable to acquire all the material that one should really examine in order to discuss this subject sufficiently. Certain items, of prime importance to any serious research of the "massacre," have been difficult to locate. Perhaps the most important of these, the published record of the Malmédy Massacre investigation conducted by a Subcomittee of the Comittee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate, had been most elusive for me. Numerous unsuccessful attempts to acquire this book through my local library led me to various used book dealers in an attempt to purchase a copy. Finally, just one week ago, a book dealer located a copy which I have purchased; naturally, a few days later the library informed me they had the same material! Unfortunately, acquiring this work only a few days before the convention would not allow me time to even fully read its over 1600 pages, let alone use it in the preparation of this paper.

Some material did not arrive until the last moment and there is still a considerable amount of material I am still trying to locate. Thus, I am presenting today only some of the important points concerning the incident, the trial and its aftermath. My research will continue beyond this and I will provide the Institute for Historical Review with articles based on my continuing research. At some appropriate point in the future, after I am satisfied with my research efforts, I will produce a book covering the entire subject.

The unit commanded by 29-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Peiper consisted basically of his First SS Panzer Regiment, a battalion plus an additional company of panzergrenadiers, two companies of motorized combat engineers, an anti-aircraft company, a few King Tiger tanks of the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion, and a company of Luftwaffe paratroopers. Such composite formations were known as Kampfgruppen, or battle groups, and were formed to per-

form a specific task. The task of Kampfgruppe Peiper, as the spearhead of the 1st SS Panzer Division, and, indeed, the 6th Panzer Army, was to reach the Meuse River with all possible speed.

Eventually, the route they actually travelled would take them through Honsfeld, Bullingen, Baugnez, Ligneauville, Stavelot, Trois Ponts, La Gleize, and Stoumont, with elements of his command going to Petit Thier, Wanne, Lutrebois, and Cheneux. In each of these towns, and at times on the roads between them, it is alleged that men from Peiper's command killed various numbers of unarmed American soldiers as they were surrendering, or after they were captured. Additional numbers of dead civilians have been largely attributed to Peiper's men also.

The exact count of the dead, American military and civilian, has never been conclusively established. At the trial, the prosecution declared they would prove the murder of from 538 to 749 prisoners of war and over go Belgian civilians (and they suggested that the number was probably even higher.) It appears that the figures finally settled on were 350 American soldiers and ill civilians.

And of these, it is not certain how many may have actually been justifiably killed: some Americans may not have totally surrendered to their captors; some may have attempted to delay or impede the progress of Peiper's troops, or made outright sabotage attempts; some may not have surrendered all their weapons; others may have been slow to obey commands or even totally disobeyed them. There was the possibility of accidental shootings as well.

Yet, one cannot deny the fact that at least some American prisoners had been killed under highly suspect circumstances, if not murdered outright.

The matter of civilian deaths along Peiper's route of advance is even more clouded. Many were, indeed, killed, but it could not always be clearly established by whom and under what circumstances. In house-to-house fighting it was a common tactic to toss grenades into buildings first and then rush in with weapons firing.

Accidental deaths of civilians caught in battle zones was the rule rather than the exception. One woman, carrying her baby, was killed while running from house to house, trying to escape the battle; it was not determined which side fired the fatal shots, but it was most certainly accidental.

In one instance, a Belgian killed a wounded German soldier with an ax, and was promptly shot by Peiper's men.

Evidence given at the trial, however, did indicate that some civilians were killed without justification by Peiper's troops.

Claims that Belgian guerrilla fighters were active throughout the area were proven truthful. One defendant told how an officer instructed him to shoot a Belgian, the officer claiming the Belgian was a guerrilla fighter.

The mere thought of the presence of guerrillas, who would be virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the population, would obviously make any soldier trigger-happy around civilians in a combat zone. Some defendants, including Peiper, claimed to have seen civilians firing on German troops.

But in some cases, the claim by the prosecution of the killing of civilians and military personnel by Peiper's troops could not be proven or was effectively disproven.

The prosecution claimed at least nine civilians were murdered by Peiper's men in Bullingen. One of the defense lawyers made a brief investigative trip to Bullingen. He brought back an affidavit from the village mayor and registrar, whose task it was to keep track of the citizenry (and not a very hard task in a small community of about 300), which stated only two citizens had died since 16 December 1944: one of natural causes, in 1946, the other by shrapnel from American artillery fire (the latter claim was supported by an affidavit from the husband of the woman who was killed). Still, it was possible that transient civilians might have been killed in Bullingen by Peiper's men.

The prosecution, on the basis of a number of sworn statements, alleged that as many as 311 American prisoners had been killed in La Gleize. Hal McCown, ultimately the defense's star witness, was a major at the time of the Offensive and spent several days as Peiper's prisoner in La Gleize. He maintained that during that time he had not seen a single dead American prisoner. The prosecution pointed out that McCown had not seen all parts of the village.

The defense was, however, able to offer several affidavits by La Gleize residents who had been present during the Germans' stay there. None had seen any American prisoners shot, nor the dead bodies from any alleged shootings, nor had they even heard of any such incidents.

These were followed by testimony from German witnesses who supported the observations of McCown and the civilians. But, as in other instances during the trial, the Belgians' testimony in favor of the defendants was highly effective, since they had no stake in the outcome of the case. Indeed, they would tend to be hostile towards the defendants if anything.

The defense was often able to counter the prosecution's allegations, though not always successfully. Part of the problem was in trying to defend 74 men at once. Although all were accused of the same basic crime, each played a different part in it. Separate charges, though not always specific, were brought against each, however, the U.S. Military Government had determined they be tried en masse for the sake of "efficiency."

The first review of the trial was performed by Maximilian Koessler, a civilian attorney of the War Crimes Branch of the judge Advocate General's Department. Koessler believed the mass trial, and especially the use of numbered placards worn around the defendants' necks as a means of identification, made it difficult for the judges to distinguish one prisoner from another. The result was that evidence of guilt against some would tend to be damaging to all.

The defense did request that two separate trials be held: one for those accused of having issued illegal orders, and another for those accused of having carried them out. This request was denied by the court, in the first of many instances where the court would favor the prosecution, even when the defense was clearly in the right.

The bench assembled for the trial consisted of eight men. The presiding officer was Brigadier General Josiah T. Dalbey. The crucial position of law member was filled by Colonel Abraham H. Rosenfeld; it was his duty to interpret applicable law and determine procedure. (Rosenfeld had recently acted for the prosecution in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp case and thus one has to suspect his objectivity in the Malmédy case.) Line officers, all colonels, made up the rest of the bench.

Chief defense counsel was Colonel Willis M. Everett, Jr. Everett had only just arrived overseas and was actually horrified by his assignment. He accepted it with reluctance, due partly to the awarness of his own professional inadequacies (having had virtually no courtroom experience previously), but primarily for the repugnance he felt for the ostensible crimes of his clients.

After the trial, his continuing efforts for the Malmédy defendants was due to his belief that justice had not been properly served.

Six Army attorneys were designated assistant defense counsel; of these, only one, Lieutenant Colonel Granger G. Sutton, had had extensive courtroom experience.strong

A civilian member of the defense staff, Herbert J. Strong, born and raised in Germany, was a Jew and refugee from Nazi Germany. Being fluent in German, he was an invaluable member of the defense staff. Later, during the Senate hearings on the trial, Strong criticized the Army's conduct of the investigation and trial. He also believed, that while some of the defendants were guilty, it had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And his testimony could not be easily brushed off as pro-Nazism or anti-Semitism.

The defendants were also allowed to engage native German counsel, and some did so, but their value was limited due to the ever-present language problem and their unfamiliarity with American legal procedure.

Prosecutors

The orginial investigation team assigned to the case included Captain Dwight Fanton, a graduate of Yale Law School, Captain Raphael Shumacker, First Lieutenant William R. Perl, and two civilian Army employees, Morris Elowitz and Harry Thon. Perl, Thon, Elowitz, Shumacker, and another investigator, Joseph Kirschbaum, were accused, during the trial, of having used physical and psychological duress in order to extract sworn statements from the defendants. The use of mock trials and threats was admitted by the investigators, but all manner of physical abuse was denied.

The following allegations were made by defendant Hendel:

… on 4 April 1946 1 was led from my cell under a black hood, was put into a cell facing the door and was then beaten in the abdomen and face until I fell to the ground. When a moment later the hood was taken off, Lieutenant Perl and Mr. Thon stood before me. During the subsequent interrogation, I was also beaten several times. No notice was taken of my request to have the interrogation postponed since I was not in condition for it at that time. The facts described happened before my interrogation. During the interrogation, promises were made to me but since I did not know anything and today still do not know anything of an order, all sorts of threats were made to me and since things were immaterial to me and I wanted to avoid further beatings, etc., I wrote down everything that was dictated to me.

Many additional allegations were made by defendants, all in the same vein.

Later, the Senate investigation would show that at least some of these allegations of physical brutality, denied by the interrogators at the trial, were founded in evidence.

The prosecution team for the trial included interrogators Perl, Thon, Elowitz, Kirschbaum and Shumacker, plus First Lieutenant Robert E. Byrne and Lieutenant Colonels Homer B. Crawford and Burton F. Ellis. Ellis became chief prosecutor.

The guards at the prison where the interrogations took place were not under the control of the war crimes team. They also, for a time, included Polish refugees who harbored considerable resentment towards Germans-and especially SS men. Some defendants specifically mention physical abuse by these guards as they were being led between their cells and the interrogation rooms and while waiting in halls, all the time wearing black hoods over their heads. (The hoods were claimed to be necessary to keep the prisoners form recognizing each other and to prevent them form speaking to fellow soldiers.) Kicking, punching, beating about the arms, and pushing prisoners down stairs, in addition to verbal abuse, was conducted frequently, much to the amusement of the perpetrators.

After the trial, Everett attempted to get the Supreme Court to hear the appeal of the Malmédy Case defendants. In May 1948 the Court's decision not to hear the appeal prompted the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, to order a stay of execution of the sentences pending further investigation.

This decision by Royall prompted at least some persons who had been close to the case to comment. A letter from James R. Rosenfeld, father of one of the American soldiers alleged to have been shot by Peiper's men at the Baugnez crossroads, to Senator Irving M. Ives, was in protest to Royall's decision. It stated in part:

It appears that the defense attorney for the Germans, Colonel Everett, does not ask that the sentences be set aside because of their innocence but solely because of the weird procedure allegedly used by the American prosecutors in seeking confessions.

I am altogether in favor of accused German soldiers being ably defended to the last ditch. However, I am certain that they received a fair trial and due justice rendered in their sentences. But in view of the fact that the act for which they were convicted was such an outrageous atrocity, I feel that the War Department would be indulging in mock sentimentality were their sentences to be remitted because of overly shrewd legal tactics or the invoking of minor technicalities of the law.

I would therefore appreciate anything that you can properly do in behalf of the memory of my son and those other American soldiers so cold-bloodedly massacred to the end that just law and not legal technicalities shall prevail.


One of the survivors, Virgil P. Lary, also protested, writing directly to Royall. He stated:

I was the only officer to survive this ordeal and I am now in a retired status due to disability received at that time. I mention this as I feel that it is necessary for you to know that I am competent to discuss this case. It was my pleasure to return to Dachau and to testify with other survivors.

Before the Malmédy Case was heard we spent three months in Europe awaiting the trial to begin. During this period I personally observed the techniques and methods used by the War Crime Teams in obtaining confessions... only the fairest methods were used in the interrogations. No group of Army personnel have ever, in my opinion, conducted their investigation more thorougly or efficiently. Any criticism from an individual that did not have an opportunity to observe this work is unfair, unkind to the parents, wives and children of those American men and is not based on truth. I am certain that you will quickly find that what I say here is correct when you conduct your investigation.

If you so desire I would be happy to present a true, unquestionable picture to you or your investigating group.

However, a letter from Fiske H. Ventres to Royall, provides a different view:

… at Bremen, Germany, I was billeted with a member of the War Crimes Commission who had just resigned his post because of the methods employed by "Americans" to gain confessions and convictions. According to him confessions were the sole evidence against the accused and no methods were too brutal to employ in gaining the confessions. One defendant was beaten to death because of his refusal to sign a confession and as a lesson to his other unwilling fellow defendants. To prove his point the resigned agent produced from his trunk the blood-caked hood he, himself, had removed from the head of the murdered German.

From one end of Europe to the other, people are quite aware of the true character of these so-called trials, from Nuremberg to the Bulge. They know full well the identity of those conducting the proceedings and, I might add, a great many Europeans are more than a little suspicious that what is being done is more in the interest of another nation than to the United States.

The first two letters characterize the general mood of the country towards the trial and its defendants. Not until the Senate investigation did that mood begin to change. After the investigation, things quieted down. But then in 1956, after Dietrich had been released from prison and Peiper's release was imminent, the call for vengeance was renewed.

Articles in magazines and newspapers retold the story of the atrocities and the trial-too often glossing over, or totally ignoring, the irregularities in the interrogations and trial. And it made little difference that the facts in these articles were often grossly inaccurate.

One article in particular, written by Emile C. Schurmacher and published in the May 1956 issue of a sensationalistic pulp magazine called Real Adventure, was titled, "Who Turned the Killers Loose?" Schurmacher's account of the incident reads more like fiction; the majority of his errors could have been corrected had he examined the trial records.

Peiper was, of course, released despite the outcry from "concerned citizens" and most of the veterans organizations. In 1964 he moved to France where he made a comfortable living as a translator. But in 1976 a sensational article on Peiper appeared in a French communist newspaper. A two-week campaign of threats and harassment followed, during which time Peiper was preparing to leave France, and on the night of 14/15 July, he was killed in a fire-bomb attack on his house.

A CIA agent in Bern, Switzerland, claimed to have unmasked Peiper and put the information of his whereabouts in the hands of his killers. Yet Peiper's residence was not a real secret. A group calling themselves the "Avengers" (supposedly composed of former members of the French resistance) claimed responsibility for Peiper's death. But it is believed that Israel's Massed was actually responsible; they were operating in France at the time against Palestinians; they were the only ones with the motivation and means to kill him, and Simon Wiesenthal had also suddenly started up a campaign against Peiper.

There are still, however, many unanswered, and even unasked, questions:

Why are the statements and testimony of a handful of the survivors continuously repeated as evidence of a massacre? What about the statements made by the other survivors?

In the initial attack on the American column at the Baugnez crossroads, some GIs were wounded. Descriptions of the attack indicate that the column was fired on by all manner of tank cannon, mortars, machine gun and small arms fire. Photos clearly show the destroyed, burned-out, and bullet-and-shrapnel-riddled vehicles of the column. It would seem highly unlikely that no one would be killed in such a battle. Were any Americans killed in the battle, prior to the alleged massacre? If so, how many-and are they included in the number of dead alleged to have been murdered by Peiper's men?

What was the "new information" Everett wired Peiper he was on his way over with? (Everett died before he could make the trip.)

The big question seems to be whether or not an order existed that prisoners were to be shot. No proof of a written order has ever been found. Many of the defendants claimed orders to such effect were given by their superiors, prior to and during the Offensive.

The prosecution's claim that such an order had been given by Hitler or at least some higher authority above Dietrich could not be conclusively proven, although some comments made by Dietrich and others to their subordinates could be interpreted in different ways.

If such an order was given by any higher authority above Peiper, why was his unit the only one to carry them out? If the order originated with Peiper, why did they kill only some prisoners and not others?

U.S. troops not only brutalized and killed German prisoners on their own-before, during and after the Battle of the Bulge--but orders to that effect had been given. An order issued on 21 December 1944 by Headquarters of the U S. 328th Infantry Regiment stated:

"No SS troops or paratroops will be taken prisoner, and will be shot on sight."

Isn't just the issuance of such an order a war crime? Weren't some of the Malmédy Case defendants being accused of the exact same crime? How many German bodies littered the battlefields who had been the victims of American and Allied war crimes? Where is their justice?

And there are many more questions that need to be asked. More importantly, they need to be answered, although many will probably never be satisfactorily answered.

For those who desire to do some further reading on this subject, I can recommend James J. Weingartner's Crossroads of Death: The Story of the Malmédy Massacre and Trial, published last year by the Unversity of California Press. This work, above all others that I have examined to date, is the most complete and, perhaps, the most objective account, but it is still far from the final word on the subject.

Another account which I have been informed is somewhat objective is Charles Whiting's Massacre at Malmédy, originally published in 1971 by Stein and Day. Some groups thought the book too objective and apparently forced the publisher to stop selling it; copies of that edition have proven hard to find. However, earlier this year Stein and Day's new catalog included a listing of this title in a paperback edition. At the trial Everett concluded his closing summary with a quote from Tom Paine:

He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent which will reach himself.

And finally, a personal interview with Peiper had been arranged for Weingartner. Unfortunately, Peiper's untimely death occurred before the interview took place. Ultimately, Weingartner concludes his book with:

"In some sense, Peiper was one more victim of the crossroads of death. May he be the last."

 

When the allegations of torture following Malmedy were raised in the trials of the SS murderers in 1948, guess who condemned it? Joe

The Malmedy Massacre, or the shooting of 84 American soldiers who had surrendered, took place on December 17, 1944, the second day of the Battle of the Bulge. After the war, during the summer of 1945, the U.S. occupation authorities rounded up over 1,000 former soldiers in the 1st SS Panzer Division and interrogated them. Seventy-five of them were originally charged as war criminals in the Malmedy case. One of those who were charged was 18-year-old Arvid Freimuth who committed suicide in his cell before the trial started.

Lt. William Perl...was the chief interrogator of the Malmedy Massacre accused....The chief prosecutor, called the Trial Judge Advocate, was Lt. Col. Burton F. Elli...The lawyer for the defense was Lt. Col. Willis M. Everett....Everett was ably assisted by Herbert J. Strong, a civilian attorney who had volunteered to work on the war crimes military tribunals....A panel of high-ranking American army officers acted as both judge and jury. Seven members of the panel are shown in the photograph below. The president of the panel was Brigadier General Josiah T. Dalbey....

 

In the prison of the Swabisch Hall, he stated, officers of the S.S. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were flogged until they were soaked in blood, after which their sexual organs were trampled on as they lay prostrate on the ground. As in the notorious Malmedy Trials of private soldiers, the prisoners were hoisted in the air and beaten until they signed the confessions demanded of them.

On the basis of such "confessions" extorted from S.S. Generals Sepp Dietrich and Joachim Paiper, the Leibstandarte was convicted as a "guilty organisation". S.S. General Oswald Pohl, the economic administrator of the concentration camp system, had his face smeared with faeces and was subsequently beaten until he supplied his confession. In dealing with these cases, Senator McCarthy told the Press: "I have heard evidence and read documentary proofs to the effect that the accused persons were beaten up, maltreated and physically tortured by methods which could only be conceived in sick brains. They were subjected to mock trials and pretended executions, they were told their families would be deprived of their ration cards. All these things were carried out with the approval of the Public Prosecutor in order to secure the psychological atmosphere necessary for the extortion of the required confessions. If the United States lets such acts committed by a few people go unpunished, then the whole world can rightly criticise us severely and forever doubt the correctness of our motives and our moral integrity."

The methods of intimidation described were repeated during trials at Frankfurt-am-Mein and at Dachau, and large numbers of Germans were convicted for atrocities on the basis of their admissions. The American Judge Edward L. van Roden, one of the three members of the Simpson Army Commission which was subsequently appointed to investigate the methods of justice at the Dachau trials, revealed the methods by which these admissions were secured in the Washington Daily News, January 9th, 1949. His account also appeared in the British newspaper, the Sunday Pictorial, January 23rd, 1949. The methods he described were: "Posturing as priests to hear confessions and give absolution; torture with burning matches driven under the prisoners finger-nails; knocking out of teeth and breaking jaws; solitary confinement and near starvation rations." Van Roden explained: "The statements which were admitted as evidence were obtained from men who had first been kept in solitary confinement for three, four and five months ... The investigators would put a black hood over the accused's head and then punch him in the face with brass knuckles, kick him and beat him with rubber hoses ... All but two of the Germans, in the 139 cases we investigated, had been kicked in the testicles beyond repair.

This was standard operating procedure with our American investigators." The "American" investigators responsible (and who later functioned as the prosecution in the trials) were: Lt.-Col. Burton F. Ellis (chief of the War Crimes Committee) and his assistants, Capt. Raphael Shumacker, Lt. Robert E. Byrne, Lt. William R. Perl, Mr. Morris Ellowitz, Mr. Harry Thon, and Mr. Kirschbaum. The legal adviser of the court was Col. A. H. Rosenfeld. The reader will immediately appreciate from their names that the majority of these people were "biased on racial grounds" in the words of Justice Wenersturm -- that is, were Jewish, and therefore should never have been involved in any such investigation. Despite the fact that "confessions" pertaining to the extemination of the Jews were extracted under these conditions, Nuremberg statements are still regarded as conclusive evidence for the Six Million by writers like Reitlinger and others, and the illusion is maintained that the Trials were both impartial and impeccably fair. When General Taylor, the Chief Public Prosecutor, was asked where he had obtained the figure of the Six Million, he replied that it was based on the confession of S.S. General Otto Ohlendorf. He, too, was tortured and his case is examined below. But as far as such "confessions" in general are concerned, we can do no better than quote the British Sunday Pictorial when reviewing the report of Judge van Roden: "Strong men were reduced to broken wrecks ready to mumble any admission demanded by their prosecutors."

The chief prosecutor, called the Trial Judge Advocate, was Lt. Col. Burton F. Ellis, a Jewish attorney who had no prior experience in a military courtroom. He took over the case which had been handled by another Jewish prosecutor, Dwight Fanton, during the interrogation phase. His chief assistant prosecutor was another Jew, Raphael Schumaker.

The lawyer for the defense was Lt. Col. Willis M. Everett, who had never been involved in a criminal case before, had never fought in combat, couldn't speak German, and had only just arrived in Germany a few weeks before the proceeding began. On the opening day, Everett and his defense team had not yet interviewed all 73 of the men they were representing in the court room.

Everett was ably assisted by Herbert J. Strong, a civilian attorney who had volunteered to work on the war crimes military tribunals. Strong was a German-born Jew who had emigrated to America after the Nazis came to power. Except for the accused, most of the people in the courtroom were Jews, including two of the court reporters, and it was understandable that they had nothing but hatred and contempt for the ruthless and sadistic SS men.

The dominant member of the panel, Col. Abraham H. Rosenfeld, was the "law member," who ruled on all motions and legal matters during the proceeding.

Col. Rosenfeld was Jewish, and a graduate of Yale. He had had experience in over 200 court martial cases before coming to Dachau in March 1946. "Rosenfeld" was a name that was very familiar to General Dietrich because his close friend, Adolf Hitler, always referred to President Franklin D. Roosevelt by that name, claiming that FDR was both a Communist and a Jew.

it appears that the prosecution team resorted to dubious methods in garnering evidence and admissions from the accused. Although convictions were established for all of the accused, Congressional hearings and a petition to the United States Supreme Court eventually compelled military review boards to overturn all of the convictions based on the questionable tactics of the prosecution team. Joachim Peiper, the charismatic field commander of the convicted Waffen-SS group, was the last to be pardoned in December of 1956.

The "American" investigators responsible (and who later
functioned as the prosecution in the trials) were: Lt.Col.
Burton F. Ellis (chief of the War Crimes Committee) and his
assistants, Capt. Raphael Shumacker, Lt. Robert E. Byrne, Lt.
William R. Perl, Mr. Morris Ellowitz, Mr. Harry Thon, and Mr.
Kirschbaum. The legal adviser of the court was Col. A.H.
Rosenfeld. The reader will immediately appreciate from their
names that the majority of these people were "biased on racial
grounds" in the words of Justice Wenersturm -- that is, were
Jewish, and therefore should never have been involved in any
such investigation.
 

One year after the trial ended, an Army office carried out a review of the trial and made large changes in the original sentences. Although no prisoner was released, twenty-five of the forty-three death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment, seventeen defendants had their life sentences reduced and those with shorter prison terms had them made even shorter. Many of these changes were made, the reviewing body said, because of the youthfulness of the defendants at the time. The charges with these changes were also reviewed a year later by the War Crimes Review Board, which, after declaring the pre-trial investigation flawed and saying the court had favored the prosecution, recommended to a higher body a further reducing of sentences. This higher body, the Military Governor of the American Zone, took some of the Review Board's suggestions into account, and its changes led to thirteen defendants being freed, and only twelve still facing execution. Still later, the Governor reduced the number sentenced to death to 6. As the end of the Malmedy affair approached, American military authorities reduced to life imprisonment the death sentences for the 6 remaining defendants

 

150 shot but 70 lived?

On May 16, 1946 in Dachau, Germany, the trial of seventy-four SS members who had taken part in the Malmedy massacre began. All of the defendants were charged with violation of the laws and usages of war and with deliberately participating in the killing, shooting, and torturing of U.S. soldiers and unarmed civilians. The prosecution's case was made up mainly of sworn statements from eyewitnesses, which the defense later claimed were forced to testify under duress. The defense's case was made up of testimony from a few witnesses, mostly ex-SS men, including Colonel Joachim Peiper who had headed the division charged with the massacre.

The most stunning defense witness was the American soldier Hal McCown, who testified that, as a prisoner of Peiper, he received fair treatment, as did the other American POWs, and that he never saw murdered Americans. Neither Peiper's nor McCown's testimony helped, however, as the seventy-three defendants (one had been released to French custody during the trial) were all found guilty on July 11. On July 16, 1943, forty-three were sentenced to death by hanging (including Peiper) and twenty-two were sentenced to life in prison, with the rest receiving either ten, fifteen, or twenty year prison terms. Those associated with the case soon began to have their doubts about how the case was handled, however, specifically the eyewitness statements used by the prosecution. Some also expressed concern that US soldiers had carried out similar acts without being punished. One year after the trial ended, an Army office carried out a review of the trial and made large changes in the original sentences. Although no prisoner was released, twenty-five of the forty-three death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment, seventeen defendants had their life sentences reduced and those with shorter prison terms had them made even shorter. Many of these changes were made, the reviewing body said, because of the youthfulness of the defendants at the time. The charges with these changes were also reviewed a year later by the War Crimes Review Board, which, after declaring the pre-trial investigation flawed and saying the court had favored the prosecution, recommended to a higher body a further reducing of sentences. This higher body, the Military Governor of the American Zone, took some of the Review Board's suggestions into account, and its changes led to thirteen defendants being freed, and only twelve still facing execution. Still later, the Governor reduced the number sentenced to death to 6. As the end of the Malmedy affair approached, American military authorities reduced to life imprisonment the death sentences for the 6 remaining defendants

 

 

You need to do some reading, The defendants at malmedy had their sentences commuted and when the army investigated the the crime scene after the snow had melted they didnt find 150 machine gunned us soldiers who were lined up and shot in the back as the the survivors claimed. They found far fewer bodies that were strung out across the field indicating what the Germans claimed. That the soldiers were ran trying to escape into a wooded area across the field. Lt. Harold McGown the commander of those killed at malmedy supported the germans claim. He appeared at the trial of Joachim Peiper and stated that Peiper had been responsible for actually saving a number of Americans. Ofcourse he was accused of fraternization and was even accused of aiding the Germans avoid an american ambush.

The Malmedy defendents had a competent lawyer,
Lt. Colonel Willis M. Everrette, Jr. who made numerous appeals and even took this case to the US supreme court. Everrette kept fighting for these Germans that he took it to the press and numerous clergy men protested. Finally Secretary of the Army appointed a commission to investigate into the trials held at Dachau (where the malmedy trial were held). The commision submitted its report to the Secretary of the army in Oct. 1948. Its finding were varified by an independent investigation by a review board appointed by General Lucious Clay (the american military Governor) and found that the defendant held for trial at Dachau were subject to all sorts of brutality. In 137 cases they found beatings to the point of knocking out teeth, and crushing testicles, the with holding of food, the impersonation of priests and defense attorneys to gain confessions and "mock trials" where I defend was "found guilty and sentenced to death but they would commute the sentence if they signed a confession. They even threatened the families of the defendents.

When Colonel A. H. Rosenfeild was confronted by the press with these with the rumors of mock trial he admitted as such saying

"Yes, ofcourse. We couldn't have made those birds talk otherwise.......It was a trick, and it worked like a charm"

Rosenfield after this resigned.

The American Lawyer George A. McDonough served both as a prosecuter and defense attorney in the war crimes program. He later served on the reviewing board and arbeitor of clemency claims wrote to the NY times complaining about the legal basis for these trials. In regards to the Dachau trials (where the maolmedy defendents were tried) He said

"Hearsay evidence was admitted indiscriminately and sworn statements of witnesses were admissible regardless of whether anybody knew the person who made the statement or the individual who took the statement. If a prosecutor considered a statement of a witness more damaging than the witness' oral testimony in court he would advise the witness to go back to his home, submit the statement as evidence, and any objection by defence counsel would be promptly overruled"

Again he sat as arbeitor for clemency claims. No wonder so many death sentences were commuted.