

# Precise GNSS positioning

## Threats and opportunities

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Simpósio Brasileiro de Geomática

UNESP, Presidente Prudente, July 2002

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Modernized GPS and Galileo

GNSS vulnerabilities


Integrated GPS/Galileo ambiguity resolution

Major error sources

Trends in RTK positioning

# GPS modernization

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No Selective Availability (SA)

Second civil signal on L2

Third civil signal on new L5  
frequency (1176.45 MHz)

Switched off on 2 May 2000


# Availability of new GPS signals

## Block IIR

New civil signal on L2

Stronger signals on L1 and L2

First launch in 2003



## Block IIF


L5 frequency (1176.45 MHz)

New civil signals on L2 en L5

Stronger signals on L1, L2 and L5

First launch 2005

# Availability of new GPS signals




# Galileo orbits and frequency bands

Orbits	Frequency bands
Orbital planes	3
Satellites/plane	10
Semi-major axis	29900 km
Inclination	56°
E1	1587-1591 MHz
E2	1559-1563 MHz
E4	1254-1258 MHz
E5	1164-1214 MHz
E6	1260-1300 MHz


# Satellite constellation

GPS


Galileo



# GNSS frequency allocation



# GPS and Galileo signals



# Galileo schedule

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Official go-ahead on 26 March 2002

First experimental satellite in 2004  
(Galileo System Test Bed)

First four operational satellites in 2005-2006

Full operational constellation in 2008


See also [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy\\_transport/en/gal\\_en.html](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/gal_en.html)

# Visible satellites

Location: Presidente Prudente

Date: 11 July 2002

Minimum elevation: 10°



# GPS system vulnerabilities

See Volpe vulnerability report (august 2001)  
<http://www.navcen.uscg.gov>

Unintentional interference

Radio-frequency interference (RFI)

GPS testing

Ionosphere (solar maximum)

Spectrum congestion

# GPS system vulnerabilities

Intentional interference

Jamming: denial of use of GPS

Spoofing: broadcast wrong GPS-like signals

Meaconing: rebroadcast GPS signals

System damage: satellites or ground control segment

Human factors

Errors, over-reliance, lack of knowledge/training

# Jamming

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## Characteristics

Simple, 1 watt: 10/85 km (loss/no acquisition)

GPS-like, 1 watt: 1000 km (no acquisition)

# Jammers

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Russian, 4 Watt, L1 and L2, GPS  
and GLONASS, US\$ 4,000



USA, 1 Watt

# Miniature L1 jammer

TNO-FEL prototype jammer


1 mW output

Range > 125 m

Power consumption 9 V, 30 mA

Size of one cubic inch feasible

TNO-FEL: Physics research lab of the Netherlands organization for applied research



# Sources of interference

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## Technical enthusiasts

Students or people that cannot withstand the challenge

## Criminals

Car or cargo theft, free access to toll-roads

## Terrorists

Block airports, rescue and police

## Military

Jam potential enemy to deny use of GPS, Galileo and Glonass signals

# Precise GNSS positioning


Carrier ambiguity resolution is the key to precise positioning with a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) such as

I n t e g r a t e d



**GPS/Galileo**

# GNSS processing steps



# Success-rate

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Probability (number in interval [0-100%]) of fixing the carrier ambiguities to their correct integer values

Requires satellite almanac and approximate user position, but no actual data

# Ionosphere models

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## Ionosphere **float** (long baseline)

New ionosphere parameter for each satellite at each observation epoch (equivalent to **eliminating** ionosphere)

## Ionosphere **weighted** (medium baseline)

New ionosphere parameter for each satellite at each observation epoch constrained by ***a priori*** standard deviation

## Ionosphere **fixed** (short baseline)

Ionosphere assumed **absent**

# Design parameters - frequencies

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GPS	
L1	1575.420 MHz
L2	1227.600 MHz
L5	1176.450 MHz

Galileo	
E2-L1-E1	1575.420 MHz
E5b	1202.025 MHz
E6	1278.750 MHz

# Design parameters

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Computation of instantaneous success-rates  
(single-epoch ambiguity resolution)


Location:	Presidente Prudente (22° S, 51° W)
Date:	11 July 2002
Minimum elevation:	10°
Standard deviation carrier:	0.003 m
Ionosphere weight:	0.05 m (medium baseline only)

# Design parameters - code observations

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
Standard deviation code			
L1	0.30	E2-L1-E1	0.15
L2	0.30	E5b	0.10
L5	0.10	E6	0.10

# Interpretation of results




# GPS only

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# Integrated GPS and Galileo




# Code observations - alternatives


Standard precision			
L1	0.30	E2-L1-E1	0.15
L5	0.10	E5b	0.10

High precision			
L1	0.30	E2-L1-E1	0.10
L5	0.05	E5b	0.05

# Integrated GPS and Galileo (2 freq.)



# Integrated GPS and Galileo (2 freq.)



# Integrated GPS and Galileo

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Integrated use of GPS and Galileo significantly increases ambiguity success-rate

Single-epoch ambiguity resolution becomes feasible if ionospheric effects can be constrained

Very long-baseline ambiguity resolution requires more than one observation epoch and benefits most from triple-frequency integrated system

# Major GNSS error sources

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Ionosphere  
Multipath

# Ionosphere

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Ionosphere is dispersive: effect is frequency dependent

Effect depends on free electron density in atmosphere


Electron density is related to solar activity

Solar activity has period of 11 years and is characterised by sunspot numbers


# Sunspots

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MINIMUM




MAXIMUM




# Solar cycle and sunspot numbers

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# Sunspot number prediction



# Effects of ionosphere

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Poor GPS satellite tracking  
Disturbance of GPS data links  
Positioning biases  
Incorrect ambiguity resolution  
(also results in positioning biases)

# Ionosphere and positioning

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## Measurement set-up

Two permanent GPS receivers, 4 km apart  
(short baseline) in The Netherlands ( $52^\circ$  N)

Known baseline, continuously monitored

# Ionosphere and positioning


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## Analysis procedure

Compute daily percentage of height errors greater than 5 cm for period of two months

Correlate this percentage to daily variations in Total Electron Content (TEC)

# Height biases and TEC



# Effects due multipath

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
**Periodic** biases in

Observations

Estimated positions (if same satellites are used)

Biases repeat every  $23^{\text{h}}56^{\text{m}}$

# Multipath in observations



# Multipath detection in positions


## Aim

Show multipath explicitly in stationary baselines


## Set-up

Collect data over  $2 \times 24$  hours and determine presence of repeatable effects with period  $23^{\text{h}}56^{\text{m}}$

## Background

GPS constellation has  $23^{\text{h}}56^{\text{m}}$  repeatability  satellite-reflector-antenna geometry re-occurs every day

# Height errors




# Real-time kinematic (RTK) positioning

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## Ideal world

Centimeter accuracy in real-time, provided carrier ambiguities can be resolved to their correct integer values

# RTK positioning in the real world



# Precise RTK GNSS positioning

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Choose reference stations carefully to avoid multipath as much as possible

Integrate RTK GPS with other sensors

Validate estimated carrier ambiguities

# Trends in RTK positioning

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From single-reference station  
to network-based RTK


## Advantages

Higher reliability

Longer baselines

Less reference stations

# Fugro Starfix global DGPS network



# Fugro Starfix HP

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Starfix HP (High Performance)

Regional sub-networks of global Starfix network

Decimeter accuracy for distances up to 500 km

# Jet Propulsion Laboratory's IGDG

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Internet-based Global Differential GPS (IGSG)

Global network of reference stations


Reference station data collection via the Internet

Data dissemination to users via the Internet

Decimeter positioning accuracy


# IGDG - demonstration results

See also <http://gipsy.jpl.nasa.gov/igdg>



Last six hours

Last 30 minutes



# Conclusions

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Modernized GPS and future Galileo offer unprecedented accuracy and availability

Both systems are vulnerable to intentional and unintentional interference

Error sources (ionosphere, multipath) remain major concern

Network-based RTK will result in longer baseline lengths and less reference stations