WHEN WE LEFT OFF last episode, I had just announced with cautious optimism that the courts had reinstated the Bari case. As you may recall, on May 24, 1990, environmental and labor activist Judi Bari was driving from my friend's place to my other friend's place when a bomb went off in her car, under her seat. It wasn't a big enough bomb to kill her, though one that big certainly would have fit. It was just big enough to mutilate her. In short, it wasn't attempted murder; it was terrorism.
Terrorism, we are constantly reminded by the establishment media, is exactly what the FBI is here to prevent. The FBI definitely did not prevent this act of terrorism against Judi Bari. It did profit from the intelligence-gathering opportunity of the ensuing virtual witch-hunt. But did its involvement end there? I think not, and I'm not the only one.
Most progressives have long suspected elements within the FBI and/or its friends in Wackenhut of complicity in the Bari bombing. My own suspicions were aroused by the timing alone. Less than 10 minutes after the bomb went off, the FBI was raiding my friend's house. They raided my other friends shortly afterward.
For those of you unfamiliar with the geography of the Bay Area, let me assure you that 10 minutes is simply not time enough to get across the Bay Bridge from their headquarters in San Francisco, let alone assemble a team to do so first. It can't be done. It's physically impossible. This leads one to consider other possibilities. Did the FBI, or elements within the FBI, know of the bomb in advance? If not, how did they arrive at my friend's house so quickly?
I was in Crockett, about the same distance away and with no bridge to cross. I heard about the Berkeley raid minutes after it commenced. By chance my friend was on his way to one of the houses being raided and turned the last corner just in time to see the raiders arrive. Prudently he slipped away unnoticed. He called me immediately. I threw on my jacket and helmet, hopped on the bike and made 65 to 70 mph nearly the whole way to the Ashby Ave. exit. I kept the revs down. It seemed like a bad day to get pulled over for speeding. It took me nearly 40 minutes to reach a point where I could see what was going on. And the FBI got there in 10 minutes without prior knowledge? Gimme a break.
Then there's history. Unlike their counterparts on the right, progressives know from bitter, sometimes personal, experience that the FBI's extra-legal suppression of dissidents predates the atrocities at Waco and Ruby Ridge by decades. It's time for the rest of America to catch up on its history lessons.
Ever wonder what happened to the great progressive movements of the 1960s? Oh sure, they had internal problems. The 1960s rebels were a product of the very culture they despised. They made many of the same mistakes. Sexism, racism, homophobia, and top-down decision making were never the sole province of the establishment. The antiwar movement, the civil rights movement, even the second wave of movements they spawned -- women, gay, Puerto Rican, Native American -- all had ample internal problems, no doubt about it. But they didn't have the chance to learn from their mistakes. They were under constant attack from without, and not always by legal means. Chief among their attackers, overseeing the action as it were, was the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program, COINTELPRO for short.
Ever wonder at the great dearth of credible and effective national leadership in the African American community today? Why is it that glorified poverty pimps like Jesse Jackson seem to be the best this otherwise most-productive of America's talent pools can come up with politically? Why is it that the biggest economic boom in recent memory has left such a disproportionate number of African Americans behind, and yet there is not mass, national-level organizing on the 1960s scale going on in the African American community? Again we must look to history, in this case the history of COINTELPRO.
The Freedom of Information Act, FOIA for short (pronounced "foo-ee"), can help. Let's look at a memo, marked "special attention" and dated March 4, 1968, from "Director, FBI (100-448006)." This memo was sent to local bureau chiefs in 39 cities and "WFO" (whatever that is). The one that fell into my hands was the Albany version. Its title is:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
It is a very telling document. It announced the expansion of the Counterintelligence Program from the 23 offices included as of Aug. 8, 1967, to 41 offices. Let's look at what it says about goals:
For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.
1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups.
(snip)
2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement.
(snip)
3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance ... Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.
(snip)
4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to ... (snip) ... the responsible Negro community ... (snip) ... to the white community, both the responsible community and the "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist (sic) simply because they are Negroes ... must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.
5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.
Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.
The memo goes on, but that's the meat of it. Anyone familiar with intervening history can judge for themselves how successful COINTELPRO really was and how much more refined it must have become as the years went by. One can even extrapolate how this strategy, even as it was being refined, was applied to other groups.
The FBI and police instigated violence and fabricated movement horrors. The FBI and police are implicated by government documents in the bitter breakup of pivotal groups and the collapse of repeated efforts to form long-term coalitions across racial, class, and regional lines. Dissidents were deliberately criminalized through false charges and frame-ups. Offensive, bogus leaflets and other materials were published in their name. Some were physically threatened or assaulted until they abandoned their work. Still others were murdered under phony pretexts, such as "shoot-outs" in which the only shots were fired by the police.
Sound familiar?
The public exposure of COINTELPRO and other government abuses elicited a flurry of apparent reform in the 1970s. The FBI formally shut down COINTELPRO a few weeks after it was uncovered. William Webster, a prestigious federal judge, was appointed by President Carter to clean house and build a "new FBI."
It was a clear case of "same soup, different bowl." In its April 27, 1971, directives disbanding COINTELPRO, the FBI specifically provided for future covert action to continue "with tight procedures to ensure absolute security." The bureau's war at home continued unabated. Domestic covert action did not end when it was exposed in the 1970s. It has become a permanent feature of U.S. government. The results are apparent. Remember that if you're ever tempted to help them.
