The Birth Of a New Bomb Source: The Washington Post Shades of Dr. Strangelove!
The Cold War is over and the U.S. government says it is
no longer in the business of building new nuclear weapons. So why is
it deploying a versatile new kind of nuclear bomb intended to
penetrate the earth and destroy underground facilities?
This spring, the United States began fielding the first
new nuclear capability added to the U.S. arsenal since 1989 -- a slim,
12-foot-long weapon known as the B61 "mod-11" gravity bomb. It was
developed and deployed without public or congressional debate, and in
contradiction to official assurances that no new nuclear weapons were
being developed in the
United States.
The government contends the B61-11 is merely a
"modification" to the B61-7 gravity bomb. And yet, these modifications
provide a substantial new military capability. This is significant for
three reasons:
1.) From a military standpoint, the B61-11 is uniquely
able to destroy underground targets, and it can be set to do so with a
small nuclear yield. With such an underground blast, much of the
resulting fallout might be relatively localized. For these reasons,
there are those who might be tempted to rationalize using the bomb.
Even before it was fully developed, it was used to threaten Libya over
its construction of an alleged underground chemical weapons factory.
2.) From a diplomatic standpoint, this new weapon
violates the spirit of the delicately forged international ban on
nuclear testing. And it further undermines the long-standing U.S.
commitment to nuclear disarmament embodied in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
3.) From a development and production standpoint, the
B61-11 may be the first such new capability, but it will not be the
last. It opens the way for other new weapons now under development in
the Department of Energy's massive "stockpile stewardship and
management program." Current funding for this program exceeds the
average spent by DOE during the Cold War. Last month, nuclear pioneer
Hans Bethe, joined by Frank von Hippel of Princeton and others, warned
that some of this research could lead to entire new classes of weapons
and should be stopped.
But the B61-11 is a reality now, and raises fundamental
questions about the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by President Clinton last
September and due to be considered for final ratification by the
Senate this fall.
While producing the B61-11 apparently did not involve
modifications to the "physics package" -- the nuclear explosive
itself -- there is no question that the bomb provides a new nuclear
capability. Although the treaty is silent on the question of new
weapons, U.S. negotiators have explicitly
said it is intended to prohibit such development.
The B61-11 fulfills a longstanding desire of the
military for an earth-penetrating weapon, a bomb that can get at
command centers or other installations designed to be invulnerable to
all but the largest nuclear weapons. The previous weapon with this
mission was the B53, the highest-yield weapon in the U.S. arsenal.
Although not a true earth penetrator, it was capable of taking out
underground targets through brute force; a nine-megaton bomb makes a
large crater. The huge B53 weighs 8,900
pounds and can be delivered only by lumbering B-52 bombers.
The smaller and lighter (1,200-pound) B61-11 can be
delivered by the B-2A Stealth bomber, or even by F-16 fighters. It is
far more suitable for post-Cold War missions, penetrating as it does
tens of meters into the earth and creating devastating shock waves
with substantially less explosive power -- anywhere from just 300 tons
to about 340 kilotons. These lower yields are said to enhance its
credibility as a deterrent. The B53, goes the tortured logic, was too
big and too dirty to use. It would cause
massive collateral damage" above ground -- or, in simpler language,
the death of many innocent civilians. The more modest B61-11 is
considered relatively "useable" in such a context.
But useable where? What is the mission of the B61-11?
For years, nuclear planners sought to develop a weapon to hit deeply
buried Soviet command-and-control centers. But today Russia and the
United States are no longer adversaries. Increasingly, U.S. nuclear
strategists speak of holding targets at risk in "rogue states." But
since 1978, U.S. policy has
expressly forbidden U.S. forces from using nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states that are signatories to the NPT, unless they are
allied with a nuclear state engaged in an act of aggression. Given
this, the events surrounding the arrival of the B61-11 are, at best,
difficult to explain.
Interest in a B61-based earth penetrator appears to have
been revived with an October 1993 request by Harold Smith, assistant
to the secretary of defense for atomic energy, to explore alternatives
to the B53. On Nov. 29, 1994, the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing
Safety Committee endorsed the B61 plan. And on Feb. 6, 1995, Deputy
Defense Secretary John Deutch signed
off on it.
On April 18, 1995, DOE submitted a classified request to
six key members of Congress to find funds for the B61-11. All
necessary approvals were in hand by late July. On Nov. 15, 1995,
shortly after work on the B61-11 was formally approved, Smith
requested that the schedule be accelerated. He
asked that the first unit be delivered "as soon as possible, with a
goal of Dec. 31, 1996."
The response from the nuclear labs was positive. As the
Los Alamos employee newsletter "Weapons Insider" put it:
"NWT [the Los Alamos Nuclear Weapons Technology program]
is committed to meeting the aggressive schedule, and a significant
reprogramming of resources has allowed us to accelerate our progress."
The project is one the labs are keenly interested in. In
recent years, some military strategists have advocated deployment and
possible use of very small tactical nuclear weapons against Third
World adversaries, especially in earth-penetrating roles. Some of this
advocacy -- perhaps most of it -- has come from the weapons labs. In
the fall 1991 issue of Strategic Review, for instance, Los Alamos
strategists Thomas Dowler and Joseph Howard wrote:
"Would policymakers employ nuclear weapons to protect
U.S. contingency forces if conventional weapons proved inadequate, or
would the nature of our present nuclear arsenal `self-deter'
policymakers from using those weapons?
"One possible answer to these questions might be the
development of nuclear weapons of very low yields . . . . The
existence of such weapons -- weapons whose power is effective but not
abhorrent -- might very well serve to deter a tyrant who believes that
American emphasis on proportionality would prevent the employment of
the current U.S. arsenal against him.
"We doubt that any president would authorize the use of
the nuclear weapons in our present arsenal against Third World
nations. It is precisely this doubt that leads us to argue for the
development of subkiloton weapons."
In July 1992, Los Alamos conducted a high-level briefing
called "Potential Uses for Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in the New World
Order." One theme of the briefing was that in future showdowns with
Third World states, "we need options besides defeat or use of
inappropriately large [nuclear] weapons."
One option, suggested the briefing, was to develop and
deploy "micronukes" with a yield of some 10 tons of high explosives;
"mininukes" with a yield of 100 tons; and "tiny nukes" with a yield of
1,000 tons. An earth penetrator with a yield of just 10 tons could,
according to a Los Alamos briefing chart, "hold buried leadership and
C3 at risk." And it could do
that while keeping "collateral damage very localized."
Translation:
You could threaten to blow up an enemy's headquarters
bunker and disrupt his command, control and communications without
destroying the surrounding area.
Why did Smith insist in November 1995 on setting such
"aggressive deadlines" for the B61-11 project? Perhaps the answer can
be found in a series of statements offered the following spring by
administration officials, including Defense Secretary William Perry.
On March 28, 1996, Perry testified in the Senate in support of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. At one point, he said:
"We have an effective range of alternative capabilities
to deter or retaliate against use of the CW [chemical weapons]. The
whole range would be considered . . . . We have conventional weapons,
also advanced conventional weapons -- precision guided munitions,
Tomahawk land-attack missiles -- and then we have nuclear weapons."
A few days later, Robert Bell of the White House
National Security Council spoke about the United States having signed
on to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, a treaty
that Libya had signed. "Each party pledges not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against an ANFWZ party. However, [the treaty] will
not limit options available to the United States in response to an
attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons
of mass destruction."
At a breakfast meeting with defense writers, Smith went
further. He was quite specific regarding the possible preemptive use
of nuclear weapons. He spoke of the potential menace presented by a
Libyan chemical weapons factory under construction underground at
Tarhunah, 40 miles southeast of
Tripoli. At present, said Smith, the United States had no conventional
weapon capable of destroying the plant from the air, and such a weapon
would not be ready in less than two years. However, by the end of the
year, the United States would have a nuclear warhead based on the B61
that would be able to do the job.
At the same time, administration officials began hedging
on the "no-first-use" pledge that President Clinton had reaffirmed
only a year earlier. When arms-control advocates questioned this
apparent change in attitude, the Pentagon tried to clarify matters. At
a press briefing on May 7, 1996, Defense Department spokesman Kenneth
Bacon said there had been some "confusion" in the press regarding the
issue. "Should military options be necessary [against Libya], we can
accomplish this with conventional means. There is no consideration to
using nuclear weapons and any implication that we would use nuclear
weapons against this plant preemptively is just wrong."
"Preemptively" seems to have been the operative word at
the May 7 briefing. Bacon also reiterated that the United States for
years had reserved the right to respond with "devastating force" if
weapons of mass destruction were ever actually used "against us or our
forces."
Bacon went on to quote Perry, who said on April 26 at
Maxwell Air Force Base:
"In every situation that I have seen so far, nuclear
weapons would not be required for response. That is, we could have a
devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would
not forswear that possibility."
Whatever message the administration spokesmen were
trying to send regarding the nuclear option, work on the B61-11
project continued on schedule. At the same time, President Clinton was
signing the test-ban treaty. That treaty bans nuclear testing, but
does not specifically address weapons development or new deployments.
However, stopping new weapons is clearly a
part of the treaty's intent.
Consider, for example, a January 1996 statement made in
Geneva by John Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, as he pushed for completion of the CTBT:
"Even the open literature points to a broad array of new
weapons developments . . . . Many would involve directed energy
weapons -- ways to focus the release of energy with greater precision
than is now possible, to enable military effects well beyond those
available now. Without nuclear testing, the nuclear weapon states will
not be able to pursue confidently
such technologies as the nuclear-explosion-pumped X-ray laser, the
so-called nuclear shotgun, enhanced electromagnetic pulse weapons,
microwave weapons, and enhanced radiation weapons . . . . And the true
zero [yield] test ban will also place out of reach new `mininuke' and
`micronuke' concepts.
"So let there be no mistake -- the CTBT will help impede
the spread of nuclear weapons. But its great practical impact will
also be for arms control -- to end development of advanced new weapons
and keep new military applications from emerging."
The B61-11 may be a mere modification, a new shell for
an older physics package. It may not be the kind of exotic new weapon
that Holum listed. But it is a weapon with a new capability. Should
the need arise, it will allow U.S. military forces -- to borrow
Holum's words -- to "focus the release of
energy with greater precision," in a "new military application."
Why was it developed and deployed now? That's a question
the Clinton administration needs to answer. Because the real
"collateral damage" of new weapons like the B61-11 is likely to occur
not in wartime, but much sooner, through devaluation of the treaties
and commitments upon which the fragile non-proliferation regime rests.
Greg Mello directs the Los Alamos Study Group, a nuclear
weapons policy research and education organization located in Santa
Fe. This article is adapted from one that appears in the May/June
issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
MEET THE B61 `MOD-11':
The B61-11 is the latest modification in the U.S.
history of earth-penetrating bomb development. It can pierce the
ground so deeply that it produces devastating shock waves that destroy
structures underground, while its lower yield capabilities may produce
less "collateral damage" under some conditions.
COMPARING SIZE AND STRENGTH:
Fat Man B61-11 HOW BIG IS THE BLAST?
The Oklahoma City bomb was roughly 4,000 lbs. of
ammonium nitrate; this would be equivalent to less than 2 tons of TNT.
The B61-11's yield ranges from a little more than 1
percent of the Fat Man, (or more than 150 times the force of the
Oklahoma City blast) to 14-22 times the yield of Fat Man.
SOURCES: Los Alamos Study Group, Jane's All the World's
Aircraft, Nuclear Weapons Databook
c Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Company
by Greg Mello
Sunday, June 1 1997;
Page C01