Foresight Guidelines on Molecular
Nanotechnology
Source: Foresight Institute Original Version 1.0: February 21, 1999 © Foresight Institute and IMM. Do not publish draft
without permission.
Contents
Preamble Preamble
The term "Molecular Nanotechnology" (MNT) refers to the
ability to program matter with molecular precision, and scale it to
three-dimensional products of arbitrary size. This developing
technology presents an unprecedented new set of technical and economic
opportunities. The opportunities include: the development of
inexpensive and abundant diamondoid building materials with a
strength-to-weight ratio 50 times greater than titanium, the
possibility of widespread material abundance for all the Earth's
people, the development of revolutionary new techniques in medicine,
and the opening of the space frontier for development. Along with
these new capabilities come new risks, and new responsibilities. The
acceptance of these responsibilities is not optional. The future
capabilities of MNT also raise an unprecedented set of military,
security and environmental issues. Dealing with these issues
proactively will be critical to the positive development of the field.
The Foresight Guidelines were developed during and after
a workshop on Molecular Nanotechnology (MNT) Research Policy
Guidelines sponsored by the Foresight Institute and the Institute for
Molecular Manufacturing (IMM). The workshop was conducted over the
February 19-21, 1999, weekend in Monterey, California. Participants
included: James Bennett, Greg Burch, K. Eric Drexler, Neil Jacobstein,
Tanya Jones, Ralph Merkle, Mark Miller, Ed Niehaus, Pat Parker,
Christine Peterson, Glenn Reynolds, and Philippe Van Nedervelde. The
resulting Foresight Guidelines ("the Guidelines") include assumptions,
principles, and some specific recommendations intended to provide a
basis for responsible development of molecular nanotechnology.
Continued research and education are needed to create a
shared understanding and sufficient knowledge base on the entire set
of MNT development and risk management issues that must be addressed.
While discussion of guidelines can begin today, the scientific and
technical community will continue to evolve its understanding of the
issues. The Guidelines have already changed over time to reflect that
dynamic understanding and input by a wider community (see Background
section).
Future discussions of this subject should include
detailed consideration of the economic and environmental benefits of
MNT, as well as the potential problems. In particular, the need for
some controls should not prevent the responsible development of the
technology. Rather than have reflexive, or poorly informed controls
imposed upon the MNT R&D process, the developing MNT R&D community and
industry should adopt appropriate self-imposed controls, formulated in
light of current knowledge and the evolving state of the art. The
possibility of the necessity for additional controls remains an open
question, and its resolution may depend to some extent on the success
of voluntary controls.
The NIH Guidelines on Recombinant DNA technology are an
example of self-regulation taken by the biotechnology community almost
25 years ago. While the kind of artificial molecular machines of
primary interest for nanotechnology are expected to be very different
from the kind of biological systems covered by the NIH Guidelines
(just as a 747 is very different from a sparrow, even though both
fly), the NIH Guidelines illustrate that advance preparations are
possible and can be effective. Those guidelines were so well accepted
that the privately funded research community has continued to submit
research protocols for juried review, in spite of the fact that it was
optional for them to do so. In addition, although the NIH Guidelines
have been progressively relaxed since they were first released, they
did achieve their intended effect.
Experimenters and industry should have the maximum safe
opportunities to develop and commercialize the molecular manufacturing
industry. In addition, MNT should be developed in ways that make it
possible to distribute the benefits of the technology to the four
fifths of humanity currently desperate to achieve material wealth at
any environmental or security cost. Providing technical abundance
alone cannot make a people wealthy and secure. This also requires
education, and social arrangements described as a high-trust, civil
society. However, technological abundance can alleviate many of the
conflicts that stem primarily from rivalry over resources. Reducing
this specific cause of conflict via molecular manufacturing could make
the world more secure than it is today. In addition, the release from
bare economic subsistence could enable billions of people to take
advantage of the emerging global classroom over the World Wide Web.
This education effect could compound the positive environmental and
security benefits of MNT.
Relevant ecological and public health principles must be
utilized in conducting MNT R&D. Diamondoid products may not break down
easily in the natural environment. Furthermore, consumers may not at
first have means readily available to recycle them. Thus, total
"product lifecycle" considerations should be taken into consideration
as the MNT industry develops.
Effective means of restricting the misuse of MNT in the
international arena need to be developed. Adding MNT to the list of
technologies covered in Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons
treaties might seem appropriate, but it could lead to the unintended
consequence that only the U.S. and other rule following nations would
be at a competitive disadvantage economically and militarily. While
most nations are likely to adhere to reasonable restrictions,
guidelines that are viewed as too restrictive will simply be ignored,
paradoxically increasing risk. While a 100% effective ban could, in
theory, avoid the potential risks of nanotechnology, a 99.99%
effective ban would result in development and deployment by the 0.01%
that evaded and ignored the ban. There are reasonable arguments on
both sides of the treaty question. However, at this time, the
Guideline participants as a group do not endorse any specific
initiative to address MNT safety and security concerns through treaty
arrangements.
The safe development and use of MNT depends, in part, on
the good judgment of the researchers carrying out this work. The more
clearly this is recognized, the more effective researchers are likely
to be in avoiding and actively preventing unsafe uses of MNT and in
insuring that commercial systems have built-in safeguards. The "moral
repugnance" associated with biological weapons may have attenuated
their development and use, in spite of the fact that they are
relatively easy to make and deploy.
Eventually, MNT policy will have to balance potential
risks with known benefits, and distinguish between different classes
of risks. Molecular Manufacturing and nanotechnology are not one
thing, but rather a spectrum of technologies, with radically different
risk profiles. A substantial R&D program is needed to clarify the
nature, magnitude and likelihood of the potential risks, as well as
the options available for dealing with them effectively.
There are significant risks associated with failing to
address ongoing economic and environmental problems that the
development of MNT could help resolve. The Guidelines were not
intended to cover every risk or potential abuse of the technology.
People still abuse automobiles, and society has responded both by
making cars safer to operate, holding drivers accountable for their
actions through laws that are enforced, and requiring drivers to pay
for automobile insurance. Likewise, industry and governments are held
responsible for their use of technologies that have widespread impact.
The Guidelines are intended to cover most of the risks
associated with normal development and use of the technology, and to
mitigate, as much as possible, the risks associated with potential
abuse of the technology. Informed MNT policy could accelerate the safe
development of peaceful and environmentally responsible uses of the
technology. This includes capturing the opportunity to develop
powerful new approaches to medicine, as well as energy efficient and
zero emission manufacturing and transportation technologies.
Principles
People who work in the MNT field should develop and
utilize professional guidelines that are grounded in reliable
technology, and knowledge of the environmental, security, ethical, and
economic issues relevant to the development of MNT.
MNT includes a wide variety of technologies that have
very different risk profiles. Access to the end products of MNT should
be distinguished from access to the various forms of the underlying
development technology. Access to MNT products should be unrestricted
unless this access poses a risk to global security.
Accidental or willful misuse of MNT must be constrained
by legal liability and, where appropriate, subject to criminal
prosecution.
Governments, companies, and individuals who refuse or
fail to follow responsible principles and guidelines for development
and dissemination of MNT should, if possible, be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with respect to access to MNT intellectual
property, technology, and markets.
MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for
built-in safety mechanisms, such as:
1) absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel
source or artificial "vitamins" that don't exist in any natural
environment;
2) making devices that are dependent on broadcast
transmissions for replication or in some cases operation;
3) routing control signal paths throughout a device, so
that subassemblies do not function independently;
4) programming termination dates into devices, and
5) other innovations in laboratory or device safety
technology developed specifically to address the potential dangers of
MNT. Further research is needed on MNT risk management, as well as the
theory, mechanisms, and experimental designs for built-in safeguard
systems.
The global community of nations and non-governmental
organizations need to develop effective means of restricting the
misuse of MNT. Such means should not restrict the development of
peaceful applications of the technology or defensive measures by
responsible members of the international community. Further research
in this area is encouraged.
MNT research and development should be conducted with
due regard to existing principles of ecological and public health. MNT
products should be promoted which incorporate systems for minimizing
negative ecological and public health impact.
Any specific regulation adopted by researchers, industry
or government should provide specific, clear guidelines. Regulators
should have specific and clear mandates, providing efficient and fair
methods for identifying different classes of hazards and for carrying
out inspection and enforcement. There is great value in seeking the
minimum necessary legal environment to ensure the safe and secure
development of this technology.
Development Principles:
1) Artificial replicators must not be capable of
replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment.
2) Evolution within the context of a self-replicating
manufacturing system is discouraged.
3) Any replicated information should be error free.
4) MNT device designs should specifically limit
proliferation and provide traceability of any replicating systems.
5) Developers should attempt to consider systematically
the environmental consequences of the technology, and to limit these
consequences to intended effects. This requires significant research
on environmental models, risk management, as well as the theory,
mechanisms, and experimental designs for built-in safeguard systems.
6) Industry self-regulation should be designed in
whenever possible. Economic incentives could be provided through
discounts on insurance policies for MNT development organizations that
certify Guidelines compliance. Willingness to provide self-regulation
should be one condition for access to advanced forms of the
technology.
7) Distribution of molecular manufacturing development
capability should be restricted, whenever possible, to responsible
actors that have agreed to use the Guidelines. No such restriction
need apply to end products of the development process that satisfy the
Guidelines.
Specific Design Guidelines:
1) Any self-replicating device which has sufficient
onboard information to describe its own manufacture should encrypt it
such that any replication error will randomize its blueprint.
2) Encrypted MNT device instruction sets should be
utilized to discourage irresponsible proliferation and piracy.
3) Mutation (autonomous and otherwise) outside of sealed
laboratory conditions, should be discouraged.
4) Replication systems should generate audit trails.
5) MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for
built-in safety mechanisms, such as: 1) absolute dependence on a
single artificial fuel source or artificial "vitamins" that don't
exist in any natural environment; 2) making devices that are dependent
on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation;
3) routing control signal paths throughout a device, so that
subassemblies do not function independently; 4) programming
termination dates into devices, and 5) other innovations in laboratory
or device safety technology developed specifically to address the
potential dangers of MNT.
6) MNT developers should adopt systematic security
measures to avoid unplanned distribution of their designs and
technical capabilities.
Background
The idea of guidelines for the safe development of MNT
(Molecular Nanotechnology) has been discussed within the Foresight
community for over a decade. It is inevitable that any guidelines put
forth today will be further discussed and perhaps substantively
changed; but the dialog on specific proposals must begin somewhere.
In spite of the diversity of briefing materials and
views represented at the Monterey workshop in February of 1999, the
participants managed to discuss the technical and policy issues with
both intensity and civility. While any one participant might have
preferred more or less emphasis on a particular issue, the group was
able to converge on a common set of draft guidelines for the
development of MNT.
The group agreed to review the Guidelines among
themselves, discuss them in wider Foresight meetings during 1999, and
then release them on the WWW for review by the larger community. The
goal was to get the Guidelines endorsed and adopted by organizations
sponsoring MNT research and development projects, and to inspire
effective self-regulation wherever necessary and possible.
Another goal of the Workshop members was to educate MNT
researchers about the potential benefits and risks of the technology.
The long-term goal was to eventually produce a dialog and set of
Guidelines that would be useful to policy makers, the public, and the
MNT research and development community.
The Foresight Guidelines were intended as a living
document, subject to modification and revision. Early drafts have been
reviewed and revised several times since the Monterey workshop,
including during Foresight/IMM sponsored discussions led by Neil
Jacobstein in May and November of 1999. They were also provided in the
attachments to Ralph Merkle's June 1999 Congressional testimony on
MNT, and referenced in Neil Jacobstein's presentation on
Nanotechnology and Molecular Manufacturing: Opportunities and Risks at
Stanford University's Colloquium for Doug Engelbart in January of
2000. The Workshop participants debated whether the Guidelines were
sufficiently developed for widespread publication, when Bill Joy's
article: "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us" was published in the April
2000 issue of Wired Magazine. This article raised public awareness of
the potential dangers of self-replicating technologies, including
nanotechnology.
Since that time, the Guidelines were reviewed critically
by Robert Freitas, and revised by Ralph Merkle and Neil Jacobstein.
Version 3.6 of the Guidelines was discussed in a May 2000 Foresight
workshop session led by Neil Jacobstein. Bill Joy was invited to
participate in this discussion. He made several constructive
suggestions, including one that outlined a guideline on closing the
economic incentives loop via an insurance policy requirement for
developers. Jacobstein incorporated the feedback from this and
subsequent discussions into version 3.7 of the Guidelines, and they
were then published for open review on the web.
Version 3.7 of the Guidelines are available at the
Foresight web URL: http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/. This text,
like most web text, can be annotated using software called Crit, which
enables in-line comments to be made using a web browser. Information
about the use of Crit can be found at http://crit.org. We encourage
your ideas and constructive criticism about how to improve the
Guidelines.
Eventually, the Guidelines need to become sufficiently
specific that they can form the basis for a legally enforceable
framework within which MNT development can be safely pursued. Future
versions of the MNT Guidelines might eventually be enforced via a
variety of means, possibly including lab certifications, randomized
open inspections, professional society guidelines and peer pressure,
insurance requirements and policies, stiff legal and economic
penalties for violations, and other sanctions. Enforcement will be
inherently imperfect, but the deterrent effect of unpredictable
inspection, combined with predictable and swift consequences for
violations, may prove preferable to the available alternatives.
Care must be taken that future revisions of the
Guidelines do not become so restrictive that they simply drive MNT
research and development underground. This could expose compliant
countries to the increased risks associated with decreased technical,
economic, and military capabilities. It would also sacrifice the many
significant economic, environmental, and medical benefits of MNT that
counteract serious and certain risks that society now faces in
industrialized countries and particularly in the developing world.
http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/current.html
Revised Draft Version 3.7: June 4, 2000
Principles
Background