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A D V I S O R Y
97.14
******************************************************************************
Topic: SGI IRIX df, pset, and eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities
Source: CIAC
Creation Date: May 27, 1997 17:00 GMT
Last Updated: May 27, 1997 17:00 GMT
To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information,
FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CIAC bulletin
H-61. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as
possible.
If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC:
Telephone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
=======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SGI IRIX df, pset, and eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities
May 27, 1997 17:00 GMT Number H-61
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Three vulnerabilities have been identified on the SGI IRIX
operating system: (1) df program, (2) pset program, and (3)
eject program.
PLATFORM: All SGI systems running the following corresponding versions
of IRIX: (1) IRIX 5.3, 6.2, and 6.3; (2) IRIX 5.3 and 6.2; and
(3) Irix 6.2. Other versions may be vulnerable.
DAMAGE: All three vulnerabilities may allow local users to gain root
privileges.
SOLUTION: Apply the suggested workarounds listed below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit information involving these vulnerabilities have been
ASSESSMENT: made publicly available.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start AUSCERT Advisories ]
1. df Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
===========================================================================
AA-97.19 AUSCERT Advisory
SGI IRIX df Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
26 May 1997
Last Revised: --
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in df(1),
distributed under IRIX 5.3, 6.2 and 6.3. Other versions may also be
vulnerable.
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Description
df(1) is a program used to display statistics about the amount of used
and free disc space on file systems.
Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied
by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the
df program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed
argument to the df program, intruders may be able to force df to
execute arbitrary commands. As df is setuid root, this may allow
intruders to run arbitrary commands with root privileges.
Sites can determine if this program is installed by using:
% ls -l /sbin/df
df is installed by default in /sbin. Sites are encouraged to check
for the presence of this program regardless of the version of IRIX
installed.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
2. Impact
Local users may gain root privileges.
3. Workarounds/Solution
AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this
vulnerability in df by immediately applying the workaround given in
Section 3.1.
If the df functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT recommends
applying the workaround given in Section 3.2.
Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.
3.1 Remove setuid and non-root execute permissions
To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this
advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed
from the df program immediately. As df will no longer work for non-root
users, it is recommended that the execute permissions for them also
be removed.
# ls -l /sbin/df
-r-sr-xr-x 1 root sys 23136 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/df
# chmod 500 /sbin/df
# ls -l /sbin/df
-r-x------ 1 root sys 23136 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/df
3.2 Install df wrapper
AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being
exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites
which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install
the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C
compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available
(Section 3.1.2).
3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source
The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can
be found at:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/
overflow_wrapper.c
This wrapper replaces the df program and checks the length of the
command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds
a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without
executing the df command. The wrapper program can also be configured
to syslog any failed attempts to execute df with arguments exceeding
MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this wrapper, please
read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c.
When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with df, AUSCERT recommends
defining MAXARGLEN to be 32.
The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be
retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM
The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key.
3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries
Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install
the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has
compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should
be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following
compile time options have been used to create the binaries:
REAL_PROG='"/sbin/df.real"'
MAXARGLEN=32
SYSLOG
More information on these options can be found in Section 3.1.1 and
in the overflow_wrapper.c source code.
The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z
The MD5 checksum for AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z is:
MD5 (AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z) = 9d21e6358129cccbe3768757a5361f56
AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation
instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary.
Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the
README file before installation.
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. pset Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
===========================================================================
AA-97.20 AUSCERT Advisory
SGI IRIX pset Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
27 May 1997
Last Revised: --
- - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in pset(1M),
distributed under IRIX 5.3 and 6.2. Other versions may also be
vulnerable.
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain the privileges of group
sys. These privileges may then be leveraged to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
- - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Description
pset(1M) is a program used to display and modify information concerning
the use of processor sets in the current system. The pset command is
used on multi-processor systems to restrict the execution of different
classes of jobs.
Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied
by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the
pset program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed
argument to the pset program, intruders may be able to force pset to
execute arbitrary commands. As pset is setgid sys, this may allow
intruders to run arbitrary commands with the privileges of group sys.
This may then be leveraged to gain root privileges.
Sites can determine if this program is installed by using:
% ls -l /sbin/pset
pset is installed by default in /sbin. Sites are encouraged to check
for the presence of this program regardless of the version of IRIX
installed.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
2. Impact
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain the privileges of group
sys. These privileges may then be leveraged to gain root privileges.
3. Workarounds/Solution
AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this
vulnerability in pset by immediately applying the workaround given in
Section 3.1.
If the pset functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT
recommends applying the workaround given in Section 3.2.
Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.
3.1 Remove setgid and non-root execute permissions
To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this
advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setgid permissions be removed
from the pset program immediately. As pset will no longer work for
non-root users, it is recommended that the execute permissions for
them also be removed.
# ls -l /sbin/pset
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root sys 31704 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/pset
# chmod 500 /sbin/pset
# ls -l /sbin/pset
-r-x------ 1 root sys 31704 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/pset
3.2 Install pset wrapper
AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being
exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites
which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install
the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C
compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available
(Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source
The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can
be found at:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/
overflow_wrapper.c
This wrapper replaces the pset program and checks the length of the
command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds
a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without
executing the pset command. The wrapper program can also be configured
to syslog any failed attempts to execute pset with arguments exceeding
MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this wrapper, please
read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c.
When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with pset, AUSCERT recommends
defining MAXARGLEN to be 32.
The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be
retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM
The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key.
3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries
Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install
the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has
compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should
be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following
compile time options have been used to create the binaries:
REAL_PROG='"/sbin/pset.real"'
MAXARGLEN=32
SYSLOG
More information on these options can be found in Section 3.2.1 and
in the overflow_wrapper.c source code.
The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z
The MD5 checksum for AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z is:
MD5 (AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z) = 875367aec70936fc5f4531b0ba8ebc03
AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation
instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary.
Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the
README file before installation.
4. Additional measures
Most Unix systems ship with numerous programs which have setuid or
setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged
programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged
programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible
uses of the system.
AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs
and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not
absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for example,
it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges should
be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your site,
then all execute permissions should be removed.
A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root):
# find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \;
It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being discovered
in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct
operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by
removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs.
For example, the functionality provided by the pset program is not
needed by many sites. If sites had previously disabled this program,
they would not have been susceptible to this latest vulnerability.
- - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
===========================================================================
AA-97.21 AUSCERT Advisory
SGI IRIX eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
27 May 1997
Last Revised: --
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in eject(1),
distributed under IRIX 6.2. Other versions may also be vulnerable.
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Description
eject(1) is a program used to eject a removable media device, such as
floppy, CDROM, or tape. If the floppy or CDROM is mounted, eject will
first try to unmount it.
Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied
by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the
eject program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed
argument to the eject program, intruders may be able to force eject
to execute arbitrary commands. As eject is setuid root, this may
allow intruders to run arbitrary commands with root privileges.
Sites can determine if this program is installed by using:
% ls -l /usr/sbin/eject
eject is installed by default in /usr/sbin. Sites are encouraged to
check for the presence of this program regardless of the version of
IRIX installed.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
2. Impact
Local users may gain root privileges.
3. Workarounds/Solution
AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this
vulnerability in eject by immediately applying the workaround given
in Section 3.1.
If the eject functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT
recommends applying the workaround given in Section 3.2.
Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.
3.1 Remove setuid and non-root execute permissions
To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this
advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed
from the eject program immediately. As eject will no longer have its
full functionality for non-root users, it is recommended that the
execute permissions be also removed for these users.
# ls -l /usr/sbin/eject
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root sys 45892 Nov 28 15:09 /usr/sbin/eject
# chmod 500 /usr/sbin/eject
# ls -l /usr/sbin/eject
-r-x------ 1 root sys 45892 Nov 28 15:09 /usr/sbin/eject
3.2 Install wrapper
AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being
exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites
which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install
the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C
compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available (Section
3.2.2).
3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source
The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can
be found at:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/
overflow_wrapper.c
This wrapper replaces the eject program and checks the length of the
command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds
a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without
executing the eject command. The wrapper program can also be
configured to syslog any failed attempts to execute eject with
arguments exceeding MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this
wrapper, please read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c.
When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with eject, AUSCERT
recommends defining MAXARGLEN to be 32.
The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be
retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM
The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key.
3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries
Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install
the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has
compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should
be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following
compile time options have been used to create the binaries:
REAL_PROG='"/usr/sbin/eject.real"'
MAXARGLEN=32
SYSLOG
More information on these options can be found in Section 3.2.1 and
in the overflow_wrapper.c source code.
The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z
The MD5 checksum for AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z is:
MD5 (AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z) = 276bf0f51c89e54d4c584a9e8dd9265d
AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation
instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary.
Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the
README file before installation.
4. Additional measures
Most Unix systems ship with numerous programs which have setuid or
setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these
privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number
of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for
all possible uses of the system.
AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs
and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not
absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for
example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges
should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your
site, then all execute permissions should be removed. A sample command
to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root):
# find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \;
It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerability are being discovered
in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct
operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by
removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs.
For example, if sites had previously removed the setuid permissions
for the eject program, they would not have been susceptible to this
latest vulnerability.
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ End AUSCERT Advisories ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of AUSCERT for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
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For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
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Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
H-51: Vulnerability in libXt
H-52: IRIX csetup Program Vulnerability
H-53: Vulnerability in webdist.cgi
H-54: Vulnerability in xlock
H-55: IRIX netprint Program Security Vulnerability
H-56: Solaris 2.x lp temporary files creation Vulnerability
H-57: Windows NT/95 Out of Band Data Exploit
H-58: IRIX runpriv Program Vulnerability
H-59: Solaris 2.x ps Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
H-60: Vulnerability in metamail
========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC)
to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling
efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related
services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident
Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center
(CERT/CC).
If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact
FedCIRC:
Telephone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/
* Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering
Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Defense.
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
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