A minimum installation for NT servers includes NT 4.0, the latest Service Packs, recommended patches and relevant security Hotfixes released by Microsoft.
It is not recommended to install more than one copy of Windows NT on the same computer, however if you must, we recommend that the second copy of Windows NT has no users except for the local Administrator and that a strong password be set on this account. There are cases where ACLs created by one of the copies are not protected when another copy is active.
When installing Windows NT do not copy the entire root directory and a few other files from one computer to another as each NT installation receives a unique system ID which makes its accounts and group ID's also unique. Making such copies may compromise the entire network's security.
Check for ROLLBACK.EXE on the hard disc and if present remove it. ROLLBACK can destroy critical system information including the registry, user account information. To recover from the ROLLBACK.EXE damage the entire system has to be restored from the backup tape, if one is available. Note that Microsoft inadvertently distributed ROLLBACK.EXE with some Windows NT 4.0 releases.
There are two types of patches from Microsoft; Service Packs and Hotfixes. Installing these patches in order is important. Service Packs must be installed before the Hotfixes. These fixes can be found at:
Extensive information about installing the Service Pack can be found in the readme.htm file.
Before you install these fixes on critical systems or install them on a large number of devices, test hotfixes to ensure that there is not a conflict with other third party drivers.
Details about the order to install hotfixes can be found in the postspX.txt file, where `X' is the number of the service pack you have installed. As an example, for Service Pack 5 the file is postsp5.txt.
Since new patches are released frequently, it can be difficult for system administrators to keep up with them. Microsoft has a security notification service that anyone can subscribe to. This service keeps customers informed about current security issues, how to protect systems from these issues, and what Microsoft is doing to fix the problems. For further information on the Microsoft Security Notification Service, see:
Computer viruses spread easily through floppy disks, email, or programs downloaded from the Internet. Potential problems range from changing data to reformatting your hard drive. Once created, viruses can spread without help from their creators. You can get them from computers at the office, from using computers at school, or from a document emailed to you by a friend.
To protect your systems, we recommend that you install a virus scanning/detecting/cleaning program. Our Computer Virus Resources document links to information about computer viruses, hoaxes, and chain letters.
http://www.cert.org/other_sources/viruses.html
http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Sources/virus.html
Once you start using a virus detection/prevention program, it is very important to keep it up-to-date. New viruses are created continuously, and vendors of virus detection software offer updates to detect them. To get the latest updates, check the manuals or the vendor web page. Some virus detection software allows you to get the updates automatically via the Internet. Make sure you setup the software to schedule these updates at least once a week.
We recommend that computers, at the very least, do a quick scan when the system is booted, as programs are loaded into memory, and when new data is detected (from email, removable media).
Computers should get a full system scan periodically which can be scheduled to run when the users are away for the evening.
Prior to making software available to many machines on a network install it on a stand-alone device and scan it for computer viruses. There have been reports that installation media contained a virus, but was not detected by the software company that distributed the media.
Computers that act as servers keep in mind that many files from a wide variety of users pass through it such as email and file/directory sharing. Because of this consider performing frequent scans of areas that users have read and write access to, perform full virus scans before backups, and implement mail and gateway scanning.
A good method to prevent large outbreaks of computer viruses in an organization is user education. This may include having policies and procedures for downloading software, the transfer of software between internal machines, how to deal with email attachments (executables, and documents that may have macros), how and when to run anti-virus software, and what to do when a virus is detected.
Disable unneeded network protocols and services.
Disable inbound and outbound traffic to your external connections for TCP and UDP ports 135, 137, 139 and UDP port 138. Blocking these ports prevents potential intruders from gathering useful information such as computer names, usernames, and services running on those computers. This list, from Microsoft Knowledgebase Article Q150543, describes services available on these ports.
List of Ports Used by Windows NT version 4.0 services: Function Static ports -------- ------------ Browsing UDP:137,138 DHCP Lease UDP:67,68 DHCP Manager TCP:135 Directory Replication UDP:138 TCP:139 DNS Administration TCP:139 DNS Resolution UDP:53 Event Viewer TCP:139 File Sharing TCP:139 Logon Sequence UDP:137,138 TCP139 NetLogon UDP:138 Pass Through Validation UDP:137,138 TCP:139 Performance Monitor TCP:139 PPTP TCP:1723 IP Protocol:47 Printing UDP:137,138 TCP:139 Registry Editor TCP:139 Server Manager TCP:139 Trusts UDP:137,138 TCP:139 User Manager TCP:139 WinNT Diagnostics TCP:139 WinNT Secure Channel UDP:137,138 TCP:139 WINS Replication TCP:42 WINS Manager TCP:135 WINS Registration TCP:137
For additional protection, block ports on individual NT systems using the advanced options in the protocol properties. Start -> Setting -> Control Panel -> Network -> Protocols -> TCP/IP -> Advanced -> Enable Security -> Configure. This could be useful if you have an NT server that is only used as a public web server. You can then block out all TCP ports except 80 (HTTP) and IP ports 6 (TCP) and 17 (UDP).
If you need to run the Internet Information Server (IIS), make sure that you block known vulnerabilities and we recommend IIS runs on a stand-alone machine.
The Windows NT Remote Access Service (RAS) allows remote computers to connect to Windows NT RAS servers across a telephone connection or using PPTP protocol over an intranet. If your site requires this service make sure you:
To increase the level of security for user accounts, implement password policies. Password policies are set in the User Manager and enable you to change the following:
In Service Pack 2 and higher, better password protection is offered through passfilt.dll. To enable the enhanced password policies, refer to the following Microsoft article:
passfilt.dll imposes the following additional restrictions on passwords:
Use SYSKEY. Syskey enables the private password data stored in the registry to be encrypted using a 128-bit cryptographic key. This is a unique key for each system. For further information on configuring and using syskey, see the following Microsoft Knowledgebase article.
By default, the administrator account is never locked out, so it is generally a target for brute force logon attempts of intruders. It is possible to rename the account in User Manager, but you may wish to lockout the administrator account after a set number of failed attempts over the network. The NT resource kit provides an application called passprop.exe which enables Administrator account lock out except for interactive logons on a domain controller.
Another alternative to avoid all accounts belonging to the Administrator group being locked over the network is to create a local account which belongs to the Administrator group, but is not allowed to logon over the network. This account may then be used at the console to unlock the other accounts.
Make sure the Guest account is disabled. If this account is enabled, anonymous connections can be made to NT computers.
Secure the Emergency Repair Disk as it contains a copy of the entire Security Access Manager (SAM) database. If a malicious user has access to the disk he/she may be able to launch a crack attack against it.
Always use NTFS. With NTFS it is possible to define access control to files and directories.
There are File/Directory ACLs (Access Control Lists) and Share ACLs. When files are accessed remotely, the most restrictive of the two types of ACLs is used. For example, if the ACL on a file is set to be READ, but the share permissions are set for FULL CONTROL the resulting permission will be READ access. To ensure that both local and remote connections have the correct ACLs we recommend using NTFS ACLs.
Ensure that Windows NT is the only operating system installed on
machines intended to be servers. The presence of a secondary operating
system may allow NT's security features to be bypassed.
An alternative operating system such as MS-DOS, Windows 95 or Linux
can be used to run programs which read and write NTFS partitions and
circumvent ACL protection.
Do not install more than one copy of Windows NT on a computer unless absolutely essential. There are cases where ACLs created by one copy of the OS do not provide protection when a different copy of the OS is active.
If you want to prevent sharing on an NT device, do not start the Server service and Computer Browser service automatically. You can still browse to other devices if these services are not started, but they prevent your device from offering file and print sharing services to others.
If you are sharing directories or printers, make sure that the permissions are what you expect. By default, when a share is enabled, it gives Everyone Full Control on the share.
Even if you have proper NTFS file permissions and enable sharing on directories, replace the share permission for the Everyone group with the USERS and/or ADMINISTRATORS groups instead.
Be careful of the FULL CONTROL permission for non administrator and system accounts. The files in a directory can be deleted regardless of what the file permissions are if users have FULL CONTROL on the directory. This happens because there is a hidden 'delete child' permission that is part of the FULL CONTROL permission that allows a user to delete a file even if the user does not have delete permission on the file. To prevent this, use any other combination of permissions.
This batch file exemplifies various NTFS permissions that would better secure the base file system of a standard NT install. It does not factor in specific applications.
This list gives registry settings that administrators may find useful for enhancing the security of an NT system.
To prevent the floppy drive from being accessed remotely, use this setting. The user who is locally logged on can still access the drive.
To prevent the CD-ROM drive from being accessed remotely, use this setting. The user who is locally logged on can still access the drive.
To display a legal notice before a user enters their username and password to logon to a device, use these settings. It is only displayed to a user logging on locally. We encourage you to discuss the content of this banner with your legal counsel.
When a user successfully logs into an NT system, the username is shown by default the next time someone tries to log into the system. Knowing the usernames of a successful logon can help intruders perform dictionary or brute attacks. To prevent the username of the last logged on user from being displayed to the next user to logon to the device, use this setting.
To deter unknown people from shutting down NT systems and deactivate the shutdown button on the initial logon screen, use the following registry setting. This works because to shutdown a device the user would need to logon first. If auditing is turned on to track logon activity, the administrators can determine who rebooted the system.
By default NT caches the past 10 logons. This is used in case the domain controller is unavailable. To prevent the caching of logon information, change the following registry value. It can range from 0-50.
For more information on cached logons, see:
By default, it is possible for users to add print drivers to an NT system. To prevent users from adding print drivers, make the following registry change:
Although there is no clear evidence that OS/2 and POSIX are a security risk you may wish to disable OS/2 and POSIX if they are not required.
Name: POSIX
Type: REG_EXPAND_SZ
Default Value: %SystemRoot%/system32/psxss.exe
Recommended Value: remove it
To prevent all users from viewing the Application Event Log, use the following registry setting. Also, be sure to set the proper access control on the registry key. See section VII.B for further information on controlling access to the registry.
To prevent all users from viewing the System Event Log, use the following registry setting. Again, be sure to set the proper access control on the registry key. See section VII.B for further information on controlling access to the registry.
The default configuration for the Security Event log does prevent users from viewing the log.
NT allows non-authenticated users to list domain usernames and share names. This information could be useful to intruders. To prevent this type of access, set the following registry key.
For further information on preventing anonymous access to NT devices, see:
There are two types of authentication used by NT. The first is LanManager (LM) which is a backwards compatible authentication and is inherently insecure. The other is the Windows NT authentication. The NT authentication has a stronger encryption method and can support mixed/special character passwords. To prevent LM authentication, set the following registry key.
This configuration may be incompatible with some versions of Samba. For further information on disabling LanManager authentication in Windows NT, see:
To enable the use of more restrictive password policies, use the following registry key. See section III. Passwords for further information on passfilt.dll. Be careful not to remove any existing strings when adding passfilt.dll.
To prevent remote users from viewing the NT registry, use the following key. The access control on this key is then used to determine who can remotely view the registry.
For further information on restricting access to the NT registry, see:
To prevent users from changing the attributes of shared resources (e.g. printer settings), set the following registry value
By default, the file used for paging is not cleared. This may contain clear text passwords or other sensitive information. To ensure that NT clears the paging file when the machine is shutdown, set the following value.
For further information, see:
To prevent "man-in-the-middle" attack, enable SMB signing. There are 2 steps to implementing SMB signing. The following registry entry is the first step, which enables SMB signing on the workstation side.
Name: EnableSecuritySignature
Type: REG_DWORD
Default Value: 0
Recommended Value: 1
The following entry is the second step for enabling SMB signing for the server side.
Name: EnableSecuritySignature
Type: REG_DWORD
Default Value: 0
Recommended Value: 1
For further information, see:
NT creates a number of hidden shares that are not visible through browsing, but can still be connected to. These are known as administrative shares. They are generally used for remote backup purposes, but if this is not necessary, you can disable them with the following registry setting.
Another method to prevent users from browsing to other NT workstations is to disable the Server service and Computer Browser service. This is more practical for end user workstations that should not be sharing anything. If these services are disabled, it is still possible to connect to other devices that are sharing.
In conjunction with disabling the Server service, use this setting.
ISS has a utility called everyone2user.exe that will change all instances of the Everyone group to the Users group. The Everyone group also has unauthenticated users as part of its membership.
Any key with TREE next to it means all of the keys that are below it should also have the ACLs set.
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Profile List
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Windows 3.1 Migration Status TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Embedding TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Type 1 Installer
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\MCI TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\MCI Extenstions TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\FontDrivers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\FontCache
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Fonts
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\FontMapper
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\FontSubstitutes
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WOW TREE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports TREE
The audit logs can be configured to take certain actions when the logs are full. One setting enables you to overwrite old events when the log is full. This could result in lost information, but is easy to maintain. Another option is to overwrite the logs after so many days. The third option is to not overwrite any events. This ensures that you do not lose any logging data, but could also be a denial of service issue since once the logs are full the system will not perform any actions that need to be logged. In the last case the logs need to be cleared manually.
Keep in mind that not all applications log to the Event Viewer so make sure you know where all the logs are being stored. One example of this is Microsoft Internet Information Server which stores logs in the c:\winnt\system32\logfiles directory.
In a high security environment the following registry setting will stop (crash) the computer if the audit logs fill up. The following Knowledgebase article gives further information about this registry setting.
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q140/0/58.asp
By default not all privileges are audited. The following registry setting will also enable auditing of backups and restores, debug programs, traverse checking, and replacing of process level tokens. During backup and restores this will cause a large number of events in the audit logs.
In high security development environments auditing of base objects should be enabled. After setting this registry value, use User Manger to begin this type of auditing.
Using User Manager, it is possible to define an audit policy of various user actions. These include logon, logoff, accessing files, restarting and shutting down the system. All of these can record successful and failed attempts. We suggest that you audit failed logon attempts at the very least.
When changing the properties for files and directories, you can also audit various events such as read, write, execute, delete, change permission, and taking ownership. When defining the audit policy for a drive or directory, you can have the policy be the same for all of the files and directories below it.
The third area to define auditing is in the registry. Much like defining file and directory audit properties, you can track actions taken in the registry on the various keys.
| Revision History | |
|
April 17, 2000 |
Initial Release |