[Going to be posting this in full here, adding three pages a day. Incompete but fantastic look at Political Correctness from a British academic, now retired I believe. I've decided to put this in this section because so much of PC concerns thought control through control of language and punishment for those now who misbehave but misspeak, according to the neo-communist commissars. PC is essentially the attempt to enforce a warped view of reality through twisted language. Use the cultists' code or be punished. Ellis won't tell you that jews are the primary driver behind PC; apart from that, what he says is mostly accurate.]

Discussion here (Radio Istina shows and more)
http://vnnforum.com/showpost.php?p=990574&postcount=10

Buy it at amazon here:
Marxism, Multiculturalism, and Free Speech (Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Monograph Series, 31): Frank Ellis: 9780930690601: Amazon.com: Books

A Work as Eye-Opening as it is Measured and Studied July 27, 2007
By ScottTownsendPublishers
Introduction by Professor Dwight D. Murphey. A collection of essays which explore the neo-Marxist roots of the contemporary move to suppress race consciousness, to promote "multiculturalism," and to criminalize (at least in Europe) freedom of speech on such matters as race, national identity, and immigration. The author is a British professor of Russian and Slavic languages who is a recognized authority on Marxist and neo-Marxist ideology and propaganda techniques. Included are chapters on Race, Marxism and the "Deconstruction" of the United Kingdom; on the historical link between Communism's "Enemy of the People" and the European Union's concept of "Hate Criminals"; on "Political Correctness" and Race Legislation in Britain and the European Union; and on what the author calls "the Ideological Struggle from Lenin and Mao to Marcuse and Foucault."



Marxism, Multiculturalism, and Free Speech

Frank Ellis

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Monograph No. 31

Council for Social and Economic Studies
POB 34070
Washington DC 20006

Copyright 2006

ISBN 0-930690-60-5




Table of COntents

Introduction
By Dwight E. Murphey............................................................1

Chapter 1:
The Parekh and Macpherson Reports:
"Deconstruction" of the United Kingdom.....................................6

Chapter 2:
Race Legislation in the European Union.....................................38

Chapter 3:
Political Correctness and the Ideological Struggle:
From Lenin and Mao to Marcuse and Foucault............................52

Chapter 4:
From Communism's "Enemy of the People"
to PC's "Hate Criminal"...........................................................90




Introduction

Frank Ellis is primarily a scholar, an expert on the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist ideology. He is a member of the faculty in the department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at Leeds University in the United Kingdom. It is not surprising that he is the author of several publications -- books and articles -- in his area of expertise.

But his is not a detached, effete scholarship. His voice is impassioned, and informed by his scholarship. He stands unabashedly for the England that is known to history and that now lies under the incubus of an alien thought-control that dominates the West today. The incubus of which we speak takes the form of a smothering cloud of ideology that insists entirely on its own prerogative to speak, barring quite militantly any opposing view, no matter how well-considered. It is in this context that we find Frank Ellis threatened today by the most strenuous efforts to silence his voice. Leftists student demonstrations have demanded that he be dismissed because in off-campus writings he has expressed opinions that opposite Marxism and multiculturalism and the suppression of free speech in present-day Britain and Europe. He is a man of great courage, and it would be easy to speak of him as potentially a martyr on behalf of the England-that-was. That would not be inappropriate, but doing so would obscure, perhaps, a larger truth: that it is England, the United Kingdom, and the West in general that is being martyred, not simply one man.

The amazing things is that the "multiculturalism" and "diversity" that seeks to still his voice presents itself -- and is no doubt accepted at face value as such by a great many who have not thought it through -- as a benign, well-meaning, life-affirming perspective. Anyone who opposes something so positive, so moral, must per se be profoundly evil. It is from this perspective that Ellis is under attack today, even though his message is in fact fully in keeping with what the overwhelming consensus among educated Englishmen held to be true even so recently as a few years ago. What, after all, could be more compassionate and more attuned to the moral high ground than a multiculturalism that makes everyone welcome and that values each individual and each culture as invaluable parts of the rich texture of the human race?

The difficulty, of course, is that that is not what "multiculturalism," as the West is experiencing it today, really is. When it welcomes an influx of large numbers of people from Asia, Africa and Latin America into Europe and North America, it is not primarily affirming those people and their cultures. What it means, first and foremost, is the cultural transformation and destruction of the existing societies of the West. If it were truly "multicultural," it would seek to strengthen Western societies precisely in their own uniqueness, and to do so to other cultures as well, so that true variety and diversity would continue to exist in the world. It is worth noting that in this course of negation, "multiculturalism" must adopt a ubiquitous double standard -- one that champions everything non-Western and that undercuts and denies everything originally European.

I saw the double standard at work even so recently as this morning. Ellis is under fire because he has argued, among other things, that not all cultures are equal, and that the West has had a superior culture. This is said to be "racist," and "to make those of other cultures uncomfortable." In that context, it isn't admitted as something that a reasonable person of good will might assert, having in mind the mathematics of Euclid, the astronomy of Copernicus, St. Paul's Cathedral with its Christopher Wren dome, the "Moonlight Sonata" of Ludwig van Beethoven, and countless other manifestations of high culture. Nor is it acknowledged that the overwhelming number of Englishmen of prior generations would have found Ellis' observations unexceptional. But this common wisdom is now damned as vicious. On the other hand, I shared a bowling lane this morning with a young Afro-American who sported a "black pride" T-shirt, with a picture of a submachine gun on it. No one took offense, and certainly the thought-police weren't called. It seems that within the prevailing ethos it is accepted as benign for all other cultures than the West's to proclaim their excellence -- and in the most militant fashion. The fact that there is such a double standard is, as I have said above, most revealing about the ideological fakery that is at play.

This deserves still another moment of reflection. There was a time when the West asserted its superiority and sought to extend its dominion over the world. I take Ellis' view to be far short of that. There is nothing in his writing suggesting a program of cultural conquest. Rather, his is no more than a defense of the West's right of continued existence. It is those who use "diversity" and "multiculturalism" as a pretext for a demographic swamping-out of the Western nations who are on the cultural offensive. When they shout loudly that it is he who is vicious, they artfully reverse the truth.

Those who do not understand the "attack on the West" that has "captured the moral high ground" and has come to suffuse virtually all of the institutions and "commanding heights" of Western society are not personally to be blamed for their acceptance of today's shibboleths. Most people are fully occupied with the details of their own lives, jobs, businesses, and avocations. They accept with implicit trust the truisms that are presented to them, especially when those truisms are repeated over and over again by the opinion-makers in academia, the media and the professions. The fault lies not with the average person, even the average "educated" person. The fault lies with those who make it their lives' work to deal in ideas and articulated opinion -- and who have signed on to the project of cultural transplantation. Even most of these have done so out of conformity, breathing in without question the ethos of their doctoral instructors, their "role models," or their peers. The few others -- the leaders -- act out of a conformity at a higher level. While ostensibly "thinkers," they have sucked at the breast of alienated social commentators going back over a long history within the literary, artistic and academic culture of the modern West. The alienation against all mainstream Western culture goes back at least as far as Rousseau in the eighteenth century. It is commonplace these days to attribute it to the Frankfurt School of half or three-quarters of a century ago -- to men like Marcuse, Adorno and Gramsci, who saw that the primary upcoming battle against the West was to be a cultural one, and that victory lay in "a march through the institutions." (Earlier, with Marx, communism was to be ushered in by a revolution of the "proletariat." But after the Left's disappointment with how the populations of Europe rallied to the side of their respective counties in World War I, there was a gradual disillusionment toward the "proletariat" as an ally of the intelligentsia. This made necessary a change in strategy, which eventually took the form of seeking all disaffected or unassimilated groups, and particularly "ethnic minorities," as allies.)

The two World Wars of the twentieth century weakened European civilization immeasurably, and one cannot help but think that the cultural Left played an opportunistic game in latching onto the rising assertiveness of all "peoples of color" in the aftermath of the Second World War. The predominant intelligentsia of the West -- historically highly alienated, but of course with many who stood outside it, not joining in the alienation -- have no particular love for the cultures of the non-Western world. We ought not to be fooled by the superficial and ultimately denigrating shows of "compassion" that serve primarily to demonstrate "how really good we are." What the Leftist elements that dominate the present-day Western intelligentsia actually feel, and feel with a seemingly white-hot intensity, is hatred. Ironically, we are taught to believe that "hatred" is an ignoble passion, and that "hate speech comes from those who would champion the West's right to exist. All the while, the real hatred burns within the Left -- and in the name of "acceptance of others," in truly Orwellian style, has made itself the official ideology of government policy and of the institutions in Britain and elsewhere in the West.

As Frank Ellis points out, many streams of thought feed into this hatred. As a Sovietologist, he sees most acutely the relevance of Marxist thought and the earlier "multiculturalism" sought within Stalin's empire. Ellis does not himself have occasion to explore them, but there are other major forces at work in the world today that have the same tendency. It is often pointed out that the leaders of "neo-conservatism" (so influential at the core of the George W. Bush administration in the United States) trace their mental histories to an affinity years ago for Leon Trotsky, who sought to universalize Communism. The neo-conservatives' messianic desire for universal meliorism is joined by the regnant ideology of "globalization," a prime feature of which is to argue for "economic efficiency" and "reduction of costs" while deliberately eschewing any concern for a given country's or peoples' own particular interests. Given the truly incredible developments recently in communications, transportation and world finance, the winds of economic globalization blow fiercely over every land, increasingly stripping away the vestiges of local culture. Interestingly, there are a number of movements of "devolution," by which local peoples seek to preserve their own identities; but it remains to be seen whether they can prevail in any meaningful way against so imposing an array of forces against them.

A subset of these issues -- a subset that is of infinite importance -- is the question of intellectual freedom and its offshoot, "freedom of speech." It was Herbert Marcuse who, in his "Essay on Repressive Tolerance," argued that all speech that advocated change in (Western) society should be encouraged and all speech that defended existing social structures should be repressed. Only in this way, he said, could a truly meaningful "tolerance" be attained. It takes only a moment's reflection to see that this was a rationale for a totalitarianism of the Left. Indeed, it is the rationale for today's multiculturalist demand that all opposition to the demographic and cultural invasion of the West be silenced.

Thus, the overriding moral issue for all caring persons in England and elsewhere in the West today is whether this totalitarianism is to be praised, coddled and encouraged. There was, not so long ago, outrage in the intellectual culture of the West when the Soviet Union sought to enshrine "proletarian science" in the form of Lysenkoism in place of Mendel's genetics. Where is the outrage today?

We find it in the impassioned voice of, among others, Frank Ellis. I recommend his essays collected in this volume (all of them published recently in the Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies) to all readers, of whatever persuasion, who believe that intellectual freedom should continue to be one of the fundamental values of the West.

Dwight D. Murphey




Chapter One

THE PAREKH AND MACPHERSON REPORTS: "DECONSTRUCTION" OF THE UNITED KINGDOM*

Cities and towns the length and breadth of Britain -- from Bristol, the Medway towns, Slough and London in the south, to Birmingham and Leicester in the Midlands, to Bradford, Burnley, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Oldham, Leicester and Manchester in the north -- all now harbour large populations of non-white immigrants, a significant proportion of whom, for various reasons, refuse to or are unable to adapt to the host country. Over the last 20 years violent street confrontations between the native indigenous majority population and black and Asian immigrants have become depressingly familiar. In fact, racial strife is now a recognizable feature of the British urban landscape. Meanwhile, the numbers of legal and illegal immigrants entering the United Kingdom continue inexorably to rise. By any standards these are dramatic changes in an already densely populated and traditionally, racially homogenous country such as Britain. Given the failure of the British government to address the scale of the problem, it is reasonable to assume that the worst is still to come. And the problem is by no means confined to the United Kingdom. Similar and equally deleterious effects of legal and illegal immigration can be observed all over the Western world.

The native British population faces two threats from these changes, one immediate and on-going, the other a distinct possibility in the next two decades. For the present, there is the covert and overt war being waged against the indigenous majority population, against its history, language, folkways, culture and traditions. This is a war in which
multiculturalists exploit existing institutions -- the legal system, the education system at all levels (especially the universities), the print and broadcast media, parliamentary democracy and free speech -- to achieve their goals (Bork, 1997, Honeyford, 1998, Vazsonyi, 1998). These methods are analogous to those used by Soviet commissars to sovietise Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 (Ellis, 2001). Attacked in this way, institutions retain their outward form but the heart is torn out, the soul extirpated. Incapable of defending themselves, these institutions and the people who work in them can no longer serve the nation state that has created and nurtured them over the centuries. A second, long term threat is terrorism. Street riots, as the experience of Northern Ireland and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict demonstrate, can easily escalate to well organised terrorist campaigns against the security forces. It is difficult to see what would prevent determined militant immigrant groups from using the same means, were they so minded, especially were they wedded to some form of Islamic fundamentalism.[1] In this regard "Islamophobia", fear of Islam, is fully justified.


__________________________
*This chapter first appeared as an article "Race, Marxism and the 'Deconstruction' of the United Kingdom" in Volume 26,

Number 4, Winter 2001 of The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies.

Two reports published recently in the UK, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny (1999), sponsored by the British Labour government, and The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), sponsored by the Runnymede Trust, and authored by Bhiku Parekh (both reports being more widely known, respectively, as The Macpherson Report and The Parekh Report) illustrate the scale of the threat to the white indigenous majority population. For, in their respective analyses of British society and the recommendations they propose, both these documents represent a fundamental break with the norms of English common law and culture. In his report of the police investigation into the murder of a black teenager, Sir William Macpherson, a retired British judge, accused the police of "institutional racism". Predictably, the consequences on police morale have been disastrous. On the streets, ever fearful of attracting the catch-all "racist" label, the police have adopted a low-key approach towards non-white suspects. The result has been an increase in the number of violent street crimes as immigrant criminals operate with apparent immunity from prosecution (something which has been observed in Cincinnati and Seattle in the aftermath of black rioting). More worrying in the long term has been the readiness of many senior police officers uncritically to accept Macpherson's accusations and, perversely, to revel in public displays of self-flagellation and self-accusations of "racism".

Based on the illiberal neo-Marxism that underpins so much of multiculturalism, The Parekh Report is a far more comprehensive and aggressive attack on the United Kingdom than its predecessor. For example Parekh, believes that we in the UK are suffering from 'multicultural drift' (Parekh, 2000, 11) and that what is required is 'a purposeful process of change' (Parekh, 2000, 11). Later in the report, and with obvious approval, Parekh cites a respondent who argues that: 'People in positions of power must really believe, in their hearts and minds, that black and white are equal' (Parekh, 2000, 141, emphasis added). And again in chapter 20 we are given the thoughts of an anonymous race bureaucrat: 'Training is encouraging people, but we have reached the stage where people must be told to do it or else' (Parekh, 2000, 284, emphasis added). We have been warned.

National Identity and History

History's would-be nation killers hae always understood that to subjugate or to weaken a nation it is necessary to destroy a nation's sense of history, or at the very least dilute it. In the twentieth century the masters of the genre have always been communists or other activists of the left, such as Ceausescu, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and Kilm Il Sung. For the multicultural agenda to succeed in the UK the indigenous majority population must be coninced or intimidated into believing that it is just one of a number of groups, with no special privileges conferred by the past, then opposition to the coercive incorporation of large numbers of non-white aliens will be made all the more easier (or so believe the advocates of multiculturalism). In practice, however, there is widespread resistance, instinctive and rational, and frequently violent, to multiculturalism in the UK. This can be seen not just in the street confrontations between gangs of Asians and indigenous whites but in the periodic outbursts of politicians who, having expressed views contrary to orthodoxy, then recant in spectacular fashion, John Townsend, the former Conservative Member of Parliament for East Yorkshire being the latest example.

Any one who reads The Parekh Report can have no doubt that the destruction, or in postmodernese the "deconstruction" of any strong white identity, is one of Parekh's main aims. Thus, in the preface Parekh talks of 'the non-existent homogeneous cultural structure of the 'majority' (Parekh, 2000, x), only, subsequently, to expend vast amounts of ideological energy attempting to destroy something, which apparently, does not exist. When whites are no longer able to say "we", they are vulnerable to groups of non-white immigrants who most assuredly are encouraged to promote the use of "we" at the expense of the host society. To this end, divide, weaken and rule are the essential policies deployed by Parekh against the whtie, indigenous majority population. Case as victims, the Irish are singled out for sympathetic treatment, as are the Scots and Welsh.

Symptomatic of Parekh's confusion and muddle on the question of race is the astonishing disclaimer in chapter 10 that: 'Irish people are classified as white for statistical purposes' (Parekh, 2000, 130). Curiously, while highlighting Scotalnd as a special deserving case, as victim of English rather than a beneficiary of the 1707 Act of Union, Parekh pointedly refrains from criticixing the nationalist movements in both Wales and Scotland. In fact, he justifies them in a way which would not be the case were there a strong English Nationalist movement: 'The rising tides of nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales, however, have clearly been driven by historical resentments of long-standing relations of privilege and dependency' (Parekh, 2000, 21).

Among the Scottish politicians, I suggest, any drive for nationalism is inspired not by images of Braveheart but by the tantalising possibility of bypassing Westminster and acquiring ever more generous subsidies from the European Union (EU). Any English National Party would be singled out by Parekh for putting the interests of the indigenous British population before aliens and foreigners, whereas the perfectly legitimate aspirations of the Scottish National Party towards independence are ignored. There exists an unbridgeable contradiction between Scottish nationalism and the multicultural agenda which Parekh wishes to impose on the English (Linsell, 2001). And violent conflict between native Glaswegians and large numbers of immigrants in the summer of 2001 over the allocation of resources -- the wave of the future -- supports this view. Parekh applauds the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism not out of any regard for these legitimate aspirations towards Welsh and Scottish independence, which his multiculturalism obliges him to reject, but for the weakening effects it has on the British identity as a whole. On the other hand, any similar sense of identity or national revival among the English is to be deplored as 'a new kind of little Englandism' (Parekh, 2000, 24).

Especially resented is Bill Bryson's best-seller, Notes from a Small Island, first published in 1995. Bryson's crime in Parekh's eyes is that he omits blacks, Asians and others from his story of a small island. Such omissions are perfectly rational. For these minorities have arrived very late in the day and the national story can only 'exclude them'. Here we have another reason why English history and the history of the United Kingdom have to be written off and where that is not possible, rewritten Orwellian-style to suit the purposes of multiculturalism. Trafalgar, Oliver Cromwell, the English Civil War, the Battle of Britain, the Somme, the Falklands, Sir Isaac Newton, Shakespeare, Elizabeth I are hardly likely to inspire the same love, admiration or other emotions in immigrants as they do in the white indigenous majority population. And why should they? Quite reasonably, Asians and blacks look to their own. With regard to Bryson, Parekh is also guilty of an omission of his own, failing to point out to the reader that Bryson is a white American, who clearly loves Britain, warts and all.

Identity is inextricably linked with history and so it is to be expected that Parekh and his social engineers with to "deconstruct" British history to serve their purposes. Having noted that the Act of Union in 1707 created Great Britain, Parekh then argues that: 'The dominant national story of England includes Agincourt, Trafalgar, Mafeking, the Somme and Dunkirk' (Parekh, 2000, 16). To be sure, the Royal Navy was founded by an English King and Nelson's historic address was to Englishmen to do their duty, but Trafalgar was fought and won in 1805 nearly a century after the Act of Union. Though the vast majority of Nelson's sailors were Englishmen, the consequences of defeat would have affected all of Britain, not just England. Likewise, it was not just English soldiers who fought and died at the Somme. Nor can the English, as Parekh implies, lay sole claim to the miracle and the pain of Dunkirk. For the memory of Dunkirk is also the memory of the surrender of the British 51st Highland Division at Saint-Valery. Dunkirk, as the Somme, belongs to a number of great and sometimes painful moments in the life of Britain. This can be appreciated in a memorable passage taken from Alistair Maclean's HMS Ulysses, possibly that Scottish writer's finest novel, and certainly one of the best we have of the Battle of the Atlantic in World War Two. A senior naval commander feels the crushing weight of the command and reflects upont he British lives lost in the Atlantic as the convoy battles its way through repeated German air and U-boat attacks:

And the broken sorrowing families, he thought incoherently, families throughout the breadth of Britain: the telegram boys cycling to the little houses in the Welsh valleys, along the wooded lanes of Surrey, to the lonely reek of the peat-fire, remote in the Western Isles, to the limewashed cottages of Donegal and Antrim... (Maclean, 1955, 170)

These are crucial defining moments in British history which bring English, Scots, Welsh and Irish together. History can bind as well as divide.

Especially dubious in the Parekh deconstruction of English and British history is the emphasis placed on imagining history, part of a much wider attack on traditional method inspired by French radical theories, so popular in the academy (Windschuttle, 1997). If history is just imagination, then anything goes and anything can be claimed and the way is open for all kinds of charlatans to take centre stage. Imagination is hardly a reliable historical source. Imaginative use of historical data and documents is another matter entirely. There is, Parekh points out, more to Britain than just England, which is true enough. But England was and remains the economic powerhouse of Britain. This has long been obvious to foreign observers. Russians, for example, routinely refer to Britain and the UK as Angliya the Russian word for England. And the Irishman, Edmund Burke, pointedly writes of "we English" in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. English Common Law, the break with Rome, The Book of Common Prayer, the model of parliamentary democracy and free speech, the special role of maritime matters in shaping the life of the country (this after all was why Trafalgar was so decisive since it guaranteed British naval supremacy for nearly 150 years) have all contributed to England's special nature. Foreign observers have well understood the monumental significance of the evolution of private property, free speech and parliamentary democracy in England and the benefits for the rest of the world unlike Parekh who seems to be trapped by his parochial multiculturalism. A mere 20 miles of water separates Britain from continental Europe, yet the effects of this separation have been profound for the political, cultural, intellectual and religious development of Britain. What we have here in the separates and highly distinctive political and cultural evolution of Britain is perhaps analogous to what happens in genetics, namely that very small differences in the genes can have large phenotypic consequences. As with race, it is not the size of the genetic difference but rather the impact that change has on the phenotype.

None of these differences however has deterred Parekh from asserting that the uniqueness of the British system of parliamentary democracy 'is not supported by the known historical facts' (Parekh, 2000, 19). In part this is correct. For the system is a uniquely English contribution to world civilization, certainly not Welsh, Scottish or Irish, though Irish and Scottish thinkers, most notably, Edmund Burke, David Hume and Adam Smith, have shaped this process. In reviewing the role of representative institutions in continental Europe, Richard Pipes notes that there were various assemblies in Spain, Scotland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. None, however, was as successful as the English. Pipes argues, convincingly, that 'one factor that bolsters parliamentarism is territorial smallness. As a rule, the smaller the country and its population the easier it is to forge effective democratic institutions, because they represent manageable communities with shared interests and are capable of concerted action: conversely, the larger a country the greater is the diversity of social and regional interests, which impedes unity.' (Pipes, 1999, 153). Pipes, in other words, recognises the importance of homogeneity, cultural and racial. Again, Pipes notes, it was to England's advantage that she 'never developed provincial parliaments' (Pipes, 1999, 153). This, of course, is something that the EU is desperately trying to foist on England so as further to weaken any strong sense of English national identity, and yet another reason why Parekh wants the British to cast away their independence and become totally absorbed into the EU.

Discussion of religious conflict in Britain is intended to show that there has always been strife in Britain and division over religious matters between the people of England, Scotland and Ireland. Thus, runs the argument, the conflicts arising over multiculturalism in the UK are part of this on-going historical conflict and adaptation to change. Three points can be made here. First, there is the question of race. The idea that since large numbers of Normans, Saxons, Jutes and Danes have come here and settled is not in itself and argument in support of large scale non-whites immigration to the UK. None of these were genetically very distinct from the earlier population of the islands. The Norman Conquest imposed a very thin layer on the Anglo-Saxons and by the 14th and certainly no later than the 15th century, the Normans had been totally absorbed into Anglo-Saxon England (Johnson, 1995). Second, if as Parekh believes, race is a social and political construct, not something that has evolved in different parts of the globe in response to differing survival challenges, then the large scale legal/illegal immigration is simply a matter of "deconstructing" the dominant white indigenous identity and reconstructing it along multicultural lines. (Note for example the title of chapter 3 "Identities in Transition"). As we know from countless historical examples, people and nations emphatically do not lend themselves to this kind of neo-Marxist moulding and remoulding. For better or for worse, race matters, and will continue to matter, however much people such as Parekh and others deny it.

Third, desperate to convince us of the benefits of multiculturalism, Parekh fails to provide any convincing evidence from anywhere in the world, past or present, of a successful and enduring multicultural (multiracial) society. Catastrophes and bloody failures on the other hand are easy to find: Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Empire. For all the differences and disagreements that exist among the white indigenous majority population, when Britain has been in peril the nation has pulled together. Similarly, Russians rallied to fight the Germans in the darkest days of the German invasion not out of loyalty to the Cominterm (the Soviet version of multiculturalism) but out of deep love of Mother Russia. In the words of Viktor Kravchenko: 'At the core of a nation there is a hard, eternal and unconquerable element - it was this that was bared in Stalingrad, that survived blood-letting and disaster on a horrifying scale. It had nothing to do with Karl Marx and Stalin' (Kravchenko, 1946, 402). And whether it was Henry V's band of brothers on the eve of Agincourt, Nelson's Jack Tars at Trafalgar, or the Few in the summer of 1940, it was love of hearth and country and a sense of duty, tempered by military discipline, that prompted soldiers, sailors and airmen to risk their lives in battle, not the perverse, unnatural abstractions of multiculturalism. Parekh is oblivious to the very history and its significance that he wishes to erase.

In citing a great many things that bind people into something called a community -- many of which are sensible -- Parekh unwittingly cites reasons why multicultural societies cannot remain stable and why there is so much friction. He argues that a sense of belonging is needed, failing to see that multiculturalism destroys that very sense of belonging. The cult of multiculturalism demands that white Englishmen value the achievements (or in many cases the non-achievements) of foreigners above those of native Englishmen. Now, granted many of what one might regard as better and, in some cases, superior achievements include a degree of subjectivity. But not all. For example, the scientific achievements of Europeans completely overshadow those of subSaharan Africans. We can argue about why this is so, but the enormous disparity in achievement remains (for an analysis of the relationship between national IQ and economic performance see Lynn & Vanhanen, 2001).

Having ridiculed the idea of the nationalist state, Parekh then argues for something called 'One Nation'. In passing one can note that Parekh's use of 'One Nation' bears a close resemblance to Evgeniy Zamyatin's use of 'One State' in his powerful satire of Soviet totalitarianism, We. In Zamyatin's 'One State', the inhabitants, or numbers, as they are called, live out a wreteched existence in which every possible aspect is governed by a brutal bureaucracy. Orthodoxy (multiculturalism?) is associated with mental health, dissent (belief in the nation state?) with madness. Written in the early 1920s and then banned by the communist party for over 660 years before being finally published in the Soviet Union in 1988, We turned out to be a dire predictions of totalitarianism. And twenty five years after The Camp of The Saints was first published, Jean Raspail's deeply disturbing analysis of cowardly politicians and intellectuals and enervating compassion is proving to be a similarly dire prediction of multicultural distemper.

Parekh's idealised 'One Nation' will not be based on a unifying and enduring national identity. Only bureaucratic coercion and something akin to Soviet-style totalitarianism can hold things together. This is conceded by Parekh when he talks of 'substantive values' or 'common values':

Substantive values are those that underpin any defensible conception of the good life. They include people's freedom to plan their own lives, the equal moral worth of all human beings, and equal opportunities [...] On the basis of such values it is legitimate to ban female circumcision, forced marriages, cruel punishment of children and repressive and unequal treatment of women, even though these practices may enjoy cultural authority in certain communities (Parekh, 2000, 53-54).

Once again we are confronted with the barrenness of postmodernism; the view that identities can be remade and reinvented; that they are endlessly malleable. Ultimately, there are no privileged perspectives and one idea of the good life is no better than anyone else's conception of the good life and emphatically not superior to it. Given that multiculturalism recognises no one culture as superior to another, the support for banning female circumcision, for example, is rather odd. If female circumcision enjoys 'cultural authority', then the very essence of multiculturalism with its endless calls to respect something called "diversity" demands that this authority be respected.

There is of course a profound irony here of which Parekh is painfullly unaware. For it is preeminently Western societies, and within that framework, English traditions of equality before the law and the assertion of individual rights, (the Taliban, as far as one can tell, did not have habeas corpus or free speech) that provides the moral, legal and intellectual basis for banning the non-white practices of female circumcision, arranged marriages and unequal treatment of women. Parekh needs to be reminded that it was in the sceptred isle that the ideas of individual freedom, the rule of law and parliamentary democracy were born and bred, certainly not in India, Pakistan, Japan or China, let alone Africa.

Racism

Parekh has much to say on the subject of racism and the definition offered differs substantially from that given in The Macpherson Report. According to Parekh:

[...] racism, understood either as a division of humankind into fixed, closed and unalterable groups or as systematic domination of some groups by others, is an empirically false, logically incoherent and morally unacceptable doctrine (Parekh, 2000, ix).

No doubt Parekh believes that 'empirically false', 'logically incoherent' and 'morally unacceptable' is the trident that slays the dragon of racism. The Parekh definition of racism is a fallacious diversion, since it attacks a straw man. It is not at all obvious that scientists accept the division of mankind into 'fixed, closed and unalterable groups' which, as has been pointed out by Arthur Jensen was an idea advanced by Plato's politics in c.370 BC not one found in modern genetics (Jensen, 1998, 420). What can be demonstrated empirically - whether many will accept the findings publicly is another matter - is that race is something much more than an exogenous factor.[2] In the light of the vast amount of data now available, Arthur Jensen's definition of races is far more convincing, and more importantly, independently verifiable, than the unreconstructed Marxism of Parekh. According to Jensen: 'Races are defined in this context as breeding populations that differ from one another in gene frequencies and that vary in a number of intercorrelated visible features that are highly heritable (Jensen, 1998, 421). And both Vincent Sarich (1995, 85) and Jensen (1998, 423) have applied the notion of fuzzy sets to race, neatly turning one of multiculturalism's most hallowed metaphors - the rainbow - against it in the process: To quote Jensen:

The fact there are intermediate gradations or blends between racial groups, however, does not contradict the genetic and statistical concept of race. The different colours of the rainbow do not consist of discrete bans but are a perfect continuum, yet we readily distinguish different regions of this continuum as blue, green, yellow and red, and we effectively classify many things according to these colors. The validity of such distinctions need not require that they form perfectly discrete Platonic categories (Jensen, 1998, 425).

_______________________
[2] Later in the report Parekh cites a correspondent who bemoans the fact that: 'Young children are not colour blind. As young as two or three y ears old they are aware of differences between the people around them...' (Parekh, 2000, 149). Is this evidence for a genetic preference for one's own race or evidence that race is something inculcated into children.

Yet this has not deterred Parekh from asserting that: 'Race, as is now widely acknowledged, is a social and political construct, not a biological or genetic fact. It cannot be used scientifically to account for the wide range of differences among peoples' (Parekh, 2000, 63).[3] At no stage in this report does Parekh attempt to justify the basis on which he makes this astonishing assertion. We are expected to take it on trust. While one would not expect to see the names of John Baker, Thomas Bouchard, Chris Brand, Carleton Coon, Jon Entine, Hans Eysenck, Linda Gottfredson, Arthur Jensen, Michael Levin, Richard Lynn, J. Philippe Rushton, Vincent Sarich and Glayde Whitney in the bibliography, one would most certainly expect to find the names and works of Stephen Jay Gould, Leon Kamin, Richard Lewontin and others who deny the biological and genetic basis of race and who, when they attack the hereditarians, as they are called, are given pride of place in the print and broadcast media as being the legitimate voice of science, whereas Baker et al are to be dismissed as cranks or wose. One anomaly is the inclusion of Charles Murray's & Richard Herrnstein's The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life in the bibliography, though, curiously, the sub-title is omitted. Equally curious is the absence of any attempt to challenge the Murray & Herrnstein thesis that: (i) race has a biological basis and; (ii), to challenge the well established empirical finding of a 1 standard deviation between the average black and white IQ. Parekh passes up an opportunity at the very least to criticise Murray & Herrnstein.

Since the whole basis of multicultural social engineering rests on the assertion that race is a social and political construct and not a biological or genetic reality, Parekh's assertion is of the greatest importance. That this assertion -- no more -- is repeatedly cited as evidence that those who oppose multiculturalism are racists, the omission of any source material in The Parekh Report's lengthy bibliography or endnotes, which would serve to provide some independently verifiable corroboration of this all important assertion is quite striking. Why this obvious omission? I speculate that the reason the latter set of names is absent is because

_______________________
[3] Parekh's approach to race can also be seen in his egregiously political/ideological definition of what he calls sexism: 'Similarly, sexism involves seeing all differences bewteen women and men as fixed in nature rather than primarily constructed by culture' (Parekh, 2000, 67, emphasis added).

Parekh is deeply worried that by citing any authors who have written about race, pro or contra, he is merely drawing attention to the huge amount of evidence in the professional and specialist journals, as well as the many monographs, all in the public domain, and, as a result, the huge discrepancy between what many scholars say publicly on the subject of race and what they accept professionally. Studying this huge reservoir of empirical data, independently minded individuals might just be dissuaded from the notion that race is a social and political construct. To this end The Bell Curve's sub-title might well stimulate interest in forbidden territory, indicating, as it does, that there is a link between intelligence and socio-economic status. Unable to bypass the question completely, Parekh nevertheless wants to shut the discussion down as soon as is possible. This implies that he is possibly aware that race is not a social and political construct or that he is ignorant of the developments made, and which continue to be made, in genetics and evolutionary biology.

Some of the objections to race as a genetic reality cited by Parekh are the usual collection of fallacies. We are told that there is more genetic variation within one group, or as Parekh writes, 'any one so-called race than there is between 'races'" (Parekh, 2000, 63). Again, Jensen's comment is far more convincing, since it has withstood independent scrutiny:

[...] individuals in a given group differ only statistically from one anotehr and from the group's central tendency on each of the many imperfectly correlated genetic characteristics that distinguish between groups as such. The important point is that the average difference on all of these characteristics that differ among individuals within the group is less than the average difference between the groups on these genetic characteristics (Jensen, 1998, 425 [emphasis in the original]).

In view of the data -- psychometric, genetic and statistical -- that have been accumulated over the last 150 years, Parekh's assertions are an example of the perverse refusal to recognise let alone to evaluate, some of the enormous strides made in evolutionary biology, genetics (the Human Genome), and physical anthropology, since the time of Darwin. The view that race is a social and political construct is race Marxism and, in Parekh's own words, 'empirically false'. Far from rejecting the idea of race beign a social and political construct, the state of scientific knowledge as of 2001 provides powerful empirical evidence for the view that race is a biological and genetic reality which can be readily subjected to objective mathematical and statistical analysis. Race is not something that has been invented by "Neo-Nazi racists".

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, for all his assertions that race is a social and political construct, Parekh evasively notes that: 'Some diseases disproportionately affect certain communities' (Parekh, 2000, 178), implying that this is due to cultural conditions alone. Again, despite his insistence that race is a social and political construct, Parekh bemoans the fact that: 'people from South Asia are at risk of thalassaemia' and are not offered 'genetic counselling' (Parekh, 2000, 179, emphasis added). Even advice from the British Prime Minister's Cabinet Office, cited with approval by Parekh, insists that statistics regarding illness and diseases be 'separated by race' (Parekh, 2000, 181). As Parekh acknowledges, almost all the sufferers of sickle cell disease are of African descent, and the disease is found in black populations throughout the world. Race as a social and political construct cannot account for this distribution pattern, whereas the genetic explanation is simple: the link between race and disease is medically established (Rushton, 1999). Parekh's position on race is, in his own words, 'logically incoherent'.

Parekh's main contribution to the genre of racism is the invention of 'cultural racism' (Parekh, 2000, 148). Now, if according to Parekh race is a social and political construct, that is, above all cultural in the sense that things social and political make up culture, 'cultural racism' is pure tautology and meaningless. That in itself does not make it useless, given that so much that has anything to do with anti-racism is incoherent. Placing any suitable adjective before racism frequently leads to contradiction and incoherence, but it has a wonderfully intimidating effect which weakens the will to resist in a logical manner. Therein lies the purpose of creating 'cultural racism'. The danger of arguing that race is a social and political construct is that if you attack some aspect of culture you are racist. So if you attack the practice of female circumcision you are racist or, as Parekh says later in the report, guilty of 'cultural racism'. And if should be understood that any sense of disgust, articulated or otherwise, towards such practices is itself a manifestation of cultural racism.

Free Speech and "Hate" Crime

Barely hidden and frequent attacks on free speech by trying to argue that incitement to racial hatred must be avoided are some of the more sinister aspects of The Parekh Report. This leaves plenty of room for those promoting multicultural/multiracial societies to assert that anything they do not like is somehow guilty of inciting racial hatred and thus that certain areas be barred from discussion (race as a biological and genetic reality, racial differences and IQ, immigration, for example). This attempt to censor critics becomes more important in the light of recommendation 12 of The Macpherson Report which provides a definition of a racist incident ('A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person').

An insidious attempt to set limits to certain Anglo-Saxon rights is implicit in the assertion that: 'Human rights are thus rarely absolute but can be limited in order to protect the rights of others' (Parekh, 2000, 91). Decoded, and with reference to free speech, this means, I suggest, that rights of free speech, rightly regarded as the basis of all open and free societies, should not apply to those who criticise the multicultural/multiracial experiment. Since Asian and black societies have never independently recognised the value of free speech as the basis of a free and open society or shown much respect for it in the aftermath of European colonial withdrawal, immigrants to the UK from sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent cannot reasonably be expected to grasp the importance of free speech or to defend it with the same tenacity as white Anglo-Saxons. For the indigenous whites of England and European civilization as a whole, however, a great deal is at stake. Western civilization is inconceivable and unsustainable without free speech.

'Crucially', pleads Parekh, 'restrictions on rights are legitimate only if such restrictions are proportionate to the harm they are trying to prevent' (Parekh, 2000, 91). Bearing in mind that, as far as the multicultural ideologues are concerned, racism is the great evil, then this paragraph provides a convenient basis for restricting free speech. What we have here is the typically postmodernist agenda - cloaked in the language of human rights - which asserts that any standard it wishes to destroy or subvert (in this case free speech) is relative and can claim no privileged perspective, but that any standard it wishes to enhance or to promote (multiculturalism, race is a social and political construct for example) most certainly is deemed to be a privileged perspective and thus worthy of special moral and legal status (its critics are to be silenced and vilified as racists). And if this is insufficient warning of what Western societies can increasingly expect, we should note the report's demand that human rights 'be interpreted and applied in a culturally sensitive manner' (Parekh, 2000, 91). People who attack multiculturalism, in other words, are behaving in a culturally insensitive manner and must be silenced. True enough, 'the logic of multiculturalism qualifies and informs the logic of human rights' (Parekh, 2000, 91), but it does so in a way which is inimical to logic and human rights and exposes the multicultural agenda as both illogical, deeply illiberal and, despite its assertions of inclusiveness, as monochromatic: white is second best.

Note, for example, Parekh's illogical and illiberal approach to the Human Rights Act 1998: 'Freedom of expression may assist individuals who are not allowed to wear clothing at work or school which is important to them for religious or cultural reasons' (Parekh, 2000, 97). This is, I assert, a perverse interpretation of the Act. 'Freedom of expression', as stated in the Act, has no relevance for wearing or not wearing certain items of clothing. As always, the special pleading on behalf of blacks and Asians - and in the example just noted, a perverse and illogical interpretation of the Act - is accompanied by the assertion that the rights and freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted in certain circumstances: 'Crucially, the infringement will have to be proportionate to the harm that the authority is trying to prevent' (Parekh, 2000, 97). Not specifically mentioned, I again suggest that the rights to free speech, as opposed to the right to wear unsuitable clothing at school or work, are the rights that Parekh really wishes to violate.

Hate crime, with its appropriately Orwellian ring, is another invention of multicultural ideologues who are trying to silence opposition and criminalise the thoughts and utterances of those who disagree with them. Special pleading is again evidence in the way in which Parekh characterises hate crime:

Hate crime in general, and racist crime in particular, has a character that distinguishes it from other kinds of crime. The difference lies not only, and not primarily, in the offender's motivation, but in the greater harm done (Parekh, 2000, 127).

Revisiting the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: the Parekh Report 10 years on - YouTube

Comments seem to be moving in the right direction:

hilletehnoob 1 month ago
this immigration is absolute suicide
Reply ·


GCMaxProductions 3 months ago

Britain is a mess due to mass immigration and through joining the EU open market. Any positive aspects of immigration are now virtually non-existent as our services struggle to operate under the weight of over population.

The immigrants breed so much they are destroying the nation and so they have to go. It's either them or us and we were here first.
Reply ·

Sh0klar 1 year ago
Immigration into the west is genocide of the white race, which is fermented by radical extreme jews who play race against race, colour against colour. The more ethnic minority that make it into governments over white europeans is a win for them. Immigrants will effectually bring what they left behind to that where they go, and force it on the western nations. Making a new third world.

It'z gone exponential. . .notice jews not capitalized. . .

It is not at all clear why hating or disliking someone, so long as the hate does not lead to physical violence or other forms of law breaking, should automatically be seen as something criminal. Any expression of dislike, indifference, mild disapproval or resentment directed at multiculturalism or blacks will, naturally, always bee regarded as an expression of hate, rather than one of the milder forms of rejection. Nor is it immediately apparent why racially offensive language - a hate crime - must be considered more harmful than muggings, rape and murder. Murder is serious because it is murder. The power of hate crime to silence and to intimidate opponents of multiculturalism is a direct consequence of recommendation 12 of The Macpherson Report (see above). Hate crime is based on the notion that hating people is a crime, which in certain contexts and situations might well be suspect, or even morally reprehensible, but in other cases might well be a wholesome and logical response to clear and present danger, such as, for example the discovery that some 7,000 of your fellow citizens ahve been murdered by Islamic terrorists.

Worse still, what Parekh calls racist crime is not just an attack on an individual but on the community because that individual is a member of a community. This conclusion does not follow at all but it is nevertheless revealing of the mindset of multiculturalism which sees individuals primarily not as individuals but as cogs in a machine, or in the language of race Marxism, a community. Important here is not such much racist crime but crime itself. That affects every one of us regardless of race or sex. Following on from his original dubious assertion, Parekh then goes on to assert that racist attacks are perpetrated 'not only against [emphasis in the originalo] a community but also, in the perception of the offenders themselves, on behalf of a community' (Parekeh, 2000, 128). This comes very close to arguing that recently, whatever the perceptions of the offenders, when a 77-year-old man white man was badly beaten by Asian youths in Oldham that the non-violent and law-abiding members of the Asian population resident in Oldham approved of what happened. Possibly, some did , but many, one can assume, were disgusted by the act of violence itself regardless of the victim's race. And the same could be said of the white reaction to Stephen Lawrence's murder in 1993.

Education, Arts and Media

As inheritors of the Marxist-Leninist tradition of agitprop, multiculturalists pay special attention to education, the arts and the media which they consider to be the commanding heights in the anti-racist industrial complex. Parekh seems unable to envisage art and related activities independent of the state. What he has in mind here is a huge enterprise of socialist-realist propaganda subsidised by the tax payer which will then disseminate the tenets of multiculturalism. He makes explicit demands for 'redistribution of funding' in the arts (Parekh, 2000, 166) and his plans for the media are the sort of thing that was common place in the former Soviet Union. Overwhelmingly, there is a desire to change reality by changing what we see on television.

Among multiculturalists it is an article of faith that higher education in the UK fails to take account of non-whites:

[...] curricula and programmes of study that do not reflect Asian and black experience and perceptions; assessment regimes that are not appropriate for mature students; timetabling arrangements that are culturally insensitive; lack of sensitive pastoral support for students experiencing difficulties associated with colour or cultural racism; and a lack of Asian and black lecturers and tutors (Parekh, 2000, 148).

Anyone familiar with higher education in the US will recognise the provenance of these demands. In citing them Parekh unwittingly provides no justification for changes but a number of solid reasons why the influence of multiculturalism on the university curriculum is disastrous and something to be very firmly resisted (Bloom, 1988, Hughes, 1993, Kirk, 1994 & Windschuttle, 1997).

__________________________
[4] Parekh's hiring and promotigno plans for the media and the arts are a direct borrowing from the federal employment preferences used in the US (Parekh, 2000, 166-167)


Consider the study of Russian language and literature. Now, one can argue about what should be included in a course of study - whether one concentrated on the nineteenth century or twentieth century literature
but the point remains that the subject requires long hours of study, especially when some students take a joint honours course which involves the study of another language and literature at the same level. Irrespective of what combination of study a student pursues he must achieve a minimum level of competence in spoken and written Russian to get his degree. 'Asian and black experience and perceptions' have no relevance here at all. All students irrespective of race or sex are expected to achieve the same minimum standard. Students are able to meet these standards or they are not. The same requirements apply in other disciplines. Parekh's demand that the Asian or black perspective should be considered (what this means exactly in the field of modern languages or physics is not clear) is still further evidence of special pleading. Higher education in the US has been pursuing this course for a number of years and the result is preferential treatment for black students on entry requirements to certain courses who fail to meet minimum standards. As a result large numbers of capable white students with high SAT scores have been denied a place in a good university for which their innate intellectual abilities make them suitable (D'Souza, 1992, Bork, 1997). This most certainly is racial discrimination or racism, and of a particularly vicious kind. If poor average black performance at university is IQ-related, then this will have a limiting effect on the number of blacks who can teach at university level and in the type of disciplines taught.

Chapter 12 of The Parekh Report, which deals with the arts and media, begins with a citation from Jane Austen's Mansfield Park in which 'dead silence' is noted in response to a question concerning the slave trade in Austen's novel. 'Dead silence' then becomes Parekh's theme for this chapter. In his eagerness to castigate the English for their part in the slave trade, Parekh ignores or is unaware that slavery was practised long before the first white colonialists arrived in Africa (Baker, 1975, 364-5) and that it still flourishes today in sub-Saharan Africa (Lamb, 2001). Forgetting that the UK is overwhelmingly white, Parekh has no hesitation in demanding, presumably as a way of overcoming the 'dead silence' that: 'It is essential that 'Westerners' should know far more than they do about the arts, philosophy and religions of other civilizations' (Parekh, 2000, 164). With regard to the successful prosecution of the British national interest, diplomacy and other forms of international intercourse as well as the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, something that is not equally distributed among the population, then one might agree with the use of 'essential'. In, however, the context of a comprehensive programme designed to instill in Westerners a sense of loathing of their own civilizations, in order to weaken their resistance to the presence and consequences of large numbers of non-white aliens in their countries, the suggestion should be rejected for the social engineering it undoubtedly is.

Underlying all Parekh's discussion of multiculturalism is a deep-seated resentment of white Britain, especially the English. So the West and Westerners are placed in quotation marks or are prefaced with the inevitable and sneering 'so-called'. The intention here is to deny not just the racial basis of Western civilization and the outstanding contributions already noted but to erase from the historical record the very idea of a distinct, separate, high-achieving white Europe. Something very similar was attempted by the Nazis with regard to the Jews. Long before the Final Solution was implemented every attempt was made to eliminate Jewish influence from German culture. Exactly the same process occurred in the Soviet Union when various national groups (Ukrainians, Volga Germans, Tartars, Kazakhs and Armenians) were deemed to be obstacles to the Soviet Union's totalitarian brand of multiculturalism. All this is, of course, in stark contrast as to how whites are expected to behave regarding Pakistanis, Indians and blacks. No 'soc-called' or 'Asian' in quotation marks are permitted here. Whites are the new untouchables.

Parekh's complaints about the way in which blacks and Asians are represented in the British media and arts should be examined alongside the photographs published in The Parekh Report itself. The conclusions are interesting. By race the breakdown is as follows:

1 Asian boy, (p.9)

1 black woman + 2 white women, (p.17)

1 black man + 1 black boy + Asian boy (p.30)

1 black boy (p.45)

1 Asian boy with graffiti "Fuck the BNP" on the wall in the background (p.70). Photo taken by the Association of Black Photographers

1 white boy with 1 white (?) girl, (p.83)

3 whites, immigrants?, Albanians? Status unknown. (P.98)

1 white woman + 1 black man (p.104)

6 Asian girls + 1 white woman (p.121)

1 black man (p.134)

3 Asian girls (p.155)

1 white male + 5 white boys (p.173)

1 white male + 1 black baby (p.186)

1 black male (p.195)

1 Asian male (p.209)

3 male figures on building site. Race not clear. Possibly white (p.228)

1 black woman (p.244)

1 Asian woman + 1 Asian boy (p.259)

1 Asian male (p.275) Photo taken by The Association of Black Photographers

2 Black girls + 1 white girl (?). Others present. Race not clear (p.287)

___________________________

Total number of people of all races: = 48

Total number of Asians and Blacks = 27 (56%)

Total number of whites including assumed Eastern European immigrants: = 21 (44%)

Total number of whites minus assumed Eastern European immigrants = 18 (38%)

___________________________
[5] the British National Party (BNP) is a right wing party that firmly opposes all immigration.

The striking thing about these percentages is the huge underrepresentation of whites. Were these figures taken to be proportionally representative of the indigenous majority population as a whole, they would mean that whites comprised less than half of the populations of the United Kingdom when in the year 2001 they comprise approximately 95%-96%. If we exclude the three men on page 98 who shall be assumed to be Eastern Europeans, the proportion of indigenous whites falls to a staggering 38%. Whites are the new invisibles as well. The hugely disproportionate numbers of non-whites shown are thoroughly misleading. They have more to do with propagandistic ambitions of multiculturalism (note here for example the graffiti on the wall on page 70 which is the real object of this photo) than with representing an accurate picture of the UK's current racial mix. In fact, we should see these photographs more as the desired multicultural vision of the UK, a future in which whites are the minority in their own country.

Such crude socialist-realist iconography (the relation of such thinking to the history of the Communist Left will be explored at length in the later chapters of this monograph) makes it all the more difficult to understand why Parekh should complain about black actors who are expected: '...' to act their skin colour' - rather than deploy the full range of their skills' (Parekh, 2000, 168). We are expected to submit to the demand to promote diversity yet when a black actor is given a role, in accordance with the diversity decree, Parekh complains, because this is is 'acting his colour'. And the oft-cited reason for black failure, the lack of role models, should be borne in mind. Recall, too, Parekh's bemoaning the lack of black and Asian tutors and lecturers in higher education. If blacks are deemed to need role models in the media and in higher education, this can only be because white role models are not being accepted. If a black role model is to influence blacks he must appeal to some aspect of being black, not white. he must, as it were, 'act his colour' or 'teach his colour'. The solution, according to Parekh is 'much more colour-blind casting' (Parekh, 2000, 168). Now consider Macpherson's fuery, directed at those police officers who rather quaintly believed that the law should be 'colour-blind' (see paragraphs 6.18 and 45.24 of The Macpherson Report), and bear in mind Parekh's own demand that diversity be given preferential treatment irrespective of the White Anglo-Saxon notion of equality beore the law -- colour-blind in other words -- and you can grasp the scale of contempt, double standards, violence to logic, and hypocrisy on which the drive for multiculturalism is based. When colour-blind policing means that more blacks are arrested for violent crime, then colour-blind policing is obviously racist and has to go: police officers must respect diversity (ignore black criminals). On the other hand, when Parekh's television watchers perceive that black actors are acting 'their colour', colour-blind casting, but definitely not colour-blind policing, is the order of the day.

Disproportionately high levels of black crime present Parekh with another opportunity to undermine free speech. If a newspaper runs an article which produces objective and verifiable data about the disproportionate numbers of blacks arrested for violent street crime, this, according to the Parekh view, is an abuse of free speech, since it encourages racial prejudice. This is the standard contempt that Parekh can barely restrain towards white viewers and readers (and possibly some black ones as well). Parekh wants to decide what we should be allowed to watch because, he believes, such programming will predispose the white indigenous majority population to react in a prejudicial manner towards blacks. The trouble is Parekh might well be right in believing this but entirely wrong to criticise whites for reacting in this manner.

Assume that you are a white living in a major British city and you frequently encounter sullen, aggressive black youths on street corners and you personally know of friends who have been mugged and been subjected to racist taunts (you yourself may even have been a victim of such language and assault). You then see the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police informing a press conference that in a recent operation and analysis of the data it was ascertained that blacks, although a minority of the population, were disproportionately responsible for street crime in London (Woods, 2000).[6] Moreover, no one, as far as one can tell, disputes the accuracy of the data. As a result of your own personal experience and observation, confirmed by acquaintances and reinforced by meticulously gathered reports with objective data, you conclude that it is definitely prudent to avoid young blacks on street corners and to plan your day in such a way that you can avoid such people at all times. You may even reevaluate your decision to stay in those many areas of London now heavily populated by blacks and Asians, seeking the relative safety of the suburbs, or leave the city and its environs altogether.

_______________________
[6] Woods's analysis is based on the British Home Office publication, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: A Home office Publication Under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, 1999 and www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/index.htm. [no longer located at this link! --AL]


No, as far as Parekh is concerned, if you do that you are an unreconstructed racist, the typical white bigot, whereas you are in fact merely a thoroughly rational individual who, sensible of danger, has assessed the situation and acted accordingly. 'Prejudice', as Burke warns us, 'is of ready application in the emergency' (Burke, 1790, 183). The beleaguered white Briton, living in a city which he no longer feels he can call his own, and Parekh's insistence that - if you do not like what is happening to your country, you are a racist - is just one of the unbridgeable gaps between the 'community of communities', with its institutional hatred of whites and the gruesome reality in many British cities in the year 2001. The communist party of the Soviet Union had the same problem with reality which all the tanks, secret police, psychiatric hospitals for dissidents and concentration camps could not bridge.

When indigenous Britons reject the 'community of communities' fantasy, the next step has become coercion and the restriction of their rights to free association, to assert their identity, history, culture and language and their rights to free speech. Whites, remember are to be made to believe that multiculturalism is doubleplusgood. Not only does Parekh support the view that free speech can be sacrificed if the multicultural programme is not to be put at risk, but in true neo-Marxist fashion he wishes to criminalise the act of speaking out against multiculturalism. Marx and Lenin would certainly have approved of this attempt to use the very openness of England's institutions to destroy England. For ever since Lenin wrote What is to be Done? (1902) and countless left-wing totalitarians have enriched it, the infiltration and capture of established institutions has been the standard approach employed to subvert, to destroy and to reinvent a state along communist lines. The approach and methods remain unchanged and readily lend themselves to serving the agenda of multiculturalism or race Marxism.

Immigration

Sheer numbers alone, quite apart from racial and cultural differences, mean that legal and illegal immigration has profound consequences for a small, already densely populated island and that at some stage governments will have to act to stop the influx of immigrants. Presumably, even Parekh can see that the size of Britain necessarily means that limits to immigration must be set if the infrastructure is not to collapse and the countryside lost under concrete. Environmental groups in the UK are strangely silent on this latter point.

Rather than making the obvious tactical concession that 'Immigration and asylum controls are needed' (Parekh, 2000, 221) and then hurrying on to the next anti-white measure, Parekh, should spell out why immigration and asylum controls are needed. Numbers are absolutely crucial. How far are we expected to see the population rise before we declare a critical threshold beyond which we will not tolerate more immigrants, 60,000,000, 80,000,000, 100,000,000, 120,000,000? That Parekh bypasses this issue, as with that of race, is because an open discussion of why immigration and asylum controls are needed would make another formidable case against immigration and thus a rejection of one of the report's central points, namely that large-scale immigration is inherently a good thing.

That Parekh's concession is purely tactical can be seen from the following:' Our recommendations are designed to shift UK (and ultimately EU) policy away from the overt or implicit racist base on which it was developed, and towards a system that reflects and endorses the kind of society outlined in part 1 of this report' (Parekh, 2000, 221). These recommendations are designed, quite deliberately, to allow large numbers of immigrants (predominantly non-white) to enter the white nation states of Europe with the long-term aim of changing their racial composition irreversibly in favour of non-whites. It goes without saying that such breathtaking multicultural engineering, cannot be permitted to be derailed by anything as crude as the wishes of Europe's white indigenous populations, who do not want immigration and asylum controls to be abandoned because they know that their countries will not survive the influx of large numbers of foreigners. The spirit of apartheid lives on in multiculturalism: apartheid forcefully separated the races, whereas multiculturalists seek to impose racial and cultural mixing on homogenous populations regardless of the social, moral and economic consequences. Which is worse?

[onto page 31, three more on thurs.]

The person who launched the action to have Ellis removed from his position was a college kid (front) member of UAF, United Against Fascism, another loud-mouth protest group of Jews, Blacks, Communists, Arabs, Socialists -- a motley crew.

http://uaf.org.uk/about/our-officers/ (UAF officers)

Unite Against Fascism - Shopping-enabled Wikipedia Page on Amazon (UAF info)

This is an interesting, though sickening, video worth watching to the end. Nazi this and Nazi that, Blacks have learned their masters' language.

http://www.punkerslut.com/video-library-of-revolution-and-social-justice/anti-fascism-and-anti-nazism/punkerslut--413/punkerslut--413.php

My thoughts were, the world has become much too small; we're having to share space with ugly, obnoxious people who don't shut up. Sixty years ago Blacks and Jews were barely visible, hidden away in their own little enclaves. And who ever heard of an Arab? Blacks didn't mingle at all with Whites, and when Jews did, they held their tongues. The video is really sickening.

Ellis wasn't actually fired; he was suspended pending outcome of an investigation, but he chose to leave the profession without waiting for that to take place.

The person who launched the action to have Ellis removed from his position was a college kid (front) member of UAF, United Against Fascism, another loud-mouth protest group of Jews, Blacks, Communists, Arabs, Socialists -- a motley crew.

http://uaf.org.uk/about/our-officers/ (UAF officers)

Unite Against Fascism - Shopping-enabled Wikipedia Page on Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/wiki/Unite_Against_Fascism) (UAF info)

This is an interesting, though sickening, video worth watching to the end. Nazi this and Nazi that, Blacks have learned their masters' language.

http://www.punkerslut.com/video-library-of-revolution-and-social-justice/anti-fascism-and-anti-nazism/punkerslut--413/punkerslut--413.php

My thoughts were, the world has become much too small; we're having to share space with ugly, obnoxious people who don't shut up. Sixty years ago Blacks and Jews were barely visible, hidden away in their own little enclaves. And who ever heard of an Arab? Blacks didn't mingle at all with Whites, and when Jews did, they held their tongues. The video is really sickening.

Ellis wasn't actually fired; he was suspended pending outcome of an investigation, but he chose to leave the profession without waiting for that to take place.

Thanks, Jean. Yes, all these 'minorities' have been raised up in false history, and 99% of niggers are too dumb to see through it. They are worse than middle-class whites, even, in their parrotlike repetition of equality dogmas and everybody-knoews history. One thing peculiar to blacks, seemingly nearly universal among them, is the idea that you can defeat a generalization with a single, anecdotal counterexample. I have seen this from virtually every black I've argued with online, it has to be something these idiots are being taught in high school.

Ellis has some weird punctuation, and is semi-PC in his opposition to PC. But I guess you take what you get in Britain. I don't understand how anyone can write about this stuff at length and not see the jewish thread running through leftism. Wherever this people goes, it brings the same verbal tricks and big bag of bad ideas/dishonest history with it. I just don't see how any other approach to the study of PC and term warfare comes close to providing the clarity analysis from the jew vs goyim angle does.

[conclusion of chapter one]

Despite the many assertions from politicians of all parties that immigrants, and the supposed benefits of "diversity" that accompany them, are a good thing, there is no demand for more "diversity" on the part of whites. Indeed, the reverse is true. Not on the same scale as in the US, there is now a recognizable manifestation of white flight to the countryside and the suburbs in the UK. America provides more clues as to what the UK can expect if high levels of non-white immigration continue for another decade or more: much higher levels of violent crime; a huge increase in taxes to fund welfare programmes; an overwhelmed criminal justice system; loss of amenity and environmental destruction, especially acute in the south east of England. The American experience also makes it quite clear that whenever they can escape or circumvent oppressive federal legislation, blacks and whites will segregate themselves along racial lines. The periodic eruptions of race-related violence which we have seen in British cities would become much worse in scale and duration, as the numbers of non-white immigrants increased. Oldham, not the sickly utopian Parekh fantasy of a 'community of communities', would be the symbol of the new, strife-torn Britain. Now is the time to avert this catastrophe and the point to bear in mind is that it can be averted. It is not inevitable. It is above all a question of political will.

The UK does not have an open-ended obligation of any kind to allow foreigners (black or white) for whatever reasons to come here and live. The primary obligation of the British government is to safeguard the way of life of the majority (overwhelmingly white) and to secure the nation's physical boundaries from armed invasion. And here we can identify an affliction peculiar to the Western mind. All the research and development costs allocated to National Missile Defense (NMD) and the costly infrastructure needed to deal with the threat of Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) count for nothing if the state that disposes of such weapon systems has meanwhile voluntarily and suicidally relinquished control of its borders, so acquiescing to an unarmed invasion of legal and illegal immigrants. The vast majority of people in the UK want to see the numbers of immigrants reduced and illegals expelled. In view of the moral and intellectual failure of Parekh and many British politicians to make the case for immigration that is a perfectly rational and respectable position to hold. The onus is not on the white indigenous majority population to deploy rational arguments against large-scale immigration into the UK - though such arguments can easily be mustered - but on the pro-immigrationists and multiculturalists to justify why they wish to disunite and to balkanise the UK by importing large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants. So far their attempts have been pitiful in the extreme.

Conclusion

Sponsored by a strange combination of white liberals who reject their coutnry and recent immigrants who seem driven more by a desire to punish Britain for her past greatness, particularly where it concerns empire east of Suez, The Parekh Report is less a blueprint for creating a 'community of communities', to use one of Parekh's favourite expressions, than an attempt to impose an alien agenda on the British people for which no major party has any mandate at all, let alone the Runnymede Trust (a nasty irony in view of the importance of Runnymede in English history).

One of the crucial questions arising from this report is whether race is a social and political construct or a biological and genetic reality. Whatever one's view conflict is to be expected if the multicultural agenda, as envisaged in The Parekh Report, is even partially implemented. The proposed declaration on cultural diversity is especially offensive in an overwhelmingly white country where blacks and Asians have only lived in noticeable numbers since 1948. One wonders what Robert Mugabe's reaction would be, were white farmers, Zimbabwe's beleaguered wealth creators, to make such a suggestion in that unhappy land.

Even if race were a 'social and political construct', as Parekh insists, though, as noted he fails to provide any works in the secondary literature to support his belief, this would still not invalidate the desire of the 'socially and politically constructed' white population to retain their own particular social and political construct known as the United Kingdom. Even social and political constructs are not built in a day. Parekh's expectation that the white majority population abandon their historically established social and political construct in favour of his is thoroughly unjust and, in view of the nature of his recommendations regarding what he calls "hate crime", deeply threatening to all the freedoms constructed by all these little Englanders, emulated, incidentally, worldwide. 'Albion's seed', in David Hackett Fischer's striking phrase, has born remarkable fruit and not just in North America. Another alarming consequence of race's being a social and political construct is that the mission of the United Kingdom's Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) must extend way beyond racial equality. It means, given the way in which race is defined, that the CRE is, by default, also committed to imposing social and political equality. This does not mean anything so crass as equality before law: it means equal outcomes. In the twentieth century this was known as communism. We are, it seems, slow to learn.

In attempting to compel the white British to believe that they are just a social and political construct and that this construct must be deconstructed to make way for another, Parekh is, in fact, asserting that a multiracial, social and political construct is not merely on a par with, but superior to, the traditional, mono-racial, British one he wishes to "deconstruct" and replace. In other words, he is behaving like one of those old-fashioned British "racist" empire builders whom he excoriates for taking up, as Kipling famously put it, the white man's burden.

If Parekh believes that multicultural societies are deemed to offer the world a privileged perspective, then there can be no objections to white Britons holding the view that Britain, as it has evolved over the centuries, is also a privileged perspective, and one to be protected not to be "deconstructed" by social engineers and foreigners. Recasting the problem as a social and political construct, as Parekh does, may divert attention from race, as a genetic and biological reality - for the time being and not for much longer - but solves nothing because the fundamental causes of conflict in multicultural (multiracial) societies are ignored. Consider, too, that the flow of legal and illegal immigrants from India, Pakistan, sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe is unidirectional. The reasonable assumption has to be that these immigrants also believe that white Britain has something to offer them that his vastly superior to the grand corruption, squalor, incompetence, disease, superstition, endless tribal and civil wars, murderous rulers, overpopulation and environmental degradation of their own benighted countries. Indeed, how can it be otherwise? As far as one can tell, whites are not storming India's borders or those of South Africa.

Multiculturalism is also conspicuously one-sided in that the demands made of the British and other European nation states to deconstruct themselves in order that they accommodate large numbers of aliens do not apply to China, Japan, Mexico, India, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Somalia. This has been thoroughly, and for people such as Parekh, embarrassingly well documented by Peter Brimelow in his pioneering study, Alien Nation. Brimelow wanted to ascertain what would happen were one so minded to emigrate to one of the countries that provide the bulk of immigrants to the US (Mexico, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Jamaica, China and India). Brimelow's favourite response was that from the Indian embassy.

Three separate officials asked him whether he was of Indian origin, one making it quite clear that: 'Since you are not of Indian origin, while it is not impossible for you to immigrate to India, it is a very difficult, very complex, and very, very long process. Among other things, it will require obtaining clearances from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. (Brimelow, 1996, 253).

As Brimelow observes: 'Note that these Indian officials are asking not about citizenship, but about origin. For those unaccustomed to recognizing such things, this is racial discrimination. It is even more stringent than the 1921 Quota Act - an outright "brown-India poilcy".' Brimelow concludes that: 'The world is laughing at America' (emphasis in the original, Brimelow, 1996, 253). And Parekh wants the world to laugh at the United Kingdom as well.

Fissiparous and predisposed to conflict, multicultural states offer unprecedented opportunities for an unaccountable and unelected stratum of race bureaucrats to regulate the lives of the majority. Nothing less than the transformation of traditionally white, homogenous, Western nation states into multiracial societies will satisfy Parekh. Love of nation and allegiance to ancient standards of genuine community block the path towards this transformation. Powerful feelings of love and belonging have to be eradicated if multiculturalism's goals are to be achieved. History, language and the-way-we-do-things have to be destroyed or corrupted. In the pursuit of these goals, Parekh and others are fully aware that persuasion will not work, hence the coercion and oppressive nature, or rather anti-nature, of multiculturalism. It is a new and particularly virulent form of oppression. Too many of the indigenous population, have been slow to realise just how virulent, or they prefer to look away or run away. And it is well advanced. So fundamentally opposed is The Parekh Report in both the spirit and substance of its message to the United Kingdom's indigenous majority population that one might easily conclude it was written by the agents of a would-be occupying power and their collaborators. Multiculturalism, like its Marxist-Leninist predecessors, is showing itself to be preeminently the cult of the nation killer not the nation builder. What is happening in Britain may well be replicated in numerous other of the West's nation states in the years ahead.

References

Baker, John R. 1974, Race, Oxford University Press, New York and London.

Bloom, Alan. 1988 The Closing of The American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students, foreword by Saul Bellow, Touchstone Books, Simon & Schuster, London.

Bork, Robert H. 1997 Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline, ReganBooks, New York.

Brimelow, Peter. 1996 Alien Nation, HarperCollins, New York.

Burke, Edmund. 1986 Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), Penguin, London.

Ellis, Frank. 2001 The Macpherson Report: 'Anti-Racist' Hysteria and the Sovietization of the United Kingdom, Right Now Press Limited, London.

D'Souza, Dinesh. 1992. Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, Vintage Books, New York.

Hackett Fischer, David. 1989 Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America, Oxford University Press, New York.

Honeyford, Ray. 1998 The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy and the Multiethnic Society, Transaction Publishers, London.

Hughes, Robert. 1993 Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.

Jensen, Arthur. 1998 The g factor: The Science of Mental Ability, Praeger, Connecticut and London.

Johnson, Paul. 1995 The Offshore Islanders: A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Phoenix, London.

Kirk, Russell. 1994 America's British Culture, Transaction Publishers, London. 1996 Redeeming the Time, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Delaware.

Kravchenko, Viktor. 1989 I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (1946) [?], with a new introduction by Rett R. Ludwikowski, Transaction Publishes, New Brunswick and Oxford.

Lamb, Christina. 2001 "Meanwhile, in West Africa girls are on sale - just £5 each", The Sunday Telegraph, 9th September 2001, p.28.

Linsell, Tony. 2001 An English Nationalism, Athelney, Norfollk, England.

Lynn, Richard & Vanhanen, Tatu. 2001 "National IQ and Economic Development", The Mankind Quarterly, volume XLI No 4, 2001, pp.415-435.

Maclean, Alistair. 1994 HMS Ulysses (1955), HarperCollins, London.

Macpherson, Sir William of Cluny. 199 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, CM 4262-I, The Stationery Office, London.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000 The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, Profile Books, London.

Pipes, Richard. 1999. Property and Freedom, The Harvill Press, London.

Rushton, J. Philippe. 1999 Race, Evolution and Behavior, Special Abridged Edition, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick.

Sarich, Vincent M. 1995 "In Defense of The Bell Curve: The Reality of Race and the Importance of Human Differences", Skeptic, 3, 1995, pp.84-93.

Vazsonyi, Balint. 1998 America's 30 Years War. Who Is Winning?, Regnery Publishing Inc., Washington, D.C.

Windschuttle, Keith. 1997 The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering Our Past, The Free Press, London.

Woods, John. 2000 "Race and Criminal Cowardice", Right Now!, Issue 29, October/December 2000, pp.10-11.

[end chapter one]

Chapter Two

RACE LEGISLATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*

The Joint Action and The Directive

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the European Union has adopted a series of major treaties -- the Treaty on European Union (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001) -- all of which are designed to facilitate the metamorphosis of Europe's independent nation states into mere member states of a new supranational entity, the United States of Europe. As the ambitions of Europe's politicians have grown, so have the illiberal tendencies of the EU become manifest.[1] Freedoms which in England for example, have long been taken for granted as inalienable and irrevocable, are now threatened. Nowhere is this more apparent than with regard to free speech. Here, the major threat is the EU's official policy of multiculturalism and the attempt to impose multicultural orthodoxy on Europe's profoundly sceptical populations.

On 19th July 2000 the directive of the Council of the European Union 'implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin' entered into force (hereinafter the Directive).[2] The Directive adds to earlier EU legislation, most importantly, Title VI of The Treaty on European Union (TEU) which provides for cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs[3] and, additionally, The Joint Action adopted on 15th July 1996 to combat racism and xenophobia[4] (hereinafter The Joint Action).

Despite reassuring references in its preamble to Article 19 of The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF), the two Titles of The Joint Action weaken the presumption in favour of free speech in order to favour measures designed to combat racism and xenophobia. It is worthwhile to recall the provisions of Article 19 of the ICCPR:

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights of reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.[1234]

The preamble of The Joint Action emphasizes 'the respect for the rights of others, as laid down in Article 19' of the ICCPR, yet it is the case, in contrast to the preamble, and obvious from paragraph 3 above, that this is only applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 19, not paragraphs 1 and 3. The right to hold an opinion without interference means more than the right merely to form and to retain an opinion. It means, too, the right to express that opinion (acknowledged in paragraph 2). Although this right may be subject to certain restrictions, the presumption of Article 19 is strongly in favour of the freedom of expression. Where restrictions are to be introduced they must be provided for by law and they must be necessary and subject to a strict scrutiny standard. On these points the preamble of The Joint Action clearly begs an important question: racism and xenophobia, as they affect expression of opinion laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the ICCPR, are automatically assumed to be so execrable that the various politicians and drafters of The Joint Action are relieved of the burden of demonstrating legislative necessity. They are thus free to impose coercive measures on freedom of expression which would not be justified in time of war, let alone in peace time.
____________________
[1] In this respect see Rodney Atkinson, Fascist Europe Rising, Compuprint Publishing, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England 2001.

[2] 'Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29th June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic'. In Official Journal of the European Communities, L 180, 19.07.2000., pp. 22-26.

[3] The relevant Article is K.3, paragraph 2(b) which makes it possible 'to adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States'.

[4] 'Joint Action of 15th July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia', in Official Journal of the European Communities, L 185, 1996, pp.5-7.

The directive consists of 19 articles, and many of its provisions represent a serious threat to free speech, free association, the rule of law, scientific research and the dissemination of results.[5] The long term implications are also worrying since the Directive obliges the members states, inter alia, to notify the European Commission by 19th July 2003 of 'sanctions applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive (Article 15), and that by 19th July 2003 member states 'shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive' (Article 16). Two years later on 19th July 2005, and every five years thereafter, member states are required to inform the Commission to draw up a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive' (Article 17).

The emphasis placed on 'the right to equality before the law' (paragraph 3, Preamble) is largely cosmetic and is in any case rendered meaningless by the provisions of paragraph 17 of the Preamble and Article 5 (Positive Action):

The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a group of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin, and such measures may permit organisations of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin where their main object is the promotion of the special needs of those persons (paragraph 17, Preamble and Article 5).

____________________
[size=1]5 Particularly ominous is the call in paragraph 11 of the Preamble for 'effective judicial cooperation in respect of offences based on racist or xenophobic behaviour'. No attempt is made here to define what constitutes 'racist or xenophobic behaviour' or the nebulous term 'social advantages' (paragraph 12, Preamble).

[onto page 41, three more sat.]

[okay...backed up from saturday, we pick up on page 41 and will get 12 pages up today to get back on sched.]

Now, is the fact that blacks have on average a lower IQ than whites and that this leads to blacks' being under-represented in vocations which require above average IQ - a disadvantage for which whites are responsible and blacks are entitled to compensation? There are also some obvious inconsistencies with the Directive's stated aim of 'the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity' (Paragraph 9, Preamble). Special dispensation for black-only organisations to plead for blacks is hardly likely to promote 'economic and social cohesion'. Further, there is a strong hint in paragraph 17 that, since it can be taken for granted that whites are always the perpetrators of disadvantages for others and never the victims, the establishment of organisations geared to the promotion of whites' special needs (however defined) are not necessary. Worse still, in the climate of searching out 'hate crime' and combating 'racism and xenophobia' some will argue that any such organisation is inherently 'racist and xenophobic' and thus to be vilified or proscribed. Indeed this is strongly suggested by Article 14 (Compliance). Anything that conflicts with the 'principle of equal treatment' is to be abolished. This also includes the abolition of 'non-profit-making associations, and rules governing the independent professions and workers' and employers' organisations' where the principle of equal treatment is violated (Article 14, paragraph (b)). In the present inconsistent and frequently incoherent legal climate whites can be certain of one thing, namely that sanctions which the Directive demands be 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive' (Article 15 Sanctions) will in practice be: (i) ineffective (because they are unjust and violate the very principle of equal treatment which the Directive is pledged to uphold); (ii) disproportionate (because of the tendency in all things multicultural to be led by hysteria) and (iii) punitive to the point of viciousness (for the same reasons as ii).

Paragraph 6 of the Preamble goes to the very heat of the EU's multicultural agenda:

The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The use of the term "racial origin" in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories (paragraph 6).

This attempt to brush aside a vast amount of scientific evidence raises the very important question of exactly what the European Union's legislators do understand by "racial origin". In the absence of any explicit rejection of race as a genetic and biological reality, or any cited evidence on which this rejection is based, the assumption has to be that the drafters of this Directive are either not sure of what they themselves understand by "racial origin" or, possibly, that they harbour a very strong suspicion, even a guarded acceptance of race as a biological and genetic reality, and that race, as a biological and genetic reality, represents a stern challenge to the EU's multicultural agenda.

This failure to make explicit the meaning of "racial origin" and, equally, the failure explicitly to reject 'such theories' rather than endorse the evasive caveat that the term "racial origin" does not imply acceptance, raises, once again, some interesting questions, as can be seen from Article 4 of the Directive which is cited in full:

Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.[6]

Important here is the fact that a distinction is made between 'racial' and 'ethnic'. Now, ethnic gives greater weight to cultural factors but does not automatically exclude race (as a genetic or biological reality), whereas race, according to the multicultural view, is a political or social construct and not a biological or genetic reality. It can be seen that the conspicuous failure to clarify where the Directive stands on the question of race results in the normal double standard and inconsistency. By any standard treating an individual differentially is discrimination, be it negative or positive.

________________________
[6] Readily applicable to 'the principle of gender mainstreaming' (Article 17 Report, paragraph 2).

On the other hand, the lack of clarity here and the undetermined position on "racial origin" as well as the criteria laid down -- 'particular occupational activities' -- make a potentially strong case for outcomes almost certainly not intended by the Directive. To begin with, let us apply the 'genuine and determining occupational requirement' to boxing. Consider the case of a black boxing promoter faced with making a choice between whether to support one of two relatively unknown and untested boxers (one black, one white). He would be acting rationally and in a manner consistent with the Directive were he to support the black boxer and reject the white boxer. He could show that his decision was 'based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin' and not on his being personally biased in favour of black boxers, merely because they were black. His decision would also be based on the criteria of legitimacy (within the law) and proportionality (he can only select one boxer from two candidates) as specified in the Directive.

By 'biased in favour' I mean that if, over the years the boxing promoter has found that for most weights of boxing, black boxers have won more fights than whites (and thus made more money for him) his tendency to favour black boxers is entirely rational. Suppose a black boxing promoter favoured black boxers merely because they were black. How would it be possible to determine that his bias was based on a racial preference for his own kind and not on boxing criteria? Given the innate physical advantages that blacks [word(s) missing, probably possess (not to mention cough, Klitschkos, cough)] the boxer's colour would be a rough proxy of boxing ability so even here it would be rational to discriminate on the basis of colour. But even if the promoter's decisions were so biased in favour of blacks to the extent of giving contracts to blacks who were temperamentally and physically unsuited to the demands of the sport, should he be stopped from pursuing this discriminatory policy? I suggest no. If he pursues such a policy, he will lose fights (read money) and risk the ultimate sanction of business failure: he either readjusts his policies or goes out of business. Legislation that penalises him for preferring black boxers irrespective of their abilities affects all of us, whereas if he goes out of business because of his personal preferences our fundamental freedoms are left untouched. Unlike the black boxing promoter who decides to promote incompetent boxers, the university that awards university places to incompetent blacks suffers no such business sanction. That is borne by the taxpayer. The use of psychometric testing (including IQ tests) to determine suitability for certain types of employment (as in the famous US case Griggs v. Duke Power Co) is also legitimate, proportionate and based on determining occupational need. The black boxing promoter has based his decision on experience, the proven and demonstrable superiority of black boxers over most but not all whites. He does not ask for any biometric data. His judgement is tested in the ring. The case of a university which rejected most but not all blacks because their SAT scores were not good enough for, say , law or medical school is also acting according to the criteria specified above, and far more scientifically, given that SAT scores bear a strong positive correlation with IQ test results and academic performance.

Although Article 4 concentrates on occupations, we cannot avoid the fact that blacks and whites have different types of medical problems. So Article 4 also has a bearing on medicine. Given that the profile of black medical problems -- the predisposition to certain types of disease -- is found throughout the world, these medical problems cannot be explained on the basis of culture. Race as a biological and genetic reality has no difficulty in accounting for this.

________________________
[7] Of relevance for EU legislation is the landmark US case The City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co (1989) in which the Supreme Court struck down the reverse discrimination provisions of affirmative action. At the heart of the Croson decision was the failure of the city of Richmond to demonstrate any evidentiary basis for racial quotas. Vague claims about past wrongs and societal discrimination were held to be an insufficient basis for race-conscious programmes. Henceforth, any remedial measures had to be victim-specific and meet a strict scrutiny standard. For a detailed discussion of Croson and its wider implications see Roger Clegg ed., Racial Preferences in Government Contracting, The National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Washington, D.C., 1993.

The above analysis is of course not at all how the drafters of this Directive wish it to be interpreted. When they use legitimacy they really mean something vague, along the lines of fairness or more specifically equal opportunities and equal outcomes. When they use proportionate they mean quotas based on the percentage of racial or ethnic minorities in the population.[7] The determination to impose quotas arises from the assumption that blacks and Asians are victims of discrimination even when there is no obvious discrimination. Thus paragraph 2(b) of Article 2 states that:

[...] indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary (Article 2, paragraph 2(b) emphasis added)

The use of 'apparently' begs the question that neutrality is somehow flawed or hides discrimination. That has to be demonstrated not just asserted, as is the case here. Or it suggests that the very idea of neutrality is something negative precisely because neutrality, as with colour-blind policing, leads to undesirable outcomes, undesirable being anything which conflict with the multicultural agenda (more blacks are arrested for violent crime). Given that we are all 'persons of a racial or ethnic origin' of some kind or other, then this paragraph does not make clear who is supposed to be the source of disadvantage for 'persons of a racial or ethnic origin'. Is this due to other persons of the same racial and ethnic origin or persons of a different racial and ethnic origin? In both scenarios the fact that an outcome benefits one individual or group at the expense of another is not in itself prima facie evidence of discrimination on the basis of 'racial or ethnic origin', especially where the discriminating and injured parties are of the same racial or ethnic origin, thought that, as noted above, is unwittingly permitted by the Directive.

The exception to this assertion would be the multicultural who is quite happy to see white students with high SAT scores denied a place at a good university in order that a low-achieving minority student be given the place. Article 5 (Positive Action) will also have an impact: 'With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin'. The use of compensation here is misleading. It suggests that minorities have somehow been wronged or cheated because, for example, they are not represented in the university population in proportion to their number in the population as whites (the disparity ratio fallacy). Apparently, white men can't jump. Should they then be compensated for their failure to match black dominance in basketball?

Article 8 (The Burden of Proof) shifts the burden of proof in any legal action to the respondent and paragraph 2 also permits Member States to introduce 'rules o evidence which are more favourable to plaintiffs' (emphasis added). Moreover, in view of the fact that multiculturalists wish to give the widest possible meaning to an interpretation of "hate crime", making it in fact a serious crime (a federal crime in the US), the assurance in Article 8, paragraph 3 that: 'Paragraph 1 shall not apply to criminal procedures' is not convincing. Paragraph 3 should possibly have been amended to conclude with 'for the time being' (In view of the provisions of the Council Framework Decision, 'for the time being' is appropriate. See below).

The whole dubious notion of 'indirect indiscrimination' also reveals intellectual inconsistency in another way. The Directive states that indirect discrimination can 'be established by any means including on the basis of statistical evidence' (Preamble, paragraph 15 emphasis added). The combination of 'by any means' and the shift in the burden of proof puts respondents at a severe legal disadvantage. In the context of English common law these are serious erosions of traditional freedoms.[8] The willingness to use statistical evidence, which almost certainly means using the low numbers of blacks and Asians in certain professions as well as status within those professions as prima facie evidence of discrimination, is in stark contrast to the hostility of egalitarians rationally and honestly to consider the rigorous statistical data as it relates for example to black and white IQ differences, crime rates worldwide and other forms of dysfunctional behavior.

[Commentary: The US got anti-white discrimination going formally and legally under LBJ, but really institutionalized and kicked off under Richard Nixon, directed by one of his jews. The first formal academic criticism, from jew Glazer, appeared a few years later, still in the '70s. It's as though Europe has taken the American example and, if anything, removed the fig leaf. This equality law is nothing but a way to fuck whites. 'Affirmative action' or 'positive discrimination,' as well as the concept of and intention behind 'hate crimes' are designed solely to hurt and endanger and degrade whites. They are not aimed to help blacks. They don't help blacks. They are designed solely to hurt whites. By rubbing their nose in the fact they can do nothing about having their racial inferiors shoved on top of them as 'equals.' This tepid British academic, who deserves credit for courage, just like Kevin MacDonald, can't, because of professional deformation, as the French call it, as much as any other reason, truly effectively evoke the outrageousness of these anti-white policies. Instead, Ellis analyzes them with the usual conservative, neoconservative, gloss. He makes the obvious points obviously. He only hints that the people who designed these policies just might be aware of their actual effect! The people enacting these legal outrages are not stupid. They are running things. Nor are they well intentioned. They are quite ill intentioned. But they ARE rational. They DO know 1) that blacks are niggers; 2) that there ain't no cure for nigger; 3) that sticking niggers over whites will have no effect but destroying the white race and the West it made. They know this. What they do is deliberate. It is calculated. It is and should be called murder. Genocide. White men are morally crushed by being legally forced to accede in their own undermining, all in the name of historical guilt and 'equality.' . . . In the US, the rhetoric began by calling a jewish movement a black movement. Constitutional rights were done away with (freedom of association, for one) and it was called 'civil rights.' The promulgators spoke of equality and opportunity and fairness, but this was a cover. What they actually wanted was legal superiority. The 'civil rights movement' was a jew-led anti-white movement, aimed at subverting the constitution and placing blacks, browns, reds and yellows on top of whites - but below jews. This would be done in the name of equality, fairness, morality and justice. Degree by degree, decisions by decision, courts came to find that mere 'statistical disparity' was enough to prove invidious discrimination. This is where the EU has started. Statistical patterns alone are enough. The fundamental irrationality of this position, and the fact that in practice it is anti-white, are well known to the architects. They're what they intend. Conservatives are losers precisely because they won't take this point head on. They will pretend these consequences are unintended results of well intentioned men, when the facts are the opposite. The men are ill intentioned, and the results are entirely intentional. No kind of moron doesn't realize that the fact that niggers are 80% of D.C. yet <1% of aeronautical engineers has nothing to do with racial discrimination. Essentially this stuff amounts to a white tax. A tax on whites for being white. They are penalized because they are superior. They are tied up like plowhorses and made to farm fields for their inferiors, all while being lectured about their historical guilt. No ordinary white wants this, not in France, Germany, Italy or England. But we have it anyway. Why? Because the elites somehow split from the people. How is that? Because the elites came to be dominated by a tiny alien outsider racial group - namely, the jews. And jews plus white sellouts (think the Bill Clintons) run things. Any voice that might rise up and speak for the white majority gets attacked or crushed. That position - that whites have interests - is declared beyond the pale. Its ideas aren't discussed. They are smeared as hate. Their carriers are defamed. Their representatives are shamed or imprisoned - whatever means of separating them from money and influence the jews have to use is employed. Whites have effectively been converted into slaves, through law. Through media rhetorical trickery many of them have been so blinded to this they think it a good or at least inevitable thing. It is neither. Whites don't need blacks and jews to run effective, attractive societies. Jews are an alien, competing race that has figured out how to get control of white society and destroy it from the inside. Whites exist to feed jews and the muds they use to control and dilute the white population. Essential to white recovery in the future is teaching our young that jews are not us. They are hostile aliens bent on our genocide. Ellis doesn't get anywhere near this because his work is mostly descriptive rather than analytical. Its the racial animus driving the PC crowd that needs to be excavated and put on the table for all to see and think about. Specifically what needs to be done is to identify the jewish role in creating communism, its policies and rhetoric, and drawing lines to their equivalents in the West. Ellis at least sort of does this, indirectly. He's a Soviet expert, so he draws some parallels. But he leaves out the jewish nexus. That's what is essential though. For it, you must turn to the Nazis. Their puzzling it out and explaining it so all could understand is why they are, to the jews, and in the jew-controlled media, the most evil men of all time. Evil, note wryly, is a word jews laugh at everywhere else.]

Council Framework Decision (CFD)[9]

Multiracial societies worldwide are artificial constructs and liable, as demonstrated by the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and countless examples from Africa, to explode into violence. Beyond certain limits racial and cultural diversity has historically posed a threat to the survival of a nation or state. Yet the explanatory memorandum which accompanies the CFD instructs us that: 'European societies are multicultural and multi-ethnic, and their diversity is a positive and enriching factor' (paragraph 1, emphasis added). No evidence is cited in support of this assertion. Nor are we told when in the recent history of Europe, the continent ceased to be monoracial and became multiracial. If diversity, which is a code word for the presence of a large numbers of non-white legal and illegal immigrants in European societies, were indeed 'positive and enriching', then whites would be demanding ever more diversity. Of course, they make no such demands. There is massive opposition to large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants in Europe and the CFD is intended as part of the wider coercion of indigenous Europeans to believe, act, and to speak as if they believe, that diversity is a good thing.

__________________________
[8] Another remarkable feature is the provision of Article 7 (Defence of Rights) which permits individuals to apply the principle of equal treatment 'even after the relationship in which discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended'.

[9] Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia, COM (2001) 664, 28.11.2001. See: http://europa.en.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf2001/com2001_0664en01.pdf

When the numbers of racist crimes are discussed it is noted that: '66% fell within the category of propaganda offences' (Some Figures, paragraph 3, emphasis added). 'Propaganda offence' is the sort of language we expect to find in Soviet jurisprudence, specifically, the notorious Article 58 of the Soviet criminal code, which made anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation a criminal offence, invariably punished by long terms in slave-labour camps or death.

______________________________
[10] Racism and xenophobia are not to be treated as political offences and thus cannot serve as grounds for refusing to extradite an accused individual (Article 14 Political Offences).


As far as the EU is concerned, a propaganda offence is anything that rejects multicultural assumptions and the uncritical acceptance of diversity as a positive and enriching factor. The following -- many more could be added -- would all be regarded as examples of 'propaganda offences':

(i) drawing attention to the disproportionately high numbers of blacks involved in violent street crime even though this is based on official statistics;

(ii) discussion (as in this article) of the fact that the average black IQ is lower than the average white IQ;

(iii) drawing attention to the failure of black states to achieve even minimal levels of good governance and administrative efficiency and competency;

(iv) criticism of the widespread practice of slavery in sub-Saharan Africa or any suggestion that the extremely high levels of AIDS among black populations world wide are due to sexual delinquency;

(v) drawing attention to the murderous policies of black states towards whites (South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example);

(vi) any criticism however mild of multicultural societies.

(vii) as a white, expressing a preference for living in a white neighbourhood. Blacks would not be guilty were they to express a preference for living in a black neighbourhood.

The whole thrust of the CFD is that racist crime is white crime. References there are aplenty to alleged Neo-Nazi groups but nothing at all regarding black crimes against whites. Whites commit racist acts, we are told, because racism 'is often a manifestation of the cause of belonging to a group, which is perceived as being reinforced by a negative and contemptuous attitude towards other groups' (paragraph 5). The authors clearly have no interest in black and Asian attitudes towards whites. The main theme of rap music is hatred of and contempt for whites. Is this to be condemned as a 'propaganda offence' or 'hate music', or will this be defended on the grounds of free speech? Or are rap and hip hop part of the positive and enriching diversity which whites should eagerly be embracing?

The Move Toward Thought Control

The desire to police what we can and cannot read, view and listen to are evident in the concerns expressed about the Internet in the Council Framework Decision (CFD). Among other things, 'the Internet is also a relatively cheap and highly effective tool for racist individuals to spread hateful ideas to an audience of thousands if not millions' (paragraph 12).[11] Now, it is for individual users of the Internet to decide whether ideas are in fact hateful not unelected bureaucrats. There is barely concealed rage at the constitutional guarantee of free speech in the USA (paragraph 12) and the following should be noted: 'The Commission's approach on this issue is to ensure that racist and xenophobic content on the Internet is criminalised in all Member States' (paragraph 13). If this goal is achieved it will mean taht the free speech guarantees in the USA will be of great importance to dissident Europeans facing bureaucratic and legal persecution in the EU. It will not be surprisign if we see the opponents of censorship turn the concerns expressed about hate crime, racism adn the rest in the CFD against its drafters. Thus, an indigenous Briton would be entitled to claim that promoting multiculturalism at the expense of whites is itself racist; that TV-programming and advertisements which conspicuously use black actors to promote black self-esteem or to give a false picture of black status and their numbers in the population, was to use the language of the CFD 'a propaganda offence'; that rap was 'hate music'; that the BBC and a large part of the press, incite racial hatred of whites; that -- to use the hyperbole of black activiss when campaigning for black history classes -- the multicultural curriculum in British schools amounts to cultural extermination since it encouraged white schoolchildren to despise their country and its achievements.

By far the most threatening provisions of the CFD, however, are to be found in the definitions of racism and xenophobia:

"racism and xenophobia" shall mean the belief in race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin as a factor determining aversion to individuals or groups (Article 3, paragraph (a)).

This definition represents not just a direct assault on free speech but marks the triumphal assertion of what Orwell famously and presciently called Thoughtcrime. To criminalise belief is to criminalise intellectual activity, to stifle all thought from the very outset. It also effectively repeals paragraph 1, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHRFF. For if 'the right to hold opinions without interference' (paragraph 1, Article 19, ICCPR) means anything it means the right to believe in the sort of things that the drafters of Article 3 are seeking to criminalise. Were this definition to become law it would effectively ban all research into the genetic basis of race, as well as huge areas of anthropology and history. It would be argued that criticism of the CFD definition was itself inspired by racist and xenophobic sentiments and thus criminal as well. If we replace belief in race, colour, etc., with belief based on empirical evidence that the Earth and other planets in our solar system revolve round the Sun, then one can appreciate the regressive and crudely medieval nature of this definition. Stripped of all the concerns about racism, it represents and attempt to silence all opposition to multiculturalism. It is a measure of the blindness induced by multiculturalism and a reflection of multiculturalism's innate totalitarianism that 12 years after the fall of communism Europe's legislators can draft proposals which would be more appropriate to the former Soviet Union or North Korea than to 'Free Europe'.

___________________________
[11] Paragraph 2 of Article 12 (Jurisdiction) states that jurisdiction extends 'to cases where the offence is committed through an information system'. No definition of what constitutes an information system is given so this could mean anything from an Internet web site to a privately held filing cabinet. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3 Article 15 (Exchange of Information) this gives a free hand for the police to search private premises and raid private dwellings at will. Paragraph 3 states:

Where a member state has information relating to the storage in its territory of material containing expressions of racism and xenophobia for the purposes of distribution or dissemination in another Member State it shall provide that information to the other Member State to enable the latter to initiate, in accordance with its law, legal proceedings or proceedings for confiscation. For that purpose, the operational contact points referred to in paragraph 1 may be used.


Conclusion

Given the definitions of racism and xenophobia which are used in the Council Framework Decision, it is not racism and xenophobia that 'are a direct violation of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law' (paragraph 2), but the nature of the detailed plans to combat racism and xenophobia themselves, which are the direct and indirect threat to a civilized society. The whole tone of the CFD and related legislation is the assumption that racism and xenophobia are so terrible, so dreadful, that normal rational appraisal must be suspended or be deemed to be inadequate. Established legal custom, it is argued, cannot and must not prevail. As far as the UK is concerned, this means that in order to fight this allegedly supreme evil, the rule of law and free speech must be abandoned in order to serve the greater good of combating racism and xenophobia.

To those familiar with the National Socialist state or Soviet totalitarianism this has a familiar ring. Indeed, the whole thrust of "anti-racist" legislation in the EU provokes some ominous and startling parallels with the totalitarian despotisms
of the last century - Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist China. In much the same way that Nazi Germany's Nuremberg Laws in 1935 consolidated the state's official policy towards Jews, finalising the emergence of the National-Socialist state, so the EU's race and multicultural legislation discussed in this article can be seen as a decisive move towards not just the emergence of a United States of Europe but also towards Europe's becoming a unified police state.

[end chapter 2, page 51]

Are the goddamned kikes & Social Marxist goy whores who gleefully ram this genocidal shit down White throats all surrounded by squads of heavily-armed bodyguards?

Are the goddamned kikes & Social Marxist goy whores who gleefully ram this genocidal shit down White throats all surrounded by squads of heavily-armed bodyguards?

No. They feel quite free to make genocidal statements openly, in public, per the woman who spoke about diversifying Europe; I forget her name, but a jewess.

[this is the truly interesting one, the most important and meaningful, which is why I've spent lots of time discussing it in Radio Istina]

Chapter Three

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE: FROM LENIN AND MAO TO MARCUSE AND FOUCAULT*

Introduction

The suddenness with which political correctness entered the public domain in the period between 1989-1991, and the ensuing arguments about the legitimacy of Western culture which lasted until well into the mid 1990s, implies that the concept of political correctness is a very recent phenomenon, the origins of which are to be found in certain intellectual trends of the late twentieth-century. Richard Burt, for example, in an essay published in Censorship: A World Encyclopedia, argues that the term political correctness was first introduced by the New Left in the 1960s (Jones, 2001, 1901). Certainly, thinkers of the New Left developed the concept, but long before Marcuse and Derrida, and a host of other New Left and postmodernist writers were required reading on the campus, we find political correctness established as an ideological criterion of Marxism-Leninism. Official Soviet sources clearly show that the term was in use as early as 1921 (Resheniya, 1967, 205). If one takes into account the role of Lenin as the architect of the Soviet Union, and his massive influence in shaping Soviet ideology, then a reasonable assumption is that it is to Lenin to whom we must turn in order to find the conceptual origins of political correctness and the term itself. Soviet sources support this assumption.

A review of a diverse and large body of Soviet and Western literature, written and published throughout the twentieth century, which was conducted in preparation for this article, repeatedly identifies the theme of correctness - ideological, political or theoretical - as a concern of exceptional importance for Marxist-Leninism and Maoism. The range of sources is impressive: Lenin's own writings before and after the start of the twentieth century; some early resolutions of Communist Party congresses; the insights of writers and philosophers, for example, Joseph Berger, George Orwell, Czeslaw Milosz, Stefan Amsterdamski, Leszek Kolakowski, Balint Vazsonyi[1], Arthur Koestler and Alain Bensançon; the writings of Mao, and other official Chinese sources; victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse; Chinese and Soviet dissidents; scholarly studies, both Soviet and Western, of Soviet propaganda, agitation and media[2]; and the works of some of Russia's greatest writers, most notably Andrey Platonov, Boris Pasternak, Vasiliy Grossman and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Soviet and Chinese manifestations of political correctness are worlds of paranoid suspicion, endless show trials, false confessions and struggle sessions. They are worlds where the workings of the rational mind are viewed with suspicion, even hatred. For the hapless victims ensnared in the web of communist ideology it was frequently a matter of life and death (Conquest, 1990, Lifton, 1961, Lin 1991, Thurston, 1988, Wu, 1994). In the aftermath of the Soviet experiment, Russian scholars have explored the connection between Soviet ideology with its insistence on correctness and the consequences for Russian culture (Dobrenko, 1997, Etkind, 1993, Shalin, 1996). Their observations leave no doubt that political correctness was an ideological criterion which applied to all spheres of intellectual endeavor. Having lived under a system where verbal spontaneity and scepticism could sometimes be fatal, and having experienced the party's attempt to police thinking, these former Soviet citizens, and their Chinese counterparts, offer acute insights into the problem of political correctness in the West today.[3] They repay careful study.

___________________
[1] Balint Vazsonyi, a refugee from communist persecution, states that his first encounter with the term politically correct was when he read the works of Anton Makarenko, Lenin's expert on education (Vazsonyi, 1998, 13).

[2] In her pioneering study of Soviet media published in 1973, that is well before the term political correctness acquired wide usage, Gayle Durham Hollander made teh following observation: 'The teacher is a third source of political influence: as a representative of society's authority, she is both an adult model of behaviour, and the perpetrator of a learning culture in which political correctness is an integral part of scholarly success. [....] Alternative views of politics are ridiculed or ignored, and Marxism-Leninism is presented as the basis of all knowledge - social, political, aesthetic, and scientific. (Hollander, 1973, 13, emphasis added) [no emphasis added, I suspect it would be on "all knowledge."] Note in this respect the Soviet ditty: 'if you are ideologically consistent, then you are politically literate'.

Lenin, Partiinost' and Political Correctness

In fashioning an elite revolutionary party, Lenin was obsessed, perhaps tormented, with questions of ideological purity and orthodoxy. For Lenin, theoretical considerations were paramount: 'Without a revolutionary theory', wrote Lenin in What is to be Done?, 'there can be no revolutionary movement' (Lenin, 1946, 341).[4] Only a specifically revolutionary theory, Lenin believed, would prevent the incipient revolutionary movement from abandoning 'the correct path' (Lenin, 1946, 341). Despising the exemplar of liberal democracy represented by England, Lenin believed that if a small revolutionary party was to maintain its sense of purpose and seize power, then it had to avoid becoming just a forum for discussion, with all the in-fighting and factionalism that involved. Party discipline and the sense of purpose could only be maintained, according to Lenin, if there was a rigidly enforced party line on all questions: from the materialist explanation of knowledge and reality, the supposed crisis of imperialism which led to World War One, to a free press or the role of women in the future communist utopia, there was, if the party theoretician knew his seminal and patristic texts, a politically correct answer.

Commentary: You can see this at work among the leftists in the Gawker ring. Leftists hunt heretics. They hunt deviationists like dogs after foxes. Either you're with them or you're nothing. It does work.

Lenin himself, as in so many things Soviet, set the precedent and the standard for dealing with deviations from the party line. His tone varies according to the status of the addressee. Lenin can be the teacher, impatient with some skeptic who lacks his commitment to ideology or, fearing his criticism of his peers, he shows himself to be the master of the ad hominem attack. In an article first published in 1906, in response to a draft resolution of a party congress, demanding freedom to criticise, Lenin accused the resolution's drafters 'of totally, incorrectly understanding the relation between freedom of criticism within the party and the party's unity of action' (Lenin, 1947, 408, emphasis in the original). 'The Central Committee's resolution', argued Lenin, 'is incorrect in essence and contradicts the party's statutes' (Lenin, 1947, 409, emphasis in the original). Even Plekhanov, one of Russia's foremost interpreters of Marx, was attacked by Lenin for, inter alia, 'incorrectly assessing the real relationship of the proletariat towards both the government and the bourgeoisie' (Lenin, 1947, 412, emphasis added). In his ferocious polemic Lenin asks 'whether comrade Plekhanov has acted correctly' and answers his own question: 'No, he has behaved completely incorrectly' (Lenin, 1947, 412, emphasis added). In a later article, also published in 1906, Plekhanov came in for another bout of Leninist invective: 'He [Plekhanov] is profoundly mistaken. "Treachery" is not "a strong word" but the sole correct expression from a scientific and political point of view to describe the actual facts and the actual aspirations of the bourgeoisie' (Lenin, 1947, 437-438, emphasis added). One can note here, in passing, that Lenin conflates political and scientific correctness in his riposte to Plekhanov. Karl Kautsky, another prominent interpreter of Marx, received the same treatment when in The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918) he warned of the violence that would ensue from the Bolshevik dictatorship. As a counter attack Lenin rote The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918), consigning Kautsky to the ranks of the ideologically damned. Lenin's manner of dealing with politically incorrect deviations justifies Grossman's observation that: 'In an argument Lenin did not seek the truth , Lenin sought victory' (Grossman, 1974, 169).

________________________________
[3] Tat'yana Tolstaya's essay identifies the various themes of political correctness in the West - racism, sexism, lookism - yet understates or largely ignores the repressive legal and intellectual infrastructure that supports political correctness and the corrupting effects on the university, though the Soviet maxim cited by her points to precisely that: 'if you don't know then we'll teach you, if you don't want to know then we'll force you' (Tolstaya, 1998, 131). She also fails to identify the Leninist contributions. Her use of korrektnost', which is a literal translation of the English, instead of pravil'nost' is misleading since it implies non-Soviet origins. The same error can be found in The Concise Oxford Russian Dictionary where political correctness is translated as politicheskaya korrektnost' (1998, 816).

[4] The section from which this is taken is entitled "Engels concerning the significance of the theoretical struggle".


To assist his drive for ideological paramountcy Lenin invented partiinost', which in English translation can mean party membership, party-mindedness or party spirit. To this list one could also add party truth (see Berger below). According to Kunitsyn, partiinost' was first used by Lenin in 1894 in a dispute with opponents concerning the objective state of knowledge (Kunitsyn, 1971, 45). Knowledge and truth, argued Lenin, are a product of one's class. In fact, what is called objective knowledge is a part of the bourgeois conspiracy to retain power and control so that the working classes can be exploited. In non-Marxist thought truth and knowledge are merely bourgeois biases. This dispute features prominently in all Marxist-Leninist polemics and adumbrates the intellectual relativism of postmodernism, specifically that truth is a matter of perspective. The idea that knowledge and truth (and latterly perspective) are class-specific (or in Neo-Marxism community-specific) defines the Leninist notion of partiinost', as can be seen from the following:

If, having examined the origins of this question, one tries to formulate the concept of partiinost' which emerges from Leninist assumptions, then it may be looked at in the following manner: the partiinost' of ideology (in particular journalism, literature and art and so on) is then [I]the conscious struggle of the ideologue, theoretician, publicist, artist (of each using his own specific means) for asserting the interest of one or another social class (Kunitsyn, 1971, 55-56, emphasis in the original).

A later Soviet study reaffirmed the basic thrust of what we are to understand by partiinost':

Partiinost' in communist propaganda is fidelity to the higher, class interests of the working class and its mission of the revolutionary transformation of the nature of social relations. The principle of partiinost' rejects the pretensions of bourgeois ideology and propaganda to "non-partiinost'", "objectivity" and "pluralism" as masking the bourgeois mechanism of social control (Beglov, 1984, 362).

Taking his lead from Lenin, Kunitsyn, in his analysis of partiinost', repeatedly emphasizes the correctness of Leninist teachings. Thus, he refers to 'the correctness of the chosen path' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 99, emphasis added). Various supporters of the Bolsheviks are upbraided for being 'unable correctly to understand Bolshevism' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 99, emphasis added). Of another party member we are told that he 'lost the correct orientation and was even ready to accuse Lenin of "factional tendentiousness" (Kunitsyn, 1971, 166, emphasis added). Certain individuals, who though willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause, 'did not always think and act correctly' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 166, emphasis added). Colleagues who make ideological mistakes need to be the focus of 'correct work' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 180, emphasis added) and problems of culture are to be resolved in 'a correct Leninist way' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 183, emphasis added). Then we are instructed as to the need for 'the foundation of the correct relations of the proletariat and the revolutionary intelligentsia' (Kunitsyn 1971, 224, emphasis added). Even science must submit to the dictates of partiinost': 'Lenin's solution of the problem of the interrelationship of gnosiological and political partiinost' enables us correctly to understand the problem of the partiinost' of science, correctly to set about the practical selection of authors writing in the press on scientific questions' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 134, emphasis added). The frequency with which Kunitsyn and other Soviet interpreters of Lenin - and later, Mao - identify Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy with correctness and ideological absolutism reveals much about the state of Soviet scholarship in this field, and elsewhere. We are confronted here not so much with a study of a serious subject but rather a sustained panegyric, even a hagiography, of Lenin, the father of all theoreticians, in which the hagiographers are more concerned to demonstrate their own political correctness than intellectual rigour.

Lenin's concept of partiinost' is, I believe, the most likely progenitor of political correctness.

[onto page 57, three more Thur.]

No. They feel quite free to make genocidal statements openly, in public, per the woman who spoke about diversifying Europe; I forget her name, but a jewess.

That confident, carefree Summer's Eve feeling needs to come to an end.

To quote noted political theorist Billy Idol:

"You don't need a gun..."

[picking up on page 57, we're past the halfway point, right in the guts of what matters most, the origins and meaning of political correctness, and our tutor has traced it to Lenin, the leader of the communists]

Lenin's concept of partiinost' is, I believe, the most likely progenitor of political correctness. For it is partiinost' that accounts for the unusual ferocity of all communism's ideological disputes whether they are being carried on among various intra-party factions or directed at external enemies. Lenin is quite clear that non-partiinost' separated the socialist from the bourgeoisie: 'Non-partiinost' is a bourgeois idea. Partiinost' is a socialist one' (Lenin, 1947, 61). Partiinost' is the hallmark of ideological purity: non-partiinost' identifies the ideologically deviant. Kunitsyn identifies three main types: revolyutsionnaya partiinost' (revolutionary party spirit); kommunisticheskaya partiinost' (communist party spirit); politicheskaya partiinost' (political party spirit, Kunitsyn, 80 & 126). Given the various meanings that can be attributed to partiinost', and the fact that the theory of partiinost' was still being ideologically modified in the years before 1917, the mutation of politicheskaya partiinost' (political party spirit/truth) into politicheskaya pravil'nost' (political correctness), was not an unpredictable outcome. Certainly, there existed a need for such a formulation. In the Manichean mindset created by Leninism a term was required, which, unlike partiinost', contained an explicit reference to right/wrong, correct/incorrect from a political or ideological point of view, one that could be used to indict those deviating from the party line in an authoritative manner. Politicheskaya pravil'nost', that assertive, impressive sounding and approving criterion of orthodoxy, satisfies this requirement very well indeed. We might see political correctness as a practical solution arising from the theoretical discussions surrounding partiinost'.

Lenin refined his position on partiinost' in What is to be Done? and the influential article "Party Organisation and Party Literature". In its revolutionary, communist or political forms partiinost' went beyond being merely politically correct, and was elevated to the realm of science (see, for example the response to Plekhanov above). Now, this should not be taken as an appeal to discredited bourgeois notions of objectivity but should instead be seen as being based on a higher form of rational thinking, that of class consciousness or soznanie. The ideology of class makes possible a new powerful mechanism for interpreting the world, scientific socialism no less.[5] Science and scientific method, as it had evolved since Newton, could not escape the need for a correct understanding of the world, one that was congenial to Marxism-Leninism.[6] Where science clashed with Marxist-Leninist ideology, as it frequently did in the course of the twentieth century, then scientists were expected to confess to "errors" and recant or were arrested. Lysenkoism was one of the better known communist witch hunts against scientists who presented or implied conclusions contrary to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (Counts & Lodge, 1949, Medvedev, 1969). Liberated from the burden of proof, Lenin and his successors were allowed to claim superior insight. The consequences were profound. By insisting on party unity at all costs and instilling fear of factionalism, Lenin made serious intellectual discussion impossible. Absolute theoretical certainty or rather the belief that the party had uncovered the laws of historical progress justified all means necessary to bring about the new society. To quote Valery Turchin: [...] 'society is either structured "correctly" (i.e., in accordance with the laws of Nature) or "incorrectly" (i.e., in contravention of them). In the latter case, society must be ruthlessly destroyed and then rebuilt' (Turchin, 1981, 164).

__________________________
[5] In an article first published in 1906 ("Kadety, trudoviki, i rabochaya partiya"), Lenin congratulates himself on the 'correctness' (pravil'nost') of dividing the main bourgeois parties into three main types (Lenin, 1947, 420).

[6] As Françoise Thom has pointed out: 'The phrase 'the correctness of Leninist theses' implies that the proposition 'Leninist theses are correct' is true' (Thom, 1989, 83)

Academic Cesspools and Cultural Marxists (Or Do I Repeat Myself?)
Posted by Thomas DiLorenzo on May 9, 2013 07:44 AM

The insightful article by Walter Williams today pinpoints how cultural Marxists have essentially destroyed academic freedom at most American universities while pursuing an agenda of the infantilization of college students. In the old days the Marxists rarely, if ever, debated their intellectual opponents. Instead, they simply resorted to name calling and personal attacks ("Capitalist Tool!!"). After the worldwide collapse of socialism the academic Marxists gave up on the capitalist-working class exploitation story and reinvented themselves by inventing a new class of alleged exploiters: white heterosexual males. All other groups are, by definition, "oppressed" by what they call "white male privilege." The poorest, least educated white redneck living in an old bus down by the river in Mississippi is said to be, by definition, an "oppressor" of Oprah Winfrey, Tiger Woods, all women, gays, lesbians, the transgendered, and all the other mascot groups of the academic left.

Like the old Marxists, the cultural Marxists do not debate their intellectual opponents; they simply call them vile names. As the Walter Williams article pointed out, a potential donor to Bowdoin College was publicly labeled a "racist" by the college president because he suggested that Bowdoin should teach courses about American history and cool it with the obsession with "diversity" (a.k.a. institutionalized discrimination against white heterosexual males) as the sole purpose of higher education. This is why we observe such spectacles as when Walter Block gave a state-of-the-art public lecture at Loyola University Maryland on the economics of discrimination, a field pioneered by Professor Block's Columbia University dissertation advisor, the Nobel laureate Gary Becker, he was libeled by the university president, Brian Linnane, as a racist and a sexist. (Linnane wasn't even at the lecture; it was enough for him to hear that someone had criticized one of the superstitions of academic feminism, that sex discrimination is the one-and-only-cause of male/female wage differences). There are dozens -- probably hundreds -- of other similar examples in academe, which is why it has indeed become an academic cesspool, as Walter Williams describes.

Walter Williams: Academic Cesspools
http://lewrockwell.com/williams-w/w-williams166.html

Over the past 10 years, I have written columns variously titled "Academic Cesspools," "Academic Dishonesty," "The Shame of Higher Education," "Academic Rot" and "Indoctrination of Our Youth." Therefore, I was not surprised by David Feith's April 5th Wall Street Journal article, "The Golf Shot Heard Round the Academic World." In it, Feith tells of a golf course conversation between Barry Mills, the president of Bowdoin College, in Brunswick, Maine, and philanthropist Thomas Klingenstein. Klingenstein voiced disapproval of campus celebration of diversity and ethnic differences while there's "not enough celebration of our common American identity."

Because Klingenstein wouldn't help finance the college's diversity craze, Mills insinuated, in remarks to the student body, that Klingenstein is a racist. Mills also told students: "We must be willing to entertain diverse perspectives throughout our community. ... Diversity of ideas at all levels of the college is crucial for our credibility and for our educational mission."


Klingenstein decided to check out Mills' commitment to diverse perspectives by commissioning the National Association of Scholars to examine Bowdoin's intellectual diversity, rigorous academics and civic identity. Its report – "What Does Bowdoin Teach?" – isn't pretty. There are "no curricular requirements that center on the American founding or the history of the nation." Even history majors aren't required to take a single course in American history. In the history department, no course is devoted to American political, military, diplomatic or intellectual history; the only ones available are organized around some aspect of race, class, gender or sexuality.

Some of the 37 seminars designated for freshmen are "Affirmative Action and U.S. Society," "Fictions of Freedom," "Racism," "Queer Gardens," "Sexual Life of Colonialism" and "Modern Western Prostitutes." As for political diversity, the report estimates that "four or five out of approximately 182 full-time faculty members might be described as politically conservative." During the 2012 presidential campaign, 100 percent of faculty donations went to President Barack Obama. Despite political bias and mediocrity, in 2012, Bowdoin was ranked sixth among the nation's liberal arts colleges in U.S. News & World Report and was ranked 14th on Forbes magazine's list of America's top colleges. That ought to tell us how much faith should be put in college rankings.

I applaud Klingenstein for not making a contribution to a college agenda that is so common today. Wealthy donors are generous but tend to be lazy and uninformed in their giving. They give large sums of money that winds up supporting college agendas that are contemptuous of donors' values, such as enlightened racism, anti-capitalism and Marxism. A rough rule of thumb to discover modern-day racism is to search a college's website to see whether it has vice presidents or deans of diversity and diversity programs. If so, keep your money.

Recent evidence has emerged that some colleges have become bold enough to hire former terrorists to teach and possibly indoctrinate our young people. That's the case with Columbia University in the hiring of convicted Weather Underground terrorist Kathy Boudin, who spent 22 years in prison for the murder of two policemen and a Brink's guard. She now holds a professorship at Columbia's School of Social Work. Her Weather Underground comrade William Ayers is a professor of education on the faculty of the University of Illinois at Chicago. Unrepentant, in the wake of 9/11, Ayers told us: ''I don't regret setting bombs. I feel we didn't do enough.'' Bernardine Dohrn, his wife, is a professor at Northwestern University School of Law. Her stated mission is to overthrow capitalism. Ayers and Dohrn, as well as the Rev. Jeremiah Wright, are people who hate our nation and are longtime associates of President Obama's. That might help in explaining our president's vision.

What we see on college campuses represents a dereliction of duty by boards of trustees, which bear the ultimate responsibility. Wealthy donors who care about the fraud of higher education should recognize that there's nothing like the sound of pocketbooks snapping shut to open the closed minds of college administrators.

Despite political bias and mediocrity, in 2012, Bowdoin was ranked sixth among the nation's liberal arts colleges in U.S. News & World Report and was ranked 14th on Forbes magazine's list of America's top colleges.

It's all snob cachet, like wearing expensive designer clothes that have the labels prominently displayed. Nothing to do with the actual quality of learning.

Recent evidence has emerged that some colleges have become bold enough to hire former terrorists to teach and possibly indoctrinate our young people. That's the case with Columbia University in the hiring of convicted Weather Underground terrorist Kathy Boudin, who spent 22 years in prison for the murder of two policemen and a Brink's guard. She now holds a professorship at Columbia's School of Social Work. Her Weather Underground comrade William Ayers is a professor of education on the faculty of the University of Illinois at Chicago. Unrepentant, in the wake of 9/11, Ayers told us: ''I don't regret setting bombs. I feel we didn't do enough.'' Bernardine Dohrn, his wife, is a professor at Northwestern University School of Law. Her stated mission is to overthrow capitalism. Ayers and Dohrn, as well as the Rev. Jeremiah Wright, are people who hate our nation and are longtime associates of President Obama's. That might help in explaining our president's vision.

If a presidential candidate palled around with Dr. Pierce or David Duke - men who never set off a single bomb or killed anyone - the judenpresse would scream in mock horror until he was at the bottom of the political shitcan with the lid screwed down tight. But their Magic Nigger gets off scot-free.....:puke:T.J.B.

[onto page 59]

Consistent with the creation of a revolutionary elite to guide the masses, great emphasis in Lenin's writings is attached to ensuring that the right people work in the party press, that they be thoroughly well versed in Leninist thought and they have an intuitive understanding of what is politically/ideologically correct.

Pravil'nost' informs all aspects of publishing and the dissemination of ideas, particularly translations of foreign literature which carries a heightened risk of ideological deviation. To this end, notes Kunitsyn, 'our party supports among the flood of publications that which helps the correct understanding of life' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 100, emphasis added).[7] We are warned that not all authors can be relied on to provide a 'correct understanding' of class character (Kunitsyn, 1971, 131, emphasis added) and 'In the long term', writes Kunitsyn, 'the correct education of authors acquired a much bigger role' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 232, emphasis added). Lenin, we are also assured, believed that 'the workers, confronted with a Marxist explanation of any complicated situation, would correctly understand' and 'he [Lenin] showed such boundless punctiliousness in correcting errors which had been made in the party press' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 160, emphasis added). Lenin was also concerned 'about the correct implementation of revolutionary principles in the press' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 194, emphasis added), and revolutionary struggle and its interests required a 'correct, fundamentally scientific reflection of them in the press' (Kunitsyn, 1971, 191, emphasis added). In other words, censorship of all writing is fully justified.

This insistence on the link between correct thinking and writing means that journalism and writing become the collective responsibility of the party. It is expressed in one of Lenin's most oft-quoted lines: 'The newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer' (Lenin, 1946, 10). The paper was intended to educate the masses politically, preparing them under the guidance of the party for the day of revolution. With this end in mind Lenin insisted on 'the correct supply' of material for the paper and 'on its correct dissemination' (Lenin, 1946, 11). As a later official Soviet source makes clear, one of the tasks of party propaganda is 'to elucidate for the benefit of the working masses the correctness of the party's policy [pravil'nost' politiki partii] and the need to implement it' (Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1959, column 628).

__________________________
[7] Under conditions of Maoism, as Michael Schoenhals points out, the problem is especially fraught with dangers for Chinese translators of Western books: 'Translators and others professionally engaged in the systematic introduction of foreign thought in China have always been in a precarious situation when it comes to formulations' (Schoenhals, 1992, 117).

Free and open discussion, which existed in the West, represented the greatest threat to Lenin's arrogation of intellectual infallibility. Two points can be noted. First, a free press protected in law cannot be easily manipulated, and Lenin can, of course, be attacked with impunity. Journalists will resist control by a small group of individuals - Lenin's party for example. Second, the very lack of centralised control means that the concentrated essence of ideology, deemed by Lenin to be a precondition for the pursuit and consolidation of power will not be achieved. This leads to heterodoxy, ideological deviation and debasement of the medium for less serious purposes (entertainment, sensationalism, tabloid journalism, for example). Nevertheless, Lenin argues that within the party: 'Free speech and the freedom of the press must be total' (Lenin, 1947, 29), subject to the caveat that the party reserves the rigth to expel those who propagate anti-party views. Regarding the prcedure to be adopted for ascertaining 'anti-party views', Lenin makes the following point:

The party's programme, the party's tactical resolutions and its code and finally the entire experience of international social-democracy, of international voluntary alliances of the proletariat, which while constantly incorporating into their parties individual elements or trends, which are not entirely consistent, Marxist, or correct, but additionally, constantly initiating periodic "purges" of their party, shall serve to determine the line separating party views from anti-party ones (Lenin, 1947, 29).

So the party, in order that it preserve orthodoxy, must resort to periodic purges of incorrect elements whose incorrect status shall be determined by the party elite in accordance with the doctrine of democratic centralism. Lenin provides an ideological justification for terror against the party itself and against any opposition to the party from outside. In such apparently innocuous, theoretical beginnings we find the genesis of communist terror which has had truly catastrophic consequences in the twentieth century. Terror itself is politically correct.

Harsh administrative measures to eradicate factionalism from party ranks were stepped up after 1917. Demonstration of ideological orthodoxy become crucial for survival. Evidence of the party's determination to root out factionalism and other heresies can be seen at the 10th Party Congress in 1921. The resolution 'Concerning Syndicalist and Anarchistic Deviation in Our Party' (16th March 1921) is particularly important:

Apart from theoretical disloyalty and a fundamentally incorrect [nepravil'nyi] attitude towards the practical expertise initiated by Soviet power in the field of economic construction, the congress of the RKP, in the views of the aforementioned group and analogous groups and persons, sees colossal political incorrectness [gromadnaya politicheskaya nepravil'nost'] and an immediate political danger for the preservation of power on behalf of the proletariat (Resheniya, 1967, paragraph 5, 205, emphasis added).

Returning to ideas first expressed in How to Begin?[8], Lenin in a letter to Kurskii dated 17th May 1922, submitted an amendment to the Soviet Criminal Code. Free of all practical restraints, the theoretical struggle now gives way to physical extermination of class enemies. Terror reaches its politically correct apotheosis:

Despite all the shortcomings of the draft, the fundamental idea is, I hope, clear: that is openly to bring forward a principled and politically correct[9] (and not merely narrowly juridical) statute, which sets out the essence and justification of terror, its necessity and limits.

The court must not eliminate terror -- to promise that would be self-deceit or a trick but is to put it on a sound principled foundation, to legitimise it, clearly, without any lies or evasions. It must be formulated as widely as possible, since only a revolutionary feel for justice and a revolutionary conscience will stipulate the terms of use as widely or as not (Lenin, 1964, 190, emphasis in the original).

________________________
[8] 'From a point of principle we have never renounced and cannot renounce the use of terror' (Lenin, 1946, 7).

[9] Richard Pipes translates the Russian original - politicheski pravdivoe - as politically correct (Pipes, 1994, 401) which I have retained since it is consistent with the ideological justification for the use of terror demanded by Lenin.

By the time of Lenin's death in 1924, and certainly no later than the end of the 1920s, the concept of correctness was pervasive in ideology, politics, psychiatry, education, literature, history, jurisprudence, culture and economics. To be politically correct meant to be consistent with, not deviating from, the party line or any given issue. To be politically incorrect was to run the risk of being denounced as engaging in 'revisionism', 'factionalism', being a 'wrecker' or an 'enemy of the people'.[10] Even the choice of children's names was affected,[11] and a recent study of early Soviet reading habits also shows the astonishing lengths to which the Soviet state was prepared to go to ensure that the correct opinions were formed and internalised by readers (Dobrenko, 1997). The withdrawal of books published in Tsarist times, as part of a systematic policy of ideological indoctrination, clearly anticipates the contemporary feminist and multicultural approach to education at all levels. By the late Soviet period dissent or deviation was not just politically incorrect but regarded as symptomatic of some profound mental disturbance. Khrushchev, in a major policy speech to writers, whom he called 'engineers of human souls', (Khrushchev, 1959, 1) set the tone:

Crime is a deviation from the accepted norms of behaviour in society, which is not infrequently caused by confusion in a person's psyche. Can there be illnesses, psychic disorders among individuals in a communist society? Apparently there can be. And if there are, they will be misdemeanors, which are peculiar to people with an abnormal state of mind. So one will not judge a communist society by lunatics such as these. To those, who on a similar "foundation" might start to call for a fight against communism, one can say that there are indeed people who are fighting against communism, with its noble ideals, but, evidently, such people are manifestly not in a normal state of mind (Khrushchev, 1959, 2).

Dissent went on to become a factor in determining whether an individual should be incarcerated and is a recurrign theme in the well documented abuses of dissidents in Soviet psychiatric institutions in the 1970s and 1980s (Bloch & Reddaway, 1977, Shalin, 1996).

_______________________
[10] Antony Beevor cites an NKVD [Soviet Secret Police] report, written in 1945, in which it is noted with some alarm that Soviet soldiers are talking about the obvious confort of German civilians and forming 'politically incorrect conclusions' (Beevor, 2002 34).

[11] In a letter published in The Times in 1970, Dr Nina Szamuely a specialist working on the Oxford Russian Dictionary wrote that: '[...] the craze for ideologically correct, artificial "revolutionary names was extremely widespread in the twenties and early thirties'. Girls were given names such as Lenina and Stalina or Russian acronyms such as Revdit - revolyutsionnoe ditya - revolutionary child (The Last Cuckoo, 1987, 109).

Political Correctness and Socialist Realism

With its tradition of realism and social criticism, Russian literature had attracted the attention of the party well before 1917. Lenin's essay, "Party Organization and Party Literature" can rightly be seen as a foretaste of the sort of controls and expectations that would be imposed on journalists and writers. In the one-party state artistic endeavor would not be permitted to exist and function independently of the party. It would serve the ideological goals of the state. Initially, in the years before 1917, Lenin made some effort to appeal to his non-Marxist audience by arguing that writers and journalists who wrote for money were merely slaves of capital, whereas the writer who placed his talent at the disposal of the party was engaged in some noble activity. After 1917, with power seized and the free press banned, and the censorship apparatus initiated by decree, the pose of reasonableness could be dropped. Thereafter, authorial freedom was defined purely in terms of a willingness to commit oneself to the party and its goals.

Stalin's rise in the party coincided with a greater prescriptiveness regarding literary policy and led ultimately to the promulgation of the literary doctrine of socialist realism in 1934. Henceforth, art for art's sake was condemned. One of a number of notorious examples of socialist realism is Nikolai Pogodin's The Aristocrats (1934), which portrays former thieves and peasants undergoing perekovka (reform through labor) while building the White Sea canal. The reality was something else. Prisoners were not "reformed" through labor at all but merely worked to death in appalling conditions in order to build a canal which, architecturally and practically, was of little value. A recent study, in which the author applies a postmodernist approach to the history of the canal, does to the memory of the victims what Soviet propaganda did as well: denies their suffering by relativizing and burying it under spurious theories (Ruder, 1998). Ruder argues that: 'Pogodin acted politically correctly, in contemporary parlance, and was rewarded for it with success and publication' (Ruder, 1998, 157). In both the context of the 1930s and that of the 1990s, one could say that Pogodin acted 'politically correctly'.[12]

Socialist realism demanded that artists depict the world as it ought to be not as it was. Again, this principle has been thoroughly grasped by feminists and appears to be the holy of holies among practitioners in our contemporary broadcast and print media. It is, too, as any interested American parent can confirm, crucial in the production and marketing of contemporary school textbooks, many abandoning any pretence of historical accuracy in the name of "balance" and "fairness". Likewise, affirmative action and equal opportunities programs and legislation are predicated on a theoretical template that owes little to empirical data and human behavior.

An important point here and one that explains a great deal about Marxism-Leninism and Neo-Marxism is the distinction made in Russian between pravda (truth which is socially, morally or ethically just) and istina (the truth, the empirical state of affairs, that what nature makes possible or impossible). For the Marxist-Leninist, and more recently the multiculturalist and feminist, empirical reality (istina) is the enemy, since the Soviet ideologue and his current imitators are pursuing a socially and morally higher truth (pravda). This somewhat arcane difference between the two types of truth in Russia was thoroughly understood by the former communist, Joseph Berger:

[Istina] denotes the correspondence between the notion and the objective reality. Pravda is a unique and specifically Russian concept: it means the highest concept of truth, a truth elevated to the rank of an idea. It is etymologically linked with pravo ['right' or 'law'] and with pravosudie ['process of justice']. A Russian who 'stands for pravda' or who 'struggles for pravda', does not stand or struggle for the sum of all kinds of truth, big and small, but for the truth which needs to be attained, truth in action, the ideal of conduct, the correspondence between acts and the demands of ethics. Perhaps in English one would have to say 'the right truth' or 'knowledge plus righteousness', but this splits the concept - and in the thirties this split created an abyss.

In the rooms of the NKVD [Soviet Secret Police] and at Party meetings, istina was nothing - it was relative and it could easily be changed: only pravda was absolute. It seemed to me, as it must do to millions of others who have not been through this school, hard to understand how a philological distinction could have such an effect on the lives of so many. But in fact this small difference - this tyranny of pravda over istina - was the lever by which white was turned into black; no such dialectic had existed since the Inquisition. The notion of pravda was the basis of power (Berger, 1971, 52-53).

Berger illuminates not just the deadly split in Soviet ideological thinking but, equally, the intellectual schizophrenia, the intellectual and moral relativism and the dishonesty that characterises so much of the multicultural agenda. His use of 'the right truth' is, in essence, what feminists and postmodernists wish us to understand by the term politically correct. Biological differences between men and women -- an insignificant istina as far as feminists are concerned -- must not be permitted to undermine the struggle for pravda, the great truth, in this case, the absolute equality of all outcomes.[13]

____________________________
[12] For a detailed discussion of Ruder's book see Frank Ellis, 'The Decline and Fall of History', Salisbury Review, vol 20, No 2, 2001, pp.28-32.

[13] Martin Dewhirst has also made the connection between socialist realism and political correctness: 'I would therefore suggest that pravdivyy and pravdivost' as used in the official definition of Socialist realism mean not so much 'truthful' and 'truthfulness' (when Russians want to insist that some pravda really does correspond to the Western concept of truth they talk about istinnaia pravda) as pravednyi and pravdenost' ('righteous' and 'righteousness' and pravil'nyi and pravil'nost' ('correct' and 'correctness', in other words 'morally and ideologically right' or, as we might say these days, 'politically correct'. See 'Soviet Socialist Realism and the Soviet Censorship System' (Chung et al, 1996, 26). The Russian word for government (pravitel'stvo) and the verb to govern (pravit') are also etymologically linked to the notion of pravda: those who know this 'higher truth' are those fit to govern.

Czeslaw Milosz has written at length on the excruciating moral and intellectual damage done to Polish writers who, accustomed to writing before the imposition of Soviet rule, now had to adapt to socialist realism. Of one colleague who fell foul of the new method, Milosz writes that 'a politically correct theme would not have saved him from the critics' attack had they wanted to apply orthodox criteria, because he had described the concentration camp as he personally had seen it, not as one was supposed to see it' (Milosz, 1985, 126, emphasis in the original).[14] To the insights of Berger and Milosz in this area can be added those of Arthur Koestler (Darkness at Noon, 1940) George Orwell (1984, 1949) and Alain Besançon (The Falsification of the Good: Soloviev and Orwell, 1994).

One writer of exceptional importance for this theme in twentieth-century Russian literature is Andrei Platonov whose novel, The Foundation Pit (1929-1930), is a study of alienation brought on by the ideological corruption of language. As the slogans, bureaucratese, jargon and a never-ending flood of acronyms overwhelm the language, Platonov's characters lose the ability to communicate with one another. Crushed by the weight of ideology (and anticipating the distinction made by Berger between istina and pravda), one character ponders whether 'truth [istina] is a class enemy' (Platonov, 1998, 332). Words there are aplenty in this politically correct cacophony but their meaning has been appropriated by the party. Language is a series of ideological rituals. Denied the means to express their hopes and fears, Platonov's characters regress to a state of fearful isolation. Silence becomes the only effective form of communication. Corrupting language, communism destroys community, the very thing that communists purport to be creating. Well before Orwell, Berger and Milosz, Platonov identified and satirized the attempt made by the party to change reality by a conscious policy of making certain words and ideas redundant, or politically incorrect, and replacing them with appropriate or politically correct ones. In both manifestations -- that depicted in Platonov's novels, or that favored by postmodernists -- the intention is to use language as a weapon. In this scenario language is not primarily used to communicate ideas but rather to signal the speaker's willingness to submit to the politically correct register (gay, for example, in place of homosexual or gender in place of sex). Language is power not for the masses but for the party intellectuals who are to instruct us on correct usage. Contemporary political correctness pursues the same policy by dominating public discourse and creating a climate of fear such that "incorrect" opinion is declared illegitimate or racist and so on.

___________________________
[14] Valentin Turchin records what happened to Grigory Pomerants, a Soviet dissident writer: 'Someone complained to the Party Bureau about an "incorrect ideological line" at the seminar, and I was summoned to give an explanation' (Turchin, 1981, 12).

Introjection [edit]

In an influential 1981 article "Some Clinical Consequences of Introjection: Gaslighting", Calef and Weinshel argue that gaslighting involves the projection and introjection of psychic conflicts from the perpetrator to the victim: 'this imposition is based on a very special kind of "transfer"...of painful and potentially painful mental conflicts'.[10]

The authors explore a variety of reasons why the victims may have 'a tendency to incorporate and assimilate what others externalize and project onto them', and conclude that gaslighting can be 'a very complex, highly structured configuration which encompasses contributions from many elements of the psychic apparatus'.[10]
Resisting [edit]

With respect to women in particular, Hilde Lindemann argued that "in gaslighting cases...ability to resist depends on her ability to trust her own judgements."[11] Establishing "counterstories" to that of the gaslighter may help the victim re-acquire or even for the first time "acquire ordinary levels of free agency".[11]

The Sino-Soviet Schism Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Correct thinking in Chinese communism owes much to Mao's political personality and ambitions and, as in the case of Lenin in the Soviet variant, arises in part from the need to impose a general line on the party cadres and the population as the party attempted to modernise the country. Factors peculari to China would be the role of face and the leagacy of Confucianism (Lin, 1991, Lipman & Harrell, 1990). From Confucianism comes the custom in Chineses culture whereby disciplies of some revered master, in the firs instance Confucius, would collect the master's sayings (yu-lu) for posterity (Chuang, 1968, 7-8). The Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Mao chu-hsi yu-lu) have been put together with the Confucian tradition in mind.

The Soviet precedent also helps to explain why Mao wanted to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.[15] In Dr Zhivago, one of Pasternak's characters, looking back at the 1930s, argues that collectivization was such a calamity that the party could not acknowledge it and so in order to hide the failure all means were used to force people to lose the habit of independent thought and judgment (Pasternak, 1957, 519). Precisely the same problem confronted Mao after his policies caused a massive famine which in terms of human suffering, misery and the numbers of dead, has no parallel in human history. Objective reality, that is the deaths of millions by starvation, had to be forced from people's minds by terror. So the stage was set for this great and ancient nation to descend into self-inflicted madness goaded on by Mao and his teenage thugs. The masses, that category of amorphous, docile worker ants so beloved of Marxist theorists everywhere, had to be kept in a state of permanent frenzy and suicidal enthusiasm. Acting not thinking was the requirement of the time.[16] Scepticism was a heresy, and so by one of those paradoxes in which communism abounds, correct thinking meant in essence not thinking at all.

_____________________________
[size=1][15] Note the changes fromt he original "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in the 1960s to "Cultural Revolution" in the 1970s & 1980s to, currently, "cultural revolution" (Schoenhals, 1992, 109).

[16] Jung Chang, the author of Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China, who lived through the cultural revolution, admitted that on hearing of Mao's death she had to hide the lack of 'correct emotion' (1993, 658). The expectation that every Chinese was supposed to be stricken with grief on hearing of Mao's death has a parallel with the capricious blood-letting inflicted by the Zulu king Chaka on his people after his mother died. Hundreds, possibly thousands, were executed for failing to make appropriate and prolonged displays of grief. (Baker, 1974, 389-390).

[17] Lin provides confirmation of the broad definition of Soviet political correctness given above. She notes that: '[...] there is in any given situation just one "correct line" of policy, all others tend to lead to ruin, and so on' (Lin, 1991, 70). Michael Schoenhals's study is a painstaking analysis of the extreme importance attached by Chinese Communist Party theoreticians to the use of correct formulations (tifa) andconfirms the fundamental approach to language and power shared by both the former Soviet Union and Communist China (Schoenhals, 1992). Thom (1989) in her study of Soviet Newspeak anticipates many of the points made by Schoenhals.

Jing Lin's study of the political, psychological and eduational factors which prepared the Red Guards for the violence they inflicted on their fellow Chinese durign the "ten-year calamity" (shinian haojie), as the cultural revolution is now referred to, confirms the extreme emphasis on all types of correct behavior and thought in Maoism. Communist ideology was sancrosanct, 'the only correct official ideology' (Lin, 1991, 40)[17] As in the case of its Soviet counterpart, the Chinese mass media's main task was to indoctrinate the masses with "correct attitudes, ideas and beliefs" (Lin, 1991, 57). And the main task of the highly centralised education system was to inculcate 'the correct political orientation' (Lin, 1991, 79). Another parallel with Soviet Russia (and National Socialist Germany) was the party propaganda machine's use of young role models specifically aimed at the Red Guards (see, for example, Pavlik Morozov in the Soviet Union and Horst Wessel in Nazi Germany). The Chinese exemplar was Lei Feng, a young communist whose diary inspired the learn-from-Lei-Feng movement in which the Red Guards would keep diaries and hand them in to teachers 'for help in correcting possible deviations' (Lin, 1991, 122). Attitudes among the Red Guards were comparable to those identified by Berger regarding istina/pravda: 'While being absolutely obedient to Mao and aggressive against the "class enemies", the Red Guards treated the proletariat as embodying a concept of "justice", and idea that represented correctness' (Lin, 1991, 156).

Extracts from Important Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was published in 1970 at the peak of the cultural revolution, as well as those from other official Chinese sources, confirm Lin's conslusiosn and, again, the absolutely central role of correctness in all fields of Maoist thought and Chinese communism.[18] If anything centrality understates the emphasis. We are dealing here with a fanatical faith which is impervious to reasoned argument and evidence. The following citations -- many more could be cited -- require no explanation. They demonstrate an even greater obsession with correctness than that found in Lenin and his interpreters:

[...] 'our Party will always forge ahead victoriously along the correct course charted by Chairman Mao' (FLP, 1970, 75);

'Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's correct line' [...] (FLP, 1970, 65);

[...] 'the great, glorious and correct Party' (FLP, 1970, 66);

'Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!' (FLP, 1970, 106);

[...] 'the correct kind of leadership' (FLP, 1970, 134);

'Without correct literary and art criticism it is impossible for creative work to flourish' (FLP, 1970, 230);

'China is a great socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and has a population of 700 million. It needs a unifying thought, revolutionary thought, correct thought. That is Mao Tsetung Thought. Only with this thought can we maintain vigorous revolutionary drive and keep firmly to the correct political orientation' (FLP, 1970, 240);

'Red Guard fighters, revolutionary students, the general orientation of your struggle has always been correct' (FLP, 1970, 257);

[...] 'the correct line of Chairman Mao and the bankruptcy of the bourgeois reactionary line' (FLP, 1970, 274);

'Only by thoroughly criticizing and repudiating the bourgeois reacionary line and eradicating its influence can the line of Chairman Mao be carried out correctly, completely and thoroughly' (FLP, 1970, 276);

teachers are to understand the 'correct line' of Chairman Mao (FLP, 1970, 279);

'Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China' (FLP, 1970, 290);

'Not to have a correct political orientation is like not having a soul' (FLP, 1977, 405);

'Mao Tse-Tung's thought is the life-line of our Party, the sole correct supreme guiding thought of our Party, also the sole correct supreme guiding thought of the international communist movement' (Union Research Service, 1968, 121);

'Incorrect expressions must be eliminated from newspapers and journals', Editor's and Writer's Friend, 1984 (cited in Schoenhals, 1992, 76).[19]

Political correctness in Chinese communist ideology must also be interpreted against the background of the Sino-Soviet split. Chinese communists found it unforgivable that Khrushchev could denounce Stalin and promulgate a doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West which implied either a suspension of, or a retreat from, the class struggle. Scandalised by such ideological revisionism -- though this did not prevent China from welcoming President Nixon in 1972 -- the Chinese communist party saw itself as the one true bastion of ideological purity. Khrushchev was a dire warning of where incorrect thinking would lead. Extreme ideological vigilance was needed if China was not to lapse
into revisionism as well. Some sense of what Soviet revisionism meant for communist China can be understood in the Communique of the 11th Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party 8th Central Committee (August 12th 1966). According to the communique, 'the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] has betrayed Marxism-Leninism, betrayed the great Lenin, betrayed the road tot he great October Revolution, betrayed proletarian internationalism, betrayed the cause of the international proletariat and of the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations, and betrayed the interests of the great Soviet people and the people of the socialist countries' (Documents, 1971, 223). So concerned was the Chinese Communist Party leadership with the Soviet line that in the 1960s it established an Anti-Revisionist Writing Team whose specific task was 'to compose authoritative denunciations of Soviet-style "revisionism" in the name of the CCP Central Committee' (Schoenhals, 1992, 63).

________________________________
[18] Note, for example, the title of Mao's work published in 1957, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People. We are told that the Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art gave artists the 'correct orientation' (FLP, 1970, 235).

[19] An example of incorrect formulation among a majority of Western scholars would be the use of "totalitarian" to refer to the Soviet Union. To quote Martin Malia: 'In the introduction to each new monograph, the totalitarian model was ritually excoriated, and the "T-word" was banished from polite academic discourse, its use viewed as virtual incitement to Cold War hostility towards the "Evil Empire". By the onset of perestroika in 1985, a pall of political correctness had settled over the field' (Malia, 1994, 12).

Internal dissenters, or those deemed to be traitors and revisionists, were subjected to brutal treatment by the state media -- literally trial-by-media -- especially where the victim was a high profile member of the party. Thus, in a report of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, Liu Shao-Chi, who had disagreed with Mao, was referred to as a 'renegade', 'traitor' and 'scab' (Documents, 1971, 243). Lesser figures would be attacked at local level and those deemed to be guilty of serious deviations from the party line could face the dreadful pressure of a struggl session in which they were subjeted to prolonged physical and psychological abuse often in front of large audiences and were called upon to repent their crimes (Chang, 1993, Lifton, 1961, Lin, 1991, Saunders, 1996, Thurston, 1988, Wu, 1994). Other methods were rectification campaigns designed to correct 'bad thoughts', and a variation on the struggle session known as unity-criticism-unity, which involved breaking the victim down, "deconstructing" him, as it were, and then putting him back together again.

Worse still was the thought reform, si xiang gai zao, that was practised in the Chinese concentration camp system, the laogai, or 'Auschwitz of the mind' in Harry Wu's startling expression (Saunders, 1996, 73). 'For the Chinese communist', notes Wu, 'the aim is not to destroy him [the prisoner], a hostile element, physically through violence, but to destroy him mentally and ideologically, while threatening him with violence' (Saunders, 1996, vii).[20] Certain forms of physical abuse are used in conjunction with thought reform, as in the degrading ritual of bai lao men ('paying respects to the cell-god'), which involves a new prisoner's being made to suck up excrement from a bucket through straws and then say that the excrement tasted delicious (Saunders, 1996, 41).

Compelling prisoners to act out their roles in what to the Westerner appears to be a theatre of the absurd plays a major role in breaking the prisoner's mental resistance. The more grotesquely at odds with the truth, the more blatant the distortion and accusation, the more powerful the intellectual violence done to the victim. Agreeing to some blatant fabrication, the victim damages and eventually destroys his ability to think for himself, which is consistent with the Maoist view that: "Self" is the origin of all evil' (Union Research Service, 1968, 225). His inner self destroyed or broken, the victim ceases, finally, to be an independent thinking human being.

[onto page 72, more wednesday]

Political Correctness and the New Left

Mao's Great Leap Forward inspired and encouraged a new generation of 'political pilgrims' to suspend their critical faculties in much the same way that an earlier generation of Western communists and fellow travelers had embraced Stalinism (Hollander, 1981). Mao's cultural revolution also provided a convenient backdrop to the Vietnam war protest and the wave of student rebellion and resentment directed at white middle class society.

The New Left itself was a product of the 1960s. Its message was simple: 'All power in the world is oppressive, and all power is usurped. Abolish that power and we achieve justice and liberation together' (Scruton, 1985, 7). 'Impatient for doctrine' (Scruton, 1985, 7), this was a generation ripe for the teachings of Lenin and Mao and much in Althusser, Derrida, Foucault, Gramsci, Galbraith and Marcuse. Yet, for all the pose of rebellion, the break with the existing order and hierarchy, this was a movement that craved submission to authority, and the more hostile the New Left was to bourgeois mores and behavior, the more outrageous its claims, the more tightly it controlled the minds of its youthful followers.

_______________________
[20] In their study of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union, Bloch and Reddaway considered the possibility of such abuses occurring in other communist states. Of China, they noted: 'As for China, no reliable evidence of psychiatric abuse is available to us. But the apparently widespread practice of trying to cure mental illness by inculcating Maoism into patients so that they should think "correctly" arouses the suspicion that psychiatrists may also be involved in the "thought reform" practised on dissenters in labour camps' (Bloch & Reddaway, 1977, 466). Twenty five years later, the evidence for such psychiatric abuse is detailed and abundant.

Althusser can lay claim to being the master sorcerer of the New Left, whose manipulation of language entices the unwary, leading to intellectual confusion and oblivion. From Foucault, the radical derives his obligatory paranoia and the belief that the boundary between the deviant and the natural is a monstrous bourgeois fiction designed to perpetuate bourgeois rule (an echo here perhaps of Lenin on the free press). Derrida teaches him the need to deconstruct language and literature (the hegemonic discourse of the white, heterosexual ruling class). Gramsci stressed the importance of revolutionary theory: 'Gramsci did for the sixties what Lenin and Stalin had done for the thirties and forties: he convinced his following that revolutionary practice and theoretical correctness are identical concerns' [...] (Scruton, 1985, 77). And while attacking the economic practices of the West, the author of The Affluent Society comments that: 'In the communist countries, stability of ideas and social purpose is achieved by formal adherence to an officially proclaimed doctrine. Deviation is stigmatised as "incorrect". In our society, a similar stability is enforced far more informally by the conventional wisdom' (Galbraith, 1969, 17, emphasis added).[21] Galbraith's concluding sentence is a precise example of the intellectual relativism that did so much to create and to perpetuate the view that Western societies and the Soviet Union were one and the same, even indeed, that they were converging (Whereupon the Soviet Union in a fit of curmudgeonly ingratitude towards its Western friends and fellow travelers collapsed). Marcuse was probably the most influential of all the New Left thinkers. His manipulation of language -- one better known example being "repressive tolerance" -- continues the assault on empirical reality pioneered by Lenin.
______________________________
[21] This is taken from the 1969 revised edition. In the 1963 edition of Galbraith's book, the underlined text is absent.

These thinkers and others

These thinkers and others have contributed in various ways to what is probably the striking feature of the New Left, and one that sets it apart from conventional Marxists[22]: the extraordinary emphasis placed on culture and language; the belief that language is the essential lever of power. Mao, whose influence was by no means confined to mainland China, has, one suspects, been hugely influential in this respect. To quote Chuang:

Ever since the Communists came to power nineteen years ago, every political campaign in China has been simultaneously a semantic campaign as well, introducing or reviving a plethora of shibboleths and slogans with such determination and concentration that it sometimes borders on verbomania or graphomania. Mao strikes one as a true believer of word-magic... (Chuang, 1968, 47).

"Word magic" explains why the contemporary notion of political correctness exert such a beguiling influence on so many discrete groups and factions. For, if money is power, then some will have more power than others. If, however, language is power, then anyone can partake of power and groups and factions who otherwise might have very little to say to one another, now find that they are united in their desire to impose new linguistic norms on mainstream bourgeois society which, it is alleged, has traditionally marginalized them. This new alliance, or rainbow coalition, has a ready ally in the universities, print and broadcast media and public sector bureaucracies. The universities in particularly are uniquely placed to be the new brokers of language and culture, since it has been New Left ideology ensconced in our universities and on its fringes that has turned the world into language.[23] In particular, the universities are crucial to the New Censorship Paradigm (Ellis, 2000). No longer the guardian of our cultural heritage, they actively seek to "deconstruct" it.

Instructed by Ne Left theoreticians that they are victims, that language is power and better still that it has been "constructed" to serve the hegemony of the white heterosexual male, blacks and women now feel that they have the moral authority to impose cultural and linguistic change, that is "the correct orientation". For the "repressed and their allies, this is an intoxicating message. Instead of resistance, they have all too often found a willingness on the part of mainstream culture to submit to their linguistic and relativist demands. Concessions of any kind earn no good will at all. On the contrary, they tend to confirm the radical in his contempt for the society around him, reinforcing his suspicion that society was rotten all along (why else do they make concessions?) and encouraging him to make ever greater demands for institutional and cultural change.

______________________________
[22] Though, as Etkind points out, the belief that human beings can be remoulded is fundamental to Soviet Marxism: 'Man is seen as plastic material which is suitable for creation. He has no natural qualities, he is totally immersed in culture and is formed by the purposeful influences of milieu, society and science. In other words, man's nature is no longer seen as nature. It is seen as culture, the result of mankind's efforts or those of its best representatives. Nature-as-culture loses its inherent qualities - primacy, innateness and sense of detachment from others, the fundamental independence of its efforts. What is made by people, can be remade. Man's nature becomes an object of purposeful manipulations' (Etkind, 1993, 184, emphasis in the original).

[23] I have borrowed Thom's remark about the effect of Marxism-Leninism on language: 'Ideology turns the world into language' (Thom, 1989, 87),

Comparative Summary

The main features which Western political correctness derives from as Soviet and Maoist variants can now be summarised as follows:

i. No limits to the competence of politicians and activists to remould human societies are recognized. There is no area of human endeavour which cannot be "deconstructed" and improved. All versions of political correctness are genuine manifestations of ideology in the definitions provided by Apter, Arendt, Francis, Heller, Kirk and Lin (Apter, 1964, Arendt 1973, Francis, 1999, Heller, 1988, Kirk, 1984, Lin, 1991);

ii. Political correctness denies objective truth, or something close to it. See the istina/pravda split identified and discussed by Berger.

iii. Only certain types of art, literature, scientific research and thinking are permissible. Soviet ideologues believed mistakenly, that they could co-opt the tradition of nineteenth century Russian literature for their own ends. Rather than acknowledging the grandeur of the great canon, postmodernists have chosen to attack the canon with the aim of destruction through leveling. Both Western and Soviet/Maoist versions accept the need for truth and facts to be censored if this conflicts with politically correct aims. When harvard professor, Barbara Johnson, as part of the AWARE campaign (Actively Working Against Racism and Ethnocentrism), declared that 'professors should have less freedom of expression than writers and artists, because professors are supposed to be createing a better world' (Beard & Cerf, 1992, 97), she reveals her full commitment to the spirit of Soviet socialist realism and Leninist partiinost'. Whereas the Soviet communist party was brutal in regard to censoring forbidden manuscripts, killing and imprisoning writers without hesitation, more diverse approaches are favoured in the West. The following can be noted: outright suppression of manuscripts by a publisher, even hen teh author has been earlier informed that publication will proceed (as in the case of Chris Brand's book on the g factor); intimidation of publishers by left-wing extremists who often adopt a guise of "anti-racism" or "anti-fascism"; failure or refusal on the part of university librarians to consider certain titles for collection development (a very effective long-term form of censorship); refusal to review certain books; ignoring a book even when it sells well; organising a discussion panel to attack an author or publication, ensuring that the author under attack or advocate of certain views has minimal time to respond. This is a favourite technique of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Britain's state-owned television station, when a politically incorrect opinion or book cannot be ignored since to do so merely draws attention to the silence of the state media; ideological and political attacks on the institution of free speech frequently based on the straw man fallacy that free speech is not absolute (no man-made institution is);

iv: Use of the print and broadcast media to vilify and to demonise those who break any taboos prescribed in paragraph iii. This is important in the Western version since the totalitarian violence used by the Soviet Union is not currently an option;

v. We find exceptional importance attached to the need to establish and to maintain correct theoretical approaches (Chuang, 1968, Chung et al, 1996, FLP, 1970, Khrushchev, 1959, Lenin, 1901, 1902, 1905 & 1906, Resheniya, 1967, Schoenhals, 1992, Thom, 1989). For contemporary political correctness domination of political discourse -- symbols, words and usage -- is all important (Goldberg, 2002, Stein, 2000);

vi. The role of a demon figure either the class enemy or currently the white, heterosexual male;

vii. Political correctness has, to paraphrase Thom, turned the world into language. And strives for absolute control over the dictionary;

viii. Envy is exploited to an unusual degree;

ix. Freedoms guaranteed in Western societies are exploited in an attempt to destroy those freedoms while arguing that these freedoms are a sham (free speech, equality before the law, freedom of assembly);

x. The Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties seized power and proceeded on the basis of the tabula rasa or Year Zero. In the West, we are experiencing a process of slow and incremental Sovietization.

Conclusion

Emerging into the wider public domain at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the term political correctness, much to the surprise and chagrin of those who used it, rapidly became associated with the Phrarisee and the tyrant. As early as 1992, the compilers of The Official Politically Correct Dictionary & Handbook were quick to spot the danger and tried to blunt the attack, warning their readers that: "The term "politically correct", co-opted by the white power elite as a tool for attacking multiculturalism, is no longer "politically correct" (Bear & Cerf, 1992, 87). Attacking political correctness with some vigor in Culture of Complaint, Robert Hughes nevertheless felt obliged to balance his criticisms wtih the invention of "patriotic correctness", which, he assured us, was as bad as political correctness (Hughes, 1993, 28).

[onto page 78, more thur.]

Richard Burt's explanation of the origins of political correctness as something that was 'used ironically against other leftists as a critique of moralism and preachiness' (Jones, 2001, 1901) also shows a certain lack of imagination and understanding of what is at stake. For, if political correctness were simply a question of ridiculing "preachiness" or adopting poses then one could just ignore it. On the basis of the material cited and discussed here political correctness goes way beyond mere finger-wagging. In its Maoist variant it represents an extreme form of intellectual violence designed to break an individual's will and compel him to submit to the will of the collective (community). Harry Wu's insight into his own ordeal in the laogai recognises the brutal simplicity of what his tormentors were trying to achieve:

Suddenly the traditional practice of footbinding came to mind. We have switched to headbinding, I thought. It's no longer the fashion to bind a woman's feet, but they bind a person's thoughts instead. That way the mind can't move freely. That way ideas all take on the same size and shape, and thinking becomes impossible. That's why they arrested me. That's why they want to change me, that's why they force me to reform.

(Wu, 1994, 87).

Western versions lack concentration camps for re-education and reform through labor, yet they indisputably involve wholly unacceptable levels of censorship and intellectual violence to those who dissent from multicultural orthodoxy. Race awareness courses in American universities are just one example (Kors, 2000).

Moreover, the threat and use of physical violence is always there is the left feels that some recalcitrant academic needs to be taught a lesson. Orchestrated mob rule which ws used to intimidate professors Michael Levin, J. Phillipe Rushton, Chris Brand, Arthur Jensen and Hans Eysenck, is straight out of the Maoist canon of street thuggery deployed against Chinese intellectuals during the cultural revolution. Burr's citing others to the effect that no academics have been prevented from teaching or dismissed by any administration is disingenuous, and demonstrably wrong (Pearson, 1997). In the United Kingdom, Ray Honeyford, the headmaster of a school in Bradford -- an inner-city area with a large concentration of schoolchildren from the Indian sub-continent -- was subjected to a sustained campaign of physical violence and bureaucratic intimidation because he highlighted the failures of multicultural education (Honeyford, 1984 & 2001). Some twenty years later, he has been thoroughly vindicated, as some of his erstwhile critics and the government now admit.[24] Yet, this is small comfort to a decent man whose career was destroyed in its prime. The most recent example was the death of Pim Fortuyn, a former Dutch university professor, who was murdered by an extremist because of his views.

_________________________________
[24] The article in which Ray Honeyford drew attention to what was happening in his school was first published in The Salisbury Review in 1984. The race riots in Oldham, Burnley and Leeds in 2001 were a direct consequence of trends which Honeyford had earlier identified. The article was reprinted in 2001 ('Education and Race - an Alternative View', The Salisbury Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, pp.9-12).


Furthermore, anyone who has taught at an American university can testify that enormous psychological pressure is brought to bear on academics and students to submit to the general line on all issues dealing with multiculturalism, race and feminism. The atmosphere is not one which is conducive to asking awkward questions. It is one of coercion. As Robert Lifton has noted in his pioneering study of thought reform: 'The message of coercion is: you must change and become what we tell you to become - or else. The threat embodied in the "or else" may be anything from death to social ostracism, any form of physical or emotional pain' (Lifton, 1961, 438, emphasis in the original). Nor, given the way tenure is awarded in American universities, are we likely to encounter many dismissal cases. Any academic who publicly or privately dissented on issues relating to multiculturalism would be placing his chances of securing tenure in grave jeopardy. Dissent would lead to negative reviews in the tenure process, the result being the denial of tenure, an administrative pre-emptive strike, in effect de facto dismissal. Most academics, even with tenure, prefer to stay silent. In the strict sense of the term, the question of dismissal does not therefore arise.

That said, attempts have been made to get university administrations to fire tenured faculty for expressing politically incorrect opinions (Pearson, 1997). So far these attempts appear to have failed but they have caused a great deal of stress to the victims and resulted in much emotional and intellectual energy being wasted. In view of the legal security that tenure affords in American and Canadian universities, one is tempted to conclude that university administrations that attempt to fire faculty, do so not in the hope that they will succeed - though that would be a desirable outcome - but rather with the express intention of causing the victims as much misery as possible. If true, and one suspects that this would be difficult to prove in a court of law, then it amounts to a university administration's abandoning the presumption of innocence, a vital feature of Western jurisprudence. The mere fact of your criticising multiculturalism renders you "guilty" and liable to punishment.

Nor were the debates over political correctness in the early 1990s something peripheral to the future of higher education, as Burt has also suggested, but something fundamental. Whatever cause the left-wing radical supports in the rainbow coalition -- and these days he need not be very left or very radical -- his relativist approach to knowledge, his commitment to the 'truth that ought to be' rather than the one that is, his barely concealed loathing of individual excellence, the belief that in the collective or community resides superior wisdom, his loathing of free speech (which he, naturally, exploits to the full) and his ready acceptance of a completely politicised education system, are demonstrably the offspring of communist systems. Political correctness provides the deep structure, the base on which the superstructure of multiculturalism et al can be raised. Political correctness, in other words, is something serious.

Some of Burt's points have been taken up by Helena Kennedy, a well known left-wing Scottish lawyer and supporter of things multicultural and feminist. As recently as May 2002, she restated views made in the mid-1990s, namely that: 'Political correctness is an invention of the right' (Robinson, 2002, 34). There is plenty of evidence, as I have tried to demonstrate in this article, that by the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and in any case well before the vast majority of Westerners, whatever their political allegiances, had heard of it, political correctness was established as an indispensable element in the theoretical struggle of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism and the New Left. Correctness, after all, that is the "correct" analysis of Western, bourgeois societies and the "correct" solutions to their ills, has always been the basis of which the Left, new or old, has staked its claim to order our lives and rebuild our societies in the name of "social justice". Kennedy's assertion was made either out of ignorance or, more probably, because she understands only too well that the demonstrable and verifiable debt owed by multiculturalism and feminism to Lenin and Mao does nothing to make the public congenial towards the whole multicultural experiment and its oppressive legislation.

Responses other than direct denial can also be noted. The frequency with which we encounter terms such as "correct orientation", "correctness", as well as the use of the adjective and adverb "correct" and "correctly" in official Chinese sources underlines the extraordinary efforts made by the Chinese communist party to control people's thoughts and feelings. Yet the studies consulted for this article betray a marked reluctance to draw conclusions about the communist origins of political correctness and the manner in which it has migrated to the West. Not a single work cited in this article and which was published after 1990, that is, at the time when the debate over political correctness in the West was raging, has actually discussed the connection between Maoist notions of correctness and the American campus, even if only to deny or to attack any connection. With the exception of Lin (1991) and Schoenhals (1992)[25] -- Lin leaving us in no doubt about the importance of correct thinking in the ideological preparation of the Red Guards -- Lipman & Farrell (1990) and Saunders (1996) have tended to avoid using "correct" and "correctness" in their discussion of the ideological pressures applied to Chinese during "the ten year calamity". Where references to "correctness" are made, as in Chung et al (1996), then the authors conspicuously refrain from making any connection with the West (Bichler, 30-43, Chung, xvi, Chung & McClellan, 1-22, Wallace, 78-87, Lan, 88-105, Chung et al, 1996). Only Dewhirst comes close to making a connection in a brief footnote (Dewhirst, Chung et al, 1996, 26). Chung herself in the introduction clearly identifies the problem of political/ideological correctness in communism yet studiously avoids making any parallels with its contemporary use by Western leftists. However, she does permit herself a parallel with China's past as in 'Confucian correctness' (Chung, et al, 1996, xvi). Now it is somewhat odd that she can make a parallel with a sage who lived five centuries before the birth of Christ yet not make the more obvious and immediate one with the 1990s. "Confucian correctness" misleads in the same way that "patriotic correctness" does, since it implies that one form of "correctness", be it "Confucian", "patriotic" or "political", is no better or worse than any other. This is the relativism of political correctness itself at work here. To blur these distinctions is to destroy them, or to weaken them to the extent that one can argue, as Galbraith does, that Western 'conventional wisdom' and communist political correctness are the same thing. If we proceed from this leftist assumption, then we could argue that there is no "connection" to be made since both systems are not separated but constitute one giant politicised whole. On this basis, not to highlight the evolution of Soviet political correctness, via Maoism to the West's universities and from there to other institutions, is not to ignore the problem, for there is no problem to be ignored. Political systems and empires from Rome to American democracy, the leftist tells us, have always imposed conformity and insisted on correct behavior. True enough. And what of conservatives, do they not tell us that liberty and 'right reason' go together? (Kirk, 1996, 3-4, Weaver, 1948, 138). Why, then, asks the leftist, should communism and the left be singled out for opprobrium? The answer is that Marxism-Leninism, from which political correctness is derived, manifests a completely different order of correctness and application from any other political system. The danger arises from the totalitarian aspirations of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. All human existence is politicised and everything is judged according to political/ideological criteria and corrected or destroyed accordingly. If a man's mind cannot be "rectified" or freed from "incorrect" thoughts, then he ceases to be a man. He becomes an "enemy of the people". Extermination is justified, demanded, in fact, by the logic of ideology of class war, as is absolutely clear from the abominations of the Gulag and the laogai. The role of ideology -- Marxism-Leninism -- is crucial, as has been fully explained by Solzhenitsyn:

Macbeth's self-justifications were feeble -- and his conscience devoured him. Yes even Iago was a little lamb too. The imagination and the spiritual strength of Shakespeare's evildoers stopped short at a dozen corpses. Because they had no ideology. Ideology -- that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. That is the social theory which helps to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and others' eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise and honours (Solzhenitsyn, 1991, 173-174).

Another anomaly is that none of the works consulted includes any references to political correctness in the indexes. This squeamishness explicitly to highlight the connection is perhaps an indirect acknowledgement that political correctness on the American campus and elsewhere does indeed owe a great deal to Mao and his antecedents. It is perhaps born of the fear that any discussion of the connection will provide ammunition for conservative opponents of multiculturalism. Whatever the reason, the lack of any discussion at a time when arguments over political correctness were taking place in the US and Britain, and when some of the authors were working on books about communist China's cultural revolution, is highly unusual to say the least.[26] In the Russian context, the same is true of Ruder and Tolstaya (Ruder, 1998, Tolstaya, 1998).

__________________________
[25] Marred in places by a failure to recognise some fundamental differences between the USA and the two communist superpowers (the former Soviet Union and Communist China), Schoenhals' book, in spite of the author's best efforts to avoid making any parallels with feminism and multiculturalism, is essential reading for understanding the debt owed by Western versions of political correctness to Mao and his successors.

[26] In The Falsification of the Good, Besançon comments on Orwell's term crimestop: 'it [crimestop] includes the ability not to perceive logical errors and not to comprehend the simplest of arguments if they are against Ingsoc, and, inversely, to have an aversion to any train of thought capable of leading in an undesirable direction. It is "protective stupidity" (Besançon, 1994, 119). Is this an explanation?)

A more recent trend, and one more effective than Kennedy's denials, is to treat political correctness with a certain disdain or even silence without actually denying its left-wing credentials, and without renouncing the methods and goals of political correctness and multiculturalism. The BBC, Britain's state television and radio network, is especially adept at this sort of Orwellian deceit, appearing to state one thing but encouraging behavior and attitudes which are entirely consistent with politically correct objectives even if not referred to as such. Many Russians, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and East Germans who revered the BBC as a surrogate domestic broadcasting service during the Cold War will balk at such apparently harsh comments. Yet when it comes to the ugly side of multiculturalism in Britain today, and much of it is very ugly indeed, the BBC lacks that commitment to objectivity and truth, which once made it so feared by the men in the Kremlin. When Greg Dyke, who is appropriately known as the BBC's Director-General, apologises for the fact that the BBC is 'hideously white', one realises the degree to which politically correct ideas now control and shape the BBC. To paraphrase one of its first Director-Generals, the BBC has become a social menace of the first magnitude.

Despite the determined efforts of liberals and left-wingers to counter the association of political correctness with their favoured causes, the perception remains among the public that political correctness is essentially a creation of the left. The historical evidence, some of which I have marshaled here, supports that association, though evennow few seem to realise just how strong the Soviet legacy is. Enriched by his successors -- Soviet, Maoist, feminist, postmodernist and most recently multiculturalist -- political correctness still bears the stamp of Lenin, the founder of twentieth-century totalitarianism. The empire Lenin helped to build is, thankfully, no more. Yet one hundred years after his tract in revolutionary subversion, What is to be Done?, was first published, his ideas still command a great deal of loyalty. Ideas do indeed have consequences, as Richard Weaver has argued (Weaver, 1948). Contemporary versions of political correctness are Lenin's revenge.

To conclude I offer an allegory. It is pessimistic and belongs to the genre of low-budget horror films. Imagine a giant arachnid, defeated and mortally wounded, which, in its death throes, manages to ejaculate a stream of spores. The victor, savoring his hard-won triumph, fails to see that the spores have landed on his body. If not decontaminated they will begin the process of his metamorphosis into the very monster he has just vanquished.

References

References

Apter, David, ed. 1964. Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press, New York and London, 1964.

Arendt, Hannah. 1961. The Origins of Totalitarianism (1961), Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York and London, 1973.

Baker, John R. 1974. Race, Oxford University Press, New York and London, 1974.

Beard, Henry & Cerf, Christopher, eds. 1992. The Official Politically Correct Dictionary & Handbook, Grafton, Harper/Collins, London. 1992.

Beevor, Antony. 1945. Berlin: the Downfall 1945, Viking, Penguin, London, 2002.

Beglow, Spartak I. 1984. Vneshnepoliticheskaya propaganda: Ocherk teorii i praktiki (Foreign Policy Propaganda: An Essay in Theory and Practice), Vneshnyaya shkola, Moscow, 1984.

Berger, Joseph. 1971. Shipwreck of a Generation, Harvill Press, London, 1971.

Besançon, Alain. 1994. The Falsification of the Good: Soloviev and Orwell, trans., Matthew Screech, The Claridge Press, London, 1994.

Bloch, Sydney & Reddaway, Peter. 1977. Russia's Political Hospitals: The Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, with a foreword by Vladimir Bukovsky, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1977.

Burt, Richard. 2001. 'Political Correctness' in Derek Jones, ed., Censorship: A World Encyclopedia, vol 3, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, London. 2001.

Chang, Jung. 1991. Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (1991), Flamingo, Harper/Collins, 1993.

Chuang, H.C. 1968. The Little Red Book and Current Chinese Language, Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology, No 13, Center for Chinese Studies Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley, California, August 1968.

Chung, Hilary et al ed. 1996. In the Party Spirit: Socialist Realism and Literary Practice in the Soviet Union, East Germany and China, Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, 1996.

Conquest, Robert. 1990. The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Hutchinson, London, 1990.

Counts, G.S. & Lodge, N., 1949. The Country of the Blind: The Soviet System of Mind Control, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1949.

Dobrenko, Evgeny, 1997. The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature, trans., Jesse M. Savage, Stanford Univesity Press, Stanford, California, 1997.

Ellis, Frank, 2000. 'Information, Communication and Control: Towards the New Censorship Paradigm', in Advances in Sociocybernetics and Human Development, Volume VIII: Evolution of Man and Societ in the Age of Accelerating Changes, Potential Benefits, Challenges to Human Development, George Lasker ed., The International Institute for Advanced Studies, Ontario, Canada, 2000, pp.55-60.

2001. 'The Decline and Fall of History', Salisbury Review, vol 20, No 2, 2001, pp.28-32.

Etkind, Alexander. 1993. 'Kul'tura protiv prirody: Psikhologia russkogo moderna' ('Culture against Nature: the psychology of the Russian Modern') Oktyabr', 7, 1993, pp.168-192.

Foreign Language Press. 1970. Important Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1970.

1977. Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, 1st edn., volume 5, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1977.

Francis, Samuel, 1999. Thinkers of Our Time: James Burnham (1984), 2nd edition, The Claridge Press, London, 1999.

Galbraith, J.K. 1963. The Affluent Society (1958), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963.

Goldberg, Bernard. 2001. Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News, Regnery Publishing Inc., Washington, D.C., 2002.

Grossman, Vasili. 1974. Vse Techet (Everything Flows), 2nd edition, Possev-Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, Germany 1974.

Heller, Mikhail, 1988. Cogs in the Soviet Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man, trans., David Floyd, Collins, London, 1988.

Hollander, Paul. 1981. Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba 1928-1978, OUP, New York and Oxford, 1981.

Honeyford, Ray. 2001. 'Education and Race - An Alternative View', The Salisbury Review, vol 20, No 1, 2001, pp.9-12.

Hughes, Robert. 1993. Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1993.

Khrushchev, N.S. 1959. 'Sluzhenie narodu - vysokoe prizvanie sovetskikh pisateley' ('Serving the people is the lofty vocation of Soviet writers'), Pravda, 24th May 1959, pp.1-3.

Kirk, Russell. 1984. Enemies of the Permanent Things: Observations of Abnormity in Literature and Politics, Sherwood Sugden & Company, Peru, Illinois, 1984.

1996. Redeeming the Time, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Wilmington Delaware, 1996.

Kors, Alan Charles. 2000. 'Thought Reform 101: The Orwellian Implications of Today's College Orientation', Reason Magazine, http://www.reason.com, March 2000.

Kunitsyn, Georgii. 1971. V.I. Lenin o partiinosti i svobode pechati (V.I. Lenin on Party Spirit and the Freedom of the Press), Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1971.

Unwin Paperbacks. 1987. The Last Cuckoo: The Very Best Letters to the Times since 1900, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1987.

Lenin, V.I.

1946. "S chego nachat'?" ("How to Begin?", 1901), Sochineniya, vol 5, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1946, pp.5-12.

1946. Chto delat'? (What is to be Done?, 1902), Sochineniya, vol 5, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1946, pp.319-492.

1947. "Partiynaya organisatsiya i partiynaya literatura" ("Party Organisation and Party Literature", 1905) Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.26-31.

1947. "Sotsialisticheskaya partiya i bespartiinaya revolyutsionnost'" ("The Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Ethos of the Non-Party Faction", 1905), Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.57-64.

1947. "Svoboda kritiki i edinstvo deystvii", ("Freedom of Criticism and Unity of Action", 1906), Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.408-409.

1947. "Plokhie sovety" ("Bad Advice", 1906), Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.410-414.

1947. "Kadety, trudoviki, i rabochaya partiya" ("The Kadets, the workers and the workers' party", 1906), Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.420-424.

1947. "Kak rassuzhdaet t. Plekhanov o taktike sotsial-demokratii" ("How Comrade Plekhanov thinks concerning the tactics of Social Democracy", 1906), Sochineniya, vol 10, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1947, pp.425-446.

1950. "Proletarskaya revolyutsiya i renegat Kautskii" ("The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", 1918), Sochineniya, vol 28, 4th edition, OGIZ, Moscow, 1950, pp.207-302.

1964. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol 45, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1964.


Lifton, Robert J. 1961. Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1961.

Lin, Jing. 1991. The Red Guards' Path to Violence: Political, Educational and Psychological Factors, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1991.

Lipman, Jonathan N & Harrell, Stevan, eds. 1990. Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, State University of New York Press, 1990.

Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. 1959. (The Small Soviet Encyclopedia), vol 7, 3rd edition, Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 1959.

Malia, Martin. 1994. The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1919, The Free Press, New York, 1994.

Medvedev, Zhores. 1969. The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko, trans., Michael Lerner, Columbia University Press, New York & London, 1969.

Milosz, Czeslaw. 1953. The Captive Mind (1953), trans., Jane Zielonko, Penguin, 1985.

OUP. 1998. The Concise Oxford Russian Dictionary, Revised edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

Pasternak, Boris. 1957. Dr Zhivago, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1957.

Pearson, Roger. 1997. Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe, Introduction by Hans J. Eysenck, 2nd edition, Scott-Townsend Publishers, Washington, D.C., 1997.

Pipes, Richard. 1994. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime: 1919-1924, Harvill, London, 1994.

Platonov, Andrei. 1998. "Kotlovan" ("The Foundation Pit", 1929-1930) in Sobranie sochinenii, vol 2, Informpechat', Moscow, 1998.

Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam. 1967. (Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions) vol 1, 1917-1928, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1967.

Robinson, Stephen. 2002. "Heavyweight bout ends in victory for all', The Daily Telegraph, 2nd May 2002, p.34.

Ruder, Cynthia. 1998. Making History for Stalin: The Story of the Belomor Canal, University Press of Florida, Gainsville, 1998.

Saunders, Kate et al. 1996. Eighteen Layers of Hell: Stories from the Chinese Gulag, with a foreword by Harry Wu, Cassell, London, 1996.

Schoenhals, Michael. 1992. Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics, Chinese Research Monograph Series, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.

Schram, Stuart R. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung, Pall Mall Press, London and Dunmow, 1963.

Scruton, Roger. 1985. Thinkers of the New Left, Claridge Press, London, 1985.

Shalin, Dmitri, ed. 1996. Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Postcommunist Consciousness, Westview Press, Colorado and Oxford, 1996.

Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. 1991. The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation (1973), Volume 1, trans., Thomas Witney, HarperCollins, 1991.

Stein, Harry. 2000. How I Accidentally Joined the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy (and Found Inner Peace), Delacorte Press, 2000.

Thom, Françoise. 1989. Newspeak: The Language of Soviet Communism, trans., Ken Connolly, The Claridge Press, London, 1989.

Thurston, Anne F. 1988. Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of Intellectuals in China's Great Cultural Revolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988.

Tolstaya, Tat'yana. 1998. "Politicheskaya korrektnost'" ('Political Correctness'), Sestry, Podkova, Moscow, 1998, pp.106-138.

Turchin, Valentin. 1981. The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview, trans., Guy Daniels, Martin Robertson & Company Ltd, Oxford, 1981.

Union Research Service. 1968. Issue Nos, 1-26, January-March, vol 50, Kowloon, Hong Kong, 1968.

Union Research Institute. 1971. Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sept. 195 - April 1969, vol 1, Union Research Institute, Kowloon, Hong Kong, 1971.

Vazsonyi, Balint. 1998. America's 30 Years War. Who Is Winning?, Regnery Publishing Inc., Washington, D.C., 1998.

Weaver, Richard. 1984. Ideas Have Consequences (1948), University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1984.

Wu, Harry and Wakeman, Carolyn. 1994. Bitter Winds: A Memoir of My Years in China's Gulag, John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, 1994.

[end of chapter three. we will return to this for some extended analysis after we have ch. 4 online, the last chapter]

Chapter Four

From Communism's "Enemy of the People" to PC's "Hate Criminal"

Communists, taking their lead from Lenin, expended vast amounts of energy attacking and damning ideological opponents. Western capitalist states were the main external target. Internally, the enemy varied accordign to the party's goals: peasants or kulaks during the Terror Famine or bigger fish during the Great Terror. As a collection of wealthy and powerful states, and despite the best efforts of fellow travellers, the West was in a position to counter Soviet attacks by highlighting the huge discrepancies between communist party propaganda and the grim realities of Soviet life. Inside the Soviet Union the struggle against the class enemy or enemy of the people was conducted in a far more one-sided manner, given that the state enjoyed a total monopoly in the dissemination of ideas and information. To be targeted as a dissenter in the Soviet Union could mean anything from harsh social ostracism and self-criticism at work to arrest and execution. The enemy of the people was an essential construct in all the party's media campaigns. During Stalin's Great Terror the Soviet people were told that many of the Bolsheviks who had made the revolution with Lenin and Stalin were in fact Western agents of one kind or another, or, worse still, that they were in secret contact with the great Satan, Trotskii. In its Chinese variant, communist thugs rooted out "enemies of the people" during Mao's Red Terror, compelling innocent people to admit to a whole range of bizarre, ideologically motivated, politically incorrect "crimes".

______________________________
This chapter first appeared as an article "From Communism's "Enemy of the People to PC's 'Hate Criminal'" in Volume 30 Number 1, Spring 2005 of The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies.

Political correctness, which became an issue in the West at the start of the 1990s, originated in the Soviet Union, undergoing various mutations on its way from Moscow via Peking to the West's universities and final modification by the new left. One key difference between old and new left was that whereas the old left concentrated on the means of production, the new left abandoned heavy industry, as it were, and set about seizing control of the means of expression. In the post-industrial society this gives the new left real power and influence way beyond its size. One thing both variants of the left retain, though, is the carefully constructed hate figure. For the old left it would have been the capitalist and his bourgeois lackeys who appeared in grotesque caricature in Pravda cartoons. Two important hate figures for the new left are patriarchy and the white, heterosexual, middle class male: patriarchy occupies center stage in feminist demonology, and for multiculturalism the hate criminal and enemy of the people is the white, heterosexual, middle class male.

Multiculturalism is a cult, and article one of the cult is that all evil in the world arises from the white male and his "civilization". His being heterosexual is in itself oppression since the society he has constructed has marginalised and punished homosexuals and women and, moreover, on the basis of the thoroughly erroneous belief that sex and sex difference are biologically and genetically determined, whereas they are, as every enlightened member of the cult knows, socially and politically constructed. Nor is his middle class status something that he has earned. It is secured and maintained through exploitation. Before 1991, the victims would have been that trusty stalwart, the working class. Today, the new victims are women and racial (ethnic) minorities. The ideological construct of the white, heterosexual, middle-class male embodies multiculturalism's unholy trinity of damnation: homophobia, sexism and racism. Xenophobia, a sub-genre of racism, can be added for good measure.

Sexism -- that is, discriminating against women -- is quite rational and desirable in a number of occupations. Certain military tasks are totally unsuited to women. That a statistically insignificant number of women may be able to perform on equal terms with some men is not an argument in favor of destroying the distinct and tested male ethos of the military in order satisfy the demands of feminists. As far as multiculturalists are concerned, racism is everywhere in Western society, another reason why it must be broken and remade. The forms and definitions of racism are just as diverse. We can find unwitting racism, cultural racism, institutional racism, covert racism, overt racism and intellectual racism. One of the curiosities of racism is that only whites seem to be guilty thereof, everyone else is a victim.

Why are homophobia, sexism and racism, so-called, deemed to be so dreadful such that every Western institution must be turned upside down and reformed ande where that is not possible destroyed (read "deconstructed")? Lurking in the background, according to the New Left, is the ghost of Hitler and it is always implied, sometimes it is explicit, that the reason we need hate crime legislation is to prevent another Hitler; that we are but one step removed from killing the "other". This focusing on the Nazis is intended to draw our attention away from the communist mass murder and genocide. Stalin's Terror Famine in the early 1930s resulted in some 11,000,000 peasants being shot and starved to death. Others were deported to slave labour camps where they died of starvation and exhaustion. Bear in mind that Stalin's Final Solution of the Peasant Question was completed ten years before the nazis convened the Wannsee conference to plan the extermination of Europe's Jews [not true] and one realises just how successful the left have been at hiding the far greater acts of genocide carried out by communists. To be fair, the left does not hide the truth: it just ignores it. And to the extent that we cannot be bothered to excavate the truth, we collude in the lie. Again, in the late 1950s, Mao repeated the whole Stalinist experiment. The numbers are stratospheric. At the very least 20,000,000 even as many as 50,000,000 were exterminated. Class war and the class struggle prosecuted in the name of equality and brotherhood have demonstrably killed far more people than the Nazis. Nor is China, slowly and relentlessly building up her economic and military strength, about to start apologising for the past (unlike Germany). This emphasis on the allegedly exclusively Nazi antecedents of racism and genocide exerts a grossly distorting influence on all legislation aimed at combating racism and xenophobia. One thing that made it possible for the Nazis and communists to carry out their abominable crimes was that they destroyed all opposition and that meant, among other things, destroying the means by which opposition sought to articulate its concerns.

Consider two states. State A possesses a modern armed forces, from a well trained professional army with expertise in everything from peacemaking to conventional military operations and counter-insurgency to a professional navy and airforce. To these conventional forces can be added a nuclear, biological and chemical defence capability and tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. State B has no army, no airforce or navy, but it does have a a strategic nuclear arsenal. Now, state A, by virtue of its having a full range of modern weapons and services, is in a position to react in a flexible manner to many different threats to national security -- from minor border incidents to nuclear attack. As the sequence of a conflict starts to escalate, as measured by the military assets deployed, so the conflict moves up the diplomatic agenda. The Cuban Missile crisis is a good example. State B, whose leaders only have at their disposal a strategic nuclear arsenal, enjoys no such flexibility. It has unilaterally withdrawn from the sphere of conventional weapons and forces and thus is powerless, paradoxically, to react even to border violations or to defend itself against conventional attack. It has only two responses to all contingencies: to unleash nuclear war or to do nothing.

Now let us return to the question of hate crime legislation that seeks to criminalise the entire spectrum of rejection words and ideas. One function of moderate rejection words is to warn others of our disapproval at an early stage. That is not to argue that because I have earlier signaled my disapproval in fairly moderate language that the dispute will never escalate to even harsher words an an exchange of blows. However, that outcome can at least, in theory, be avoided. If I am denied the option of using even moderately critical words, because they are now deemed to be racist or hate speech, then I have been verbally disarmed. I cannot signal my disapproval, my rejection of certain types of behaviour or attitudes (spitting in public places, arranged marriages, female circumcision, for example). I either disengage from my interlocutor which may not be possible, or, denied a non-violent communicative response, and frustrated, I escalate to a violent response: I assault him, my nuclear option, which is an emphatic rejection.

The criminalising of words, ideas, attitudes and jokes as racist or hate speech removes the option of graded responses, thereby increasing resentments and making things worse. Even Bhikhu Parekh, a leading guru of multiculturalism, recognises the dangers which in the light of his attempts to limit free speech -- it has, he tells us, no privileged status -- is either grossly inconsistent or Machiavellian. He warns us:

First, a contentious issue can be resolved relatively easily or at least prevented from getting out of control if it is identified, isolated and dealt with at an early stage (Parekh, 2000, 304)

How true. And it is not happening. Hate crime legislation promotes self-censorship, the worst kind of censorship. Again, there are some obvious parallels with the later stages of communism. From the state's point of view, this is a desirable outcome, since one does not need to be heavy handed. Every citizen becomes his own censor. At an individual level, the loss of being able to express oneself is bad enough, but what happens when a whole society cannot express itself for fear of incurring accusations of racism and hate crime? Does this really promote better race relations, understanding and good will? On the contrary, it promotes mutual suspicion and resentment which under certain circumstances can erupt into something very nasty indeed, as the disintegration of Yugoslavia showed. Fifty years of compelling people to act and to believe as if Yugoslavia was a model of multiethnic harmony was blown to pieces in the 1990s, when resentments and festering hatreds suppressed by the communists erupted in an orgy of genocid. Legislators in the West who think that the West will always be immune from such violence overestimate the extent to which human behaviour can be manipulated by ill-conceived laws. People do not become favourably disposed to one another because of hate crime legislation. Public displays of tolerance are not enough to hold a multicultural society together.[1] Without that essential feeling that the "other" belongs in my tribe, the "other" will always be an outsider. The more governments coerce public opinion, the bigger will be the divide between the private and public spheres. The more I am told that I must accept the "other", the more I will come to resent and, eventually, to reject him. Denied the option of expressing my rejection of multiculturalism in public, I can give free rein only within the four walls of my own home. And what happens when eventually the barriers come down, as they must, between what I really think and feel, and between what I am expected to say in public? the obedient arrows of my hatred, lovingly made and crafted, will do my bidding.

__________________________
[size=1][1] Parekh recognises the problem yet again wants to push ahead regardless: "a multicultural society cannot be stable and last long without developing a common sense of belonging among its citizens". (Parekh, 2000, 341).

Terms such as hate speech or hate crime imply that there are no circumstances where articulating one's hatred, red and raw, of another culture, race or individual can ever be tolerated. This, too, is not as straightforward as it seems. What do we believe was the reaction of people in New York when Islamic terrorists murdered 3,000 people? No different at all, one suspects, from the reaction to the news that Pearl Harbour had been attacked.

Hate speech legislation attacks and erodes the institution of free speech. We might like to remind ourselves just how crucial free speech and related freedoms were and remain for the West. In explaining why I believe that the set of ideas and freedoms embodied in something known as the West is inherently and demonstrably superior to all other competitors, past and present, I could cite not just a very long list of scientific, cultural and technological achievements and the names associated with them, such as Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, Galileo and Beethoven, but the key elements of the social and intellectual infrastructure that made it at least possible that such achievements could be conceived and brought to completion. Fundamental would be the idea of the rule of law, the right to own and to dispose of property, the right to practice one's religion and free speech.

The rule of law demands that charges against a person be heard in a properly constituted legal setting; that the due process be observed; that the individual and his defence be given every opportunity to rebut them. He is innocent until proven guilty (multiculturalists reverse this: if we say you are a racist, you are a racist). If there are to be free and fair elections, then the contesting parties must be able to submit their ideas to public scrutiny without being censored. If I am to confess my religion, then, manifestly, I require the ability to do so without my being prosecuted as a heretic or a turbulent priest. If my home is my castle, over which I exercise sole dominion, then I am free to express my thoughts orally and in writing. The link between being a property owner and free speech, not immediately obvious, becomes clear, when we consider Recommendation 39 of The Macpherson Report, a landmark publication in race relations in the UK:

That consideration should be given to amendment of the law to allow prosecution of offences involving racist language or behaviour involving the possession of offensive weapons, where such conduct can be proved to have taken place otherwise than in a public place (Macpherson, 1999, 331).

All these rights are interconnected, and an attack on one set of rights and the institutions it supoprts is an attack on the others, sometimes in ways which are clear, and sometimes in less obvious ways. Through them all, though, like a steel thread, runs the right to free speech. If this right be weakened, moderated, limited, interdicted or otherwise subjected to correction, then the other rights and their exercise will be correspondingly weakened. So important has free speech been in the intellectual and moral evolution of the West that one is tempted to assert that the West is inconceivable and unsustainable without it. Demands of any kind for controls over the exercise of free speech, however apparently noble the cause, merit the closest scrutiny.

We have already mentioned Bhikhu Parekh, the editor of The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) and author of Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000). Parekh's starting point in Rethinking Multiculturalism is the response of Muslims to the publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses (1988), which led to death threats being made against its author. Parekh cites three objections from Muslims to The Satanic Verses: 'the book gave a totally inaccurate account of Islam and spread "utter lies" about it' (Parekh, 2000, 298-299); that The Satanic Verses was 'abusive', 'insulting', 'scurrilous' and 'vilifactory' in its treatment of men and women whom they [Muslims] considered holy' (Parekh, 2000, 299); and that The Satanic Verses 'demeaned and degraded them [Muslims] in their own and especially others' eyes' (Parekeh, 2000, 299). Of Rushdie, Parekh wrote:

As a Muslim as well as a scholar of Islam, Rushdie owed it to his culturally besieged community to counter the 'myths' and 'lies' spread about them, or at least to refrain from lending them his authority. Instead, he had joined the Orientalist discourse and harmed their moral and material interests (Parekh, 2000, 299).[2]

Parekh repeatedly demands that whites step out of their culture and confront the benefits of seeing their culture from another perspective, only to condemn Rushdie for the same thing with regard to Islam.

Rushdie's real crime, you suspect, is that he has produced an unflattering portrait. This betrays not just a gross discrepancy between what Parekh demands for whites but what he is willing to accept when writers actually take him at face value.

Who speaks for the 'culturally besieged' white population in Britain today? Very few. Most writers, intellectuals, politicians and, of course, the BBC, relentlessly attack Britain and her institutions: they have no interest whatsoever in the 'moral and material interests' of the white indigenous majority population, the largely silent and vilified majority; they most emphatically lend their authority to demeaning and degrading whites in their own eyes and other's eyes, and enjoy doing it with as much relish as Rushdie did in attacking Islam in The Satanic Verses.

More fundamentally, Parekh shows a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the evolution of free speech and intellectual inquiry which has been, uniquely, pioneered in the West, and is now under threat from multiculturalism. For example, the defenders of King Charles I would have undoubtedly seized upon Parekh's attacks on Rushdie, arguing that Oliver Cromwell and his fellow parliamentarians should have lent their authority to defending the king, not to attacking him. And what of Charles Darwin? Should he have refrained from publishing The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of the Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859) because it would undermine, and has undermined, confidence in the teachings of the Church of England? (Nor is that somewhat politically incorrect sub-title, which these days is never used, exactly sympathetic to the multicultural agenda).

In his discussion of the Muslim reaction to the publication of The Satanic Verses, Parekh uses the term 'the liberal discourse on free speech' (Parekh, 2000, 305), so highlighting one of the main problems of multiculturalism's response to free speech: namely that there is no Islamic, fascist, Marxist-Leninist, Nazi, feminist, heterophobic or multiculturalist discourse on free speech, just a series of bitter, ideological tirades, all of which reflect the real fear that none of these illiberal 'perspectives' can withstand full, open and critical examination. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and Mao crushed free speech, whereas feminism, multiculturalism and postmodernism operating in the West have sought to demean and to degrade it, such that confidence in the institution is weakened or lost, and politicians can treat it as a ceremonial supernumerary, not something to be defended and taken seriously. Parekh's use of 'the liberal discourse on free speech' masks the relativist agenda of multiculturalism, which it shares in common with Marxism-Leninism and Neo-Marxism. The question begged is that all discourses are of equal worth and that no single discourse, multicultural, liberal, and, one assumes, fascist, nazi or communist, is any better or worse than the other.[3] This sort of moral and intellectual relativism collapses when one takes the time, even briefly, to consider the practical and intellectual achievements of those societies, the West, that subscribe to what Parekh calls 'the liberal discourse on free speech'.

Far too much in Parekh's discussion of free speech is regressive. Thus, he instructs us:

Political deliberation should therefore be judged not merely in terms of its immediate and tangible results but also its moral, epistemological and community-sustaining role (Parekh, 2000, 307).

This marks a return to a much earlier stage in the West's intellectual evolution, when too much power was vested in the church and monarchy. Again, had this demand been accepted by sufficient numbers in England's past, then the course of English and world history would have taken a wholly different course from the one it did. There would have been no Reformation. Rome would have been justified in burning Galileo as a terrible heretic whose astronomical discoveries destroyed the authority of the Holy Roman Church. The Industrial Revolution would have been stopped dead in its tracks since it shifted power and wealth from the land to the city and, as many feared, led to demands for greater participation in the political process. Never mind Darwin, and Marx would not have had his day in the court of public opinion to which even his utopia was entitled. And the post-industrial society which relies on computers and other forms of information technology could be rejected because they would lead to automation and the massive loss of jobs in labour-intensive industry.

Parekh's narrowly-focused, short-term, utilitarian limitations on free speech attack the scientific and intellectual enterprise in other ways. That any scientific discovery, many of which raise serious political and moral considerations, be judged 'not merely' but even just by 'immediate and tangible' results shows a lack of understanding of how scientific discoveries become technological applications. Many technological breakthroughs occur years after the discovery on which they are based is made because the full significance was not obvious at the time of discovery. Prime numbers, long regarded as an esoteric branch of number theory, are now proving very useful in encryption software. Applying Parekh's own criteria to multiculturalism, we see that it fails the test and does so very badly. The tangible results in many Western cities have been disastrous, a huge increase in legal and illegal immigrants who are hostile to the host society and have no intention of conforming to the mores and norms of the white indigenous majority and the justified grievance among whites that their country, its history, and its culture can be sacrificed, is being sacrificed, in order to promote multiculturalism and all kinds of benefits which are never demonstrated, just asserted. Multiculturalism does not sustain the white identity: multiculturalism attacks the white identity at every opportunity and for obvious reasons. A strong sense of white identity resists many of the precepts of the multicultural agenda.

In making the case for political deliberation, which in a liberal democracy cannot be divorced from the institution of free speech, Parekh argues, quite rightly, that the crucial element, often missing, is 'rational persuasion' (Parekh, 2000, 307). He notes:

Political deliberation is practically oriented in the sense that oru aim is to persuade others, to secure their agreement, to get them to see the issue in a certain way. Arguments are an important part of this process but are rarely enough (Parekh, 2000, 307).

However, from the moment Parekh then attends to the nature of rational persuasion, he moves from "rational persuasion" to "persuasion". Rational persuasion and persuasion represent two different approaches to the same problem.

______________________________
[2] Parekh is in good company. Note, in this respect, Article 62 of the Soviet Constitution (1977): 'A citizen of the USSR is obliged to protect the interests of the Soviet state, to assist the strengthening of its power and authority'.

[3] There is an obvious inconsistency in the following attack on free speech and the many assertions which in themselves are not axiomatic: 'Free speech is not the only great value, and needs to be balanced against such others as avoidance of needless hurt, social harmony, human culture, protection of the weak, truthfulness in the public realm, and self-respect and dignity of individuals and groups' (Parekh, 2000, 320). How is 'truthfulness in the public realm' to be reconciled with weakening free speech?

[final pages, 100-107]

Rational persuasion relies on verifiable evidence and logically constructed arguments which are open to scrutiny. The rational persuader may not be able to demonstrate a conclusion with absolute certainty but he will seek to show that a particular explanation is more plausible from an evidentiary and statistical point of view and internally more consistent than rival explanations. The case that Parekh makes for persuasion -- not rational persuasion -- owes more to emotional, psychological, even irrational criteria, and, if necessary, coercion. He rejects rational persuasion when he writs that 'since arguments are rarely compelling or irresistible, the person to be persuaded remains free to accept or reject them'. (Parekh, 2000, 308). Now this isi quite a good insight into the mindset of Neo-Marxists and multiculturalists who beleive that uncontrolled immigration is a good thing. It is an article of faith, wholly immune to rational enquiry.

Again, the assertion that arguments are 'rarely compelling or irresistible' strikes one as odd in all kinds of demonstrable and verifiable ways. The argument that the scarcer a commodity becomes, the higher the price, is, based on past experience, both compelling and irresistible. Most people have not the slightest interest in Newtonian mechanics and certainly no desire to attempt to falsify the law of gravity by jumping from a very tall building. They find the observation that a stone dropped into a well will fall towards the water sufficiently compelling and irresistible. All the evidence is on their side.

Confusion also arises from thew way in which Parekh fails to discriminate between reason and reasons. Thus:

It is a rationalist mistake to equate the related but logically distinct concepts of reason and argument. All arguments involve or rest on reasons, but the reverse is not true. When I urge someone not to do something because it is unworthy of her, or goes against her view of the kind of person she is, I am giving her a reason but not advancing an argument, appealing to her but not arguing with her (Parekh, 2000, 309).

Reason, as in the faculty of reason, is not the same as a reason(s) for doing or refraining from doing something. Once this is realised, then the assertion in the second sentence poses no real problem and thus reunites the concepts of reason and argument which Parekh has tried to separate. In any case, if I urge someone not to do something, he can ask my reasons for my urging a particular course of action and so the whole process of reasoned argument begins. My interlocutor, through his cross-examination of my reasons, may even be able rationally to persuade me that his reasons were in fact quite sound, and that my objections were unfounded.

There is another important point that has to be made concerning the difference between persuasion and rational persuasion, since it goes to the heart of the way multiculturalists behave. Despite what Parekh writes about trying to persuade people, persuasion can provide for all kinds of coercion and intimidation, and multiculturalists are prone to resort to it: if you write an article attacking multiculturalism, you will never get tenure in an American or Canadian university; if you oppose immigration, you will be vilified as a racist and a hate criminal; if you argue that women are unsuited to certain tasks in the military, you will be denounced as sexist; if you draw attention to the consequences of certain "life-style" choices, the high incidence of HIV among homosexuals, you will be denounced as being "homophobic". In communist states, persuasion was a euphemism for a whole host of secret police abuses: arbitrary arrest; being made to sign false confessions or being compelled to undergo struggle sessions. If all this failed to persuade you, there was always the bullet in the neck or the GULAG.

Another line of attack pursued by Parekh against the rational process is to assert that 'Arguments have no weight of their own; we give it to them' (Parekh, 2000, 310). If I give weight to an argument, I am free to remove it. In other words, I am relieved of the burden of providing rational objections or support for anything; I make an argument weighty or weightless according to whim. Based on some of the reasons given by Parekh -- 'judgement of the likely consequences of the various courses of action' and 'historical experiences' (Parekh, 2000, 310) -- arguments do have weight of their own.

Quite another problem arises. If arguments carry no weight, then we have no way of making any judgements about anything as the basis of action at all. All decisions are arbitrary. Everything is a lottery. Witch doctors are no better or worse than scientific deliberation. So arguments for banning what Parekh calls hate speech are no better than arguments for encouraging it. If all arguments are arbitrary, then how is it that some cultures are able to send men to the moon and back and make computers? Are these achievements based just on chance or do they reflect a deeper understanding of the natural world and a consistently superior and, so far, unchallenged ability to manipulate it? And if these discoveries, based on certain first principles, are merely arbitrary, how are we to explain that they can be replicated by intelligent "others" regardless of their race and culture?

Parekh's conviction that we in Britain need a law to protect racial, religious, ethnic and other communities also encounters obstacles. The "other" communities are unspecified but should this law on communal libel apply to the much-maligned heterosexual community (a group that surely has been the target of group libel for some time), the heroin addict community, the academic community, the intelligence community, the gun-owning community, the angling community, the homeless community, the wife-swapping community or the prison community? And if not, why not? Parekh notes with the approval that certain jurisdictions have upheld the concept of 'defined group' or 'designated collectivity' (Parekh, 2000, 315). That 'arguments carry no weight' now brings further problems. How is it possible to establish whether such a thing as communal libel or group defamation exists at all -- to do so requires the application of rational processes -- and then to apportion guilt? If arguments carry no weight, then what of guilt, crime and punishment? Parekh himself destroys the rational basis of his own proposals.

But let us examine these arguments on the basis that Parekh does not espouse any form of cultural and intellectual relativism and see where his proposals might lead. To quote Parekh:

Communities are obviously different from individuals. They do not think, feel and suffer in a way that individuals do. And when they are libeled, clearly it is their individual members who are libeled. However, they are libeled not as unique individuals but as members of particular communities, as sharers of a specific cultural, racial or religious background and bearers of traits associated with it (Parekh, 2000, 313-314).

Having stated that communities are 'obviously different from individuals', Parekh then withdraws the concession by telling us that for purposes of communal libel, communities and individuals are one and the same thing. If communities are different, then it is by no means the case that individual members are clearly libeled. The claim that an attack on the individual is also an attack on the community depends on the individuals themselves who make up this community. Perception of being libeled depends on individual differences and abilities to evaluate information and ideas, something that is not uniformly and equally distributed among any group of people. Who will decide in the community that the community has been libeled? How will dissenters within the community who regard the attacks as fair comment be dealt with? Will they themselves be libeled and vilified as traitors?

If one attacks the habit of arranged marriages as something bizarre and alien, or the practice of female circumcision, does that count as communal libel? And what happens when the victim of an arranged marriage, refuses to go ahead, in effect condemning the custom? Who, in such circumstances, and on what basis, makes the case for communal libel? The self-appointed communal leaders? And are the press and broadcast media guilty of "communal libel" when they report these practices? Parkeh's final defence of the need for communal libel is based on the assertion that: 'If everything is speakable then everything becomes doable' (Parekh, 2000, 314). The bizarre conclusion can be dismissed as the basis of any legislation, yet it is revealing for the light it casts on the Neo-Marxist mindset of multiculturalists such as Parekh. The belief that words always lead to acts is pure word magic of the sort favoured by Mao and North Korea. Here we see the desire of the multiculturalists to achieve escape velocity from the world of reality and head off into fantasy.

Demands for communal libel arise from the influx of immigrants to Britain from states and cultures who have no tradition of free speech, are hostile to it or do not understand it. Individuals can take action against libel because they, as the targets, can show that the remarks are unambiguously aimed at them. The same degree of certainty can never be ascertained among a community and thus injustices will arise. The idea that all members of a group of people, even if they ar racially and cultrally homogenous will react in the same way to alleged libel is thoroughly implausible. It presupposes some kind of homonoia.

Another fundamental objection to communal libel's being adopted in Britain is that it attacks the long-standing emphasis in Britain on the individual and tries to impose collectivism on the British which is thoroughly alien. Communal libel invokes the Orwellian provisions of the Soviet Constitution (1977). Article 50 states:

To further the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and to develop the socialist system citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the freedom of speech, press, assemblies, meetings, street processions and demonstrations.

The Soviet people were, naturally, guaranteed nothing of the sort but even if one takes Article 50 at face value, one notes that the freedoms guaranteed are conditional on serving the interests of the people and the socialist system. This outlaws attacks on a system basedon the public ownership of the means of production and making any arguments for a free market economy. Hate crime and communal libel have been concocted in the same laboratory. Instead of the 'people' the emphasis switches to the 'community' and a small group of multiculturalists who will decide what constitutes the interests of the community and whether the community has been libeled. In one important sense communal libel is worse than its communist antecedent. The Soviet state had no institution of free speech. We in the West do, and communal libel would be a serious weakening of free speech and not just for the indigenous majority. For we should not lose sight of the fact, easily ignored, that Parekh's communal libel can also be deployed against dissenters among immigrants themselves. Thus dissenters are discouraged from exercising rights to free speech to which they are entitled. This works against assimilation. The dangers were clearly explicated by John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty (1859) which has gained in importance since it was published and remains the decisive refutation of multiculturalism's attempts to undermine free speech. On the silencing or discouraging of dissent, Mill notes:

Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil should consider, in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy (Mill, 1859, 160).

One final and perhaps unexpected point that arises from communal libel is communal praise. If, for example, I praise a particular community, pointing out that its members are industrious, intelligent and have a strong family ethic, I can expect my words to be warmly received. However, if I then go on to a point out that members of this community are over represented in prostitution, smuggling, drugs and money laundering, I can expect to be accused of peddling scurrilous generalisations or even inciting racism. It goes without saying that I shall be guilty of communal libel. Consistency alone demands that members of this community accept the good and the bad. If a positive and negative assessment involves the rational process, then rejection of one assessment rejects the other, that is the rational process. The only consistent solution is to ban any comments, good or bad, about any community or individuals. In a multicultural society we could take this even further, extending the proscription to intra-communal comment. So the English in 2027, on the occasion of the tercentenary of Sir Isaac Newton's death, shall be denied the opportunity of celebrating the achievements of this intellectual titan, since this will merely draw attention to the failure of other cultures to match his greatness. It would be especially hurtful and insensitive towards Africans. Multiculturalism moves us inexorably towards stasis. For multiculturalists, the ideal solution is total silence, apart from a small group of multicultural commissars being allowed to speak in a carefully constructed code. In 1984, they were called the Inner Party. Thus will multiculturalism drag us back to an earlier, more barbarous stage in our history.

In attacking what he regards as the privileged status of free speech, Parekh shows, like many immigrants, his lack of understanding of just how important a role free speech has played in British history. It is the sort of misunderstanding that one would expect from someone who is so deeply embedded or rather trapped in his own cultural perspective -- something that Parekh is always ready to accuse white dissenters from multicultural orthodoxy -- that he is unable to understand just how important the institution of free speech has been to the West. If, according to Parekh, free speech can claim no privileged status, then neither can any of the West's political systems:

From a multicultural perspective, no political doctrine or ideology can represent the full truth of human life. Each of them, be it liberalism, conservatism, socialism or nationalism, is embedded in a particular culture, represents a particular vision of the good life, and is necessarily narrow and partial (Parekh, 2000, 338).

One can note that Parekh does not include multiculturalism in this list, assuming without any attempt to demonstrate, merely to assert, that multiculturalism because it is multicultural, is superior. If liberalism et al can claim no special privileges, then the same applies to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism derives no superior status because it claims to be based on a variety of responses to the problem of race and culture. The key fact is the quality of the components and their fitness for purpose. Are they a serious rival to the West? What can they teach us? Not much, and a great deal that is best avoided altogether. A motley gathering of Third World countries with a dash of feminism, anti-racism and claims of homosexual rights is not an equal partner to the liberal democracies of the West. The reason I "privilege" liberal democracy is because it, like the West from which it has grown, is demonstrably superior to all rivals.

If the two major threats to a liberal-democratic West in the twentieth century had triumphed -- Nazi Germany and Soviet communism -- then free speech and all the other rights, customs and privileges which we enjoy would have been snuffed out. That would have been the prelude to a new Dark Age. Both systems rejected the emphasis on individual freedoms and rights which in England had evolved since the Magna Carta. In Nazi Germany books were burned and various art forms were declared to be degenerate or un-German. In Germany of the 1930s and in America of the 1960s and 1970s, it was the professoriate and the students who played an active role in ridiculing and undermining the institution of free speech. Free speech was suppressed almost as soon as Lenin seized power in 1917. Censorship was only abolished as late as August 1900 with the enactment of the Soviet Press Law. One year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Free speech is one of the most important weapons the citizenry have to defend themselves against dictators and tyrants, which is why they want to destroy it. By their own attempts to silence opposition, multiculturalists confirm their own totalitarian pedigree. Hate crime legislation and communal libel are not about protecting vulnerable people. They are designed to intimidate opponents and where that fails to punish them and to deter further dissenters. The offspring of Lenin, Heidegger and Mao, multiculturalism is the new extremism that replaces the Soviet empire as the threat to the West.

References

Konstitutsiya SSSR. 1977. Yuridicheskaya Literatura, Moscow, 1980.

Macpherson of Cluny, Sir William. 1999. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, CM 4262-I, The Stationery Office, London, 1999.

Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty, Collins, Fount Paperbacks, Glasgow, 1982.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Macmillan, Basingstoke and London, 2000.

[end]

Let me know if you see any typos in this. Author is English, so he uses standard UK spelling - s for c and ou in, for example, harbour, rather than just o. In general this thing is bizarrely punctuated, with complete absence of commas. It's good the thing exist, but on typing it in, I notice a lot more holes than I did the first time: shoddy proofing and the author being either shallow or wrong due to his neoconservatism.