F.W. Braun
February 24th, 2005, 02:34 PM
From my thread on SF:
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=185621&page=21&pp=10
The nature of the German offer to Poland of November 1938, Polish_Boy is again lying - as usual, one shouldn’t expect truth to come out of a Pole’s mouth when the topic of WW II is under discussion and Poland’s incessant provocation of the crisis surrounding the events of September 1939, they have as much at stake as the Jews in preserving the current mythology and lies; hence, the Polish_Boy’s s maniacal spamming of this thread with his shameless lies and distortions. Just like the Jews they revel in playing up their false victim status. In Germany Poles are typically regarded as bottom-feeders by the entire political spectrum; I hope that the gallery gets an appreciation of why that’s the case while reading Polish_Boy’s arrogant and condescending posts brimming with patent falsehoods and hypocrisy -- when he writes that this generous offer was made under German threats it's just another lie...every single claim of Polish_Boy is a lie or distortion in this thread:
P. 145-146
Prof. David L. Hoggan, The Forced War: When Peaceful Revisionism Failed.
Quote:
Ribbentrop requested Lipski [Polish Ambassador to Germany] to convey a cordial invitation to Beck to visit Germany again in November 1938. Lipski promised to do this, and the German Foreign Minister proceeded to outline Hitler’s plan. Germany would request Poland to permit her to annex Danzig. She would ask permission to construct a superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. Lipski was assured that these carefully circumscribed suggestions represented the total of German requests from Poland.
It was clear that there had to be a quid pro quo basis for negotiation and Germany was prepared to offer many concessions. Poland would be granted a permanent free port in Danzig and the light to build her own highway and railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would be a permanent free market for Polish goods on which no German customs duties would be levied. Germany would take the unprecedented step of recognizing and guaranteeing the existing German-Polish frontier, including the 1922 boundary in Upper Silesia. Ribbentrop compared the German sacrifice in making this offer with concessions recently made to Italy in the Tirol question. He added that Germany hoped to make similar agreement with France about the Franco-German frontier, since the Locarno treaties were no longer in effect.
Germany had many other ideas for further proposals which would be of advantage to Poland. Ribbentrop proposed a new formal treaty to include these provisions for a general settlement. It need not be an alliance pact, and a new non-aggression pact which might be extended to twenty-five years would suffice. He hoped that the new pact would contain a consultation clause to increase cooperation, and he thought it would be helpful if Poland would join the anti-Comintern front.
Hitler’s offer contained generous terms for Poland. It included an enormous German renunciation in favor of Poland in the question of the frontiers. Hitler’s offer to guarantee Poland’s frontiers carried with it a degree of security which could not have been matched by any of the other non-Communist Powers. This more than compensated for the return to Germany of Danzig, which had been under a National Socialist regime for several years. Polish prestige in agreeing to the change at Danzig would be protected by this fact. It would be easy for Polish propagandists to point out that Poland was securing great advantages in such a policy.
An Ambassador would normally have confined his response to a discussion of the individual points in such an offer with the aim of obtaining complete clarity prior to receiving new instructions. This was not Lipski’s method. He replied at once that he “did not consider an Anschluss (Germany-Danzig) possible, however, if only – and principally – for reasons of domestic policy.” He developed this theme with great intensity, and he insisted that Beck could never prevail upon the Polish people to accept the German annexation of Danzig. He added that in Poland the Free City of Danzig, unlike the Saar, was not regarded as a product of the Versailles Treaty, but of an older historical tradition.
Lipski was insincere in his presentation of these carefully prepared arguments. He knew perfectly well that the chief obstacle to the German annexation of Danzig was the determination of Beck that Germany should never recover this city. The Polish diplomat deliberately created the misleading impression that Beck was unable to decide about Danzig because of public opinion. It was astonishing that Lipski displayed no enthusiasm about German recognition of the Polish frontiers. He would have been enthusiastic had he been more optimistic about a lasting good relations with Germany, but unfortunately this was not the attitude of the Polish Foreign Office under Beck’s leadership.
Ribbentrop tried to conceal his impatience, but he was obviously irritated by the strange attitude of Lipski. He warned Lipski that recognition of the Polish Corridor was no easy matter for Hitler. Lipski's response was to change the subject...[Maybe Polish_Boy will also enlighten the gallery at this point and tell us what happened to Teschen...a sizeable chunk of Czechoslovakia greedily bitten off by Poland in 1938...speaking of frightening Polonization of that territory, maybe someone will tell us how the non-Polish citizenry was treated by the invading Poles...these sweethearts...]
Again, it’s important to remind the gallery that Germany tried…and tried…and tried to come to a sensible agreement with Poland until September 1939, only to have all its offers for a compromise spurned, ignored, and turned down by the arrogant, reckless, saber-rattling Polish chauvinists. Polish recklessness and stupidity are the stuff of legend in European affairs (it’s not for nothing that Poland was dismembered thrice in her history), and once again the Poles lived up to their well-earned reputation. Therefore, to say that Danzig was just a “pretext” (when Germany hoped for a peaceful arrangement until the very end) is an insidious lie cultivated by Poles and the Allies to justify their hypocritical treatment of Germany.
Further, starting in 1934 and up to 1939 Polish leadership repeatedly beat the drums for a war on Germany. Poles periodically made calls throughout the 1930s on the West to wage war against her. The fact is that Poland wanted to see a war between Poland and Germany because the Poles thought that Poland was going to come out of such a war a major European power with a territorial expansion in the East and West. They were the willing tools of Britain’s cynical balance of power policy.
Here’s an old and interesting thread on “The Road to War” that eloquently illustrates some of the events that lead to WW II.
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/sho...ght=road+to+war
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=185621&page=21&pp=10
The nature of the German offer to Poland of November 1938, Polish_Boy is again lying - as usual, one shouldn’t expect truth to come out of a Pole’s mouth when the topic of WW II is under discussion and Poland’s incessant provocation of the crisis surrounding the events of September 1939, they have as much at stake as the Jews in preserving the current mythology and lies; hence, the Polish_Boy’s s maniacal spamming of this thread with his shameless lies and distortions. Just like the Jews they revel in playing up their false victim status. In Germany Poles are typically regarded as bottom-feeders by the entire political spectrum; I hope that the gallery gets an appreciation of why that’s the case while reading Polish_Boy’s arrogant and condescending posts brimming with patent falsehoods and hypocrisy -- when he writes that this generous offer was made under German threats it's just another lie...every single claim of Polish_Boy is a lie or distortion in this thread:
P. 145-146
Prof. David L. Hoggan, The Forced War: When Peaceful Revisionism Failed.
Quote:
Ribbentrop requested Lipski [Polish Ambassador to Germany] to convey a cordial invitation to Beck to visit Germany again in November 1938. Lipski promised to do this, and the German Foreign Minister proceeded to outline Hitler’s plan. Germany would request Poland to permit her to annex Danzig. She would ask permission to construct a superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. Lipski was assured that these carefully circumscribed suggestions represented the total of German requests from Poland.
It was clear that there had to be a quid pro quo basis for negotiation and Germany was prepared to offer many concessions. Poland would be granted a permanent free port in Danzig and the light to build her own highway and railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would be a permanent free market for Polish goods on which no German customs duties would be levied. Germany would take the unprecedented step of recognizing and guaranteeing the existing German-Polish frontier, including the 1922 boundary in Upper Silesia. Ribbentrop compared the German sacrifice in making this offer with concessions recently made to Italy in the Tirol question. He added that Germany hoped to make similar agreement with France about the Franco-German frontier, since the Locarno treaties were no longer in effect.
Germany had many other ideas for further proposals which would be of advantage to Poland. Ribbentrop proposed a new formal treaty to include these provisions for a general settlement. It need not be an alliance pact, and a new non-aggression pact which might be extended to twenty-five years would suffice. He hoped that the new pact would contain a consultation clause to increase cooperation, and he thought it would be helpful if Poland would join the anti-Comintern front.
Hitler’s offer contained generous terms for Poland. It included an enormous German renunciation in favor of Poland in the question of the frontiers. Hitler’s offer to guarantee Poland’s frontiers carried with it a degree of security which could not have been matched by any of the other non-Communist Powers. This more than compensated for the return to Germany of Danzig, which had been under a National Socialist regime for several years. Polish prestige in agreeing to the change at Danzig would be protected by this fact. It would be easy for Polish propagandists to point out that Poland was securing great advantages in such a policy.
An Ambassador would normally have confined his response to a discussion of the individual points in such an offer with the aim of obtaining complete clarity prior to receiving new instructions. This was not Lipski’s method. He replied at once that he “did not consider an Anschluss (Germany-Danzig) possible, however, if only – and principally – for reasons of domestic policy.” He developed this theme with great intensity, and he insisted that Beck could never prevail upon the Polish people to accept the German annexation of Danzig. He added that in Poland the Free City of Danzig, unlike the Saar, was not regarded as a product of the Versailles Treaty, but of an older historical tradition.
Lipski was insincere in his presentation of these carefully prepared arguments. He knew perfectly well that the chief obstacle to the German annexation of Danzig was the determination of Beck that Germany should never recover this city. The Polish diplomat deliberately created the misleading impression that Beck was unable to decide about Danzig because of public opinion. It was astonishing that Lipski displayed no enthusiasm about German recognition of the Polish frontiers. He would have been enthusiastic had he been more optimistic about a lasting good relations with Germany, but unfortunately this was not the attitude of the Polish Foreign Office under Beck’s leadership.
Ribbentrop tried to conceal his impatience, but he was obviously irritated by the strange attitude of Lipski. He warned Lipski that recognition of the Polish Corridor was no easy matter for Hitler. Lipski's response was to change the subject...[Maybe Polish_Boy will also enlighten the gallery at this point and tell us what happened to Teschen...a sizeable chunk of Czechoslovakia greedily bitten off by Poland in 1938...speaking of frightening Polonization of that territory, maybe someone will tell us how the non-Polish citizenry was treated by the invading Poles...these sweethearts...]
Again, it’s important to remind the gallery that Germany tried…and tried…and tried to come to a sensible agreement with Poland until September 1939, only to have all its offers for a compromise spurned, ignored, and turned down by the arrogant, reckless, saber-rattling Polish chauvinists. Polish recklessness and stupidity are the stuff of legend in European affairs (it’s not for nothing that Poland was dismembered thrice in her history), and once again the Poles lived up to their well-earned reputation. Therefore, to say that Danzig was just a “pretext” (when Germany hoped for a peaceful arrangement until the very end) is an insidious lie cultivated by Poles and the Allies to justify their hypocritical treatment of Germany.
Further, starting in 1934 and up to 1939 Polish leadership repeatedly beat the drums for a war on Germany. Poles periodically made calls throughout the 1930s on the West to wage war against her. The fact is that Poland wanted to see a war between Poland and Germany because the Poles thought that Poland was going to come out of such a war a major European power with a territorial expansion in the East and West. They were the willing tools of Britain’s cynical balance of power policy.
Here’s an old and interesting thread on “The Road to War” that eloquently illustrates some of the events that lead to WW II.
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/sho...ght=road+to+war