... requirement for the payment of drivers licence, insurance, registration and parking fees.


RCMP Problems Get Larger
As if the recent scandals and lies from the very people sworn to uphold the law weren’t enough, a further and more menacing threat looms on the judicial horizon.

A Notice of Constitutional Challenge has been filed with the Court by a British Columbia man, claiming, inter alia, that the sections of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act R.S. c. R-9, which permit the RCMP to enforce provincial and federal laws within certain provinces, violates the provisions of s. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867. David-Kevin: Lindsay has filed this precedent setting challenge which will forever change the face of policing in the provinces.

Historically, policing in Canada was always provincial legislation and was encompassed within s. 92 (14) of the BNA Act. Constitutionally, the only jurisdiction the RCMP have any power to enforce any laws within, are the Territories. The Supreme Court of Canada has already declared policing to be a provincial matter on no less than 5 occasions. The only remaining issue is whether the Agreements signed between the provinces and the Federal Government to permit the RCMP to exist as a provincial police force are constitutional. The answer to this has already been decided as a resounding NO.

The SCC has further held that it is not constitutionally permissible for Parliament to delegate their legislative powers nor to pass legislation which permits them to do indirectly what Parliament cannot do directly.

"No power of delegation is expressed either in s. 91 or in section 92, nor, indeed, is there to be found the power of accepting delegation from one body to the other; and I have no doubt that if it had been the intention to give such powers it would have been expressed in clear and unequivocal language. Neither legislative bodies, federal or provincial, possess any portion of the powers respectively vested in the other, and they cannot receive it by delegation..."

Attorney General of Nova Scotia v Attorney General of Canada and Lord nelson Hotel Company Ltd. 1950 SCR 31, 34

"I am amazed, well not really when you consider that I’m talking about lawyers, that no lawyer has ever challenged this jurisdiction in the past. I can only believe that either the lawyers are incompetent, as most Canadians already are well aware of, or any lawyer thinking of so doing was privately instructed not to do so or they would never win another case again, as a high profile lawyer once told me would happen to him if he ever took on one of my cases. The RCMP have a real problem on their hands on this one and by the time I’m done, the only place they will be enforcing any laws, will be in the Territories, where the Constitution mandates them to be."

-2-

David was travelling in his private automobile with a private ID plate and no insurance, drivers licence nor registration, when the 5 RCMP cruiser cars pulled him over this past winter and prevented him from travelling in his car. David is also challenging the provincial driving legislation which requires the payment of fees for drivers licences, insurance and registration prior to travelling upon the public highways.

"Everyone has the absolute constitutional right to the free use of the public highways", claims David. "It cannot be legislated away by some petty bureaucrat. Governments continually use costs as an excuse for denial of our most cherished rights, freedoms and liberties. Economic expediency is not a lawful grounds for denial of vindicated constitutional rights, freedoms and liberties. The police and state are required to find and implement methods of policing the highways that conform to our constitutional rights, not deny them because it is easier to do so. These methods do exist but have been covered up by authorities hell bent on justifying the most massive police intrusion, power and control upon us this country has ever witnessed. That time is fast coming to an end, as we the people, assert our constitutional right to free travel, the only time the police will be able to stop you is upon reasonable and probable grounds that you have actually committed an offence. This is the rule of law and will no longer be subverted by corrupt governments, police forces, judiciary (who are supposed to be the protectors of these rights and freedoms) and insurance companies, for their own private self interests."

"Our entire highway system, from the point of passing one’s drivers test to the whole system of purported police protection on the highways, is distorted and corrupt - with government’s primary concern being the raising of revenue and using the drivers licence as a form of ID. A properly functioning highway system would ensure that everyone is required to pass a comprehensive written test, obtain their experience PRIOR to obtaining their full certificate of proficiency, and thereafter being free to travel upon the public highways free of all charges and fees. This is freedom and the right to free travel exists independently of the Charter."

[Please excuse the formatting]

In the name of Yahveh (God)
Without prejudice
File No. AH15311963-1
Kelowna Registry
In the Provincial Court of British Columbia

And in the Matter of: The common law, constitutional law and contract law

And in the Matter of: The absolute, unalienable right of David-Kevin: Lindsay, a free will, full liability flesh and blood living man, to his absolute, unalienable and constitutional right to the free use of the public highways

And in the Matter of: The British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act and Regulations

And in the Matter of: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, and agreements between British Columbia and Canada for the utilization of a federally constituted police force in British Columbia

Between:
David Kevin Lindsay
- v -
Her Majesty the Queen,
Respondent

Notice of Application
Pursuant to s. 8 (2), (3), (4) of the Constitutional Question Act R.S.B.C. 1996 Chapter 68
David-Kevin: Lindsay

Attorney General of British Columbia Attorney General of Canada
1355 Water St. 900-840 Howe St.
Kelowna, British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia
250 470-6822 V6Z 2S9
fax 250 470-6820 604 666-0211
Fax 604 666-1599






In the name of Yahveh (God)
Without prejudice
File No. AH15311963-1
Kelowna Registry
In the Provincial Court of British Columbia

And in the Matter of: The common law, constitutional law and contract law

And in the Matter of: The absolute, unalienable right of David-Kevin: Lindsay, a free will, full liability flesh and blood living man, to his absolute, unalienable and constitutional right to the free use of the public highways

And in the Matter of: The British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act and Regulations

And in the Matter of: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, and agreements between British Columbia and Canada for the utilization of a federally constituted police force in British Columbia
Between:
David Kevin Lindsay

- v -

Her Majesty the Queen of England,
Respondent
Notice of Application
Pursuant to s. 8 (2), (3), (4) of the Constitutional Question Act R.S.B.C. 1996 Chapter 68

Take notice that an application will be made by David-Kevin: Lindsay, a free will, full liability flesh and blood living man created by God, who is not the person charged nor a party to Provincial Court file no. File No. AH15311963-1, on Monday, the 12th day of February, 2007, or so soon thereafter as the Application may be heard, for the following relief:

1. is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S. c. R-9, s.1, in pith and substance, legislation in relation to policing, a matter coming within the class of subjects encompassed by s. 92 (14) of the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867, ie: the administration of justice in the province, and thus unconstitutional and/or ultra vires Parliament, as the case may be,
yes;

2. are sections 18 (a), (b), (c), (d), and 20 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S. c. R-9, s.1, in pith and substance, legislation in relation to policing, a matter coming within the class of subjects encompassed by s. 92 (14) of the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867, ie: the administration of justice in the province and thus unconstitutional and/or ultra vires Parliament, as the case may be,
yes;

3. are s. 3, 14 (1), (2) (a), (b), (c), (d), and (3) of the British Columbia Provincial Police Act, R.S.B.C.1996, ch. 367, insofar as they purport to authorize the Minister, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor to enter into and carry out agreements with Canada authorizing the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to carry out the powers and duties of the provincial police force, and inter alia, deem the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to be a provincial police force, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia as the case may be,
yes;

4. is the Memorandum of Agreement between the GOVERNMENT OF CANADA and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, dated April 1, 1992 and Order in Council # 281, dated February 28, 1992, signed by the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, which purports to authorize said Memorandum of Agreement, insofar as it permits Canada to establish a Provincial Police Service within the Province, hereinafter identified as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, with the powers and duties of a provincial police force to enforce provincial and federal criminal offences, including but not restricted to the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires both the Lieutenant Governor, said GOVERNMENTS, as the case may be, to enter into,

yes;

5. is, inter alia, s. 79 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to authorize the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to make arrests pursuant to, and enforce provisions of this Act, including the charges herein, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,

yes

6. are any and all Orders in Council, if any, including but not restricted to OIC #281, Feb. 28, 1992, and Privy Council 1992-2/369, Feb. 27/92 P.C., unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Lieutenant Governor to issue or proclaim as the case may be,
yes.
The remaining questions, presuming without prejudice that ‘motor vehicle’ as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, includes a private automobile, which was/is different than a motor vehicle, are as follows:

7. are certain definitions, including but not restricted to ‘motor vehicle’ and ‘highway’, in s. 1 of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

8. are s. 3 (1) (a), (b), (c), of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to require David-Kevin: Lindsay to obtain registration of his private automobile with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, hereinafter ICBC, obtain a licence for the operation of the said automobile, and obtain a certificate of insurance, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;


9. is s. 13 (1) (a) of the said Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318 insofar as it purports to penalize failure to obtain the aforementioned registration, licence and insurance,
unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

10. is s. 11 of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C.1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it requires that David-Kevin: Lindsay obtain and keep the aforementioned licence in his automobile at all times, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

11. are s. 24 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) (a) (b), of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as they purport to require David-Kevin: Lindsay to obtain a drivers licence, insurance and driver’s certificate and create offences for failing to so do, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,

yes;

12. is s. 25 (1), of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to require David-Kevin: Lindsay to apply for a drivers licence, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

13. is s. 62 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to authorize the Lieutenant Governor, the Queen’s Representative for British Columbia, to prescribe fees for registration and licences under this Act, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

14. is s. 71 of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as this section, in conjunction with s. 24 and 25 of the said Act or separately, purports to require David-Kevin: Lindsay to obtain a drivers licence and produce same to a peace officer upon request, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

15. is s. 73 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to require David-Kevin: Lindsay to tell the peace officer his name and the name of the owner of any automobile he is traveling therein, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

16. is s. 75 of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to create an offence for failing and/or refusing to pay prescribed fees for and to obtain a drivers licence and certificate, vehicle registration and insurance, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes;

17. is s. 80 of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318, insofar as it purports to require in a prosecution under this Act that David-Kevin: Lindsay prove he possessed a valid and subsisting motor vehicle liability policy or insurance or financial responsibility card, unconstitutional and/or ultra vires the Legislature of British Columbia, as the case may be,
yes.
The following are the rights, freedoms or liberties alleged to be infringed, pursuant to s. 8 (4) (b) (ii) of the Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 CHAPTER 68:

18. Para. 7-17 above, all infringe or deny or purport to infringe or deny to David-Kevin: Lindsay, expressly, impliedly or through interpretation of same, his absolute, unalienable, constitutional right to the free use of the public highways, a right which has existed for centuries if not millennia, which has never been dependent upon the mode of transportation, which itself has expanded over time, and which cannot be legislated away by the Legislature, directly or indirectly.

19. Para. 8-17 above, David-Kevin: Lindsay has the absolute right to not be detained by the police without reasonable and probable grounds by them to believe that an offence has been committed. These Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318 provisions permit arbitrary and random detainment of David without reasonable and probable grounds to believe that he has committed any offence.
The following are the general particulars to be argued for this challenge, pursuant to s. 8 (4) (d) of the Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 CHAPTER 68, with respect to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and the Police Act of British Columbia, including but not restricted to:

20. The history of policing in English and Canadian history has always been restricted to that of a local level. National police forces to enforce local and criminal laws are unknown to the common law and to this country and are a constitutional anomaly. This was incorporated into the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867. There is no reference in any debates prior to 1867, during passage of the BNA Act, nor thereafter, of policing being encompassed by federal legislation, exclusively or duplicitous with provincial legislative powers.

21. Parliament has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned sections of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S. c. R-9, s.1 as this is legislation in relation to the matter of policing in the province, which comes within the class of subjects identified as the administration of justice, pursuant to s. 92 (14) of the British North America Act 1867.

22. Parliament has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned sections of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S. c. R-9, s.1 insofar as it purports to authorize Canada to enter into Agreements with any of the provinces, including British Columbia, to permit a federal police force operating in the province. Parliament has no legislative jurisdiction to create and/or constitute its own police force to operate in the provinces and cannot, by way of legislative authorization to enter into agreements with the provinces, permit its own police force to operate in the provinces.

23. Applicable principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation do not permit any interpretation of s. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867, that would permit Parliament to legislate in relation to the matter of policing, ie: for a federally constituted police force to exist and/or enforce provincial or criminal laws in the provinces.

24. Res judicata and/or estoppel are applicable to any Respondent defence, inasmuch as the Supreme Court of Canada has, on no less than 5 occasions, held that the power to pass legislation in relation to the policing of the province, ie: of enforcing all Imperial, Federal and Provincial laws, is exclusively vested in the Provincial Legislatures, not Parliament. Moreover, both levels of government, via the wording of the said Agreements purporting to authorize the RCMP to operate in the province, freely concede that this is in relation to the matter of policing, encompassed within the class of subjects in 92 (14) of the British North America Act 1867, Constitution Act 1867, the administration of justice in the province. Neither provincial nor federal government can now claim or argue to the contrary.

25. The Supreme Court of Canada has conclusively and repeatedly held that delegation of legislative powers is not permitted by the British North America Act 1867, aka the Constitution Act 1867. "The Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures of the several Provinces are sovereign within their sphere defined by the British North America Act, but none of them has the unlimited capacity of an individual. They can exercise only the legislative powers respectively given to them by sections 91 and 92 of the Act, and these powers must be found in either of these sections....no power of delegation is expressed either in section 91 or in section 92, nor, indeed, is there to be found the power of accepting delegation from one body to the other; and I have no doubt that if it had been the intention to give such powers it would have been expressed in clear and unequivocal language. Under the scheme of the British North America Act there were to be, in the words of Lord Atkin in The Labour Conventions Reference (1), ‘watertight compartments which are an essential part of the original structure.’ " Neither level of government, independently or cooperatively can do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
Attorney General of Nova Scotia and the Attorney General of Canada and the Lord Nelson Hotel Company Ltd. 1950 SCR 31
The following are the general particulars to be argued for this challenge, pursuant to s. 8 (4) (d) of the Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 CHAPTER 68, with respect to the Motor Vehicle Act charges, including but not restricted to:

26. David-Kevin: Lindsay is not a person pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, CHAPTER 318 and has never possessed a British Columbia drivers licence nor ever registered nor insured any private or other automobile or motor vehicle in British Columbia. He is not a ‘person’ pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act, the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, nor the attending regulations and Orders in Council;

27. David-Kevin: Lindsay possesses the invioble, unalienable (synonymously referred to inalienable) and/or absolute constitutional right to the free use of the public highways, meaning that he is not required to pay, inter alia, drivers licence, insurance or registration fees to exercise this said constitutional right, directly or indirectly. This said constitutional right of free travel existing across Canada and includes traveling by any mode or system, including his private automobile.

28. The legislative power of the Legislature to pass laws to regulate the use of the public highways, does not include the power to prohibit or licence, directly or indirectly. Regulation being inconsistent with prohibition. The Legislature cannot ‘licence’ the constitutional rights of David-Kevin: Lindsay nor any other man or woman, directly or indirectly. The Legislature is required to regulate the public highways in subordination to the rights, freedoms and liberties of all men and women to freely travel, not conversely, and this duty imparts a legislative obligation upon the Legislature to regulate without charging fees. David’s constitutional right to the free use of the public highways is not subject to the fiat of the Legislature nor anyone else and cannot be converted into a privilege to be granted or denied at the whim of some petty bureaucrat, or other.

29. Ownership of the public highways is vested exclusively in all men and women, and more particularly the men and women who are owners of property abutting the public highways, not the Legislature, who holds them simply as trustee for the public. At no time have the people ever vested in the Legislature the legislative power to repeal and/or deny their constitutional right to the free use of the said public highways. A trustee has no right to prohibit.

30. It is not within the legislative power of the Legislature to pass legislation which denies to David-Kevin: Lindsay constitutional rights, freedoms and/or liberties. The Provincial Legislature does not have the legislative power to pass legislation contrary to the Constitution of Canada.

31. The Legislature throughout the years, has changed previously known definitions of words in the various highway acts, in a fraudulent attempt to denude men and women of their constitutional right of free travel. The Legislature in this issue is no more than a modern version of the robber barons of old.

32. Res judicata is applicable in that the highest courts in this land and this province, as well as hundreds of authorities, have recognized David-Kevin: Lindsay’s absolute right to the free use of the public highways as being constitutional in nature and higher than any legislative power to deny, and thus not subject to legislative repeal and/or denial.

33. Alternatively and without prejudice, the Constitution Act of Canada 1982, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms therein, is an addition to constitutional rights, freedoms and liberties existing prior to same. The Charter has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada to be interpreted in a broad manner which does not and cannot abrogate or deny previously existing constitutional rights, freedoms and/or liberties.

34. All legislation must be given Royal Assent by the Queen’s Representative, the Lieutenant Governor. The judiciary has held that neither the Crown nor the Queen possess the power to deny the constitutional right of free passage upon the public highways. Nor too can she so do via Royal Assent to legislation which purports to affect the same resulting constitutional rights, freedoms and/or liberties deprivations.

35. Alternatively and without prejudice, as the principle of law applies that the ends do not justify the means, neither registration, insurance nor drivers licences, and their attending fees, are necessary to permit peace officers to effectively police the public highways. Other methods exist which will effectively permit peace officers to ensure the safety of those traveling upon the public highways, including methods of identifying travelers thereon and apprehending criminals and offenders who have caused rights deprivations and/or injury to others, without any requirement for the payment of fees, directly or indirectly. Economic expediency is not a lawful basis for legislative denial and/or deprivation of constitutional or other rights, freedoms and/or liberties. The fees at issue herein are unnecessary and unreasonable.

36. Peace officers must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has been committed. It is unconstitutional to demand that everyone must show identification upon demand, with said demand being able to be exercised without reasonable and probable grounds to believe any offence has been committed. It is completely arbitrary in its scope and application and may and can operate in a manner so as to permit peace officers to stop anyone at anytime for no reason other than, "ve vas just checking your papers" and failure to produce constituting grounds to have one’s private property, their automobile, stolen from them with extortion fees required to be paid to have same returned to him. It further amounts to self incrimination.

37. Use of the public highways for commercial purposes has been held to be a privilege subject to legislation to prescribe fees and other requirements particular to this commercial activity. Outside hours of operation for commercial use however, all men and women retain their right to the free use of the public highways.

36. Such further and other particulars and grounds as may be put forth by David-Kevin: Lindsay, who is not bound nor restricted by the points listed herein and who reserves the right to amend any and all parts of this Notice at any time, including by way of his future written position.


Dated this ___ day of _________________, 2006
__________________________
David-Kevin: Lindsay
Her Majesty the Queen v David Kevin Lindsay
File No. AH15311963-1

And in the Matter of: The common law, constitutional law and contract law

And in the Matter of: The absolute, unalienable right of David-Kevin: Lindsay, a free will, full liability flesh and blood living man, to his absolute, unalienable and constitutional right to the free use of the public highways

And in the Matter of: The British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act and Regulations

And in the Matter of: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, and agreements between British Columbia and Canada for the utilization of a federally constituted police force in British Columbia


Her Majesty the Queen v David Kevin Lindsay
_________________________________________________________________________________________


Provincial Court of British Columbia
Kelowna, B.C. Registry
Proceedings commenced at Kelowna, B.C.

_________________________________
Notice of Constitutional Challenge
David-Kevin: Lindsay
__________________________________

David-Kevin: Lindsay
dklfree@gmail.com