View Full Version : wanna be free?
Charles Martel
June 24th, 2008, 02:46 AM
Buy an ironkey. google "hacker tools" and install all the standalones you can on your new key. Use it to surf and do all your business on from now on.
Oh, the feds are going to love me now......:D
OTPTT
June 24th, 2008, 02:57 AM
Buy an ironkey. google "hacker tools" and install all the standalones you can on your new key. Use it to surf and do all your business on from now on.
Oh, the feds are going to love me now......:D
Interesting.
IronKey (https://www.ironkey.com/)
IronKey FAQ (https://learn.ironkey.com/faqs#disp)
OTPTT
June 24th, 2008, 03:03 AM
Link to below post. (http://www.ethicalhacker.net/component/option,com_smf/Itemid,54/topic,2370.msg11818/topicseen,1/)
I've got a free sample of the Ironkey, it is quite nice.
Nice tactile feel, solid metal case. The chap I spoke to made some bold claims about it working after being submerged for 24 hours, once dried off but as the internals are epoxy coated, no big suprise.
Apparently, youtube has a video of one being run over by a bobcat and working afterwards.
It is supported under XP, Vista and MacOS, so saddos like me that stick to Linux and Win2k are out of luck. I have tested in on the wife's laptop and it does what it says on the tin.
There is, apparently, a management verison coming out. This should give to sysadmin the opportunity to set the number of times a password can be attempted before the key is fried. I asked if frying could be avoided completely but the salesman didn't seem to know.
I also visited Sandisk with the same requirements. The sandisk stick seems to be reasonably good, too.
While it is in no way ruggedised like the ironkey it has the benefit (?) of not frying itself. Again, there are two versions, the managed and the unamanaged. Both can be set to block access after 'n' attempts, the managed one will be subsequently recoverable, the unmanaged one will need to be reformatted but is not bricked.
The Sandisk is supported under Win2k, XP and Vista.
The Ironkey and the Sandisk both claim FIPS 140-2. Unfortunately, neither are going through the process of CAPS approval (UK Govt.) For the Sandisk, there is a different version for the FIPS which has an epoxy coating over the crypto chip to prevent analysis attacks.
Both are big (physically) compared to their unencrypted counterparts, about the size of a standard disposable lighter.
The only other difference is that the Ironkey is 128 bit AES and the Sandisk is 256 bit AES.
One thing that bothers me about both devices is that you are stuck with using the key material that the crypto chip holds. I would like to see a device that allows the crypto manager to reprogram the key with a key that they have generated. The reason for this is twofold. If, as with the Ironkey, the key is fried, the data can still be retrieved. Second, and this is the paranoid in me, if the crypto is added by the manufacturer, would they not keep a record of the key, therefore enabling them to retrieve data should the key find it's way back to them?
Charles Martel
June 26th, 2008, 10:02 PM
Link to below post. (http://www.ethicalhacker.net/component/option,com_smf/Itemid,54/topic,2370.msg11818/topicseen,1/)
I've got a free sample of the Ironkey, it is quite nice.
Nice tactile feel, solid metal case. The chap I spoke to made some bold claims about it working after being submerged for 24 hours, once dried off but as the internals are epoxy coated, no big suprise.
Apparently, youtube has a video of one being run over by a bobcat and working afterwards.
It is supported under XP, Vista and MacOS, so saddos like me that stick to Linux and Win2k are out of luck. I have tested in on the wife's laptop and it does what it says on the tin.
There is, apparently, a management verison coming out. This should give to sysadmin the opportunity to set the number of times a password can be attempted before the key is fried. I asked if frying could be avoided completely but the salesman didn't seem to know.
I also visited Sandisk with the same requirements. The sandisk stick seems to be reasonably good, too.
While it is in no way ruggedised like the ironkey it has the benefit (?) of not frying itself. Again, there are two versions, the managed and the unamanaged. Both can be set to block access after 'n' attempts, the managed one will be subsequently recoverable, the unmanaged one will need to be reformatted but is not bricked.
The Sandisk is supported under Win2k, XP and Vista.
The Ironkey and the Sandisk both claim FIPS 140-2. Unfortunately, neither are going through the process of CAPS approval (UK Govt.) For the Sandisk, there is a different version for the FIPS which has an epoxy coating over the crypto chip to prevent analysis attacks.
Both are big (physically) compared to their unencrypted counterparts, about the size of a standard disposable lighter.
The only other difference is that the Ironkey is 128 bit AES and the Sandisk is 256 bit AES.
One thing that bothers me about both devices is that you are stuck with using the key material that the crypto chip holds. I would like to see a device that allows the crypto manager to reprogram the key with a key that they have generated. The reason for this is twofold. If, as with the Ironkey, the key is fried, the data can still be retrieved. Second, and this is the paranoid in me, if the crypto is added by the manufacturer, would they not keep a record of the key, therefore enabling them to retrieve data should the key find it's way back to them?
Just spreading the word. Stay away from jewish fronts like the "hush key"'s. They are ran by the feds. Ironkey is secure and not "sold out" yet anyways.
varg
June 26th, 2008, 10:20 PM
google "hacker tools" and install all the standalones
good way to get a virus :rofl
real hackers dont use 'hacker tools'
varg
June 26th, 2008, 10:44 PM
You can just buy a 4GB (10$-20$) USB flash stick (http://www.newegg.com/Store/SubCategory.aspx?SubCategory=522&name=USB-Flash-Drives) + install a truecrypt (http://www.truecrypt.org/) partition on it. (same level of AES encryption as that ironkey)
Same level of encryption instead of paying 140$
hell most of those usbflashsticks that say 'comes with AES encryption' usually just leave you with truecrypt preinstalled on the drive (which is free & you can do on any drive.. its just a sales pitch)
Ed in CT
June 29th, 2008, 01:37 AM
You can make your stick bootable to Linux and have your data encrypted with truecrypt. Then for secure browisng, just boot As long as you use a strong encryption key, no one should be able to compromise your data.
Then use a proxy and SSL to the proxy and you should be prety safe.
If you have to encrypt sensitive documents on a regular basis, do your PGP work from a laptop that NEVER connects to the net.
Your encryption key should look something like this: "q*&noLOHW^4!---(nBBWYOP(&^"
but longer-24 characters should be good.
Charles Martel
July 14th, 2008, 11:15 PM
You can just buy a 4GB (10$-20$) USB flash stick (http://www.newegg.com/Store/SubCategory.aspx?SubCategory=522&name=USB-Flash-Drives) + install a truecrypt (http://www.truecrypt.org/) partition on it. (same level of AES encryption as that ironkey)
Same level of encryption instead of paying 140$
hell most of those usbflashsticks that say 'comes with AES encryption' usually just leave you with truecrypt preinstalled on the drive (which is free & you can do on any drive.. its just a sales pitch)
Truecrypt can be a pain in the ass to use. I've used it from time to time. And it is SW not HW encrpytion, which means it will be much slower and you have to manually select each thing as it goes on the drive to get encrypted. With this Ironkey thingee it is all taken care of for you. Plus you have the added bonus that if you lose it and someone trys to access it incorrectly 10 times, poof! No more data. Also SW encryption is a lot easier to crack.
Charles Martel
July 14th, 2008, 11:17 PM
You can make your stick bootable to Linux and have your data encrypted with truecrypt. Then for secure browisng, just boot As long as you use a strong encryption key, no one should be able to compromise your data.
Then use a proxy and SSL to the proxy and you should be prety safe.
If you have to encrypt sensitive documents on a regular basis, do your PGP work from a laptop that NEVER connects to the net.
Your encryption key should look something like this: "q*&noLOHW^4!---(nBBWYOP(&^"
but longer-24 characters should be good.
You can also use ANSI characters from the numpad. Those are even better. But your way each thing has to be encrypted one at a time manually.
OTPTT
July 14th, 2008, 11:21 PM
Truecrypt can be a pain in the ass to use. I've used it from time to time. And it is SW not HW encrpytion, which means it will be much slower and you have to manually select each thing as it goes on the drive to get encrypted. With this Ironkey thingee it is all taken care of for you. Plus you have the added bonus that if you lose it and someone trys to access it incorrectly 10 times, poof! No more data. Also SW encryption is a lot easier to crack.
I have a computer that's running TrueCrypt. The entire hard drive is encrypted and I must type in a password before the system boots into Windows. Although all of the files are encrypted the encryption is seamless and one wouldn't know TrueCrypt was installed if not for the password at boot time.
The system is running no slower than without it in my opinion.
Charles Martel
July 14th, 2008, 11:22 PM
good way to get a virus :rofl
real hackers dont use 'hacker tools'
Well you need to have adequate protection in place in all things that you do. I will make no claims on the second statement...;)
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