Joe_J.
August 17th, 2009, 07:50 PM
No copypasta allowed unless you sign up on the site. Read it. Well worth the read, although years ago I watched FDIC on CSPAN admit they couldn't cover a major problem.
http://www.24hgold.com/english/contributor.aspx?contributor=Mish&article=2269690380G10020
Not surprisingly the rate of bank failures has increased during the last two years. Throughout the period 2000-2002 FDIC handled 17 banking failures with the majority (11) occurring during the recovery period in 2002. In 2008 and so far in 2009 FDIC has assisted some 90 banks through closure. The much larger number of failed banks can easily be explained by the type of recession we are currently facing compared with the tech-bubble.
On January 1st 2009 FDIC reported they had $17,276 million in their deposit insurance fund (DIF) and according to press releases for each failed bank, the estimated total costs for FDIC’s DIF during Q1 amounted to $2,146 million, leaving $14,997 million in the fund. However, according to the latest FDIC Quarterly report the fund counted $13,007 million at the start of Q2, thus a difference of $1,990 million. In other words the estimated spending on failed banks during Q1 was $2,147 million, but the bill ended up around $4,137 million instead (and probably still counting).
This is why Q2 is even more interesting, since the estimated costs are $11,504 million, thus leaving only $833 million in the fund for supporting failing banks in the future. Moreover the real total cost for Q109 turned out to be almost twice the amount of the estimates the second quarter showed. If that will be even close to reality for Q209 the FDIC’s DIF will (very) soon be out of funds completely.
We believe the main reason for this observation lies in a de facto relaxation of accounting
standards, even before the FASB 157 amendment on March 15th earlier this year. Basically the
relaxation allows banks to only write-off parts of their losses due to market impairment and they
may themselves decide a fair price that the asset could have been sold for during normal market
conditions to keep in their books. Allowing banks to control how they mark-to-market their assets,
will likely backfire and when they ultimately end up failing, imply greater closure costs for the
FDIC. From the graph above one can infer that the average yearly DIF costs/bank assets have
increased at an alarming rate to almost reach 31% in 2008 and 2009.
So, what does that imply? Basically it means that when valuating any U.S bank, their assets should
probably be marked down significantly relative to their book value, much because of how they
nowadays are allowed to manipulate their balance sheets in order to appear more solvent than
they in fact are.
E.g. if we look at the ten biggest banks in the U.S and assume conservatively that their accounting
standards are comparable to the most truthful 15% of banks that have failed under FDIC and we
sort on the 15th percentile, it would result in a $75.3 billion (10.78% of combined assets $698.53)
write-down. In other words, if banks would quit operating in their dream-world where accounting
standards obviously are next to absent and join the real world that would leave serious gaps in
their balance sheets of some $75.3 billion. For clarification, the 15th percentile of DIF costs/bank
assets equals 10.78%.
Below is a graph showing the DIF capital as a percentage of total bank deposits insured by the FDIC.
Note that this graph is based on the old insurance limit with a maximum coverage of
$100.000/account. This limit has been changed to cover up to $250.000/account until January 1st
2014. Estimates say that the change increases the deposits covered under FDIC insurance to
approximately $6 trillion in total.
*Banks are only included if the FDIC have reported both DIF costs and bank assets.
http://www.tradingfloor.com/EN/Documents/Research%20Note/2009-08-12%20Saxo%20Bank%20Research%20Note%20-%20FDIC%20DIF.pdf
http://www.24hgold.com/english/contributor.aspx?contributor=Mish&article=2269690380G10020
Not surprisingly the rate of bank failures has increased during the last two years. Throughout the period 2000-2002 FDIC handled 17 banking failures with the majority (11) occurring during the recovery period in 2002. In 2008 and so far in 2009 FDIC has assisted some 90 banks through closure. The much larger number of failed banks can easily be explained by the type of recession we are currently facing compared with the tech-bubble.
On January 1st 2009 FDIC reported they had $17,276 million in their deposit insurance fund (DIF) and according to press releases for each failed bank, the estimated total costs for FDIC’s DIF during Q1 amounted to $2,146 million, leaving $14,997 million in the fund. However, according to the latest FDIC Quarterly report the fund counted $13,007 million at the start of Q2, thus a difference of $1,990 million. In other words the estimated spending on failed banks during Q1 was $2,147 million, but the bill ended up around $4,137 million instead (and probably still counting).
This is why Q2 is even more interesting, since the estimated costs are $11,504 million, thus leaving only $833 million in the fund for supporting failing banks in the future. Moreover the real total cost for Q109 turned out to be almost twice the amount of the estimates the second quarter showed. If that will be even close to reality for Q209 the FDIC’s DIF will (very) soon be out of funds completely.
We believe the main reason for this observation lies in a de facto relaxation of accounting
standards, even before the FASB 157 amendment on March 15th earlier this year. Basically the
relaxation allows banks to only write-off parts of their losses due to market impairment and they
may themselves decide a fair price that the asset could have been sold for during normal market
conditions to keep in their books. Allowing banks to control how they mark-to-market their assets,
will likely backfire and when they ultimately end up failing, imply greater closure costs for the
FDIC. From the graph above one can infer that the average yearly DIF costs/bank assets have
increased at an alarming rate to almost reach 31% in 2008 and 2009.
So, what does that imply? Basically it means that when valuating any U.S bank, their assets should
probably be marked down significantly relative to their book value, much because of how they
nowadays are allowed to manipulate their balance sheets in order to appear more solvent than
they in fact are.
E.g. if we look at the ten biggest banks in the U.S and assume conservatively that their accounting
standards are comparable to the most truthful 15% of banks that have failed under FDIC and we
sort on the 15th percentile, it would result in a $75.3 billion (10.78% of combined assets $698.53)
write-down. In other words, if banks would quit operating in their dream-world where accounting
standards obviously are next to absent and join the real world that would leave serious gaps in
their balance sheets of some $75.3 billion. For clarification, the 15th percentile of DIF costs/bank
assets equals 10.78%.
Below is a graph showing the DIF capital as a percentage of total bank deposits insured by the FDIC.
Note that this graph is based on the old insurance limit with a maximum coverage of
$100.000/account. This limit has been changed to cover up to $250.000/account until January 1st
2014. Estimates say that the change increases the deposits covered under FDIC insurance to
approximately $6 trillion in total.
*Banks are only included if the FDIC have reported both DIF costs and bank assets.
http://www.tradingfloor.com/EN/Documents/Research%20Note/2009-08-12%20Saxo%20Bank%20Research%20Note%20-%20FDIC%20DIF.pdf