More Testimony on the Leaking Coast Guard Ships - Michael DeKort Testimony

From: James M. Atkinson <jm..._at_tscm.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2007 01:15:43 -0400

http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Full%20Committee/20070418PM/Michael%20DeKort%20Testimony.pdf


1
Statement package for Michael DeKort
This document includes;
1.
Statement
2.
LM Notification Timeline
3.
Supporting notification text
4.
Response to DHS IG 123 C4ISR report
5.
Project Notes
6.
Overall Timeline
7.
Blind Spot
Statement
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I deeply appreciate your taking the
time to hear testimony on the C4ISR problems
relating to the Deepwater effort. While I will be
highlighting the C4ISR issues, I am sure you
realize they are only examples of the systemic
engineering and management problems associated
with this effort. The problems I will be
describing are not simply mistakes. They were
informed deliberate acts. As I will show, I have
been trying to resolve these problems for almost
4 years. After not being able to convince every
level of management of every relevant
organization in Lockheed Martin through the CEO,
Board of Directors and Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS), I turned to the appropriate
government agencies, public officials,
whistleblower organizations, and when all else
failed the internet and the press, for help. What
needs to be understood here is that every one of
these problems was easily resolved with off the
shelf products - well before any of the assets
were delivered. Additionally, as the contract
mandates system commonality, every one of these
problems is a candidate for inclusion on every
other maritime asset that ICGS delivers for the
lifetime of the contract. This plan, if allowed
to come to fruition, will literally cripple the
entire maritime fleet of the US Coast Guard for decades.
Before delving in to the issues I would like tell
you a little about my background.
I was an electronics technician in the US Navy
for 6 years. I specialized in communication
systems. After my enlistment ended I spent a
brief time in the private sector before I joined
the US State Department as a communications engineer for
2
embassy and consular duties as well for the
counter terrorism group. After leaving that
organization, I became a systems engineer in
Lockheed Martin. Through the years I was promoted
to project, program and engineering manager.
During my last 5 years I was the software project
manager for Aegis Baseline 6/3, the lead systems
engineer of C4ISR for Deepwater and the software
engineering manager for the NORAD efforts. It is
the period where I held the C4ISR lead systems
engineer position that is the focus of this testimony.
At the point I joined the effort – in the summer
of 2003 – the final design review had been
completed and most of the equipment had been
purchased for the first several boats. In
addition to creating a master schedule, I was
tasked with identifying the final deliverable
requirements and planning the integration of the
first boats. It was during this period that
several critical safety and security issues came to my attention.
The first problem was the fact that we had
purchased non-weatherproof radios for the Short
Range Prosecutors or SRPs. The boats are small
open air craft that are constantly exposed to the
environment. Upon first hearing about this issue,
I have to admit, I found it too incredible to
believe. Who would put a non-weatherproof radio,
the primary means of communication for the crew,
on a boat with no protection from the elements?
The individual who brought this to my attention
strongly suggested I look in to it no matter how
incredible it sounded. I called the supplier of
the radio who informed me it was true. We had
purchased 4 radios – for the first 4 SRPs – and
they were not weatherproof. As a matter of fact,
the vendor asked me not to use the radios on any
of the SRPs – which would eventually total 91 in
all. Upon informing Lockheed management that the
radios need to be replaced, I was told there was
a “design of record” – this meant the customer
had accepted our designs at the conclusion of the
critical design review – and that we would make
no changes that would cause cost or schedule
impacts. As a matter of fact, we ordered 5 more
radios after I went to management about the
problem in order to prepare for the next set of
boats we were contracted to modify. I tried for
several months to get the radios replaced. Just
before delivery of the first 123 and its
associated SRP, the customer asked to test the
system. Coincidently, it rained on test day.
During the testing several radios shorted out. It
should be noted that had we not tested the boats
in the rain on that day we would have delivered
that system and it would have failed the first
time it was used. After this, I was told we would
go back to the radio that originally came with
the SRPs. I believe that this example, more than any other,
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demonstrates the lengths the ICGS parties were
willing to go to hold schedule and budget while
sacrificing the safety and security of the crew.
The next problem uncovered involved the video
surveillance system. The Coast Guard wanted a
system that would permit watching the boats, when
in a Coast Guard port, without someone having to
be physically on the boats. Our solution was to
provide a video surveillance system that had
significant blind spots leaving the bridge
vulnerable to penetration. The most frustrating
part about this issue was that the simple
purchase and installation of a fifth camera would
have resolved the problem. Bear in mind we knew
about the need for the extra camera several
months before the first 123 was delivered.
Another problem we discovered involved low smoke
cables. There was a requirement to install low
smoke cables so that in case of a fire flames do
not spread quickly, equipment is not overly
exposed to corrosive smoke, and the crew is not
exposed to a large amount of toxic fumes. In a
recent report the Inspector General for the
Department of Homeland Security confirmed that
over 80 of these cables are the wrong type and
that the waiver the Coast Guard gave to the
contractor so they could avoid having to provide these cables was invalid.
The next issue involved communications security
and the standards necessary to ensure those
communications are safeguarded from eavesdropping
or inadvertent transmission of crosstalk. These
standards are known as TEMPEST. We installed
non-shielded cables – 101 in total – on all of
the 123s; cables that did not meet standard
TEMPEST safety and security requirements – as
born out by their failing of the visual
inspection which was carried out by the
appropriate testing authority. This situation
could lead to a serious compromise of secure
communications not only for the Coast Guard but
for other government organizations such as DoD,
the FBI and the DEA. I was informed that we had
not included these cables in the design because
we had not bid the TEMPEST requirements and as
such had decided we did not have the money to include them.
The final significant problem was that of the
survivability of the externally mounted
equipment. I saved this one for last because of how serious the repercussions
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are for the Coast Guard and the nation, the fact
that the DHS IG agreed completely with my
allegations relative to this issue, the
incredible position Lockheed Martin has taken on
this issue, and the fact that the Coast Guard
seems to be allowing them to get away with it.
Shortly before the first 123 was delivered we
finally received the environmental requirements.
During the late review of the equipment for
compliance, well after the design review and
purchase of the equipment, we found the very
first item we looked in to would not meet the
environmental requirements. Given this failure we
feared the rest of the equipment may not meet the
environmental requirements. Let me state this in
simple terms. This meant the Coast Guard ships
that utilized this equipment would not operate in
conditions that could include heavy rain, heavy
seas, high winds and extreme temperatures. When I
brought this information to Lockheed management,
they directed me and my team to stop looking in
to whether or not the rest of the equipment met
these requirements. This meant that all of the
externally mounted equipment being used for
critical communication, command and control and
navigation systems might fail in harsh
environments. Since that time we have learned
through the DHS IG report on the 123s that 30
items on the 123s, and at least a dozen items
installed on the SRPs did meet environmental
requirements. In addition to their technical and
contractual findings, the IG also made some of
Lockheed MartinÂ’s responses on this issue known
in the report. Incredibly the IG states that
Lockheed Martin incorrectly stated in their
self-certification documents that there were no
applicable requirements stipulating what the
environmental requirements were in regard to
weather and they actually stated that they viewed
the certification of those requirements as “not
really beneficial”. In addition, the IG states
that the Coast Guard did not know the boats were
non-compliant until July of 2005 – 1.5 years
after the first 123 was delivered. The report
also states that none of these problems were
fixed. Not on any of the delivered 8 boats. That
along with the issue not being called out in the
DD-250 acceptance documents supports my
supposition that Lockheed Martin purposefully
withheld this information from the Coast Guard.
Finally, the IG states that LockheedÂ’s position
on them passing the self-certification without
testing these items was the right thing to do
because they thought the tests would be “time
consuming, expensive and of limited value”. Bear
in mind that the contractors have stated time and
time again in front of this and other oversight
committees that they do not practice self-certification.
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Where does this situation leave us? Had the hulls
not cracked or the cracks not appeared for some
time, ICGS would have delivered 49 123s and 91
SRPs with the problems I describe. In addition to
that, the Deepwater project is a “System of
Systems” effort. What this means is that the
contractor is directed to deliver solutions that
would provide common equipment sets for all C4ISR
systems. Said differently, all the equipments for
like systems need to match unless there is an
overwhelming reason not to. This means that every
faulty system I have described here will be
installed on every other maritime asset delivered
over the lifetime of the effort. This includes
the FRCs, the OPCs and the NSCs. If we donÂ’t stop
this from happening ICGS will deliver assets with
these and other problems. I believe this could
cripple the effectiveness of the Coast Guard and
their ability to perform their missions for decades to come.
How have the ICGS parties reacted to the totality
of these allegations? At first Lockheed and the
US Coast Guard, as stated by the ICGS
organization, responded to my allegations by
saying they were baseless, had no merit, or that
all of the issues were handled contractually.
That evolved after the IG report came out to them
stating that the requirements had grey areas and
later by actually deciding, after the system were
accepted and problems were found, that in some
cases the Coast Guard exaggerated their needs –
as was their comment regarding the environmental survivability problems.
Up until the announcement yesterday I had heard a
lot of discussion about changing the ICGS
contract structure, fixing the requirements,
reorganizing the Coast Guard, and adding more
oversight. While all of those things are
beneficial, they in no way solve the root
problem. Had the ICGS listened to the Engineering
Logistics Center (ELC) and my recommendations,
there would be no problems on these boats. We
wouldnÂ’t be talking about more oversight or
making sweeping changes. Instead, we would be
discussing what a model program Deepwater is. I
guarantee you that had the changes that were made
up until yesterdayÂ’s announcement been made 4 or
5 years ago, it wouldnÂ’t have mattered. Even with
the incestuous ICGS arrangement, the less than
perfect requirements, and minimal oversight,
there was plenty of structure in place and
information available to do the right thing. It
is not practical to think one can provide an iron
clad set of requirements and an associated
contract that will avoid all problems. All that
was needed were leaders who were competent and
ethical in any one of the key contractor or Coast
Guard positions. Any one of dozens of people could have simply
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done the right thing on this effort and changed
the course of events that followed. It is because
of this that I strongly suggest your focus shift
to one of accountability in an effort to provide
a deterrent. No matter what structure these
parties put in place. No matter what spin they
come up with, or promises they make, no matter
how many people you spend tax payer dollars to
employ to provide more oversight, it still comes
down to people. We wouldnÂ’t need more oversight
if the ICGS parties would have done as promised
when they bid this effort. They told the Coast
Guard we know you have a lack of personnel with
the right skills. Let us help you. Let us be your
trusted agent. Let us help write the requirements
so we can provide you cutting edge solutions. Let
us write the test procedures and self-certify so
we can meet the challenges we all face in a post
9/11 world. In the end, people have to do the
right thing and know that when they donÂ’t the
consequences will be swift and appropriate. I
strongly believe that, especially in a time of
war, the conduct of these organizations has been
appalling. As such, I would hope that this
committee, and any other relevant agency with
jurisdiction, will do the right thing and hold
people and these organizations accountable. All
defense contractors and employees of the
government need to know that high ethical
standards are not matters of convenience. If you
do not hold these people and organizations
accountable, you will simply be repackaging the
same problems, and have no way of ensuring the
problems donÂ’t happen again on this or any other effort.
In closing I am offering to help in any way I can
to remedy these issues. As I told the Commandant
AllenÂ’s staff and Lockheed Martin before my
employment was terminated, I want to be part of
the fix. With the right people in place, in the
right positions, this project can be put back on track rapidly.
I believe it at this time that we will be putting
up for display the timeline of events relative to
my notifications of the appropriate leadership
within Lockheed Martin. Before I start that final
part of my presentation, I would like to thank
you again for the opportunity to testify and look
forward to answering your questions.
7
LM Notification Timeline
Date
Person Notified
Position
Data
Title
10/13/2003
Larry Finnegan
Mgr SW PM-functional manager
Informed Larry that the program was in a chaotic
state - deliverable requirements not
known/accepted for Inc 0, layering partial
solutions on top of each other, were rushing
toward install on the Matagorda and we purchased
non-waterproof radios for SRP. Also informed
Larry that I had raised the issues with Tom Rodgers
123 Headed Down the Wrong Road
12/16/2003
Jay Hansen
Acting Tech Director
Asked for a meeting to discuss the issues
Requesting a private one-on-one
1/7/2004
PJ Messer
Surface Asset Lead
Requesting Reassignment
Larry Finnegan
Mgr SW PM-functional manager
Jack Ryan
Director SW Org - Larry's manager
Joe Villani
DW Chief Eng
Jay Hansen
Acting Dir Tech Ops
Brian McLaverty
123 DW PM
Patrick Ewing
DW Dep PM Director
Tom Rodgers
DW PM Director
Doug Wilhelm
DW PM
Dave Ponticello
DW Former Chief Eng
Asked for reassignment to another effort if
management was not going to do the right thing -
technically and ethically. Issues mentioned were
- Cameras - Low Smoke cables - TEMPEST and
Non-Waterproof Radio Note-Ext Equipment
Survivability Issue had not been raised yet
2/5/2004
Larry Finnegan
Mgr SW PM-functional manager
Informed Larry that DW management was not keeping
it's deal to fix the problems (preferred) or let
me provide comments for the DD-250s before delivery of the Matagorda.
123- BT Complete/DD-250before issues resolved
8
2/9/2004
Joe Cappello
DW QA Lead
Asked for a meeting with Michael Cerrone - QA
Director - this eventually lead to QA VP Yvonne
Hodge getting involved and calling the org VP
Carl Bannar on 2/12/2004 - I told Carl I wanted
to give Jay Hansen one more shot before I went to see him
DW Engineering Concerns
2/11/2004
Larry Finnegan
Mgr SW PM-functional manager
Still no resolution on issues. Email with associated document called DW Issues
Still No Commitment from PMO on Issues
2/18/2004
Carl Bannar
VP
Requested a meeting with Carl to ask for issues
to be fixed. Carl promised issues would be
addressed either through fixes or on DD-250. Said
he would direct Chief Eng Joe Villani to meet with me
Request Meeting
2/24/2004
Joe Villani
DW Chief Eng
Chief Eng Joe Villani asking to meet with me
after Carl Bannar directed him to (Note that
Villani says he has heard about the issues but
wants to hear from me directly. Villani had
refused every attempt for me to meet with him on
these issues prior to this. That included several
in person requests and telephone calls over at least a months period)
Issues to be resolved on 123
2/24/2004
PJ Messer
Surface Asset Lead
Ext Equipment Environmental issue show up for the
first time. Mentioned those issues as well as my
opposition to gaming the requirements document to hide the problems
123- Environmental/Physical spec inconsistencies - testing
2/24/2004
Joe Cappello
DW QA
Asked QA to include Camera, TEMPEST, Ext
Equipment and Radio issue on DD-250 as Open Items
123-Open Items DD-250
2/24/2004
PJ Messer
Surface Asset Lead
Thread on my risks being deleted - without my
permission-from the official risk system (Problem
Sheets) - which ICGS and the CG had access to. Of
a dozen or so risks entered only the risks
associated with the critical issues I raised were
deleted. After some effort I am told they were put back.
123-Several critical Risks/Action Items missing from IDE
9
Note- removed from DW program end of February
2004. Moved to work NORAD program in Colorado
August 2004. Went to see new Tech Ops director
Robert Sledgemilch before I left MS2 to discuss
issues with him. He turned the issues over to HR
who turned them over to John Shelton - Ethics
Director for MS2. Investigation started October 2004
9/20/2004
John Shelton
Ethics Director MS2
Setting up meting in Colorado to start
investigation. Investigation ended 4 months later
with a response of - "no merit - all allegations
are baseless" would no provide any explanation
for the results. Said I had no need to know.
DeKort- conference room for discussions
2/7/2005
Gail Allen
Ethics investigator-Corporate
After Shelton left me not knowing if the issues
were fixed or letting me see the DD-250 text that
showed the CG was notified about every issue and
accepted the boat. I raised the issues to corporate
DeKort-Deepwater ethics issue
4/12/2005
Fred Moosally
President MS2 org
Wanted to discuss the issue with the MS2
President before I went to the CEO. Have an email
response receipt showing he received the message.
He never responded. Note- former CO of USS IOWA during 16in gun mishap
Outlook-DW ethics during IS&S
4/28/2005
Robert Stevens
CEO Lockheed Martin
Contacted Mr. Stevens after 2nd ethics
investigation completed . Decided too many 123s
were being delivered with these problems for me
to have to continue to grind though this process
Project Deepwater - issues of Concern
5/4/2005
Maryanne Lavan
Corporate VP of Ethics
Wrote the CEO Bob Stevens after my final meeting
with Gail Allen and getting same response from
Allen as I did Shelton. He in turn contacted Lavan.
Email to Robert Stevens
1/17/2006
Robert Stevens
CEO Lockheed Martin
Contacted Mr. Stevens again after 3rd ethics
investigation ended with an official response of
"no merit - baseless". I was told the CG was made
aware of every issue and had accepted the boat.
They would not show me proof or tell me how each issue was handled.
Deepwater ethics issue please read
10
After Mr. Stevens asked his corporate council to
look in to this and he supported those below him
I began contacting organizations outside of
Lockheed Martin. Those included - ICGS, GAO, USN,
NSA, several senators and congressmen, several
whistleblowing organizations and the DHS IG
3/1/2006
Scott MacKay
LM Corp Council
Mr. MacKay responded to my second letter to the
CEO. Partial quote from letter - “. . .I have
concluded that; (1) the corporation has
thoroughly and exhaustively investigated you
allegations; (2) I concur with the conclusions
reached by prior investigations that your
allegations were unsubstantiated; and (3) the
corporation considered the matter closed except
to the extent it is asked to respond to the Coast
guard or other government agencies regarding those allegations…”
4/4/2006
LM Board of Directors
Sent a letter to the Board asking for help on the
issues. It included the information I had sent the CEO Robert Stevens
6/26/2006
LM Board of Directors
Received their response. Quote - "The Board
considers the issues addressed in your letter and
determined that the CorporationÂ’s responses to
those issues, beginning in October 2004 and
continuing to the present, were appropriate and
no further action is warranted. Each of the
issues has been disclosed to the Coast Guard and
the resolution of each issue was coordinated with
and was or is being resolved to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard customer."
11
LM notification supporting text
Text From emails delineated in Notification Timeline
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text from email titled – 123 – Headed Down the Wrong Road – 10/13/2003
Pasted from Outlook – could not paste header
From: Michael DeKort
To: Larry Finnegan
I wanted to make you aware of some problems on
the 123. Due to schedule concerns we, in my
opinion, are being herded down the wrong road.
We are layering partial solutions on top of each
other - all the while our base, the requirements set, is not on solid ground.
Please find a slide set I made for Tom Rodgers.
Some highlights:
We are slipping again. Today was supposed to be
test start - we are weeks away. One day after we
made a "recovery plan" I find out our design is
still very suspect - our installation techs found
we called out the wrong connectors on almost half
of our cables. We were using the new "QA" data.
We picked a non-marine grade radio, and antennas,
for our critical comm suite in the SRP. The SRP
is the small rescue boat. This small boat will be
inundated with water. It is used to rescue people
- it should have environmentally sound communications.
We have told the CG that we do not meet most of
the environmental and physical hardware
requirements in INC 0. We have no plan/design to
ever meet those requirements. No one is working this with the CG.
I believe someone needs to get a hold of this
effort before someone else does it for us. I
believe we have strayed from our principles -
both in quality and engineering discipline. If we
continue down the same road we will wind up with
even greater schedule slips, customer
dissatisfaction and potential safety, ethical and legal problems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text from email thread titled – Requesting a private one on one – 12/16/2003
Pasted from Outlook – could not paste header
From: Jay Hansen
To: Michael DeKort
Mike -
I'd be glad to meet with you. Please call Mary
Kay to schedule. She will put it down as a
private meeting on my calendar so it will remain confidential.
12
Jay
J. T. Hansen
Director, Systems Engineering and Equipment Engineering
Lockheed Martin, MS2 - Moorestown
(856)722-2730
----------
From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2003 10:00 AM
To: Hansen, Jay T
Subject: Requesting a private one on one
I have some concerns about the Deepwater effort
that I would like to discuss with you.
I would appreciate it if you would keep this request and the meeting private.
Michael De Kort
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email thread titled – Request Reassignment – 1/7/2004
-----Original Message----- From: Hansen, Jay T
Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 10:44 AM To:
Messer, Paul J; Finnegan III, Laurence P; Ryan,
John E; Villani, Joseph A; Dekort, Michael Cc:
Clifford, Michael F; Ewing, Patrick; McLaverty,
Brian; Rodgers, Thomas M; Wilhelm, Douglas G;
Ponticello, David D; Haimowitz, Jay S Subject: RE: Request Reassignment
Mike -
You'll need to firm this up with your immediate
functional management and tech ops technical
leadership on IDS but my understanding is that we
will accommodate your request with the
appropriate overlap period. In light of the risk
tracking system's status, please make sure that
Jay Haimowitz receives a complete write-up on
each of these risks for processing through the
programs risk/opportunity process. By inserting
them into the process they will receive the
appropriate technical and programmatic
evaluations to produce appropriate mitigation plans.
Jay
J. T. Hansen
Director, Systems Engineering and Equipment Engineering
Lockheed Martin, MS2 - Moorestown
(856)722-2730
13
----------
From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 11:53 AM
To: Messer, Paul J; Finnegan III, Laurence P;
Ryan, John E; Villani, Joseph A; Hansen, Jay T
Cc: Clifford, Michael F; Ewing, Patrick;
McLaverty, Brian; Rodgers, Thomas M; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Ponticello, David D
Subject: Request Reassignment
Gentlemen
Over the past few months I have become
increasingly frustrated with the direction the
Deepwater project is following. Based on the
examples below I believe we have continually
sacrificed MS2Â’s hard earned and well founded
engineering and customer focused principles in
order to meet the needs of non-realistic
schedules. While meeting schedules is a paramount
concern I do not believe being herded, by an
unrealistic schedule, to the delivery of a
substandard product is in our best interest. I
strongly believe that this path will lead to, at
best, the delivery of a sub-standard product that
will harm our reputation and at worst the
delivery of a product that hamper our customerÂ’s
ability to successfully carry out their mission.
As the lead systems engineer for the 123 my
primary responsibility is to ensure the integrity
of the design and that we meet the customers
needs, requirements and fulfill the actual and
implied intent of the contract. While I do not
expect to convince tech ops or program management
that my point of view is correct on every issue I
do not expect to be overruled on the greater
majority of those issues – especially when they
involve safety, security, and the mission success
of our customer. As the mission of the customer,
the U.S. Coast Guard, is to ensure our nationÂ’s
security, I take this responsibility very
seriously. I truly believe that the decisions we
have made and are making will hinder our
customerÂ’s ability to do their job and by doing
so puts them and the general public at risk. I
have worked on military projects most of my
career – from the U.S. Navy, through the counter
terrorism group at the U.S. State Department,
through flight simulation for the U.S. Air Force
Special Ops and through Aegis Baseline 6. On each
and every project that I have worked I have been
proud of my contribution and the product we
produced. I am sorry to say that I am personally
and professionally embarrassed by the product we
are producing on this effort. I feel that as an
organization we have abandon our principles, let
down our processes and besmirched the reputation
MS2 has worked so long to establish. I believe MS2 and I are better than this.
Below I have listed some of the most important
examples. Each case was and is avoidable. Most of
the issues and solutions were known about months
ago. As we have chosen not remedy these issues
previously there is now a cost and schedule risk
to do so. A cost and schedule risk that I believe
is worth taking and the right short and long term course.
14
•
SRP VHF Radio
•
We are putting a non-marine grade radio on a
craft that will be exposed to the harshest of
environments. As such the customer, and civilians
aboard the craft could be left without their
primary long distance communications system in harsh conditions
•
This is a safety risk
•
Even though there is an option to remedy the
situation with a $300 microphone – we have no
plans to augment the current design for the first 3 cutters
•
Surveillance Cameras
•
We have placed 4 fixed mounted cameras on the
deck house that do not provide full field of view
(there are 2 dead spots), the ability to pan or zoom.
•
As such we have degraded the customers existing
capabilities. (Current ships and the planned
design by Northrop on the NSC provide 2 mast
mounted cameras that permit panning and zoom)
•
This is a security and safety risk
•
There is no plan to remedy this situation on any cutter
•
Tempest
•
We have not provided an adequate Tempest solution
for the secret crypto installed aboard the ship.
As such our shielding and grounding solution does
not meet the minimum Tempest standards
•
We have, in most cases, ignored an internal study
conducted in February, on ways to remedy the situation.
•
This is a security risk
•
There is no plan to remedy this situation for any cutter
•
Low Smoke Cables
•
We are headed down a path of not providing a low
smoke variant of some cabling aboard ship.
•
The customer has pointed out cases where we may
have missed the opportunity to provide such cables.
•
I have been informed that we do not have time to
look in to or remedy the situation for the first ship.
•
This is a safety risk
It is for the reasons stated above that with
great regret I request to be reassigned to
another effort. As I have been unsuccessful at
changing the direction of the Deepwater effort I
have no other choice than to change my own
direction. As I cannot rectify my personal
ethical standards with the direction we are
taking I feel I am left with no choice other than
to request to be reassigned. However, if the
opportunity should arise I would eagerly and
aggressively attack each of these issues should
we decide on a change in program direction.
Michael De Kort
15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – 123-BT Complete/DD-250 before issues resolved – 2/5/2004
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Larry Finnegan
To: Michael DeKort
Mike,
I have raised your concern thru Jack to Tom... more to come.
Larry
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:13 AM To:
Finnegan III, Laurence P Subject: 123- BT
complete/DD-250 before issues resolved?
Larry
I am concerned that BT ends next week, Tom
Rodgers has schedule an internal DD-250 meeting
Tuesday (to which I am invited) – and we still
have not met on the camera, Tempest, SRP radio or
Flir Video cable issues. As a matter of fact it
is almost a week now since I was told we would
open discussions on these items and there hasnÂ’t been a meeting even scheduled.
I believe these items should be discussed before
sell off and that any time lost is crucial –
especially if we seek to find an arrangement to
fix this items before the 3/1 delivery.
If we are unable to meet and discuss these items
before the DD-250 meeting Tuesday I plan on raising these issues then.
Michael De Kort
Project Manager
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – DW Engineering Concerns – 2/9/2004
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Joe Cappelo
To: Michael DeKort
We will meet in Mike Cerrone's office on Thursday
at 10:00, Mike's office is located in 105 building .
Joe Cappello
Deepwater Quality Manager
mail stop: 13000-E204
tel; 856-638-7465
fax: 856-638-4301
pager: 1-888-894-5276
16
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/11/2004
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From: Larry Finnegan
To: Michael DeKort
PJ has informed me that he is working the issues
but that they are not a priority.
I asked him if PMO has made a commitment to
address the issues and work with the CG on them.
He told me he doesnÂ’t know what that commitment is.
I am looking for PMO and our organization to
commit to solutions and address those with the
customer. What are we doing, in what time frame
and on what boats? I do not feel comfortable with
pursuing a resolution until after we deliver the
first boat (with boat 2 over 50% done with
cable/hardware installations we are well on our
way to a point of no return on that boat as well).
As such I am preparing to take the issue to the
next level on Friday by scheduling an appointment with Carl.
As I have stated before I would greatly prefer
that we settle this “in house” – between DW PMO,
tech ops and the CG before ship 1 is delivered
and/or I am no longer working the effort. With
only 2 weeks until delivery and my replacement
about to be decided on I feel the issue needs to
be resolved before next Friday.
Please find the attachment with the draft text of
the email I will be sending tomorrow if we are
unable to get any more traction on this issue.
Michael De Kort
Project Manager
123 Lead Systems Engineer
856-359-1439
Cell 609-923-6234
Associated document – title- DW Issues
Good Morning
Since my last correspondence on January 7, 2003,
I have been unable to find closure involving
several design aspects of the 123 effort.
Although discussions on the issues have picked up
lately I do not yet feel comfortable with where
we are. Before I leave the project or the
Matagorda delivers I would like to see PMO make
some acceptable commitments to the organization
and the customer concerning the issues I have
brought forward. I have been trying for several
months now to keep the issues in house and would
greatly prefer to continue to do so.
Unfortunately the issues are still open, these
commitments have not yet been made and the
Matagorda is 2 weeks away from delivery. As such
I feel it is necessary for me to seek higher
authority for assistance in resolving these issues.
17
Essentially my position breaks down in to several key points:
•
The Coast GuardÂ’s fleet is the second oldest in
the world. To respond to that need, as well as
the new challenges imposed by 9/11, we have been
selected a prime contractors, for the C4ISR
effort. As such we have been entrusted by our
customer with the responsibility to ensure we
field the best designs and outfit the Coast Guard fleet accordingly.
a.
In supporting that effort I believe it is
incumbent upon us to ensure the product we field
can meet the customerÂ’s mission requirements for decades to come.
b.
We not only have an obligation to our customer
but to the nation as a whole. The Homeland
Security mission of our Coast Guard should be our paramount concern.
c.
As such we should be fielding 49, 123 class
ships, with fully capable systems and equipment.
d.
The rush to deliver at all costs has caused us to
forgo some of our corporate values and has put
the company, customer and general public at risk.
e.
The answer that all of the issues I have raised
are currently not planning to be changed because
they are the ‘”design of record” is unacceptable.
•
Issues
a.
Cameras/Surveillance
•
Less than 360 coverage. This is a security risk.
b.
Tempest SRP VHF Radio
•
The COTS radio we selected is not meant for
outdoor use. As the SRP is uncovered and required
to operate at sea state the radio will fail at
some point and prohibit the crew from
communicating when VHF comms are needed. This is a safety risk.
c.
Misc Cabling Issues
•
There are still open items concerning several Low
Smoke cables and a Flir video cable. This is a possible safety risk
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/11/2004
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From: Michael DeKort
To: Carl Bannar
Carl,
I am requesting an opportunity to meet with you
on several important issues relating to the
Deepwater effort. I assure you the issues are
extremely important and that I have exhausted all
inter-departmental and project avenues to find a resolution.
Michael De Kort
Project Manager
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – Issues to be resolved on 123s – 2/24/2004
----Original Message----- From: Villani, Joseph A
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 6:12 AM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: Issues to be resolved on 123
18
Mike,
When can we get together so you can fill me in on
your concerns with the Matagorda. I am aware of
them but would like to hear from you directly.
Please bring reference material to help me
understand the problems. Specifically the
requirements that need to be fulfilled, the
design problems you are aware of and your
suggestions for correction. I can be available of
Wednesday if this works for you.
Thanks
Joe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/24/2004
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Michael DeKort
To: PJ Messer
The perfect world thing is a red herring
We are where we are because bad decisions continue to be made
This will bite us
You canÂ’t pull specs fro the 3.1 and leave them
in the CCM. This will lead to an inconsistency that we will get caught on.
I guess I should look on the bright side though –
I never agreed with pulling anything to begin
with. I wanted the INC 0 matrix we delivered to
stand. The powers that be changed their mind
after we delivered that matrix. Now the 3.1 has
no environmental/physical specs – so we don’t
test them – the CCM keeps those specs but we want
to change the data and not test those.
In both docs the EXACT text exists for temp and
humidity. This is sophomoric at best – we look
like out of control amateurs - this will backfire.
Has anyone informed the CG that we are
restricting their missions by tightening the temp
requirements? Maybe we should ask for forgiveness
the day we try to sign the DD-250?
I plan on making the camera, Tempest, Ross radio
and temperature issues open items on the DD-250
unless we get requirements relief relief.
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 8:55 AM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: RE: 123-
Environmental/Physical spec inconsistencies - testing
Mike - the as built spec is what it is. noone
likes it but its there. not approved but we're
not proposing to change it now. we all need to move on.
19
in a perfect world all the CCM reqs would be in
the C005, but they arent. again we need to move on.
the best we can do is see where we are against
the CCM reqs, and write ECP with what we know.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – 123 – Open items for DD-250 – 2/24/2004
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From: Michael DeKort
To: Joe Cappello
Joe
Unless we get requirements relief please add the
following issues as open items on the DD-250 – in
addition to any open problem sheets and risk database items
Surveillance cameras – 360 deg viewing restricted by 2 blockage zones
Tempest – Do not meet minimum tempest
requirements called out in spec or internal LM
report on tempest solutions. Failed several SPAWAR Visual inspection items
SRP VHF radio – radio provided does not meet
environmental requirements. Specifically humidity and Sea State 5
123 external temperature/humidity – several C4
equipments do not meet the CG temperature and
humidity requirements. Temp -40 to +125 and Humidity 0 to 100%
Michael De Kort
Project Manager
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email thread titled – 123- Several critical
Risk/Action items missing from IDE? -2/24/2004
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:43 PM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
ok - please re-enter with details (updated if
necessary - some of them you may not know about - TEMPEST for ex.)
and mitigation plans - like the Ross radio replacement
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:41 PM
20
To: Messer, Paul J Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
I never got the email. I found out third hand from Cappello
I will re-enter the risks
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:37 PM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
do you have the email that kicked it back ?? I
dont - I would like to see them if you have them.
the process is supposed to be that you get notified
also not attending the weekly 300 pm Surface Risk mtgs has slowed this down
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:35 PM To:
Messer, Paul J Subject: RE: 123- Several critical
Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
Never happened
ItÂ’s real important we do this right. A lot could depend on it.
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:34 PM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
I wasnt at the mtg that kicked back the risks
the kick back was supposed to tell you that they
were rejected for lack of detail / mitigation - seriously
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:32 PM To:
Messer, Paul J Subject: RE: 123- Several critical
Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
Then I want to know what data I am missing and I
will re-enter the risks with mitigation plans.
Why werenÂ’t all my risks deleted? I believe I
supplied no mitigation – to be honest I didn’t
see that I needed to when first entered. I
thought they went from preliminary to accepted and then I did that.
21
Also – why wasn’t I given a shot at correcting the situation?
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:26 PM To:
Dekort, Michael Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
you needed to provide the mitigation
plans.......and I thought they did notify you that they were rejected
bottom line is that just saying we have a problem
is not enough.......we have to come up with a reasonable fix / mitigation plan
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:23 PM To:
Messer, Paul J Cc: Wilhelm, Douglas G; McLaverty,
Brian; Cappello Jr, Joseph M; Cerrone, John D
Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
What lack of data? Was I supposed to provide
mitigation plans or the board saw none possible?
Why was I never informed and/or given a chance to provide data or respond?
Why is it that all of the issues I raised to Carl
were the bulk of the deleted items?
-----Original Message----- From: Messer, Paul J
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:16 PM To:
Dekort, Michael Cc: Wilhelm, Douglas G;
McLaverty, Brian Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
I believe the risks were kicked back by the
collective risk board due to lack of data and really, no mitigation plans.
and then we had subsequent risk boards without
full representation to address any new issues.
if there are valid risks - with updated status
and mitigation plans - then we should ensure the
data is complete and get them entered as risks via the formal process
PJM
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:34 PM To:
Cappello Jr, Joseph M; Wallace, James M; Messer,
Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Wilhelm, Douglas G Cc:
Cerrone, Michael G; Dunn, Richard A; Hodge, Yvonne O
22
Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action
items missing from IDE? Importance: High
The items deleted were done so without notice to me or my permission
Only half of the total risks were deleted – they
all had the same level of supporting data – as
such the reasoning for deletion is inconsistent and suspect.
The only notification I had of an issue was 2
months or so ago. I was told there was no
supporting data. I inadvertently sent the wrong
supporting spreadsheet. I corrected the
situation, notified Jim that I did so and heard
nothing back. As of a week or so ago they were still there.
All of the issues I have raised through the
organization are missing. Tempest, Cameras and
the Ross Radio issue/risks are missing.
I suggest these risks be entered back in to the
system immediately. If there is insufficient data
I would like to be told exactly what is missing –
I will immediately supply the data.
-----Original Message----- From: Cappello Jr,
Joseph M Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:27 PM
To: Dekort, Michael; Wallace, James M Cc: Messer,
Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Cerrone, Michael G;
Dunn, Richard A Subject: RE: 123- Several
critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?
I was told that they were not submitted due to
insufficient details. This was the response I
received when I asked the same question. Jim
Wallace is no longer with LM. We have a meeting
at 2:00 to discuss the open issues for the
Matagorda. Some of these issues we need to address.
-----Original Message----- From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:19 PM To:
Wallace, James M; Cappello Jr, Joseph M Cc:
Messer, Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Cerrone,
Michael G Subject: 123- Several critical
Risk/Action items missing from IDE? Importance: High
I just did a search in IDE to see the status of
the risks I have entered. Several did not show
up. Several of these – like the camera 360deg,
tempest and Ross radio issue are critical issues,
still open and should not be removed.
Could you look to see what, if anything, happened to them?
Subjects missing
Tempest
Cameras
Ross radio
Racks/internal equip not meet environmental req
23
Flir cable
Future ship schedule/test period shrink
ILS staffing for lifecycle
Pre-Arrival Check
Ship 2/3 replace equip
Problem Report priority scheme
Michael De Kort
Project Manager
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – DeKort- conference room for discussions – 9/20/2004
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From: John Shelton
To: Michael DeKort
Mike,
Thanks, I will see you on Thursday and have time on Friday, available also.
Would you meet me at the main visitorÂ’s entrance at 9:00 am and escort me
to the area where we can meet. Is there a web-site where I can get driving
directions/locations and facility information?
Thanks again,
John Shelton
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – DeKort- Deepwater ethics issue – 2/7/2005
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From: Gail Allen
To: Michael DeKort
Mike,
At this time, I do not have access to the files
that you reference. John Shelton is going to
forward the investigative report which I expect
to have before we talk. I believe we are in the
same time zone. Can we go with 3 pm as I will be
changing hotels after the Sr. Mgmt meeting ends
on Wednesday. I'll call you if that's okay.
Gail
-----Original Message-----
From: DeKort, Michael
Sent: Monday, February 07, 2005 3:24 PM
To: Allen, Gail
Subject: RE: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue
How about 2:30 my time Wed?
24
Did John Shelton forward you the data package I
gave him as well as his investigation package?
Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager
IS&S Colorado Springs
719-277-4257
719-896-0760 cell
-----Original Message-----
From: Allen, Gail
Sent: Monday, February 07, 2005 1:19 PM
To: DeKort, Michael
Subject: Re: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue
Michael,
I am in receipt of your email. I am on travel
through Thursday. The earliest that I would be
able to speak with you is Wednesday afternoon
while in Phoenix. Is your time availability flexible for Wednesday pm?
Gail Allen
-----------------
Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.
-----Original Message-----
From: DeKort, Michael <michae..._at_lmco.com>
To: Allen, Gail <gail..._at_lmco.com>
Sent: Fri Feb 04 14:52:33 2005
Subject: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue
Good afternoon,
John Shelton informed me on Monday that he has
passed the case on to you. He informed me that he
told you that I was unsatisfied with the results
of the MS2 investigation as well as my
suggestions to remedy the situation. I am
standing by ready to discuss this matter as soon as you are available.
I would like you to know that I originally
intended to contact Bob Stevens about the matter
on Monday and that I promised John I would stand
down on taking that action until we talk. The
reason for my wishing to contact Mr. Stevens is
that I feel the matter is critical enough to
involve him. I believe that in the 1.5 years this
issue has gone on we have delivered several
systems with critical safety, security and
reliability issues to Homeland Security (the
Coast Guard) and with each month that situation
grows worse as we continue deliveries and approve
designs leveraged against the issues I have
raised. I believe that not only are the Coast
Guard crew members in jeopardy but so is the
general public they serve as well as the overall
mission of the US Coast Guard/Homeland Defense.
I look forward to beginning our discussions on these issues.
25
Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Email delivered receipt to Fred Moosally – 4/12/2005
Your message
To: Moosally, Fred P
Subject: Deepwater Ethics Issue
Sent: 4/12/2005 12:57 PM
was delivered to the following recipient(s):
Moosally, Fred P on 4/12/2005 12:57 PM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – Project Deepwater- Issues of Concern – 4/28/2005
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Michael DeKort
To: Robert Stevens
Good Afternoon
My name is Michael De Kort. Currently I am the
software engineering manager for ISC2/IS&S.
Previously, when I was part of the MS2 company I
was the lead systems engineer, on the 123
project, for the Deepwater effort. During my
assignment to the project I surfaced several
significant security and safety issues. Over the
past one and a half years I have been trying to
rectify those issues through the chain of
command. I have been through the MS2 engineering
and program management chains, MS2 quality
assurance, ethics and finally corporate ethics.
While all the parties mentioned believe and have
stated that the issues I raised have been closed
satisfactorily, I do not believe they have been.
As such I am submitting this correspondence of
record to you so I may apprize you of the
situation and am seeking your help in to
rectifying the issues described. In taking this
action I will be satisfying my own personal and
professional ethical and moral responsibilities.
I strongly believe that some of the decisions we
have made on the Deepwater project have severally
compromised the mission of the US Coast Guard,
the Department of Homeland Security and as a
result Lockheed Martin. I believe our approach
and decisions have put the Coast Guard in a
position of accepting a product that will result
in severe degradation of their mission capabilities.
As I understand your time is valuable I have
included the details in a separate document. That
attached document summarizes the issues, history
as I have witnessed it, some of my opinions on the matter and my background.
In closing I would like to assure you that the
issues I have raised are significant in nature
and are important enough to be reviewed and
scrutinized at the highest levels. Given the
change in the world post 9-11 I think it is
imperative that we ensure that even though there
may be significant program pressures we ensure
that the most rudimentary ethical and
professional standards not be compromised.
26
If there is anything else I can provide or
anything I can do to be of any assistance please let me know.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Associated document – Deepwater Complete 2 .doc
The purpose of this document is to enter in to
record a complete account (not day by day) record
of my concerns, issues and opinions relative to
the Deepwater ethics complaints I have filed. I
want to ensure that the majority of the pertinent
information has been provided so that there are
no misunderstandings and to ensure that all the
relevant parties had a complete accounting of my case.
Summary
For the past 1.5 years I have been involved in
trying to correct/remedy certain technical
problems relative to the 123 class of ships for
the U.S. Coast Guard. (As this effort leverages a
systems of systems design concept many of these
issues would be leveraged in other efforts as
well – such as the MSC -Maritime Security
Cutter).) These issues involve several key
security and safety requirements. The proper
resolution of these requirements are imperative
as not doing so will endanger the lives of the
crew, as well as the general public, and
compromise the secure communications capability
of the USG as well as that of all of DoD. (As the
CG has a requirement to interface/communicate
with DoD any communications compromise would
affect all of these organizations).
In my pursuit to resolve these issues I have
worked through every level of my chain of command - through several iterations.
At the end of the day I would like to ensure the
product meets or exceeds all the USCG/Homeland
Security mission needs, the MS2 organization
properly deals with an organizational pattern of
behavior problem and policies are changed so no
other employee, or their family, should have to go through what we did.
Issues
1.
SRP/Zodiac VHF Radio
a.
We had the C4ISR requirement to provide a VHF radio for the SRP/Zodiac boat
b.
This craft is used, primarily, for rescues and to board other vessels.
c.
We had a sea state 5 environmental requirement.
This requirement means the equipment needed to
function properly in very rough seas and weather conditions.
d.
The vessel has no interior. Other than a small
area for storage under the deck – everything was exposed to the elements.
e.
The radio we chose to satisfy the requirements
was not meant to be used outdoors. (per the vendor)
f.
This is a significant safety risk. Without this
radio the Zodiac has no other method of communicating beyond a certain range.
g.
We purchased 9 radios upfront. (For the first 9 boats)
h.
We told the USG we would not use the radio that
came with the Zodiac because it did not meet all
technical criteria (Which is true. However the
ghosting capability was not nearly as crucial as weather survivability)
i.
I asked to have the radios replaced and was told
we would not do that because it was the “design of record”.
27
j.
After several months of trying to get it replaced
I convinced management to let me add a ‘raincoat”
and swap the microphone out for a weather proof
one. I said this was only a temporary measure and
did not mean the requirement was satisfied. It
simply allowed the radio to operate longer before
shorting out. I settled to keep the crew as safe
as I could for as long as I could. (If management
believed the radio met the environmental
requirements why would they agree to the raincoat
and weather proof microphone solutions? I believe
the answer is that they knew they were wrong but
didnÂ’t want to admit making such a large mistake.
The raincoat and microphone we viewed as added
protection – going above and beyond)
k.
Several months later, the same week I elevated
the issues to the VP of QA and the VP of MS2 the
USCG asked us to test the radios in the rain
without the “raincoat’ (which they found understandably annoying to use)
l.
We shorted out 4 radios in the rain. The CG
witnessed all 4 radios failing in the rain.
m.
Had the customer not tested the radio in the rain
we would have delivered the boat with that radio
and it would have failed the first time in use.
This would have put the crew and personnel being rescued in harms way.
n.
I consider the decision to keep the Ross radio,
before the USCG testing failures, to be negligent
on the part of our technical and program
management who knowingly and willfully directed
we put an unsafe radio on that boat (keep in mind
the Zodiac goes on all 49 123s and all of the
WSCs). Again – if it were not for the customer
testing the radios in the rain just before
delivery we would have delivered these radios.
o.
See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination
2.
Camera Surveillance system
a.
Northrop had a requirement to provide 2 mast
mounted cameras that could pan, tilt and zoom
b.
While the requirement did not specify specific
coverage capabilities it does state these are
surveillance cameras used to monitor the boat remotely when in port
c.
I believe that requirement means we have to
provide 360deg coverage. (At the time the USCG
had this exact solution implemented on some its
older vessels and they had 360 deg coverage.
Additionally NG planned on that same implementation on the WSC in the future)
d.
Due to a less than productive and cooperative
working relationship with NG we argued over who
would provide the cameras for several months. As
we were supposed to provide all the signaling and
control cables I suggested we take the initiative
to buy the cameras to make schedule
e.
Management agreed and wanted to put them on the
mast. NG pushed back and said that would mean a
late design change and new center of gravity
study. At that point I suggested we tell NG we
tried to help them do their job and if they
wanted to play that game they could supply the cameras on their own.
f.
It turns out that we decided to continue taking
the risk and find another way out. Later I found
out this because we made another design mistake
and did not supply all the control circuitry for
the cameras. This meant the cameras would be fixed position.
g.
The design we came up with was to mount 4 cameras
on the pilot house – 20ft lower than the standard
installation. This would, in theory provide them
the same viewing capability without having to
move the cameras (I actually liked this idea
because with moving cameras one can tell where a
moving camera is viewing and avoid being seen).
My only stipulation was that we have shipÂ’s
integration do a plot to make sure their were no obstructions or dead zones
h.
The study came back and showed 2 dead zones –
about 5 deg each- directly over the pilot hose at
10 and 2 oÂ’clock. These dead zones were about
10ft wide on the boat and projected to the
horizon were hundreds of yards wide. These dead
zones would enable someone to board the ship and
enter the pilot house without being seen
28
i.
I immediately told the chief engineer and program
management that this was a security issue and
needed to be remedied by adding another camera
and circuitry. They refused and said we would not alter the “design of record”.
j.
When I pushed back they said show me the
requirement to have 360 deg coverage. My response was:
i.
ItÂ’s common sense
ii.
Currently the existing USCG ships with cameras had 360 deg coverage
iii.
The current spec was written by us. As such we
made a mistake, should have included it and it
is, at the very least, it was a derived requirement.
k.
PMO and the Chief Eng still refused to make the
change. However. .after several weeks of pushing
they agreed to let me talk it over with the CG
tech rep. Several weeks later that tech rep came
back and said he would approve the dead zones
because the windows of the pilot house could be
locked and we could tell someone had entered
because the locks or glass would be broken. I
thought this was an incorrect and reckless
decision. However we followed with a contracts
letter requesting permission to have less than
360 deg coverage. As of March of 04 the CG had
yet to grant permission. Based on this course of
action, even though I vehemently disagreed, I
knew I wouldnÂ’t be able to fight this one further.
l.
In December of 03 the security inspector for the
CG performed an inspection of our boat and said,
in his report, that he noticed the
implementation, with 4 fixed cameras, was
different than he was used to seeing, but it
looked like he had 360 deg coverage. I felt this open the issue back up.
m.
I immediately went to management and suggested we
tell that inspector that we had less than 360 deg
coverage and see what he wanted to do.
n.
I was then told, in a room with witnesses, that
if he thought he had 360 deg we werenÂ’t going to
tell him otherwise and that it was his fault he
made a mistake and ran a faulty test. I told the
group I thought that approach was unethical and put the USCG and LM at risk.
o.
See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination
3.
Tempest cabling
a.
In the summer of 03 the environmental/security
requirements were finally flowed down to us (as I
mentioned before this was several months after
the design review and during our supposed
installation period). These requirements levied
certain tempest requirements on us. (I was aware
that requirements of this type would normally
exist. I had previously asked for them and spent months trying to get them)
b.
In doing my research on the effort I dug up an
internal report, from 2/03, that shipÂ’s
integration created to guide engineering on what
to do - specifically relative to tempest issues,
cabling, equipment separation, grounding etc. (I
should mention here that I have an extensive Tempest background)
c.
I later learned that the proposal never costed or
scheduled that work and as such engineering had
no money to do most of the most basic of tempest
designs or buy what needed to be bought.
Specifically the chief engineer directed that no
shielded cables were to be designed in or
purchased. Shielded cabling is the foundation for
the most rudimentary Tempest design. Not having
those shielded cables compromises the entire
secure system and the associated crypto. Since
the USCG had a requirement to communicate with
all DoD forces this meant that any compromise we
had would be a compromise to all of DoD. A
compromise here would mean that classified
messages could easily be read by someone who
should not be reading them. This is a serious security issue.
d.
My next move was to change the design and get the
Tempest requirements satisfied (now it should be
noted that not all tempest requirements can be
satisfied on a small vessel. Normally these can
be handled by waiver. Not having shield cables is never waived)
29
e.
Management responded to my request by going back
to shipÂ’s integration and employing a Tempest
expert. (Interestingly enough the original report
was done with out this gentlemenÂ’s help. The
people who wrote the report had no background in
the area, sought his help, but were not permitted to use him).
f.
The expert wrote a report specifying what should
be done and what could be waived. He found major
discrepancies. One of which was not having shielded cables.
g.
Management then said the “design of record”
stands and that we would wait until the visual
and electronic inspections to see where we failed.
h.
The visual inspection came with a list of
failures. Of which the cables were included.
i.
Management then decided to not fix any visual
failures until the electrical test confirmed those failures.
j.
It was at about this time that I had,
unfortunately, made my way up to the VP (Carl
Bannar). The VP agreed that we should fix all the
visual/electrical issues (short of items that should be waived)
k.
See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination
4.
External equipment survivability
a.
With the receipt of the late environmental
requirements we were notified that we have
temperature survivability requirements to satisfy
(as I said before I had been asking for this data from the beginning)
b.
These requirements said we had to meet external
temperature requirements of -40 to +125 deg.
c.
I immediately tasked my Sensors tech to research
our equipments ability to meet these
requirements. The first system he checked was the
FLIR (Forward looking Infra Red). He told me it
would only survive to -5. This would mean that a
crucial navigation system would not function in
cold areas where the CG needed to sail. This
would pose a safety risk and cause the CG to
alter its mission capability for all 49 of these
boats. I told the engineer to keep researching
and told management about the issue. They
proceeded to tell the engineer to stop performing
the research I asked him to do and told me we
would not fix a thing – we would not alter the “design of record”.
d.
When I took this issue to VP he agreed that the
issue needed to be remedied. He said the chief
engineer would handle this. The chief engineer
told me it would be handled by telling the CG
there were various requirements issues to
address. I said this was not specific enough and
should be handled by meeting or changing the
requirement. I also said we should not be
suggesting to the customer that they change their
mission requirements because we didnÂ’t do our job. He said he would handle it.
e.
I believe that those ships will be incapacitated,
in extreme hot and cold weather, because several
sensor or communications systems will fail. This could result in loss of life.
f.
See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination
5.
PCA issues
a.
LM had the responsibility of verifying the C4ISR
HW/cable installations against the drawings.
b.
When LM sent out a group from QA to check cables
– QA did a sample of about 100 cables and found over ½ to be incorrect.
c.
This situation was caused by us giving inaccurate
information to BSI during the first round of cable designs.
d.
Based on the sample several hundred cables were improperly labeled.
30
e.
This situation could lead to improper connecting
of cables in the future – specifically during
maintenance. This situation could lead to
equipment/system malfunction, ship unavailability
and possible harm to the technician.
f.
My suggestion was to fix the cables and drawings.
(Doing so would also ensure the problems were not implemented on future ships)
g.
PMO decided it was NGÂ’s responsibility to run the
actual PCA for the ship. So we would wait and see what they caught.
h.
I told management I believed that to be dishonest and unethical.
i.
See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination
6.
Issues with future designs/ships
a.
Shortly after leaving the DW effort, while still
in MS2, I received messages from personnel still
on the DW effort. They informed me that we are
perpetuating our poor design philosophy on future
efforts. For example I am told that the wind
sensor on the WSC will not survive the elements.
I cannot confirm the accuracy of the report.
However given the chain of events described here
and the pattern of performance exhibited by
program management and engineering I believe this
issue has merit and that a complete review of all
designs and requirements is warranted.
Resolutions expected/requested
1.
A complete programmatic and engineering review of
the requirements and engineering solutions
factored against what is in the best interest of
our customer. I would like each issue, along with
all the associated data, to be reviewed in this
context. (To date a thorough review of this
nature has not been accomplished in my presence).
This review should be conducted by an entity
outside of MS2 and consists of engineering team members experienced in C4ISR.
2.
A complete management assessment of the
performance of every technical and program
management lead involved in this effort –
including me. We need to know if all the proper
policies/processes were adhered to and to address
any situations where these processes were jot
followed, ethics violations were introduced and
anyone was handled or dealt with
unprofessionally. Anyone who is found to have
acted improperly or unprofessionally should be
dealt with accordingly. As I believe there was an
ongoing effort to withhold information and
deceive I believe there are some individuals who
should, at the very least, be removed from the DW effort.
3.
Given all the technical missteps on this program
I believe it is incumbent upon us to see whether
or not we need to bring in some external help –
specifically C4ISR subject matter experts.
4.
I would like a review of my last appraisal as
well as the retaliation I believe I experienced.
As a result of this retaliation I am my family
were forced to move from the NJ area and to
Colorado. For a time this put a significant strain on my family.
History
I entered the program in July of 03. Originally
my effort consisted of trying to put together and
integrated schedule for the 123 effort. As time
went on it became apparent to the DW management
team that my background and leadership
capabilities lent themselves well to my taking on
the role of lead systems engineer for the effort. I accepted this position.
During this period (7/03 through 12/03) several threads were becoming apparent:
1.
The were no documented/accepted requirements for
the Increment 0 effort. As the original
requirement was for an Increment 1 there was
nothing in place to document the subset of
requirements we had agreed to deliver, at an accelerated pace, in Increment 0.
31
2.
The proposal effort severely underestimated the
task at hand. Large groups of engineering tasks,
such as cable designs, were not costed. These
drove the schedule far to the right. As such
design reviews were shortchanged and we found
ourselves in the summer of 04 expecting to be in
the middle of install while we were still
figuring out requirements and starting some critical design phases.
3.
During this phase the critical items I mention below came to light.
4.
We had not adequately prepared for site
installation. Until I arrived there was no plan
for utilizing trailers on site and no plan
detailing the installation steps. Keep in mind we
were already supposed to be installing when these issues were brought forward.
5.
The culmination of these issues snowballed. It
was obvious that in order to remedy the situation
we would need to push the schedule several
months, incur a significant cost over run and
find ourselves in an embarrassing situation.
6.
Management seemed to be more worried about our
perceived engineering capabilities and reputation
and not providing information that Northrop
Grumman could use against us than satisfying the
requirements to the degree necessary to ensure
the USCG/Homeland Security mission. (At the time
our relationship was extremely contentious. On
several occasions management referred to us
“playing chicken” until someone blinked. This
meant that we would hold off on announcing
publicizing or fixing a problem until NG
announced a problem. Wherever possible we would
link our issues to them.). As such the mantra
used to defend all of their reasons for not
addressing the situation was that we had a
“design of record’ and under no circumstance
would we change. They maintained this posture
even when the issues involved safety and/or security degradation.
Every attempt I made, within the DW chain of
command, to fix the problems was met with the
same answer – we will not change the design of
record. I pressed for several months within the
team before I decided to utilize my engineering
chain of command. As such it took me several more
months to work through that effort. I went up and
down the chain – several times over. At each step
I proved my points technically but was unable to
enlist support. One manager even told me I was
doing the right thing, that it would come back to
bite me and said ‘good luck” in my efforts to do
the right thing. At no point did anyone offer a
credible program or technical counter to any of my arguments.
Several of the risks I had entered in the risk
management system were purposefully deleted. When
I questioned why I was told they did not meet
certain data criteria. When I asked them why only
the risks associated with the critical issue were
deleted – they had no answer. When I asked them
why I was given no heads up – I was given no
answer. Only after I complained to my director
about the situation did the risks show back up in the database.
During the installation period, in the late
summer of 03, the environmental and security
requirements were finally flowed down from the
internal Systems of System group (several months
after the design review). For the first time we
were able to see if the systems/equipment we
bought and designed met requirements. (Keep in
mind this is very late in the process and that
equipment had been purchased for several ships at that point.)
After this I went to see the QA organization. We
went through al of my data and my allegations.
They agreed that the issues needed to be
addressed. They forwarded the data to the VP of
QA who promptly called Carl Banner and told him
he should see me. He immediately called me and
asked that we meet. I told him I wanted to see
the acting tech director one more time before I
came to see him. I told him I wanted to do this
by the book. He said he understood and that his door was open.
32
After not receiving the assistance I was looking
for I went to see Carl Bannar – VP of MS2. He was
the first level of management who actually
listened to what I had to say and who didnÂ’t
dismiss me with management hyperbole. In each of
the cases he agreed with my recommended course of
action – including letting me see proof of those
resolutions before we delivered the first ship.
Unfortunately that promise was not kept. The
chief engineer of DW actually went so far as to
suggest of was mischarging for pushing the issue
2 months after the ship delivered (A couple
months later my SW engineering director did sit
me down and show me some of the data I had asked
for. This was weeks after the ship had been
delivered. At that time, after having been
removed from the effort against my will,
receiving a low appraisal and being assigned to
work far beneath my capability, I acquiesced. I
told him the data was not sufficient, that I
didn’t trust it – but that I was getting weary of the fight and retaliation)
After be exposed to what I believe is retaliatory
behavior I applied for other jobs. I was offered
a position of senior program manager with IS&S and accepted it.
On my way out of the organization I went to the
MS2 director of tech ops to tell him the entire
story. As he was new to the organization I felt
there was a chance he would get involved, look in
to the situation, fix what need to be fixed and
ensure this kind of thing never happened again.
He took no action (at the time) that I know of
other than contacting HR who in turn contacted ethics.
MS2 conducted an investigation.
•
The MS2 ethics manager came to my location and interviewed me
•
The result of that investigation was to find my
claims could not be supported. I was not
permitted to know where my accusations fell short
or were inaccurate and was not permitted to know
where the information was not supported. I do not
know if the history was found to be in error, if
the actual claims were in error or the resultant
delivery did not line up with my claims. I
stipulated at the time, and maintain now, that I
should be permitted to see all contractual and/or
engineering data that disputes my claims or
information. I believe it is in the companyÂ’s
best interest to do so. If the final results are
in keeping with the contractual requirements I
should be able to see proof that we met our obligations.
•
At no point did anyone ever contact me asking for
more detail, to refute some information or to
discuss any of my data. Given the importance and
complexity of the data as well as the fact that
the finding were that none of my claims were
substantiated I find this to be very questionable.
Corporate investigation.
•
This investigation began a short time after the
MS2 ethics investigation conclusion. I had
requested an independent engineering review of
the situation. That request was granted, at first
as a single engineer then as a team. After
several weeks had gone by without by being
interviewed I requested status. I was told the
investigation was almost over and that I would be given a report soon.
•
Gail Allen, Carol Boser (the engineer assigned to
perform the review) and I have a meeting scheduled for 4/11.
•
Gail Allen requested that I provide all copies of
the data that I have in my possession. As that
data proves each and every one of my allegations
to be true I am reluctant to give it up until I
am sure the issues have been resolved satisfactorily.
•
Outcome of debrief- 5/14
a.
Cameras - CG accepted the camera blind spots
i.
I believe this puts the CG in a severely
compromised position. The original intent of the
cameras was to provide the CG the capability to
monitor the boat remotely when in a CG port. This
would mean no one would need to be on board to
monitor the boat. I believe we have put the
33
CG in the position of now having to man the boat
– as the dead spots would permit someone to
easily get on board and enter the pilot house
without being detected. No other ships, which
have cameras, put the CG in this position. We
were already adding 2 cameras – adding a 3rd
would have been no problem. Additionally – the
fact that there are dead spots, and all
associated data, should become classified information.
b.
Radio – replaced with correct radio
i.
What should be looked in to here is the chain of
events that lead to this change. I tried for 6
months to get this change. It wasnÂ’t until we
shorted out 4 radios, in front of the CG, during
testing that we replaced these radios. I strongly
believe it was our intent to deliver the original
radios – which would have resulted in failure the first time used.
c.
Temp ext equip – fixed FLIR and agreed to check
in to compatibility of all the other equip and
get back to me. Chances are most of the other
equipment will not pass requirements thereby
forcing the CG to change its mission
destinations. Carol Boser (and sub sequentially
MS2 legal) said no problems have occurred yet on
the 5 fields 123s. I asked if any have sailed in
extreme environments and she said she didnÂ’t
know. She said if we find a problem – we will fix it. How is this satisfactory?
d.
Tempest – CG passed instrumented tests even
though proper cables not used and the original
visual A Tempest inspection failed. I doubt that
this system actually passed the standard
electrical Tempest checks. If this system is not
up to standards all the CG and DoD classified
communications will be compromised when the CG is
involved, even during simple monitoring, of communications.
i.
We knew we ordered the wrong cables before we
asked Bollinger to run them on the ship. We
should have ordered the correct cables and worked the cost issues with the CG.
e.
PCA – agreed to fix
f.
Pattern of performance by Deepwater program
management and engineering leadership
i.
Excused performance due to schedule/budget pressures and poor processes
ii.
Excused things people said – “people say stupid things”
1.
When PJ Messer said “it wasn’t our fault the
customer didn’t catch our camera blind spots” –
is this something we dismiss that easily?
g.
Retaliation – Carol in formed me that there was
no data to support. As my appraisals reflect that
sometimes I push too hard on issues she didnÂ’t see a problem.
h.
Overall – Carol Boser – engineer on investigation
– told me that management was under tight
schedule and budget constraints and were working
in an environment that had poor processes. As
such she thought their actions were
understandable and acceptable. She did not think
managementÂ’s behavior displayed any patterns of
poor judgment or ethical breeches. Carol did
mention that if any problems are found down the road they would be fixed.
i.
Response
i.
Bad process, tight schedules and budget issues
are not a get out of jail free cards. Suggesting
such- in light of the issues described here – is
ridiculous. None of these is enough of an excuse
to excuse us from the most basic ethical
considerations. I knew these things were wrong
and could be fixed – why wouldn’t the same
standard be applied to program managers and chief
engineers? Are my standards too high? Are they
too high for homeland Security and the nation?
ii.
Why would we put CG in such a difficult and
compromising position? They should never have been asked to accept any of this.
iii.
All of these issues could have been solved before
the first boat delivered with minimal schedule
risk. We knew these issues existed 6 months
before delivery and weeks before installation
began. We created this crisis by making bad
decisions and then forcing ourselves and the customer in to a box.
iv.
I have been told, in many forums, that Lockheed
Martin has an “unyielding” ethics policy. How is
the scenario unfolding here not yielding? Are
they merely policies of convenience?
34
v.
As these issues were brought up over 6 months
before the delivery of the first boat and
installation had not yet begun we could and
should have rectified these issues before
delivery. There would have been cost and schedule
impacts but they would have been justified and
far cheaper to fix then than now.
vi.
Waiting until problems are found later - (per
Carol Boser) this meant we would wait until
actual system failure. Most likely this would
occur during a mission. Is this acceptable?
vii.
I believe that the product we are delivering will
result in injury to crew members and/or the
general public and major security/communications
compromises down the road. It is very unfortunate
that the customer was put in a position to have
to accept this situation. I believe that LM and
the CG need to revisit the situation and find a
way to rectify it. If we do not there will be
severe fallout which both of us will have to answer for.
viii.
I believe we have only converted 5 out of 49
123Â’s. We should ensure that future boats are
delivered to the originally intended spec and
figure out a way to back fit the others.
Opinions/Suggestions/Observations
The information below has been provided so I can
put forth an explanation for how and why things
occurred. I understand fully that most of these
are only my opinions but I believe they are
consistent with the facts. I believe it is
important to convey these opinions as they might
help us understand the depth and root causes of
the problem so we can go forward and correct them.
•
 From the beginning I believe this project
suffered from an extensive lack of technical
expertise. As such the proposal was recklessly
under bid (I say recklessly because it far
exceeded any realistic chance of success – far
beyond normal proposal challenges we take to be competitive)
o
I believe this lack of expertise stemmed from an
organizational arrogance that led to a severe
underestimation of the work at hand. What we did
was leverage our Aegis success. While this is an
excellent strategy we went too far and assumed
that since the DW effort was considerably less
complicated than Aegis – that it would be easy to
do. While I believe it is true that the effort is
less technically challenging than the Aegis
effort one still needs to know what to do. We did
not bring an adequate level of C4ISR expertise on to the job.
o
Additionally I believe these leaders lost their
way. I believe that Aegis has a culture that
expects/demands the highest ethical standards.
That culture makes it virtually impossible to
stray. When left on their own these leaders
became lost and found they had to think on their
own. They made the wrong choices.
•
If the organization had chosen to fix all these
issues when presented in the summer/fall of 04 we
would have been able to do so on the first boat
and leverage those fixes forward. Those changes
would have caused a cost/schedule impact but
those impacts are far less than we would have to
experience now because we have fielded several
123Â’s and have completed CDR for the WCS.
Additionally we could have been seen as being
proactive – now we will be seen as not only
making a crucial sophomoric mistake but we were
late. Additionally we could be accused of hiding
information or misrepresenting the facts.
•
I believe the organization compromised its
ethical standards in order to save face. I
believe that in doing so we put the USCG/Homeland
Defense and the general public at risk
•
I believe that my management chain, at the time,
should have supported me once I made my case
technically and/or contractually. I believe it
was incumbent upon them to assist me in doing the
right thing for the project instead of informing
me that I was doing the right thing, wishing me
luck and standing on the sideline.
•
On several occasions individual contributors as
well as program management and tech leads told me
they felt I was doing the right thing but they
would not get involved out of fear of
retribution. One PM, who was just coming on the
job during these events, actually told me he
thought we were making “stupid” mistakes by
taking the course of action we were on and
35
promised me he would look in to the situation.
Two days later, after meeting with senior PM, he
told me we would stick with the “design of
recordÂ’ and told me he could no longer help me.
•
During the winter of 03 I tried, on several
occasions to see the DW chief engineer on these
issues. He refused to return 3 phone calls and
several emails requesting a meeting. It was not
until I got to Carl Bannar and he was directed to
see me that he did. When asked why he wouldnÂ’t
see me he said that he assigned that to another
engineer who apparently didnÂ’t do his job well. I
said that was fine in the beginning but that it
was incumbent upon him to see me when he knew I
was going to see Mr. Bannar because I was not
satisfied with the responses I was getting. I
told him I thought he purposefully avoided me and
that that was unprofessional and contributed to
the problem. He had no response (this is the same
chief engineer that refused to send me the data
he promised and then insinuated I was mischarging when I kept pushing)
•
I believe that the legal and ethics organizations
are not acting in the best interest of the
company in these matters. I believe that each
level of management simply trusts the one below
them and that ethics and legal are falling in to
the same pattern by defending them. I believe
that MS2/Deepwater program and engineering
management, MS2 and corporate ethics and legal
would be better served by looking for what the
right long term solution is and not looking to
defend the positions of those who made the
decisions they got us where we are. It cannot and
should not be in the best interest of LM to
continue down the path we are going.
•
I believe I have been dealt with unfairly and
unethically. I believe I suffered organizational
retaliation and that this process – being 1.5
years since the problems came to light, has taken entirely too long.
Background
•
Relevant experience
o
US Navy - 6 years as a communications electronics
technician. Specialized in the ASW communications
area. This involved going through the navyÂ’s
longest and most extensive ‘C’ school. The system
involved complete C3 systems. Certified in 3
cryptos and Tempest. I then went on to work at
the Guam and Diego Garcia communications stations
and earned several awards and medals for doing so
o
US State Department – 1.5 years as a
Communications Engineer. Spent 6 months of that
time as the communications engineer for the counter terrorism group
o
Lockheed Martin
..
Systems Engineer – worked classified LAN/WAN
projects as well as aircraft simulation efforts
and A/V training suite design. Last SE
responsibility was as SE leads for the DW 123 effort
..
Project Lead – lead several aircraft simulator
upgrade efforts as well as being the SW project
Lead for Aegis baseline 6 Phase III. (For which I
earned several Aegis Excellence and business
Excellence Awards. Most notably was for
successfully completing the baseline 6 Phase III Incentive effort)
..
Currently SW engineering manager for IS&S/ISC2
(predominantly NORAD efforts). Previously I was
SW project lead for the NORAD CS2 effort.
In closing I would like to reiterate my
commitment to see that the right thing is done
for our customer and shareholders and I will
pursue every means available to me to ensure that
happens. Post 9/11 I believe the mission of the
U.S. Coast Guard and Homeland Security has become
our nationÂ’s highest priority. As such Lockheed
Martin should ensure that the products we provide
ensure that mission succeeds now and well in to the future.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
36
 From email titled – Email to Robert Stevens – 5/4/2005
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Maryann Lavan
To: Michael DeKort
Mr. De Kort:
Your e:mail to Mr. Stevens of April 28, 2005 was
referred to me for review and handling. I
appreciate that you have devoted much time and
effort in pursuing your concerns about the
Deepwater Program. I would like to meet with you
in person to hear and respond to your concerns.
Are you available for a meeting in Bethesda,
Maryland at Lockheed Martin Corporate
Headquarters on Tuesday, May 10th, from 11:30-12:30?
Sincerely,
Maryanne R. Lavan
Vice President-Ethics and Business Conduct
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From email titled – Deepwater Ethics Issue – Please Read – 1/17/2006
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Michael DeKort
To: Robert Stevens
Mr. Stevens
First let me say that this will be the last
unsolicited correspondence I send you pertaining
to Deepwater matters. Given your position and
constraints on your time I know I am asking quite
a lot of you to indulge me by reading this
correspondence. I also realize this letter is
long. I wanted to make sure that should you
decide to read it you are fully informed.
I have been struggling for some time on how I
should formulate this letter. I am fully aware
that the odds are stacked very heavily against
me. We have 2.5 years of investigations, your VP
of Ethics and the MS2 Deepwater organization
telling you all is well. Having said that I will
endeavor to convince you otherwise by laying out
the issues and a brief synopsis on how we got
here. What we have here is the questionable
competence at the lowest levels and a chain of
command which simply wanted to trust the judgment
of those below them. In this case that was an
incredibly bad decision. This entire episode has
snowballed and with every day we lose valuable
time needed to turn this around. My background as
a communications technician for the US Navy, a
communications engineer for the US State
Department (embassy/consulate communications and
the leading engineer for the counter terrorism
group) and as a systems engineer/project manager
for Lockheed Martin tell me we have put our
company, our customer and the general public at
risk by leading our customer in to accepting
these systems as designed. There are several
critical safety and security issues involved
which will lead to severe consequences for
Lockheed Martin, Homeland Security, the US Coast
Guard and the general public down the road.
Technical issues summary – Deepwater 123 effort
37
•
Exterior equipment survivability – There is a
risk that the majority of the equipment will not
survive the environmental temperature extremes.
Several Nav, Sensor and Communications systems
will fail. This will cause serious safety issues.
•
Tempest – Shielded Cables – The proper cables
were not installed in the secure communication
circuits. This will cause serious security issues
•
Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video
surveillance system with two significant blind
spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will
cause significant security and safety problems
•
FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in
the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to
survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue
Issues Detail
Exterior equipment survivability – The majority
of the exterior mounted equipment will not
survive the environmental temperature extremes
•
Late in the project, months after the design was
approved and equipment purchased, we received our
environmental and Tempest requirements (this in
itself is very troubling). One of the
requirements was to ensure that all the equipment
and cabling we installed on the exterior of the
vessel could survive Sea State 5 and temperatures from -40 to +125 deg (f).
•
Upon receiving these requirements I immediately
asked my IPT Leads to double check all the
equipment to see if we had any issues. They were
directed to look at all Sensor, Nav and Comm equipment.
•
The very first device we looked at – the FLIR – would not survive below -5 deg.
•
Management was then informed about the situation
senior management directed me and my people to
stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the
equipment would survive the elements. They also
directed that the FLIR design would stand as is. As the “Design of Record”.
•
After 2.5 years – the organization decided to fix
the FLIR. However details were not provided on
whether the rest of the equipment met specs or if
we convinced the CG to lower the requirement.
•
I believe that we either lessened the
requirements or gun decked the solution. This
could mean that the Sensor, Nav and Communication
systems are at risk. (Especially when these boats
deploy to Alaska or warm regions such as Guam or even the Persian Gulf area)
•
All of the systems the CG currently have met
these requirements. We will be severely degrading
the performance of these vessels
•
Note – The engineer your ethics office assigned
to this case, along with your legal department,
sent me a letter stating there are no long term
issues because several of the boats have been
doing fine during their sea trials. Sea trials
conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. I hope this
gives you serious pause. The Gulf of Mexico is
about 80 deg all year around. It never sees any
of the extremes called out by the specs. This is
exactly the kind of reckless engineering the
Deepwater team utilized to get us in the
predicament we are in now. The first time these
boats get to cold waters and there is significant
sea spray – the majority of the systems will fail.
•
This situation exists not only for several boats
that are modified but for the 41 or so that we
havenÂ’t even started on yet. (I believe we are
not yet on contract for boats 6-49.)
Tempest – Shielded Cables – The proper cables
were not installed in the secure communication
circuits. This will cause serious security issues
•
Again – well after the design review and the
equipment was purchased – we received our Tempest
requirements. Those requirements called for the
standard set of military sea going requirements –
shielding, grounding, bonding, separation of equipment etc.
•
The Chief Engineer on the effort had directed
months before that we not buy shielded cables
because they were too expensive. The requirements were never changed.
38
•
Until this point we had not involved anyone who
had a Tempest background on the project even
though they worked in the organization.
•
Note – Ship’s Integration had prepared a report
on what our Tempest solutions should be. They did
an excellent job given the engineer had never
worked Tempest before (The Tempest engineer they
had on staff was not asked to participate). The
report stated shielded cables must be used.
•
I have a Tempest background – in the Navy and
Department of State – as well as 4 crypto
designations. The report made sense to me. Standard ops.
•
Management was informed that we needed to buy
shielded cables or change requirements (something
that I have never seen or heard of being done)
they informed me that the design of record would stand.
•
Sometime later we brought on the Tempest engineer
from Ships Integration to perform a site
inspection. He failed us in several areas including shielded cables.
•
Management decided to wait until the instrumented
test to see if we could pass. No effort was made
to buy or install shielded cables based on the visual test failure.
•
2.5 years later. Again I have been given none of
the technical details I was promised. However I
was able to independently ascertain that shielded
cables have not been installed.
•
Recently I have contacted several Tempest
inspectors around the country. All of them told
me the chances of passing a test were extremely unlikely without these cables.
•
I believe LM and the USCG have either gun decked
the tests or lowered the requirements. (Check
every other CG or Navy ship in the fleet now and
see if they have shielded cables in their secure
comm systems. I guarantee you they do. We took
shielded cables off these boats when we installed the non-shielded cables.)
•
As the USCG now has a requirement to be able to
communicate with DoD and several other agencies
this puts all of those agencies at severe risk.
Any foreign government monitoring these boats –
from shore or from ”fishing boats” will be able
to pick up all the communications from these
boats. Since we have no shielded cables these
boats will emanate like an antennae. The
communications heard will be in the clear and
easily understood. This means that those
listening will pick up any and all communications
DoD or any other organization has even if these
ships are simply monitoring those circuits.
•
The CG not only accepted this for the current
boats but did so for the 41 boats we havenÂ’t
touched yet or procured cables for.
Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video
surveillance system with two significant blind
spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will
cause significant security and safety problems.
•
LM and ICGS received requirements to install 2
mast mounted movable cameras. (an implementation
used for quite some time in the USCG)
•
Originally ICGS was supposed to procure the
cameras and install them and LM was to provide
the video and control circuitry – as well as the shore connection box
•
The cameras purpose was to permit remote
monitoring of the boat when in a USCG port. No watch standers would be required
•
Arguments ensued between us and ICGS on who would buy the cameras.
•
I requested that LM to take over this effort to stay on schedule
•
A decision was made to install 4 fixed cameras on
the pilot house. While I like this idea, as one
could not ‘sneak’ around a moving camera, I knew
that management was assuming each camera had a 90
deg field of view. I asked Ships Integration to
utilize the camera specs and ships design to plot
the views. They came back and said that the
cameras did not afford a 90deg field of view and
as such there would be blind spots. These blinds
spots were are 11 and 2 o’clock – directly over
the pilot house/bridge windows. The blind spots were over 10ft wide on
39
the deck and hundreds of yards wide to the
horizon. I told management we needed to install 1
more camera and shift the existing forward camera
over to cover the blind spots. Management said
the “Design of Record” was 4 cameras. (No cameras
had been purchased or installed yet)
•
Management responded by telling me there was no
360 deg requirement. My response was that it was
common sense and that the USCG currently had
ships with 2 masts mounted moving cameras that supplied 360 deg of view.
•
Management stuck to their position. But did
permit me to talk to the USCG tech rep.
•
The CG Tech Rep – feeling the same schedule
pressure – relented and said the blind spots
would be acceptable because the pilot
house/bridge windows could be locked. I told him
someone could plant a charge on the boat
undetected – for which he had no answer- or get
in to the pilot house by breaking a window. The
rep said we would detect the broken glass on the
floor and perform and inspection.
•
Again keep in mind that one more camera would
have solved this – at an expense of under $1000.
(If you asked for a video surveillance system for
your house – would you want a blind spot over your front door?)
•
Some time after this the CG security inspector
inspected the boat. His report stated the boat
didnÂ’t have the standard 2 camera mast solution
but that he had 4 fixed cameras and it looked
like the boat had 360 deg views. (This
established that 360 deg view was a requirement)
•
After reading this report I informed management
that the 360 deg requirement was indeed valid and
that we had an obligation to tell that inspector we had 2 blind spots
•
Management said it was not our fault the
inspector missed the blind spots or that they wrote and conducted a faulty test
•
This situation puts the crew of that boat in
harms way. Especially if they decide to stick
with their original plan of not having a watch
stander on board (Ethics told me they might
decide to add a watch stander due to this
problem. Why would LM permit the USCG to lessen
the original requirement? Again – they have 360
deg solutions on other boats. We are severely degrading existing capability)
•
2.5 years later. The CG has accepted the design.
All 49 boats will have the blind spots. Even the
41 boats we havenÂ’t touched yet or procured equipment for.
FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in
the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to
survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue
•
Forward looking Infrared – used for foul weather navigation
•
We installed a cable that is not meant for outdoor use.
•
The direction from senior leadership was that this was the “Design of Record”
•
I asked that we swap it out for one meant to survive the elements.
•
Management refused to swap out the cable and said
we would replace it when it fails.
•
This cable is going to fail when the crew needs it most
•
All 49 boats are planned to use this cable.
Summary of Issues
Individually each of these problems can, and I
believe will, cause serious safety and security
problems for the USCG (given that 49 or more of
these boats will have one or more of these issues
the odds are pretty good there will be a
catastrophic failure). Each of these issues could
have been solved before the first boat was
completed. I do not believe this is what Lockheed
Martin is or should be about. It is easy to say
we observe the highest ethical standards – but
apparently not as easy to do so. It is not a
matter if these things happen but when. (The
worse part is that we have the talent in the
company to do this right and most of the
solutions are COTS and not that difficult to
engineer.) EthicÂ’s response that the USCG has accepted each one
40
of these problems is a very weak argument and a
cop out in my opinion. I believe the lower level
officers of the CG accepted this because we put
them in a position of being late or being over
budget if they did not do so and thereby put them
in a difficult position with their seniors. The
USCG and by proxy the public has secured our
services to supply a product that ensures the
mission of the USCG is paramount. Our actions have put that mission at risk.
How we got here
•
LM decided to leverage our Aegis reputation to
win this effort. Therefore a decision was made
not to have other orgs, who had C4ISR
backgrounds, bid this job as prime. While I
understand leveraging LMÂ’s well deserved Aegis
reputation I think this decision laid the
groundwork for the problems I described. I
believe management thought that as this effort
was far easier to engineer than Aegis – we made
the mistake of thinking it was so easy we didnÂ’t
need subject matter experts. As such none of our
PM or Senior Technical Leadership team had C4ISR
experience (nor did most of our IPT engineering leadership)
•
Very early on the team realized they had schedule and budget issues.
•
The 123 effort was the first. The design review
was held on schedule – but prematurely. Most of
the requirements had never been flowed to the
design team by Systems of Systems.
•
In spite of this the design was completed and
equipment purchased. All of the problems
described above (as well as several others, with
lesser severity, I did not brief you about) were now set in to motion.
•
I was brought on board just before install. As I
have a C4ISR background and some success at
resurrecting red efforts I was made the lead SE for the 123 effort.
•
The management team refused to fix the issues
described above to stay on schedule, ensure costs
would not rise and to make sure Northrop didnÂ’t
have anything to use against us (this was stated
several times by senior management)
•
As such everything snowballed. Leadership on the
project had no intention of fixing these problems
because announcing they existed would demonstrate
their questionable competence and the fact that
they were ethically challenged. Now they would
not only have to explain that they missed some
“easy” design decisions but that were late and putting the customer at risk.
•
After several years and investigations I am now
writing you. I believe we are where we are
because management is supposed to be able to
trust those below them. You trust your ethics
officer to do the right thing and she trusts
those below her – and so on. The Deepwater
leadership made some very bad decisions. There
were pressures put on those people to make
schedule. They did not have the background to do
the job and had no interests in anyone finding
that out. When mistakes were made at the lower
levels their management supported them. Then
upper management supported them – and so on.
Where does that leave us now? Given the severity
of the issues and the embarrassment that would
ensue due to our incompetence anyone who stepped
forward now believes they would be doing so
risking their careers and their seniorÂ’s careers.
(I know several members of leadership on that
team who have admitted to me we have done the
wrong thing). I am fully aware that on the face
my accusations – given the opposition and the
absurdity of some of the claims – seem
preposterous. What are the odds that one guy is
right and everyone else is wrong? As I stated
before playing the odds in this case is a very
big mistake. (Again – these designs are now
planned to be used on all 49 of the 123Â’s.
Additionally I believe some of them are being
used on other vessels as well. This would mean
the majority of the new CG fleet will have severe
mission capability degradation)
•
Lastly – at no point in this process has anyone
demonstrated that my position on the original
requirements or my suggested solutions is not
technically accurate or is not the best option
for the customer or Lockheed Martin. Each and
every solution I recommend is in keeping with the
41
original requirements and/or DoD norms. The
pushback has centered on the schedule, costs or
what the customer would or could accept.
•
Case in point
•
Let me give you one more example of the teams
questionable technical competence, desperation and ethical fortitude
•
Issue – VHF radios for the SRP (Zodiac boats)
•
The 123 had a requirement to lengthen from the
previous 110Â’ to accommodate a Zodiac boat. These
are pontoon type diving boats, with no overhead
protection, meant to be used by boarding crews and for rescues
•
They had the same Sea State 5 and temperature
requirements as the 123. (Given your background I
am sure you realize these boats go out in very tough conditions and get soaked)
•
Our “Design of Record’ was to use a Ross VHF
radio for their primary communications. Their
reason – the CG liked the radio on the 270’
boats. Keep in mind that is inside that boat – on
the bridge – and not exposed to the elements.
•
When I came on board an engineer told me the
radio could not be used out of doors. I verified
this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all
•
When challenged on this management responded by
stipulating it was the “Design of Record”.
•
I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went
through every level of my chain – multiple times
– no one would help me (Even though most of my
leadership said I was doing the right thing)
•
The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS
VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad
weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.
•
After that test the decision was made to scrap
the radio and use the one that originally came
with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the
CG to remove a radio that was meant for foul
weather and for them to purchase a new one (In
fairness the Ross radio did have one feature the
CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)
•
If it had not been raining that management team
would have delivered that boat with the Ross
radio. That radio would have failed the first
time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy
sea states (sea spray). This could have put the CG and public at risk.
•
This episode is a clear example of what the
Deepwater management team was all about. They
didnÂ’t care about the safety or security of the
crew; they put their own self interests above
that of the CG and general public.
Recommendations
I hope, after reading this, you are asking
yourself if itÂ’s possible I am correct and if so
I hope you then ask yourself - what the hell are we doing?
I am asking you to play against the odds and look
in to everything I have stated here. I am asking
you to assign someone with an actual C4ISR
background to look in to these issues. The
question here is not whether we are contractually
or legally covered – it is whether or not we are
doing the right thing. In the court of public
opinion or if reviewed by experts in the industry
or under the scrutiny of a federal investigation
would it be viewed that we met our moral, ethical
and professional obligations? I believe the right
course of action here is to work with the USCG
fix the current vessels and ensure that the
designs for the future vessels are sound. As the
CG will be using these vessels for decades
performing thousands of missions I believe we
have no other choice. Additionally we need to
look at each and every position on these teams
and see if we have the right individuals in the
leadership and technical positions. The Deepwater
leadership team took advantage of the system and
manipulated the entire program and these investigations
42
in an effort to cover up their mistakes and
shortcomings. They went so far as to convince the
customer that these compromises were in no way
harmful to their mission – unfortunately the
customer went along with this scenario.
I realize these are severe charges and I should
and expect to be held accountable for all of
them. I believe your ethics team, your engineer,
the MS2 ethics director (whose finding after 5
months of investigation was that none of my
charges had merit) and the leadership of MS2 all
tried very hard and found ways to defend the
decisions of those made below them. Everyone was
playing the odds and relying on those below them
to be competent and ethically sound. This is the
essence of how this snowball was created. I am
asking you to stop its journey before it becomes an avalanche.
Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Letter from Scott MacKay LM corporate council – 3/1/2006
Retyped and only partial quote
“. . .I have concluded that; (1) the corporation
has thoroughly and exhaustively investigated you
allegations; (2) I concur with the conclusions
reached by prior investigations that your
allegations were unsubstantiated; and (3) the
corporation considered the matter closed except
to the extent it is asked to respond to the Coast
guard or other government agencies regarding those allegations…”
43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Letter to Board of Directors – 4/4/2006
Included material given to Robert Stevens earlier – will not include again here
Michael DeKort
Principle Engineer
Lockheed Martin IS&S
169 Walters Creek Drive
Monument, Co 80132
719-488-8608 h
719-277-4257 w
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee
Lockheed Martin Corporation
6801 Rockledge Drive, MP 200-10
Bethesda, MD 20817
To whom it may concern,
I am writing you looking for your assistance in
clearing up several critical safety and security
issues on the MS2 Deepwater Program. Enclosed is
text from one of the emails I have written to Mr.
Stevens on the topic. All of the details are
enclosed in that email. I should tell you upfront
that LockheedÂ’s position to date has been that
all of my allegations and assertions are
baseless. However, the Inspector General for the
Department of Homeland Security is looking in to
the matter, at my request, and has recently
informed me that they believe, after questioning
the Coast Guard and inspecting one of the boats,
that all of my allegations and assertions are
accurate. In addition to this I have been
contacted by the officers who are now in charge
of the Deepwater Surface Assets division and they
have informed me that they are cooperating fully
with the IG, that several of my allegations have
merit and that they are very concerned. I am
telling you this to avoid your dismissal of my
allegations out of hand. As such I ask, for the
good of the company, the stockholders and the
customer, that you look in to the matter
independently and work with the USCG and DHS IG
to discover the facts and get Lockheed Martin
back on the right track before the IG takes the
case to the US senate, as their process dictates,
hearings begin and this issue becomes public knowledge.
The text below is from an email I sent to Robert
Stevens. This is the same text I sent to the DHS
IG, the GAO, the Commandant of the USCG, the
Commanding Officer of the 8 boats in question and
the congressmen and senators responsible for the
relevant appropriations committees. Both the IG
and GAO have contacted me and are investigating
the issue. If you have any further questions
please do not hesitate to contact me.
44
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response from Board of Directors – 6/26/2006
Scanned – portion retyped here
Dear Mr. DeKort
This responds to your undated letter to the
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee of
the Lockheed Martin Corporation Board of
Directors, which was received by the Corporate
SecretaryÂ’s office on April 21, 2006.
The Board considers the issues addressed in your
letter and determined that the CorporationÂ’s
responses to those issues, beginning in October
2004 and continuing to the present, were
appropriate and no further action is warranted.
Each of the issues has been disclosed to the
Coast guard and the resolution of each issue was
coordinated with and was or is being resolved to
the satisfaction of the Coast Guard customer.
Sincerely,
James B. Comey
45
Response to DHS IG 123 C4ISR Report
My response to the IG findings - notes
Overall
..
The IG agreed with all of my points technically
and contractually on two of them
..
In the past LM and the CG have said that my
issues “had no merit”, “were baseless” and that
the CG had closed all the matters contractually.
..
The report states that LM self-certified a known
faulty C4ISR system - one that would cause safety
and security issues which would put the CG and nation at risk
..
The report states that the CG was unaware of some
issues and their ramifications as late as 2006.
This is incorrect. LM and the CG were notified
about every one of these issues by me in 2003.
They were notified through official briefings and
the shared ICGS problem reporting system.
..
I was told by LM before being removed from the
program and the Matagorda was accepted that all
of my issues would be clearly identified on the
acceptance documents – the DD-250s. Given the
outcome of the report it appears they did not do so.
..
I contend that the ICGS parties conspired to not
only deliver all 49 123s and all 91 SRPs in this
condition but were, or are, headed down the path
of making the same systems match on all of the
other sea going assets like the NSC and FRC
(dictated contractually by the Systems of Systems
approach). I believe they did this knowingly and willfully.
..
To this day – as the report sates – none of the
issues had been fixed on any of the 123s. While
the parties concerned may say this is due to the
hull cracks and the ships being taken out of
service – they did not know this until after the
first two (or more) boats were delivered. (The IG
supports this by stating that the parties had no
knowledge at the time I raised these issues and
they were delivering them on them first couple
boats that the hulls would crack and all 8 123s would go to Key West)
Specific report points
Low Smoke
..
I submitted the issue to the IG but didn't push
it in the video etc because I thought it was
going to be waived. Apparently the IG doesn't
think it should be- which I agree with.
..
The IG agrees with my allegations regarding this
issue and believes the waiver should not be
approved. There are 80 some of these incorrect
cables on the 123s. They are a safety problem.
Ext Equipment
..
The IG says that 30 items on each 123 and 12 on
each SRP do not meet requirements
..
The report states that the requirements for the
boats to survive and operate in extreme weather
are "not really beneficial". I believe this
statement demonstrates their incompetence and
willingness to put the CG in harms way in order
to further their corporate goals. They made this
statement because the first 8 123s went to the
Keys where the weather is not as extreme as other
places. The IG debunks this by saying the boats
were not originally destined for the Keys until
hull problems popped up – which was after the first few boats were delivered.
46
..
When I brought this issue up in LM by telling
them the first system we looked at, the FLIR, did
not meet requirements LM directed me and my IPTs
to stop looking in to whether or not the
equipment met specs. It was not until over a year
later – during the third internal ethics
investigation looking in to the matter that LM
started looking in to it. (There were three
ethics investigations because I kept pushing up
the chain after each lower level investigation
said none of my issue had merit. I stopped at
three because the corporate VP of ethics ran that
investigation. Upon receiving the same answer
after that investigation I went to the CEO and
Board of Directors. Neither of which was
satisfactory either) I believe this led to the
notification to the CG that a problem may exist
(but wasnÂ’t important or contractually stipulated according to them) in 2006.
..
At the time of the second ethics investigation
the LM engineer and council assigned told me in
writing that the problem was not severe because
the boats were in the Keys. Again – All of the
123s and most of the boats sent to the Keys were
not meant to go there. My comment to them at the
time was that I never said the boats wouldnÂ’t
survive in “bath water” and that there suggestion
that because of this there was no problem demonstrated their incompetence.
..
The report says that the CG did not know about
the problem until July 05. This is incorrect. I
told them in the winter of 03. Proof - I have an
official problem report logged in a system they used as well as LM.
..
The IG states that LM incorrectly stated that the
entire set of requirements did not exist when
they self-certified. LM also states that
certifying was a waste of money and time.
..
The report says that had the CG read the LM
self-certification documents the fact that there
were issues would not have escaped their
attention. Again- the CG was informed in late 03 and I can prove it
TEMPEST
..
The report states that while the cables I
suggested are the best option the contractor is
not bound to use them and that the cables they
did use passed the Instrumented Testing even
though the Visual Tests sowed they were wrong
..
I have been told that the Instrumented Tests
mentioned may have been falsified or never completed
..
I have been told by several TEMEPST experts that
there is no precedence for this type of cable
being used in a TEMPEST environment nor for it to pass the tests
..
Compare the cables to what is used in DoD and
State Department systems of the same type. I
worked in both organizations and know that I the
same systems they us the braided shielded cable
(or other measure to accommodate other cable types).
..
I was told by the IG this summer that the CG
refused to honor the IGs request to rerun the tests with them as witnesses
..
I was told that LM used the correct cable on the
270Â’ boats effort. I was told we did not use the
right cables on the 123s because they were not bid.
..
Over 100 of the wrong cables were used on the 123s
..
The requirements specifically call out TEMPEST
requirements from 1972. There have been dozens of
updates since. Why use such an old version?
..
I notified LM about this problem months before
the first boat delivered. They were clearly informed o the risks as well.
..
The WPB-123 OAA Final Report from the Navy
COMOPTEVFOR Test Group Sept 29 2004 clearly shows
the TEMPEST tests had not passed as of Sept 04 –
months after the first 2 boats delivered. Months
after LM told me they Instrumented Test had
passed (in spite of failing the Visual Test). I
believe this clearly demonstrates my allegations
were correct. (A Latter addendum showed they passed – based on what?)
47
..
If the TEMPEST environment is not correct these
ships will broadcast classified information –
which is clearly understandable without crypto
equipment – for thousands of miles over HF radio
circuits, around the globe on satellite and
through the entire internet due to SIPRNET. Every
government org who uses these systems – DoD, NSA,
CIA, State, FBI, DEA, DHS etc will have their
communications compromised. (This will happen
because of bleed over between cables. Something the shielding prevents.)
..
The Matagorda had shielded cables on the boats
before the upgrade began for some of the secure
circuits. We put those systems back on the boat
with the non-shielded cable. This means we
knowingly degraded those existing systems
Cameras.
..
The IG agreed there is less than 360 coverage but
say 360 degree coverage isn't mandated. They say
that 360 deg isn't in the contract nor is the
number of cameras. This is factually incorrect.
NGs contract calls out 2 cameras that were to
mast mounted, remotely controllable and pan-tilt
and zoom. Maybe the OIG missed it thinking it was
a LM requirement since LM provided the cameras?
The CG told me it was written that way to
duplicate the exact system already in use on
other boats. Those boats had 360 deg coverage
with that implementation and Lockheed knew that
..
 From an LM contract letter to ICGS
Paragraph 3.3.7.1 of the 123 Surface Asset
Performance Specifications contains a requirement
for the cutter to receive, distribute and display
video and that the video cameras shall be
remotely viewable and controllable from multiple
locations. The work share with respect to this
requirement is as follows. Lockheed Martin must
include within the C4ISR infrastructure the
capability to receive, distribute and display
video. The shipyard is required to provide the cameras.
During the proposal, Lockheed Martin understood
that the shipyard planned to provide up to four
(4) remotely controllable video cameras and
included this capability in the proposal
documentation. However, in meetings with Lockheed
Martin personnel that occurred during the third
and fourth quarter of 2003, the shipyard advised
that it intended to provide two (2) fixed
cameras. In an effort to meet its contractual
scope, Lockheed Martin proceeded with a C4ISR
infrastructure design that included the
capability to accommodate four (4) remotely
controllable cameras. At the 123 WPB CDR in
December 2003, Lockheed Martin was directed by
the USCG to change the design to accommodate two (2) fixed cameras
..
The OIG says that it is disturbing that LM would
knowingly install a system with blind spots and
that the CG would accept it. They mention being
concerned about other assets/boats in this area.
It also says that the CG should change the
contract for future boats. The comments in my doc
I sent to you still apply here.
..
I have a PowerPoint slide that shows that LM
thought that the less than 360 deg implementation
was a problem and reported it as such. If there
was no requirement why report to the CG there was a problem?
..
The security inspector for the CG inspected the
system and said we had 360 deg coverage. I have
that email. If 360 deg isnÂ’t a requirement why
was he looking for it and reporting on it? (At
that point LM directed me not to tell them he was
wrong. After I pushed they allowed me to see the
Tech Rep Joe Michel. He said that the blind spots
were acceptable because we could lock the windows
of the pilot house below the blind spots. He said
if anyone gained access we would see broken
glass. I challenged that by saying that someone could simply
48
attach a charge to the side and never go on the
boat. He agreed and said LM would need a waiver.
If 360 deg wasnÂ’t a requirement why would he ask for a waiver?)
..
I have the official program trouble reports that
were written to document the problems less than
360 deg would cover. If there was no requirement
to have 360 deg why was I permitted to write a problem report on that?
..
History – why did we go to 4 cameras? When we
decided to help NG by buying the cameras we asked
to have them install them on the mast. They
refused (even though it was their requirement)
and said that if we forced them to do so it would
require a new center of gravity study for the
mast and that would slip schedule and cost money
- which Lockheed would be responsible for. After
this LM decided to try to find another way
instead of simply tell NG to satisfy their own
requirement. Why did we do that? We actually
neglected to design and install the equipment to
control the cameras - we only installed the video
circuits. They wanted to hide that fact. At this
point LM management decided on installing 4
cameras. Why 4? Because they knew we had a 360
deg requirement and they assumed that 4 cameras –
with a 90 deg field of view – would add to 360
deg. (Again – someone needs to ask them why they
went with more than 2 and decided on 4). At that
point I told them their assumption may not be
correct because the field of view on each camera
may not be 90 deg and given everything on the
pilot house there may not be a place to install
all 4 cameras without blockages. I asked them for
a week to look in to it. At that point they
decided to tell the CG 4 cameras would work. If a
fifth camera were purchased and installed there would be no blind spots.
..
As Deepwater is a System of Systems design (SoS)
are we saying that every ship they build – every
FRC, NSC etc – can delivered with a camera
surveillance system that has blind spots over the
most critical part of the boat – the bridge?
Remember the 123 would set a precedent for design
and implementation. Every asset is required to
have implementations match unless there is an
overriding reason not to. The 123s set the
precedent for many systems. (I also believe they
would repeat the same design/implementation to
avoid getting caught. A change would mean
violation to SoS which would require explanation
and therefore discovery and validation of the problem).
Non-weather proof VHF radios for the SRPs. Not mentioned.
..
We bought 9 radios for the first 9 boats and 5 of
them after I told them they weren't waterproof
and that doing so would put the SRP crews at
risk. This issue more than any other demonstrates
how far LM intended to go with covering up the
issues and knowingly putting the crew at risk in
doing so. (I am sure the reason the IG didn't
mention this is because we actually didn't
deliver the radios. This was due to a
coincidental act of god just before the Matagorda
delivered. It rained during testing and we
shorted 4 of them out. At that point we had to
change. Had it not rained I assure you we would
have delivered and they would have failed during the first bad weather mission)
..
Background
o
When I came on board an engineer told me the
radio could not be used out of doors. I verified
this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all
o
When challenged on this management responded by
stipulating it was the “Design of Record”.
o
I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went
through every level of my chain – multiple times
– no one would help me (Even though most of my
leadership said I was doing the right thing)
o
The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS
VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad
weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.
o
After that test the decision was made to scrap
the radio and use the one that originally came
with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the
CG to remove a radio that was meant
49
for foul weather and for them to purchase a new
one (In fairness the Ross radio did have one
feature the CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)
o
If it had not been raining that management team
would have delivered that boat with the Ross
radio. That radio would have failed the first
time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy
sea states (sea spray-waves). This could have put the CG and public at risk.
DD-250s
..
These are critical documents that are supposed to
show deficiencies in the product at delivery. LM
told me every one of my issues would be
documented in there. If they were that would
demonstrate that LM knew I was correct about the
requirements. One would not document deficiencies
against non-binding requirements. On the other
side if none of these issues showed up that would mean LM hid information.
ICGS cooperation
..
While the report states that the parties
cooperated fully I do not believe this occurred
until after the press stories about my video were
released or they are not being completely
forthcoming here. The IG told me in June of 06
that the CG and LM were not cooperating, that
they could not get the data asked for nor could
they get access to the boats to rerun the Instrumented TEMPEST tests.
While I agree with some of the overall findings
and the Low-Smoke and External Equipment
Survivability issues I believe they are factually
incorrect in some of their assessment of the
TEMPEST and Video Surveillance issues.
Additionally I believe they did not show – and
should have – the level to which the contractor
and the CG colluded to deliver systems with known
safety and security issues and to cover that fact
up. The C4ISR problems are examples of systemic
problems on the program. The ICGS parties
involved have demonstrated themselves to be
incompetent and ethically, technically and
professionally bankrupt. Also – the IG told me
very clearly that the CG and LM were not
cooperating with their investigation. They could
not get data they asked for or run re-tests they
asked for. I think they may have simply done the
best with what they had. Additionally the IG did
not investigate the systems on other assets such
as the NSC. As this is a SoS design – all like
systems need to be common. As such there are
probably design flaws with the FRCs, OPCs and NSCs.
50
Project Notes
Running Notes
Technical issues summary – Deepwater 123 effort
•
Exterior equipment survivability – There is a
risk that the majority of the equipment will not
survive the environmental temperature extremes.
Several Nav, Sensor and Communications systems
will fail. This will cause serious safety issues.
•
TEMPEST – Shielded Cables – The proper cables
were not installed in the secure communication
circuits. This will cause serious security issues
o
SIPRNET
•
Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video
surveillance system with two significant blind
spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will
cause significant security and safety problems
•
FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in
the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to
survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue
•
Low Smoke cables – none were used. Safety risk. Poisoning of crew during fire
•
PCA – 80% of cables mislabeled on ship 1. Will
cause maintenance and repair problems. Could result in equipment failure.
Issues Detail
Exterior equipment survivability – The majority
of the exterior mounted equipment will not
survive the environmental temperature extremes
•
Late in the project, months after the design was
approved and equipment purchased, we received our
environmental and TEMPEST requirements (this in
itself is very troubling). One of the
requirements was to ensure that all the equipment
and cabling we installed on the exterior of the
vessel could survive Sea State 5 and temperatures from -40 to +125 deg (f).
•
Upon receiving these requirements I immediately
asked my IPT Leads to double check all the
equipment to see if we had any issues. They were
directed to look at all Sensor, Nav and Comm equipment.
•
The very first device we looked at – the FLIR –
would not survive below -5 deg.(Later fixed?)
•
Management was then informed about the situation
senior management directed me and my people to
stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the
equipment would survive the elements. They also
directed that the FLIR design would stand as is.
As the “Design of Record”. This means we do not
know if any of the other equipment have any
environmental survivability issues (temp, humidity, shock/vibe etc)
•
Third ethics investigation – VP of Ethics
admitted there was a FLIR problem (even though
final report said unsubstantiated). Agreed to fix
it and look in to all other equipment. Agreed to
provide me specifics on all equipment that
failed. Later recanted that agreement. Due to
this I did not trust that the FLIR or anything else would be fixed.
•
I believe that we either lessened the
requirements or gun decked the solution. This
could mean that the Sensor, Nav and Communication systems are at risk.
•
All of the systems the CG currently have on the
110s met these requirements. We will be severely
degrading the performance of these vessels
•
Engineer assigned by ethics office, along with
the legal department, sent me a letter stating
there are no long term issues because several of
the boats have been doing fine during their sea
trials. Sea trials conducted in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico is about 80 deg all
year around. It never sees any of the extremes
called out by the specs. This is exactly the
51
kind of reckless engineering the Deepwater team
utilized to get us in the predicament we are in
now. The first time these boats get to cold
waters and there is significant sea spray – the
majority of the systems will fail.
•
This situation exists not only for several boats
that are modified but for the 41 or so that we havenÂ’t even started on yet.
•
Reqs specifically call out Sea States, shock/vibe
standards, humidty and temp range.
•
I was informed by NG and the IG in 2006 that the
FLIR was fixed and that a “top side study” was
being on the rest of the externally mounted equipment.
•
What did the NSC do? What is the FRCs design?
•
IG report backed up my technical and contractual allegations
•
Fraud ?
o
LM knew before Matagorda delivered
o
LM said it would be in DD-250
o
Not in DD-250
o
IG said CG didn’t know until 7/2005 – 1.5 years after Matagorda delivery
o
3rd ethics investigation said-verbal- that there
was an issue and a topside study would be done.
NG told me confidentially the study was done
o
FLIR fixed?
o
Comments LM made about cert not needed – requirement exaggerated
TEMPEST – SIPRNET - Shielded Cables – The proper
cables were not installed in the secure
communication circuits. This will cause serious
security issues for all government organization who use them
•
Again – well after the design review and the
equipment was purchased – we received our TEMPEST
requirements. Those requirements called for the
standard set of military sea going requirements –
shielding, grounding, bonding, separation of equipment etc.
•
The Chief Engineer on the effort had directed
months before that we not buy shielded cables
because they were too expensive (not bid). The requirements were never changed.
•
Until this point we had not involved anyone who
had a TEMPEST background on the project even
though they worked in the organization.
•
Note – Ship’s Integration had prepared a report
on what our TEMPEST solutions should be. They did
an excellent job given the engineer had never
worked TEMPEST before (The TEMPEST engineer they
had on staff was not asked to participate). The
report stated shielded cables must be used.
•
I have a TEMPEST background – in the Navy and
Department of State – as well as 4 crypto
designations. The report made sense to me. Standard ops.
•
Management was informed that we needed to buy
shielded cables or change requirements (something
that I have never seen or heard of being done)
they informed me that the design of record would stand.
•
Sometime later we brought on the TEMPEST engineer
from Ships Integration to perform a site
inspection. He failed us in several areas including shielded cables.
•
At first management agreed to fix the visual
failures. He asked us to do an impact and
resolution document. The result was that most of
the fixes would add significant cost and
schedule. Upon hearing this management decided to
wait until the instrumented test to see if we
could pass. No effort was made to buy or install
shielded cables based on the visual test failure.
•
2.5 years later. Again I have been given none of
the technical details I was promised. However I
was able to independently ascertain that shielded
cables have not been installed.
52
•
I have contacted several TEMPEST inspectors
around the country. All of them told me the
chances of passing a test were extremely unlikely without these cables.
•
I believe LM and the USCG have either gun decked
the tests or lowered the requirements.
•
We took shielded cables off these boats when we
installed the non-shielded cables.
•
As the USCG now has a requirement to be able to
communicate with DoD and several other agencies
this puts all of those agencies at severe risk.
Any foreign government monitoring these boats –
from shore or from ”fishing boats” will be able
to pick up all the communications from these
boats. Since we have no shielded cables these
boats will emanate like an antennae. Additionally
– we could retransmit clear bleed over
information from other circuits. The
communications heard will be in the clear and
easily understood. The CG not only accepted this
for the current boats but did so for the 41 boats
we havenÂ’t touched yet or procured cables for.
•
I have learned recently that the test results may
have been falsified by the test branch of the
USCG. They walked away from the cabling until the
required reading was obtained. Instead of taking
the readings near the cables – they were taken from the pier.
•
SIPRNET – DHS IG report states the contractor
admitted there were issues but that they could
not be fixed without rendering the system
inoperable. LM said the system could function or be secure – but not both
•
The SIPRNET certification organization, in April
2006 – well after the boats became operational –
gave ICGS 45 days to correct the problems or the
accreditation would be pulled. I do not believe
all the problems have been fixed yet.
•
IG told me they asked for an independent test
6/06. CG refused. Did not know at the time the
boats were unusable due to cracks. Why not let IG run test?
•
Aluminum/Mylar? No precedence for use in TEMPEST
•
What did the NSC/FRC do?
•
IG said shielded would have been better. No req
for shielded? What about all cables failing visual? Instrumented test rigged?
Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video
surveillance system with two significant blind
spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will
cause significant security and safety problems.
•
LM and ICGS received requirements to install 2
mast mounted movable cameras. (an implementation
used for quite some time in the USCG)
•
Originally ICGS was supposed to procure the
cameras and install them and LM was to provide
the video and control circuitry – as well as the shore connection box
•
The cameras purpose was to permit remote
monitoring of the boat when in a USCG port. No watch standers would be required
•
Arguments ensued between us and ICGS on who would buy the cameras.
•
I requested that LM to take over this effort to stay on schedule
•
A decision was made to install 4 fixed cameras on
the pilot house. While I like the idea of fixed
cameras, as one could not ‘sneak’ around a moving
camera, I knew that management was assuming each
camera had a 90 deg field of view. (I later
learned we went for fixed cameras because LM did
not include the control circuitry). I asked Ships
Integration to utilize the camera specs and ships
design to plot the views. They came back and said
that the cameras did not afford a 90deg field of
view and mounting in favorable locations would be
an issue due other items installed on the pilot
house. I was told there would be blind spots.
These blinds spots were are 1o and 2 o’clock –
directly over the pilot house/bridge windows. The
blind spots were over 10ft wide on the deck and
hundreds of yards wide to the horizon. I told
management we needed to install 1 more camera and
shift the existing forward camera over to cover the blind spots.
53
Management said the “Design of Record” was 4
cameras. (No cameras had been purchased or installed yet)
•
Management responded by telling me there was no
360 deg requirement. My response was that it was
common sense and that the USCG currently had
ships with 2 masts mounted moving cameras that supplied 360 deg of view.
•
Management stuck to their position. But did
permit me to talk to the USCG tech rep.
•
The CG Tech Rep – feeling the same schedule
pressure – relented and said the blind spots
would be acceptable because the pilot
house/bridge windows could be locked. I told him
someone could plant a charge on the boat
undetected – for which he had no answer- or get
in to the pilot house by breaking a window. The
rep said we would detect the broken glass on the
floor and know someone got on. I then suggested
one could attach a charge to the side and not
have to be on the boat. He said that was a good
point and said we would need a waiver.
•
One more camera would have solved this – at an
expense of under $1000. (If you asked for a video
surveillance system for your house – would you
want a blind spot over your front door?)
•
Told other boats had 360 with implementation mentioned in spec
•
Some time after this the CG security inspector
inspected the boat. His report stated the boat
didnÂ’t have the standard 2 camera mast solution
but that he had 4 fixed cameras and the boat had
360 deg views. (This established that 360 deg view was a requirement)
•
After reading this report I informed management
that the 360 deg requirement was indeed valid and
that we had an obligation to tell that inspector we had 2 blind spots
•
Management said it was not our fault the
inspector missed the blind spots or that they wrote and conducted a faulty test
•
Have copy of LM contract letter that quotes the NG requirement for 2 cameras
•
This situation puts the crew of that boat in
harms way. Especially if they decide to stick
with their original plan of not having a watch
stander on board (Ethics told me they might
decide to add a watch stander due to this
problem. Why would LM permit the USCG to lessen
the original requirement? Again – they have 360
deg solutions on other boats. We are severely degrading existing capability)
•
2.5 years later. The CG has accepted the design.
All 49 boats will have the blind spots. Even the
41 boats we havenÂ’t touched yet or procured equipment for.
•
What did the NSC do? Plan for FRC?
•
IG admonished CG/LM for knowingly installing
blind spots. Found no requirement for 2 cameras or 360. IG incorrect see above.
FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in
the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to
survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue
•
Forward looking Infrared – used for nighttime and foul weather navigation
•
We installed a cable that is not meant for outdoor use.
•
The direction from senior leadership was that this was the “Design of Record”
•
I asked that we swap it out for one meant to survive the elements.
•
Management refused to swap out the cable and said
we would replace it when it fails.
•
This cable is going to fail when the crew needs it most
•
All 49 boats are planned to use this cable.
VHF radios for the SRP (Zodiac boats)
54
•
The 123 had a requirement to lengthen from the
previous 110Â’ to accommodate a Zodiac boat. These
are pontoon type diving boats, with no overhead
protection, meant to be used by boarding crews and for rescues
•
They had the same Sea State 5 and temperature
requirements as the 123. (Given your background I
am sure you realize these boats go out in very tough conditions and get soaked)
•
Our “Design of Record’ was to use a Ross VHF
radio for their primary communications. Their
reason – the CG liked the radio on the 270’
boats. That is inside that boat – on the bridge –
and not exposed to the elements.
•
When I came on board an engineer told me the
radio could not be used out of doors. I verified
this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all
•
When challenged on this management responded by
stipulating it was the “Design of Record”.
•
I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went
through every level of my chain – multiple times
– no one would help me (Even though most of my
leadership said I was doing the right thing)
•
The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS
VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad
weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.
•
After that test the decision was made to scrap
the radio and use the one that originally came
with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the
CG to remove a radio that was meant for foul
weather and for them to purchase a new one (In
fairness the Ross radio did have one feature the
CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)
•
If it had not been raining that management team
would have delivered that boat with the Ross
radio. That radio would have failed the first
time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy
sea states (sea spray). This could have put the CG and public at risk.
•
This episode is a clear example of what the
Deepwater management team was all about. They
didnÂ’t care about the safety or security of the
crew; they put their own self interests above
that of the CG and general public.
•
IG report did not mention this because it was
resolved by going back to the original radio before delivery
PCA
QA sampling demonstrated that 80% of the almost
500 cables were incorrectly labeled. This would
cause maintenance and repair problems.
•
When notified about this management refused to
make corrections. Said it was the shipyards issue
even though we gave them the incorrect labels.
Management also stated that the problem would
only affect LM personnel since we were
responsible for depot maintenance and repair.
How we got here
•
LM decided to leverage our Aegis reputation to
win this effort. Therefore a decision was made
not to have other orgs, who had C4ISR
backgrounds, bid this job as prime. While I
understand leveraging LMÂ’s well deserved Aegis
reputation I think this decision laid the
groundwork for the problems I described. I
believe management thought that as this effort
was far easier to engineer than Aegis – we made
the mistake of thinking it was so easy we didnÂ’t
need subject matter experts. As such none of our
PM or Senior Technical Leadership team had C4ISR
experience (nor did most of our IPT engineering leadership)
•
Some lower level engineers has experience. Too
few – too late. Others worked very hard but deck was stacked against them
55
•
Very early on the team realized they had schedule
and budget issues. We under bid drastically
•
The 123 effort was the first major effort. The
design review was held on schedule – but
prematurely. Most of the requirements had never
been flowed to the design team by Systems of Systems.
•
In spite of this the design was completed and
equipment purchased. All of the problems
described above (as well as several others, with
lesser severity, I did not brief you about) were now set in to motion.
•
I was brought on board just before install. As I
have a C4 background and some success at
resurrecting red efforts I was made the lead SE for the 123 effort.
•
The management team refused to fix the issues
described above to stay on schedule, ensure costs
would not rise and to make sure Northrop didnÂ’t
have anything to use against us (this was stated
several times by senior management)
•
As such everything snowballed. Leadership on the
project had no intention of fixing these problems
because announcing they existed would demonstrate
their questionable competence and the fact that
they were ethically challenged. Now they would
not only have to explain that they missed some
“easy” design decisions but that were late and putting the customer at risk.
•
I believe we are where we are because management
is supposed to be able to trust those below them.
You trust your ethics officer to do the right
thing and she trusts those below her – and so on.
The Deepwater leadership made some very bad
decisions. There were pressures put on those
people to make schedule. They did not have the
background to do the job and had no interests in
anyone finding that out. When mistakes were made
at the lower levels their management supported
them. Then upper management supported them – and
so on. Where does that leave us now? Given the
severity of the issues and the embarrassment that
would ensue due to our incompetence anyone who
stepped forward now believes they would be doing
so risking their careers and their seniorÂ’s
careers. (I know several members of leadership on
that team who have admitted to me we have done the wrong thing).
56
Overall Timeline
Date
System
Doc Title
Author/Org
Data
12/1/2002
Tempest
Second meeting with government on Tempest- see Sheridan item below 12/9/2003
1/1/2003
Overall
Design review complete - estimated date
1/20/2003
Tempest
Quick Look
Jo Agag
Early assessment on major areas of concern. Calls out shielding as necessary
3/15/2003
Tempest
Stan Ralph
Directed team to move on without shielded cables
(from email 1/28/04 from Rabinowitz
3/20/2003
Tempest
Eval Tempest Req
Jo Agag
Report delineates her assessment of Tempest
requirements and design suggestions - She had no
Tempest background - Persons with Tempest
background were not asked to be part of the effort
6/18/2003
DeKort
Joined team - as scheduler - estimated date
7/16/2003
Overall
Ponticello
First day as Lead SE
7/23/2003
Overall
123 Req Matrix
DeKort
Started working INC 1 subset INC 0 requirements set
7/23/2003
Overall
MLOI
DeKort-McLaverty
Started sending MLOI out
8/11/2003
Camera Tempest
IDS 123 Status
DeKort-McLaverty
First status (that I have) that we briefed to
LM/ICGS/CG - Cameras- shows we would delete the
cameras/ Tempest- develop cert plan/ PCA Open Issues risk-
8/25/2003
Cameras
DeKort
Started questioning use of only 4 cameras-
8/28/2003
Cameras
IDS 123 Status
DeKort-McLaverty
Slides say we were going to provide 360 deg
coverage with 4 cameras. Found out that 4 cameras
had blind spots. Management then backed off
360deg req- stopped mentioning 360deg and camera issue in next 2 reports
9/8/2003
Cameras
IDS 123 Status
DeKort-McLaverty
Matagorda Delivery Date Moved to 15 Dec
9/15/2003
Cameras
IDS 123 Status
DeKort-McLaverty
Status mentions Joe Michel sent CG view pictures
to get approval for blind spots. CG said it was
OK but as of 2/05 they had not signed off
10/24/2003
Radio
DeKort
Notified manager - Larry Finnegan - that there were problems-slipping and radio
12/4/2003
Overall
Haimowitz
LM org change
12/8/2003
Radio Camera
DeKort
Started notifying my matrix chain of command
about issues - asking for help- Cameras, Radios
12/9/2003
Tempest
Sheridan
Sheridan's email states- originally only 1 Secret
circuit NETVIS then added SIPRNET and COMDEC.
Customer told LM not to worry about Tempest
(November) - then in December LM told to do Tempest
12/11/2003
Tempest
Tempest Investigation 2
DeKort
My assessment of the situation. Sent out in emails
12/30/2003
Overall- all issues
Risk email
DeKort
Started entering Risks in database for all issues.
1/7/2004
Overall
DeKort
Had notified entire chain of issues several times
- went to Tech Ops director (acting) Jay Hansen
several times with no success. Now asked org for reassignment
1/12/2004
Radios
DeKort
Notified management that I had informed CG about
issue - after they asked me if there were more
risks. PMO now allowed me to get raincoat/mic - not new radios
1/15/2004
Tempest
123 Tempest Report
DeKort-Jones
Our response to the CG findings FAILED Visual
Test - management decided to wait to see if we pass Instrumented test
1/16/2004
Tempest
Response to Ron Porter
DeKort-Jones
Our response to Ron porter's assessment - he was ICGS
1/20/2004
Tempest
Response to Ron Porter- PM chop
DeKort-Jones
57
1/21/2004
FLIR
DeKort
Started email trail on trying to replace cable
after PMO said we would replace it when it broke
1/22/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Tech Ops Director- Jay Hansen- tells Jay
Haimowitz to have me enter issues in risk database- informed Jay I had
1/29/2004
Cameras
DeKort
CG inspector declares that he tested the system
and has 360deg coverage. Asked management to
inform him we do not and that we need to inform
him. Management tells me it's their fault they missed it and wrote a bad test
1/30/2004
Cameras
Iaccio
LM test lead tells me there are blind spots and
that CG inspector never looked for them
2/5/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Sent my manager-Larry Finnegan- email stating I
think we are going to get DD-250 signed without
resolving issues or declaring them as open items
2/5/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
Finnegan raises issue to my Director (SW) Jack
Ryan who then talked to PMO Tom Rogers
2/9/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
Cappello
Confirmed meeting with QA to discuss issues
2/11/2003
Radios
DeKort
Told 123 PM-McLaverty that I am not comfortable
with raincoat/mic option- explained I settled for
compromise instead of getting new radios (Losing battle)
2/11/2003
Boat 2 half way complete with same issues from boat 1
2/11/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Asked Manager-Finnegan- for help again
2/11/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
PMO Rogers directs PJ Messer, Doug Wilhelm and
McLaverty to talk to me about finding way to
resolve issues before I go to MS2 VP Carl Bannar
2/12/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Met with QA who called QA VP Yvonne Hodge - who
called MS2 VP Carl Bannar and told him we had
serious issues. Agreed with me on all issues
2/12/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
Bannar
Carl Bannar called me after Hodge called him. I
told him I wanted to gave Hansen and 123
leadership until Monday - one more shot
2/13/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Reported to Finnegan that the 123 leadership
group had agreed to my requests - prefer fixing
issues but wanted all to be open DD-250 items at
very least- agreed to close by 2/16
2/13/2004
Radios
Radios - found out we shorted 4 in the rain while testing with the CG
2/18/2003
Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke
DeKort
Requested meeting with Carl Bannar MS2 VP
2/23/2003
Temperature
DeKort
Temp issue for first time - Environmental reqs
flowed down - very late - started to question if
we met req -40 to + 125 (except radar which had a
waiver request-do not know if it was ever accepted)
58
2/24/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature
Villani
Joe Villani - DW Chief Engineer sets up appt with
me to work issues after Bannar directs him to. In
previous 4 months Villani ignored all my emails
and phone calls requesting help. Joe agreed to
all requests before sell-off DD-250 and agreed to
show me closure before sell off. I was removed
from the project before sell off and never shown the data
2/24/2004
Risk
DeKort
Found out my critical Risks were deleted from the Risk database
2/14/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature
DeKort
Added Temp to issues
2/28/2004
Removed from project
3/1/2004
Delivery of the Matagorda - 7 months late
4/1/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature
Estimated date- was removed from effort and given
a lower appraisal than standard and told I would
not be given the same types of work I had received before
4/1/2004
Put back on other efforts for a year
One year gap
5/1/2004
Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature
Estimated date - went to new Tech Ops director
Robert Sledgemilch about issues and retribution.
He filed report with HR/Ethics (based on retribution not the issues)
5/23/2004
Started working in new org - IS&S Colorado Springs
9/13/2004
Ethics
DeKort
Sent Sledge an email asking when HR/Ethics would be getting to me
9/15/2004
Ethics
DeKort
Started sending data to MS2 HR/Ethics - McIntyre HR
9/17/2004
Ethics
DeKort
Began conversations with MS2 Ethics - John Shelton
9/24/2004
Ethics
John Shelton came to site for meeting
10/20/2004
Ethics
DeKort
Second time asking for investigation status - not complete
12/2/2004
Ethics
DeKort
Sent letter to Shelton - frustrated with
progress- noted several ships were now delivered with issues
12/22/2004
Ethics
Shelton
Case Closed- coming to site to debrief me
2/1/2005
Ethics
Shelton
Meeting set for debrief
2/4/2005
Ethics
DeKort
Started discussions with corporate ethics (low
level). Shelton had told me that he could not
substantiate any of my allegations. Would not
give me any data. I did not have the need to know
Told him that wasn't good enough. He contacted Gail Allen
3/16/2005
Ethics
DeKort
Told Gail Allen I was frustrated by lack of
progress and that I had not been contacted by
engineer investigating the issues yet (Carol Boser)
4/14/2005
Gail Allen/Carol Boser meeting in Colorado.
Directed to turn over all docs at that time.
Including copies. Earlier Gail Allen had told me I could retain the data
4/28/2005
Ethics
DeKort
Sent email to LM CEO Robert Stevens after meeting
with Gail Allen/Carol Boser. Told him that their
finding that my allegations were unfounded was
not acceptable- no data given - did not have the need to know
5/4/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Corporate VP for Ethics contacts me and says she will look in to the matter
5/4/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Sets up meeting in Bethesda - directs me to turn
over docs (had not done so yet)
5/10/2005
Meeting in Bethesda - Corporate Legal, Ethics and
Engineering present. I turn over docs after we
agree that a Bates' stamped set will be kept in
Colorado. I am promised access to this data - actions promised - -
5/10/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Informed I would be fired if I did not turn over data
59
6/3/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Debrief - actions to be taken - review all the
cables to see why they aren't shielded-- ask the
customer if they want 360 deg camera coverage-
check every piece of equipment for environmental
compliance - including those on other assets-
find out what all the lessons learned are and
work with the DW team to fix them- promised to give me all data
9/26/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Informed that everything is handled but I would
not be given details as promised- "Coast Guard
fully informed"- told I no longer had a need to know
10/12/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Informed - after objecting to outcome and lack of
data- that there are no safety or security
concerns- admitted that some of my concerns had
been valid (previous 2 ethics investigations
spent a year with each saying none of my
allegations had merit). Told "corrective actions
were taken" but not told what they were
12/12/2005
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
After pushing for weeks to get details I am
informed that the CG does not grant me access
1/12/2006
Ethics
Maryanne Lavan
Responds to me by again saying the case is
closed, that there was no retribution, excusing
Shelton's actions and giving me permission in
writing to seek outside assistance since CG accepted the systems
1/13/2006
Ethics
DeKort
Sent an email to Robert Stevens asking him to get involved and reconsider
1/17/2006
Ethics
DeKort
Trying contacting Robert Stevens again
1/19/2006
Ethics
MacKay
VP Lead Council for LM- looking in to matter
60


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Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:23 CST