I was curious if anyone else here has heard about this. Basically, a Bright is a person with a naturalistic worldview free of supernatural and mystical elements. The Bright Movement is just an attempt to kind of unite atheists, agnostics, and other secular humanists together under a new word, "Bright". They're stealing the word to benefit the cause (kind of like how homosexuals hijacked "gay").

More info. can be found at their site: http://www.the-brights.net

It would be good if the Bright movement got underway. Atheists are the least trusted minority in America, so it's probably going to take a while for attitudes to change.

Eh i kind of like atheism as a one person thing and not much of an "ALL ATHEISTS UNITE!!" kind of thing. im slightly opposed to organized religion and even though atheism isnt a religion id rather it just stay as it is in the minds of the non-believers.

I doubt this will escalate beyond a website, but any gathering of people intelligent enough to realize that the world's religions are bullshit is ok by me. Even though it should be common sense by now.

As Sam Harris has said, why even have a word at all? We dont have a word to describe people that are not astrologers or not alchemists.

But we probably would if 90+% of the world were astrologists and alchemists.

Its a gay-ass sounding name. Not to detract from the movement at all, which is all well and good, but the name "Bright" sounds like something that would only appeal to fruity british scientists.

quote:Originally posted by Fascismo:

Its a gay-ass sounding name. Not to detract from the movement at all, which is all well and good, but the name "Bright" sounds like something that would only appeal to fruity british scientists.



QFT.

Let it be clear that a "Bright" would also fall under the label of secular humanist as well as Atheist.

And let it be clear that the Bright's first and foremost objective is to push a naturalistic worldview, not to undermine spirituality in the private sector.

Most Brights are tolerant of religiosity, up until it reaches the civic/gov't arena.

I admittedly have reservations about claiming to be a *Bright* in conversation - because it does sound a bit arrogant. I still think Atheist is misunderstood and when you say "Secular Humanist" ... people look at you like you're in a cult.

And look at the heavy-hitters and forward-thinkers like Dawkins, Dennett and Pinker, who all are outspoken Brights. I bet the word becomes more common in the next few years, and will soon replace "atheist" altogether.

quote:Originally posted by Mike Dogg:

Atheists are the least trusted minority in America, so it's probably going to take a while for attitudes to change.

According to Dawkins in his new book "The God Delusion" (2006) ... it is imperative to view statistics of religious adherents on somewhat of a curve, because we all know that most politicians, prominent business people and people in the public light will not claim to be atheist simply because of the fear of backlash from their respective communities. Statistically, they might be a minority. In actuality, they probably are not.

The God Delusion is one of the most interesting reads I've ever laid my hands on. Finally someone has the gnads to voice that belief in God is not just wrong, it's potentially deadly.

I prefer to be called "enlightened". I don't like the word "bright". It sounds too british, and too much like smart ass. It also implies that anyone who disagrees is dim, or dumb, since it's the opposite of bright.

I think atheists do need some solidarity to be recognized as a ligitimate group and raise awareness of our lack of belief, but we don't want to alienate ourselves in the process.

I'm a member. They do have some decent intellectuals on their side, including Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennet.



And me, of course http://www.totse.com/bbs/wink.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/wink.gif)



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by easeoflife22:

I prefer to be called "enlightened". I don't like the word "bright". It sounds too british, and too much like smart ass.

"enlightened" is pretty much exactly the same as "bright" they both imply, in the most commons connotations as of now, that you are more knowledgeable than everyone else.

I'd rather be called a materialist.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:



I'd rather be called a materialist.



Ugh, why?



Entheogenic

Because that describes me better than "bright" or "enlightened" and because it, at least to me, doesn't have the negative connotation often seen with using either of those terms.

This seems really vague.

Personally, though I do fit in to their criteria, I feel no need to identify myself with this group.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

Because that describes me better than "bright" or "enlightened" and because it, at least to me, doesn't have the negative connotation often seen with using either of those terms.

I understood what you meant; I was mostly taking a pot-shot at materialism :-P



Entheogenic

[This message has been edited by Entheogenic (edited 10-20-2006).]

Strange, my naturalistic outlook of the world involves 'mysticism' in that there is something, not neccesarily controlled, that underlies the basic fabric of the material universe.

Without this viewpoint what would i make of radiowaves and other non-natural wavelengths that the human eye cannot perceive?

quote:Originally posted by One_way_mirror:

Strange, my naturalistic outlook of the world involves 'mysticism' in that there is something, not neccesarily controlled, that underlies the basic fabric of the material universe.

Without this viewpoint what would i make of radiowaves and other non-natural wavelengths that the human eye cannot perceive?

You don't require any mysticism to make sense of radio waves; in no way are they "non-natural." Why do you think we have radio telescopes for looking at distant stars?



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:



I understood what you meant; I was mostly taking a pot-shot at materialism :-P



Well, the pot shot doesn't carry that much weight in the same thread where you admit to being a "bright" http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif)

I don't see why not--I can be a naturalist and a rational thinker without admitting to all the tenets of materialism. It's mostly the philosophy of mind stuff that bugs me.



Entheogenic

Well, I said it doesn't carry that much weight. The position of the materialist on the issue of the mind is the same position of the scientific naturalists, and that of methodological naturalism. I'd venture to say that it is the position of the vast majority of "Brights" as well.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

Well, I said it doesn't carry that much weight. The position of the materialist on the issue of the mind is the same position of the scientific naturalists, and that of methodological naturalism. I'd venture to say that it is the position of the vast majority of "Brights" as well.

I don't buy the materialist theory of consciousness--there's more to it than eletrochemical signals. This is not to say that there's something "spiritual" or "mental" in the sense of Cartesian Dualism, but a purely materialist description does not account for the inherent subjectivity of conscious experience (i.e. qualia).



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

I don't buy the materialist theory of consciousness--there's more to it than eletrochemical signals. This is not to say that there's something "spiritual" or "mental" in the sense of Cartesian Dualism, but a purely materialist description does not account for the inherent subjectivity of conscious experience (i.e. qualia).



Entheogenic

How does materialism not account for subjectivity? We can look at varying species from bacteria to people that have different types of subjective experience. There isnt a line that can be drawn where we say this has consciousness but this does not, its a continuum.

quote:Originally posted by Real.PUA:

How does materialism not account for subjectivity? We can look at varying species from bacteria to people that have different types of subjective experience. There isnt a line that can be drawn where we say this has consciousness but this does not, its a continuum.

It's more nuanced than that. I don't just mean the differing subjective experiences between the species--though those inarguably exist--I also mean the different subjective experiences between individuals. Or, perhaps better, not even the difference in subjective experience, but simply subjective experience itself: that's what materialism can't account for.

Here's a famous example. Suppose Mary is the world's most brilliant neurobiologist. She was genetically engineered to have an unsurpassed talent for the field, and was raised in experimental conditions by scientists since she was born; they've been grooming her to be the best neurobiologist in the world for her whole life. Mary understands everything about how the brain processes color. She can describe in perfect detail what happens when, say, someone sees the color red: how the electrical and chemical processes are stimulated by the optic nerve and produce the token-identical brain-state that always occurs when someone sees the color red. There's one catch, though: Mary, in addition to being raised as a scientist, is an experiment as well--she's been raised in a totally black and white environment. Everything in her house and laboratory (which are connected) is black, white, or a shade of gray. She speaks to her "family" (the other scientists) via black and white TV. The windows of her house have special filters that make the outside world appear black and white as well, and of course she's never allowed out of her compound.

Once she has fully understood the physical process of color perception, though, she's allowed to go outside. The scientists engineer it so that the first thing she sees when she opens her door is a bouquet of red roses. Mary already understands everything that's going on in her brain as she sees the roses, so has she learned anything new from the experience?

I would say unequivocably yes: she has learned what it is like to see the color red; she understood the objective (i.e. materialist) account of seeing red before, but until she has seen it herself she does not have a complete understanding of the phenomenon, as an important part of seeing red is the subjective experience of the perception. Materialism by itself cannot account for this, as it leaves no room for subjectivity in its rush to make a complete ontological reduction of consciousness to physical phenomenon.

Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

I don't buy the materialist theory of consciousness--there's more to it than eletrochemical signals. This is not to say that there's something "spiritual" or "mental" in the sense of Cartesian Dualism, but a purely materialist description does not account for the inherent subjectivity of conscious experience (i.e. qualia).



1. The whole point of my initial post was merely to comment on how the Bright movement itself, which you associate yourself with, embraces, in most cases, the materialist explanation of mind. It seemes rather out-of-place then, to take a jab at materialism in this thread. Howeover, that's not to say that you cannot have a differing view and be a Bright or that your point of view is necessarilly wrong.

2. In the example of Mary, I would argue that she would not learn anything, because if she in fact where to possess all knowledge about the material aspect of observing the color red, she would know what it would be to experience red and moreover, would know exactly what to expect if she were to see it.

I know--I just like to argue about philosophy. I realize that most brights probably share your view, Rust, which is why I'm bringing it up in this thread: I think the view is grossly mistaken, and that we can admit a subjective phenomenon of consciousness without admitting to metaphysical mumbo-jumbo about god, souls, or "mental substances." No disrespect intended http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif)

Regarding Mary, I really don't see how you can make that claim. I agree that she would probably know something about what to expect, but I don't think you can equate knowing what's going on chemically and electrically with really knowing what seeing red feels like.

Let's try another one. Thomas Nagel wrote an excellent article called "What is it Like to be a Bat?" that dealt with a similar issue. We're not far away from understanding everything about the way in which a bat's brain works: they're not terribly complicated, and within the decade we'll probably have it all mapped out. This, however, brings us no closer to knowing what it is like to be a bat. I can imagine what it would be like for me to fly around, to be almost blind, navigate by sonar, and hang upside down from the ceiling, but that's still not it--there's still something missing. That something is, again, the subjective experience of being a bat. The best I can do is imagine what it would be like if I were a bat--that is, if my mind were put into a bat's body and given a bat's sensory aparatus. I can't even begin to fathom, though, what it would be like for a bat to be a bat, even if I understand everything about how a bat's brain works.

The same holds true, I think, from human to human. To use a bit more mundane example, consider skydiving. If you've done any basic physics, you could probably model what would happen if you jumped out of a plane with relative ease (at least with the help of a textbook, perhaps!). You could describe how your body would go from having a horizontal velocity and no vertical velocity (in the plane) to having a rapidly increasing vertical velocity and a decreasing horizontal velocity (when you jump out). You'd know what to expect (a sensation of falling), and you'd know that you'd reach a terminal velocity after a certain amount of time accelerating at 9.8 m/s^2. You'd know everything there was to know (potentially) about the experience of skydiving, but if you'd never been skydiving, you still wouldn't know what it feels like to jump out of the plane and fall toward Earth--something would be missing, and it would be that subjective experience again: what philosophers would call the "qualia" associated with skydiving.

An account that takes into account only the physical phenomena and not the subjective experience they instantiate is, at best, incomplete. I do not disagree with the physicalist assertion that we're nothing but a bunch of atoms, but it seems the physicalist must admit that our particular configuration of atoms results in something more than a mere sum of the parts: we get a subjective consciousness, which may arise from physical structure, but is also something different from it.

Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:



Regarding Mary, I really don't see how you can make that claim. I agree that she would probably know something about what to expect, but I don't think you can equate knowing what's going on chemically and electrically with really knowing what seeing red feels like.

In doing so you're assuming there is something else other than the physical! You're assuming what you're trying to prove. It may seem obvious to you that there is something more, but that is hardly a proof.

What we know is that she knows everything there is to know about color. That includes what to expect when she herself sees the color. Hell, it even includes information about what neurological process causes use to sense this subjective experience you refer to.

The same applies to your bat analogy with an additional caveat. "Knowing what it is like to be a bat" would likely entail not possessing knowledge that you already possess! It is an impossible task to begin with if the bat itself does not possess the knowledge that we have (namely knowledge that we, regardless of what thought experiment we are engaging in, are humans and not bats).

quote:

The same holds true, I think, from human to human. To use a bit more mundane example, consider skydiving. If you've done any basic physics, you could probably model what would happen if you jumped out of a plane with relative ease (at least with the help of a textbook, perhaps!). You could describe how your body would go from having a horizontal velocity and no vertical velocity (in the plane) to having a rapidly increasing vertical velocity and a decreasing horizontal velocity (when you jump out). You'd know what to expect (a sensation of falling), and you'd know that you'd reach a terminal velocity after a certain amount of time accelerating at 9.8 m/s^2. You'd know everything there was to know (potentially) about the experience of skydiving, but if you'd never been skydiving, you still wouldn't know what it feels like to jump out of the plane and fall toward Earth--something would be missing, and it would be that subjective experience again: what philosophers would call the "qualia" associated with skydiving.

There is a difference, I would argue, between having knowledge of the physical process that will occur, and having knowledge of the physical sensations themselves when they occur to you. Only if you have complete knowledge on the subject of skydiving (which would arguably include knowledge of how your own senses would interpret the events), that you can say there is no other physical knowledge to be had.

quote:

An account that takes into account only the physical phenomena and not the subjective experience they instantiate is, at best, incomplete. I do not disagree with the physicalist assertion that we're nothing but a bunch of atoms, but it seems the physicalist must admit that our particular configuration of atoms results in something more than a mere sum of the parts: we get a subjective consciousness, which may arise from physical structure, but is also something different from it.



Suffice to say, I don't agree. I've yet to see anything convincing that would prove that there is something else other than physical interactions. At best, your proposition is superfluous.

ROFL!! a community of atheists... a gathering of people who do not beleive. that's pretty stupid if you ask me, what the hell is the point?

let's start an organisation of the nose, all who has a nose should join, and together we shall grow powerful and oppose those without noses... ants, for example

I think materialism accounts for the limits of our knowledge and even the limits of our imagination. It can account for why we cant ever "know" what it's like to actually be a bat, in the same way as it accounts for why we can "know" what its like to be a single atom...it's simply because we arent those things.

Our "subjective consciosness" itself is actually vulnerable to scrutiny. People who meditate (or use certain drugs) typically lose their sense of self. The self can be thought of as an illusion created by evolution.

For example, the first replicating particles didn't have any consciousness...they were just a chemical soup. But what about a bacteria? They sense and respond to chemical gradients, and thus are conscious in the most limited sense, yet they do so through a strictly materialistic process.

Why don't you spend more time in humanities, Rust? You're quite intelligent and well spoken--a pleasure to discuss with.

quote:

In doing so you're assuming there is something else other than the physical! You're assuming what you're trying to prove. It may seem obvious to you that there is something more, but that is hardly a proof.



Not at all. First, I'm not trying to present a proof--given our current state of scientific knowledge, it would be impossible to do so. What I'm presenting is a thought experiment designed to draw out intuitions--which we, apparently, do not share.



Second, I'm not arguing that there's something more than physical particles; I don't think there is. What I'm saying is that a physicalist description doesn't give us the whole picture; it may be all there is, but misses an important layer of description.

quote:

What we know is that she knows everything there is to know about color. That includes what to expect when she herself sees the color. Hell, it even includes information about what neurological process causes use to sense this subjective experience you refer to.



No argument. My point is that there's a difference between expecting a particular experience and actually experiencing what you expect. She may know everything about how color processing works, but she won't know what it is like for her to actually see it.

quote:

The same applies to your bat analogy with an additional caveat. "Knowing what it is like to be a bat" would likely entail not possessing knowledge that you already possess! It is an impossible task to begin with if the bat itself does not possess the knowledge that we have (namely knowledge that we, regardless of what thought experiment we are engaging in, are humans and not bats).



I wish I could take credit for it, but that's Thomas Nagel's argument. What you said is exactly my point--we can't imagine what it would be like to be a bat, despite the fact that we know (virtually) everything about their physiology. There's something different from their brain structure--albeit dependent on it--that we can't understand without actually experiencing it. Gaining new knowledge doesn't have anything to do with this particular argument; it just addresses the same point in the Mary example from a slightly different perspective. What you're saying is exactly what I (and Nagel) am saying: I just can't fathom what it would be like to be a bat (even if I know everything about a bat brain), because I'll never be able to shake my knowledge that I am not a bat, but a man supposing that I am a bat. A similar thing could be said of Mary--she'll never be able to shake the idea that she is a scientist supposing she's seen the color red based on scientific data, and not a scientist who has actually seen the color red.

quote:



There is a difference, I would argue, between having knowledge of the physical process that will occur, and having knowledge of the physical sensations themselves when they occur to you. Only if you have complete knowledge on the subject of skydiving (which would arguably include knowledge of how your own senses would interpret the events), that you can say there is no other physical knowledge to be had.



Good. I agree. I had a funny feeling while I was writing that example that it wasn't exactly parallel, and didn't realize until I was done why I felt that way--and by then I'd written it and wanted to include it--but I share your objection. The only force it can still be said to have, I think, is to illustrate that there is indeed a difference between academic understanding of something and "first hand" knowledge of the same thing.

quote:

Suffice to say, I don't agree. I've yet to see anything convincing that would prove that there is something else other than physical interactions. At best, your proposition is superfluous.



I don't think it is superfluous, and I don't disagree that there is anything other than physical interactions. I also don't think you really do disagree with me--I just think I'm not being clear enough. Let me put it yet another way.

Say you were going to describe a computer to someone who had never seen one before. There are a few different ways you could potentially go about it. You could describe the computer from a very high (macro) level: "A computer is this boxy thing with lots of wires and a screen that will let you play Quake 3 and post on totse." That's a true description (if it were elaborated upon, but I think you get the point).

You could also say something like "A computer is an arrangement of circuits on a board. Electrical signals pass back and forth between the circuits in such-and-such a way with such-and-such an effect." Another true description, but one that says something very different from the first: it gives you information the first one did not (how the computer works at a lower level), but omits information the first one did not (how computers look and what they're used for).

Then again, you could say something like "A computer is an arrangement of such-and-such elements in such-and-such a configurations and such-and-such proportions." This is yet another true description of what a computer is, but again gives a totally different account. All three of these "levels of description" say something true about a computer, but none of them are the whole story. There's nothing but physical particles, but if someone asks you "What is a computer" and you gave them the third answer, you'd be leaving out a lot of information that they probably wanted--the actual appearance of a computer, how one works, and what one is used for.

The same, I think, can be said of consciousness. If someone were to ask you "What is seeing red?" and you were to answer "The firing of such-and-such neurons in such-and-such part of the brain," that would (I think) be a true statement, but would miss something important as well, which is what I'm claiming a strictly physicalist explanation leaves out. The subjective conscious experience is causally reducible, but not ontologically reducible: in the same way the appearance of the computer is caused by the way its molocules are arranged yet a molecular description does not capture that appearance, consciousness is caused by physical processes yet those physical processes cannot adequately describe consciousness.

Entheogenic

[This message has been edited by Entheogenic (edited 10-24-2006).]

quote:Originally posted by Real.PUA:

I think materialism accounts for the limits of our knowledge and even the limits of our imagination. It can account for why we cant ever "know" what it's like to actually be a bat, in the same way as it accounts for why we can "know" what its like to be a single atom...it's simply because we arent those things.

Our "subjective consciosness" itself is actually vulnerable to scrutiny. People who meditate (or use certain drugs) typically lose their sense of self. The self can be thought of as an illusion created by evolution.

For example, the first replicating particles didn't have any consciousness...they were just a chemical soup. But what about a bacteria? They sense and respond to chemical gradients, and thus are conscious in the most limited sense, yet they do so through a strictly materialistic process.

I agree that there's a very fine line, and the discussion of what can be said to be conscious and what is not is an interesting one, but it's not my point here.

The fact that meditators or drug users can experience an "ego loss" is, in my opinion, irrelevant as well. Whether or not one has a conception of the self as separate from everything else, there is still a subjective character to the experience that cannot be said to be part of, say, a car engine starting. People who have experience ego loss can talk about "what it was like," and so obviously there was still some subjective quality to be experienced.

Entheogenic

Here's a thought, let's go back to Mary in the black and white room. This time we are even further in the future so we have the technology to produce any neural activity we want in a live human (via wirelessly controlled nanobots present in each and every cell of the body).

After studying all the neural activity that occurs when someone sees red, Mary writes a perfect program so the nanobots can reproduce exactly the same thing in her body. Using this program she can see red just like anybody else, but without any red object being present. IMO, this shows that materialism does account for all the information in a subjective experience. However, it is the interpretation of such information (by the brain in the case of humans) that actually leads to the subjective. If we were to have a mature "science of the mind," we would be able to understand how such an interpretation works. This science is currently unavailable to us, but I don't see a reason to believe it wont be obtained.

[This message has been edited by Real.PUA (edited 10-24-2006).]

quote:Originally posted by Real.PUA:

Here's a thought, let's go back to Mary in the black and white room. This time we are even further in the future so we have the technology to produce any neural activity we want in a live human (via wirelessly controlled nanobots present in each and every cell of the body).

After studying all the neural activity that occurs when someone sees red, Mary writes a perfect program so the nanobots can reproduce exactly the same thing in her body. Using this program she can see red just like anybody else, but without any red object being present. IMO, this shows that materialism does account for all the information in a subjective experience. However, it is the interpretation of such information (by the brain in the case of humans) that actually leads to the subjective. If we were to have a mature "science of the mind," we would be able to understand how such an interpretation works. This science is currently unavailable to us, but I don't see a reason to believe it wont be obtained.





Exactly. That's what I believe as well. My only point (I think people have been interpreting my argument as having larger implications than it does) is that a purely materialist explanation is not sufficient (though it is necessary) for consciousness--you have to mention the inherent subjectivity of the mind as well.

Think of your example this way: if prior to running this experiment with nanobots (is there anything they can't do? http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif)), suppose we anesthetized Mary so that her brain was fully functional, but her conscious mind was not present. If we then stimulated the proper part of the brain, she would not see red (or have an impression of red, if you prefer), as there would be no subjective "seer" to see it.

My main point with this, and where I primarily diverge from materialism, is that I do not believe that minds can be replicated by computers. The Turning Test, in my opinion, shows nothing about cognition or understanding. It will take a great leap of science to be able to build artificial minds, and it is not possible with our current conception of what a computer is. Most materialists disagree with me on this point (at least in my experience), and believe that creating an artificial consciousness is simply a matter of constructing a suffciently elaborate program. That, in a nutshell, is what I call bullshit upon.

Entheogenic



[This message has been edited by Entheogenic (edited 10-24-2006).]

Way to hijack my thread, guys! http://www.totse.com/bbs/mad.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/mad.gif)

*runs away crying* http://www.totse.com/bbs/frown.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/frown.gif)

"Why does this always happen to me???" http://www.totse.com/bbs/frown.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/frown.gif)

I didn't intend this to be a hijack, and I don't really think it is--my point is that it is possible to be a Bright (i.e. secular, rational, naturalistic, anti-superstition) without also embracing materialism whole-heartedly.



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

Why don't you spend more time in humanities, Rust? You're quite intelligent and well spoken--a pleasure to discuss with.



I show my face a few times, but I'll make an effort to post there more.

quote:

I don't think it is superfluous, and I don't disagree that there is anything other than physical interactions. I also don't think you really do disagree with me--I just think I'm not being clear enough. Let me put it yet another way.

Say you were going to describe a computer to someone who had never seen one before. There are a few different ways you could potentially go about it. You could describe the computer from a very high (macro) level: "A computer is this boxy thing with lots of wires and a screen that will let you play Quake 3 and post on totse." That's a true description (if it were elaborated upon, but I think you get the point).

You could also say something like "A computer is an arrangement of circuits on a board. Electrical signals pass back and forth between the circuits in such-and-such a way with such-and-such an effect." Another true description, but one that says something very different from the first: it gives you information the first one did not (how the computer works at a lower level), but omits information the first one did not (how computers look and what they're used for).

Then again, you could say something like "A computer is an arrangement of such-and-such elements in such-and-such a configurations and such-and-such proportions." This is yet another true description of what a computer is, but again gives a totally different account. All three of these "levels of description" say something true about a computer, but none of them are the whole story. There's nothing but physical particles, but if someone asks you "What is a computer" and you gave them the third answer, you'd be leaving out a lot of information that they probably wanted--the actual appearance of a computer, how one works, and what one is used for.



It does seem I didn't understand your point at first.

However now that you've made your point clearer, I still believe that the materialist/physicalist philosophical position has little to no burden of providing a complete picture of how matter (or energy, etc.) produces our consciousness. It merely holds the position that consciousness is the result of material/physical interactions since that is the only thing that exists. Whether a full explanation of those phenomenons can ever be achieved is something else entirely, and the impetus to do so falls not on the materialist/physicalist philosophy of mind, but on our methods of acquiring knowledge, namely, the scientific method.

You could definitely complain about the lack of a full scientific explanation, or oversights the current have, but it doesn't seem prudent to me to blame materialism and its philosophy of mind because of this.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

It does seem I didn't understand your point at first.

However now that you've made your point clearer, I still believe that the materialist/physicalist philosophical position has little to no burden of providing a complete picture of how matter (or energy, etc.) produces our consciousness. It merely holds the position that consciousness is the result of material/physical interactions since that is the only thing that exists. Whether a full explanation of those phenomenons can ever be achieved is something else entirely, and the impetus to do so falls not on the materialist/physicalist philosophy of mind, but on our methods of acquiring knowledge, namely, the scientific method.

You could definitely complain about the lack of a full scientific explanation, or oversights the current have, but it doesn't seem prudent to me to blame materialism and its philosophy of mind because of this.

I still don't entirely agree. I think the how question is absolutely important, and if we can't answer it then we obviously don't fully understand the phenomenon of consciousness. To continue with the example from above, suppose someone asked you "how does your computer let you post on totse?" If you answered "Well, I know it has something to do with those circuits in there," then your interlocutor could rightly claim that you aren't really answering anything, you're just giving a causal description--you don't really understand how the computer works.

It occurs to me that this probably isn't the best example for the defense of my position, as I want to strongly resist the idea that the mind is nothing but a computer, but it does serve my purpose, I suppose.

Overall, my complaint is that the physicalist position, while true, is not the whole truth. Consciousness arises causally from physical processes, but can't be ontologically reduced to them; understanding of one does not confer total understanding of the other.



Entheogenic

The point which I'm trying to make is that the materialist philosophy of the mind has no burden to show how the mind actually works. It simply holds, as a philosophical position which results from the overall materialist position as a whole (i.e. that only physical objects exist), that the mind is the result of the physical.

That's not to say that explaining how those physical objects lead to the mind is not important, it definately is, but the burden of such an explanation falls on methods of acquiring knowledge, such as the scientific method. That we currently do not have a full explanation of the mind in physical terms is not a problem of materialism as I see it, but of the methods we've used to explain it.

To use your analogy, it would be on one hand to claim that only transistors, capacitors, memory cells, et cetera, exist and that because of this, if we try to explain how computers work we must explain it in terms of those objects - which is analogous to the materialist philosophy of the mind - and actually trying to use those objects in experiments in order to reach a valid explanation of computers - which would be analogous to using the scientific method trying to explain the mind in terms of physical objects.

The materialist position isn't just (AFAIK) that the mind is the result of the physical, though, it's that the mind is physical. I don't dispute the claim that consciousness arises from the physical brain--that's obviously true--what I dispute is that consciousness is nothing more than physical particles. If you don't disagree with that, you don't disagree with me http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/smile.gif)



Entheogenic

Well yes; if the material is all that exists, then if the mind exists it must be material.

I share John Searle's distrust for the traditional metaphysical categories of "mental" vs. "physical." I think we undeniably live in one world (call it the physical world if it makes you happy), but that world can be subdivided into an arbitrary number of "domains" based on the interest of the divider.

Does magnetism belong to the physical world? It arises from physical particles, but doesn't really seem to be physical itself. What about the value of money? It has nothing to do with the physical properties of the paper, so are we to say that there is some kind of "economic substance" that gives money value? This kind of view would in some sense be right, but I think it would be absurd to say that "economic reality" exists separate from physical reality--it is, rather, a feature of the physical world that arises when certain conditions are met. To use Searle's example, what "reality" does the score of a soccer game belong to? Is it a mental fact in the mind of the scorekeeper? A physical fact about the lights on the score board? Neither? Searle argues that these questions are not really interesting (or even meaningful), and I would tend to agree. Yes, the world is made of (only) physical particles, but certain arrangements of those particles create features that, while causally reducible to the physical, is not ontologically reducible to it.

Consciousness, it seems, can be understood the same way. Some people are tempted to call this property dualism, but I don't really think it is. Most proponents of this view (myself included) reject even making a distinction between "mental" properties and "physical" properties, saying that this language is really the source of all the confusion. I agree. We're still locked in to only being able to talk about this issue by using the same vocabulary that substance dualists like Descartes used--a vocabulary that seems grossly out of date.

Entheogenic

The problem is that if you believe there are only physical objects, then the mind must undoubtedly be only physical objects. You cannot then say you dispute whether "consciousness is nothing more than physical particles" unless your definition of "nothing more" includes that which doesn't exist.

Materialism and the claim that only physical objects exist (be it matter, energy etc.) is an ontological position to begin with! To claim that only physical objects exist, is to claim that the mind is made up of physical objects and only physical objects; that we can reduce its existence to physical objects, because only that exists.

If we follow the materialist position, then all your questions are answerable in the same manner: They exist as part of the physical according to materialism.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

The problem is that if you believe there are only physical objects, then the mind must undoubtedly be only physical objects. You cannot then say you dispute whether "consciousness is nothing more than physical particles" unless your definition of "nothing more" includes that which doesn't exist.

Materialism and the claim that only physical objects exist (be it matter, energy etc.) is an ontological position to begin with! To claim that only physical objects exist, is to claim that the mind is made up of physical objects and only physical objects; that we can reduce its existence to physical objects, because only that exists.

If we follow the materialist position, then all your questions are answerable in the same manner: They exist as part of the physical according to materialism.



Like I said, I'm hesitant to accept the traditional definition of "physical." I agree that the mind exists in the "real world" and is not some kind of mental substance, but I don't think you can reduce consciousness (ontologically, not causally) to physical particles. Physical particles are inherently 3rd person and objective, and consciousness is inherently first person and subjective; it is part of the physical world in that it arises causally from physical particles, but it exists as an ontologically irreducible "feature" of those physical particles.



Entheogenic

But if you believe that only physical particles exists then the mind must be reduced to the physical, as only that exists; you cannot reduce it to anything else, because nothing else exists.

the term Bright sucks....it gives a sense of supremacy, which frankly, isn't a good way to get yourself popular if you're trying to overthrow the majority social circles.

Its just a new-age, hippy take of the traditional christian evaganelist.

btw, if atheists form a religion, can they still be considered atheists?

quote:Originally posted by deadbeat:



Its just a new-age, hippy take of the traditional christian evaganelist.

How the fuck are the "Brights" a "new-age hippy take of the traditional christian evegelist"?

Having a naturalistic worldview is pretty much the opposite of new-age hippy anything.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

How the fuck are the "Brights" a "new-age hippy take of the traditional christian evegelist"?

Having a naturalistic worldview is pretty much the opposite of new-age hippy anything.

when the last time you seen an atheist go into the public and get people to subscribe to his views? Compare this to how often you see christians in public doing the same. You get the idea. Its just IN nowadays to join a movement and be part of the 'global awakening'

You may mean that the Bright movement is an attempt to commercialize atheism (I would agree to some degree), but if the "New-Age" and "Hippy" movements were characteristic of anything it would be of an un-naturalistic world view.,

quote:Originally posted by deadbeat:

btw, if atheists form a religion, can they still be considered atheists?

Atheism is merely a lack of belief in god, not in religion. There are Buddhist atheists, so yes, you can be an atheist and religious.

hmmm, correct me if I'm wrong

Atheists don't believe in gods, but they can have a religion because they belive in a higher power.

On the other hand, free-thinkers just don't believe that there is any higher power whatsoever.

Is this true?

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

You may mean that the Bright movement is an attempt to commercialize atheism (I would agree to some degree), but if the "New-Age" and "Hippy" movements were characteristic of anything it would be of an un-naturalistic world view.,

Its a reference to the 60s, where hippies and new-age culture take root, such as Wiccans etc. Although they now make a come-back, they are mainly in the public view starting from the 60s.

quote:Originally posted by Rust:

But if you believe that only physical particles exists then the mind must be reduced to the physical, as only that exists; you cannot reduce it to anything else, because nothing else exists.

Or it isn't reducible, which is what I believe. Causally yes, ontologically no. It is a subjective phenomenon that necessarily arises from the physical particles arranged the way they are.



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

Or it isn't reducible, which is what I believe. Causally yes, ontologically no. It is a subjective phenomenon that necessarily arises from the physical particles arranged the way they are.

Entheogenic

If it exists, then it must be physical. That is reducing it ontologically.

How can you argue that consciousness is physical? An essential feature of physical particles is that they are third party accessible, whereas an essential feature of consciousness is that it is not.

Let me try another analogy (and thank you, by the way, for this discussion--I'm developing the theory as we go):

Take solidity. If you know anything about physics, you know that because of the way particles are arranged in, say, this desk it can't help but be solid; the lattice structure of the molecules forces solidity. It is causally reducible to the behavior of particles.

But suppose we were smaller. A lot smaller--say, about the size of an electron. How different would the world appear to us, and how different would the phenomenon of solidity be? The answer, I think, is that what is solid (notice that I don't say "appears solid"--I do believe solidity actually exists for us as a phenomenon) now would no longer be so: we'd be able to see the gaping holes and empty space in the molecular structure.

Solidity, then, seems to depend on certain facts about us: namely that we are the size we are, and have perceptual apparatuses that we do. However, it is also dependent on certain facts about the natural world: namely, that physical particles are arranged the way they are, and interact with us the way they do.

So it appears that solidity is codependent on facts about us (subjective) and facts about the world at large (objective). From where we stand, it is an objective phenomenon, but if either we or the world were slightly different, solidity would be different as well. It is, I would say, an aspect of the way the physical particles are arranged.

Consciousness works the same way, I believe. Obviously we would not be conscious were it not for the particles in our brain doing what they do, but we would also not be conscious if we were not able to experience being conscious. To imagine that we could be unable to do this is absurd, but no more absurd than imagining ourselves the size of electrons and watching solidity fall away or change.



Entheogenic

quote:Originally posted by Ra-deus:

I doubt this will escalate beyond a website, but any gathering of people intelligent enough to realize that the world's religions are bullshit is ok by me. Even though it should be common sense by now.

It was already in wired magazine. Made the cover.

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

I'm a member. They do have some decent intellectuals on their side, including Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennet.



And me, of course http://www.totse.com/bbs/wink.gif (http://www.totse.com/bbs/wink.gif)



Entheogenic

Well, I am a fan of your work.

quote:Originally posted by SmokingSalmon:

ROFL!! a community of atheists... a gathering of people who do not beleive. that's pretty stupid if you ask me, what the hell is the point?

let's start an organisation of the nose, all who has a nose should join, and together we shall grow powerful and oppose those without noses... ants, for example

I think the general idea is to foster understanding of atheists, destroy misconceptions, and communicate with like minded people.

In my oppinion there is nothing wrong with Athiests having a group like this.

Your still welcome to form a similer group about the nose though.

quote:Originally posted by Entheogenic:

How can you argue that consciousness is physical?

That is absolutely necessary from the assumption we are making, that only physical particles exist. When you claim that only physical particles exist, then if the mind exists, then it must be reduced ontologically to physical particles as that, and only that, exists. You cannot reduce it to anything else, because nothing else exists.

1. Only physical particles exist.

2. X exists.

3. X is a (or is made up of) physical particle(s).

If 3 is false, then it follows necessarilly that 1 is false, as there would be a logical contradiction if it were otherwise [Proof by contradiction].

The argument of solidity you use is not really valid, because the chair remains solid regardless of our perspective. Just like there is sound (as in a vibration of particles) even if there is no "ear" to hear it. In fact if we were so tiny, then the space between molecules in a liquid would be more than a solid and the space in a gas would be even greater than that. Solid < Liquid < Gas. The ratio of space remains the same regardless of our perspective.

The truth of the matter is that if we make the assumption that only physical particles exist, then anything we say exists must be a physical particle, or a composition of many physical particles.