I was re-reading Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy[i] today (because he's one of my favourite philosophers and I wanted to have a better understanding of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, which was influenced by Descartes methodological doubt and 'Cogito Ergo Sum') and it got me thinking about the ontological argument for the existence of God.

Anselm's argument goes like this:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>

<LI>God is the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived.

<LI>The concept of God exists in human understanding.

<LI>God does not exist in reality (assumed in order to refute).

<LI>The concept of God existing in reality exists in human understanding.

<LI>If an entity exists in reality and in human understanding, this entity is greater than it would have been if it existed only in human understanding (a statement of existence as a perfection).

<LI>from 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 An entity can be conceived which is greater than God, the entity than which no greater entity can be conceived (logical self-contradiction).

<LI>Assumption 3 is wrong, therefore God exists in reality (assuming 1, 2, 4, and 5 are accepted as true).

</UL>

And Descartes' arguments go like this:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>

<LI>Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.

<LI>I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.

<LI>Therefore, God exists.

</UL>

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>

<LI>I exist

<LI>I have an idea of a supremely perfect being, i.e. a being having all perfections.

<LI>As an imperfect being I would be unable to create such a concept through my own thoughts.

<LI>The concept must have come from God.

<LI>To be a perfect being God must exist.

<LI>God exists.

</UL>

The bizarre thing about this argument is that I can't find anything wrong with it at first glance, yet find it totally unconvincing. The same goes for Kant and Hume's arguments [i]against the ontological argument.

I cannot fathom why this is and would like to hear other people's opinions of the argument.

Couldn't it be argued that the universe is God? It has everything required to be defined as God. It is self-contained and contains everything imaginable and, depending on whose values, is perfect.

quote:Originally posted by Hare_Geist:

The bizarre thing about this argument is that I can't find anything wrong with it at first glance

You can't?

I have an idea of a supremely perfect being, i.e. a being having all perfections.

What does it mean to have an idea of a perfect being? Can you really fathom what a perfect being would be like? I doubt it.



quote:Originally posted by Hare_Geist:

As an imperfect being I would be unable to create such a concept through my own thoughts.

I doubt you can create such a concept. You may be able to imagine that something like this being exists, without knowing what It would be like, but why can an imperfect being not be able to come up with that concept? And if an imperfect being can not do it, does that make you perfect? I can imagine that there are 33,000,000 perfect gods. Must they exist? Must anything that I can imagine exist?

I just had a thought, but you'll need to read all of this quote to understand it:

quote:a. The Argument Described

St. Anselm, Archbishop of Cantebury (1033-1109), is the originator of the ontological argument, which he describes in the Proslogium as follows:

[Even a] fool, when he hears of … a being than which nothing greater can be conceived … understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.… And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.… Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

The argument in this difficult passage can accurately be summarized in standard form:

1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (i.e., the greatest possible being that can be imagined).

2. God exists as an idea in the mind.

3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.

4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (i.e., a greatest possible being that does exist).

5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)

6. Therefore, God exists.

Intuitively, one can think of the argument as being powered by two ideas. The first, expressed by Premise 2, is that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates all of the perfections. Otherwise put, Premise 2 asserts that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates every property that makes a being greater, other things being equal, than it would have been without that property (such properties are also known as "great-making" properties). Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection or great-making property.

Accordingly, the very concept of a being that instantiates all the perfections implies that it exists. Suppose B is a being that instantiates all the perfections and suppose B doesn't exist (in reality). Since Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection, it follows that B lacks a perfection. But this contradicts the assumption that B is a being that instantiates all the perfections. Thus, according to this reasoning, it follows that B exists.

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b. Gaunilo's Criticism

Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk and contemporary of Anselm's, is responsible for one of the most important criticisms of Anselm's argument. It is quite reasonable to worry that Anselm's argument illegitimately moves from the existence of an idea to the existence of a thing that corresponds to the idea. As the objection is sometimes put, Anselm simply defines things into existence-and this cannot be done.

Gaunilo shared this worry, believing that one could use Anselm's argument to show the existence of all kinds of non-existent things:

Now if some one should tell me that there is … an island [than which none greater can be conceived], I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: "You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent."

Gaunilo's argument, thus, proceeds by attempting to use Anselm's strategy to deduce the existence of a perfect island, which Gaunilo rightly views as a counterexample to the argument form. The counterexample can be expressed as follows:

1. It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined (i.e., the greatest possible island that can be imagined).

2. A piland exists as an idea in the mind.

3. A piland that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a piland that exists only as an idea in the mind.

4. Thus, if a piland exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine an island that is greater than a piland (i.e., a greatest possible island that does exist).

5. But we cannot imagine an island that is greater than a piland.

6. Therefore, a piland exists.

Notice, however, that premise 1 of Gaunilo's argument is incoherent. The problem here is that the qualities that make an island great are not the sort of qualities that admit of conceptually maximal qualities. No matter how great any island is in some respect, it is always possible to imagine an island greater than that island in that very respect. For example, if one thinks that abundant fruit is a great-making property for an island, then, no matter how great a particular island might be, it will always be possible to imagine a greater island because there is no intrinsic maximum for fruit-abundance. For this reason, the very concept of a piland is incoherent.

But this is not true of the concept of God as Anselm conceives it. Properties like knowledge, power, and moral goodness, which comprise the concept of a maximally great being, do have intrinsic maximums. For example, perfect knowledge requires knowing all and only true propositions; it is conceptually impossible to know more than this. Likewise, perfect power means being able to do everything that it is possible to do; it is conceptually impossible for a being to be able to do more than this.

The general point here, then, is this: Anselm's argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point:

[The notion of a greatest possible being imaginable assumes that] each positive property is to be present in the highest possible degree. Now this will be meaningless verbiage unless there is some intrinsic maximum or upper limit to the possible intensity of every positive property which is capable of degrees. With some magnitudes this condition is fulfilled. It is, e.g., logically impossible that any proper fraction should exceed the ratio 1/1; and again, on a certain definition of "angle," it is logically impossible for any angle to exceed four right angles. But it seems quite clear that there are other properties, such as length or temperature or pain, to which there is no intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree.

If any of the properties that are conceptually essential to the notion of God do not admit of an intrinsic maximum, then Anselm's argument strategy will not work because, like Guanilo's concept of a piland, the relevant concept of God is incoherent. But insofar as the relevant great-making properties are limited to omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection (which do admit of intrinsic maximums), Anselm's notion of a greatest possible being seems to avoid the worry expressed by Broad and Guanilo.

If, then, God is omnipotent, omniscience and morally perfect, surely there is something within him that holds all these things together? Surely, then, like the island, you can think and think and think of something better at holding these things together?

Maybe it's a terrible argument, but it's just a thought.

Actually, I don't know why I bothered making this thread, since this here pretty much refutes the ontological argument:

quote:IV. Is the Concept of a Maximally Great Being Coherent?

As is readily evident, each version of the ontological argument rests on the assumption that the concept of God, as it is described in the argument, is self-consistent. Both versions of Anselm's argument rely on the claim that the idea of God (i.e., a being than which none greater can be conceived) "exists as an idea in the understanding." Similarly, Plantinga's version relies on the more transparent claim that the concept of maximal greatness is self-consistent.

But many philosophers are skeptical about the underlying assumption, as Leibniz describes it, "that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible and implies no contradiction." Here is the problem as C.D. Broad expresses it:

Let us suppose, e.g., that there were just three positive properties X, Y, and Z; that any two of them are compatible with each other; but that the presence of any two excludes the remaining one. Then there would be three possible beings, viz., one which combines X and Y, one which combines Y and Z, and one which combines Z and X, each of which would be such that nothing … superior to it is logically possible. For the only kind of being which would be … superior to any of these would be one which had all three properties, X, Y, and Z; and, by hypothesis, this combination is logically impossible.… It is now plain that, unless all positive properties be compatible with each other, this phrase [i.e., "a being than which none greater can be imagined"] is just meaningless verbiage like the phrase "the greatest possible integer."

Thus, if there are two great-making characteristics essential to the classically theistic notion of an all-perfect God that are logically incompatible, it follows that this notion is incoherent.

Here it is important to note that all versions of the ontological argument assume that God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. As we have seen, Plantinga expressly defines maximal excellence in such terms. Though Anselm doesn't expressly address the issue, it is clear (1) that he is attempting to show the existence of the God of classical theism; and (2) that the great-making properties include those of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.

There are a number of plausible arguments for thinking that even this restricted set of properties is logically inconsistent. For example, moral perfection is thought to entail being both perfectly merciful and perfectly just. But these two properties seem to contradict each other. To be perfectly just is always to give every person exactly what she deserves. But to be perfectly merciful is to give at least some persons less punishment than they deserve. If so, then a being cannot be perfectly just and perfectly merciful. Thus, if moral perfection entails, as seems reasonable, being perfectly just and merciful, then the concept of moral perfection is inconsistent.

The problem of divine foreknowledge can also be seen as denying that omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection constitute a coherent set. Roughly put, the problem of divine foreknowledge is as follows. If God is omniscient, then God knows what every person will do at every moment t. To say that a person p has free will is to say that there is at least one moment t at which p does A but could have done other than A. But if a person p who does A at t has the ability to do other than A at t, then it follows that p has the ability to bring it about that an omniscient God has a false belief - and this is clearly impossible.

On this line of analysis, then, it follows that it is logically impossible for a being to simultaneously instantiate omniscience and omnipotence. Omnipotence entails the power to create free beings, but omniscience rules out the possibility that such beings exist. Thus, a being that is omniscient lacks the ability to create free beings and is hence not omnipotent. Conversely, a being that is omnipotent has the power to create free beings and hence does not know what such beings would do if they existed. Thus, the argument concludes that omniscience and omnipotence are logically incompatible. If this is correct, then all versions of the ontological argument fail.

Well, you live and learn; and die in embarrassment.

But then, if God is all powerful, couldn't he break the bounds of logic and be all three of those things? A living contradiction?

But perfection is subjective. There is no real property of "perfection". Whatever you think is perfect, is perfect.

The whole argument is shit.

quote:Originally posted by Viraljimmy:

But perfection is subjective. There is no real property of "perfection". Whatever you think is perfect, is perfect.

The whole argument is shit.

I agree with you here. But it's the only ever argument for the existence of god that has bugged me, one of the few to make me question my agnostic-atheism.

[This message has been edited by Hare_Geist (edited 01-30-2007).]

LOL, you seriously can conceive of God? Define Him then.

These arguments break down on so many levels, but the most basic is there is no concept of God. The assertion of God is the absence of thought.

While we are at it, you can conceive of God but not God+1?

Anything that exists has definition and you can add 1 (so to speak) to it to conceive of something greater than what it is. God is the assertion of no definition (infinite) which is not only why you cannot conceive of it but also why it cannot exist because to be is to be something. Something is what it is and is limited by what it is and you can always conceive or more or greater than what it is.



[This message has been edited by Easy Going (edited 01-31-2007).]

Here's Dawkins interpretation of this argument for those who care:

"Let me translate this infantile argument into the appropriate language, which is the language of the playground:

'Bet you I can prove God exists.'

'Bet you can't.'

'Right then, imagine the most perfect perfect perfect thing possible.'

'Okay, now what?'

'Now, is that perfect perfect perfect thing real? Does it exist?'

'No, it's only in my mind.'

'But if it was real it would be even more perfect, because a really really perfect thing would have to be better than a silly old imaginary thing. So I've proved that

God exists. Nur Nurny Nur Nur. All atheists are fools.'"

And here is Australian philosopher Douglas Gasking's proof that god does not exist which is also quite amusing (developed with the intention to make fun of the Ontological Argument, obviously, and not to be taken seriously):

1 The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.

2 The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.

3 The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4 The most formidable handicap for a creator would be nonexistence.

5 Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being - namely, one

who created everything while not existing.

6 An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable

and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

Ergo:

7 God does not exist.

[This message has been edited by bung (edited 01-31-2007).]

Less talking, more consulting your pineal gland.