Obbe
2008-12-23, 09:24
The last time I made this thread, it was destroyed by trolling unrelated to the thread and eventually locked by a mod. This time, I hope to generate some actual discussion on this topic, which I find very interesting.
I have recently started reading "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" by Julian Jaynes. I find the subject extremely interesting and highly related to certain conceptions of God and the origins of religion. Julian suggests consciousness developed in humans as recently as only 3000 years ago. That it developed out of language and allegory, and that consciousness itself is an allegory of the physical world.
From page 74-75:
[After speaking on the Iliad and of Greek Gods]
The [Greek] gods are what we now call hallucinations. Usually they are only seen or heard by the particular heroes they are speaking to. Sometimes they come in mists or out of the gray sea or a river, or from the sky, suggesting visual auras preceding them. But at other times, they simply occur. Usually they come as themselves, commonly as mere voices, but sometimes as other people related to the hero.
Apollo's relation to Hector is particularly interesting in this regard. In Book 16, Apollo come to Hector as his maternal uncle; then in Book 17 as one of his allied leaders; and then later in the same book as his dearest friend from abroad. The denouement of the whole epic comes when it is Athene who, after telling Achilles to kill Hector, then comes to Hector as his dearest brother, Deiphobus. Trusting in him as his second, Hector challenges Achilles demands of Deiphobus to another spear, and turns to find nothing is there. We would say he had a hallucination. So has Achilles. The Trojan War was directed by hallucinations. And the soldier who were so directed were not at all like us. They were noble automatons who knew not what they did.
The Bicameral Mind
The picture then is one of strangeness and heartlessness and emptiness. We cannot approach these heroes by inventing mind-spaces behind their fierce eyes as we do with each other. Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as do we; he had no awareness of his awareness of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon. In distinction ro our own subjective conscious minds, we call the mentality of the Mycenaeans a bicameral mind. Volition, planning, initiative is organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' to the individual in his familiar language, sometimes with the visual aura of a familiar friend or authority figure or 'god', or sometimes as a voice alone. The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not 'see' what to do himself.
More quotes:
The words in the Iliad that in a later age come to mean mental things have different meanings, all of them more concrete. The word psyche, which later means soul or conscious mind, is in most instances life-substances, such as blood or breath: a dying warrior bleeds out his psyche onto the ground or breathes it out in his last gasp. The thumos, which later comes to mean something like emotional soul, is simply motion or agitation. When a man stops moving, the thumos leaves his limbs. But it is also somehow like an organ itself, for when Glaucus prays to Apollo to alleviate his pain and to give him strength to help his friend Sarpedon, Apollo hears his prayer and "casts strength in his thumos" (Iliad, 16:529). The thumos can tell a man to eat, drink, or fight ...
... a raging ocean has thumos ...
Perhaps the most important word is the word noos which, spelled as nous in later Greek, comes to mean conscious mind. It comes from the word noeein, to see. Its proper translation in the Iliad would be something like perception or recognition or field of vision ...
... essentially [mermerizein] means to be in conflict about to actions, not two thoughts. It is always behavioristic. It is said several times of Zeus (20:17, 16:647), as well as of others. The conflict is often said to go on in the thumos, or sometimes in the phrenes, but never in the noos. The eye cannot doubt or be in conflict, as the soon-to-be-invented conscious mind will be able to.
page 69-70
... consciousness is an operation rather then a thing, a repository, or a function. It operates way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog 'I' that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts. Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things. Or, to say it another way with echoes of John Locke, there is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first.
page 65-66
From Wiki:
Brian McVeigh maintains that many of the most frequent criticisms of Jaynes' theory are either incorrect or reflect serious misunderstandings of Jaynes' theory, especially Jaynes' more precise definition of consciousness. Jaynes defines consciousness — in the tradition of Locke and Descartes — as "that which is introspectable." Jaynes draws a sharp distinction between consciousness ('introspectable mind-space') and other mental processes such as cognition, learning, and sense and perception — which occur in all animals. This distinction is frequently not recognized by those offering critiques of Jaynes' theory.
According to the theory, the voice of God was a voice in our heads which replaced consciousness (defined as that which is introspectable) and is responsible for the development of civilization.
I have recently started reading "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" by Julian Jaynes. I find the subject extremely interesting and highly related to certain conceptions of God and the origins of religion. Julian suggests consciousness developed in humans as recently as only 3000 years ago. That it developed out of language and allegory, and that consciousness itself is an allegory of the physical world.
From page 74-75:
[After speaking on the Iliad and of Greek Gods]
The [Greek] gods are what we now call hallucinations. Usually they are only seen or heard by the particular heroes they are speaking to. Sometimes they come in mists or out of the gray sea or a river, or from the sky, suggesting visual auras preceding them. But at other times, they simply occur. Usually they come as themselves, commonly as mere voices, but sometimes as other people related to the hero.
Apollo's relation to Hector is particularly interesting in this regard. In Book 16, Apollo come to Hector as his maternal uncle; then in Book 17 as one of his allied leaders; and then later in the same book as his dearest friend from abroad. The denouement of the whole epic comes when it is Athene who, after telling Achilles to kill Hector, then comes to Hector as his dearest brother, Deiphobus. Trusting in him as his second, Hector challenges Achilles demands of Deiphobus to another spear, and turns to find nothing is there. We would say he had a hallucination. So has Achilles. The Trojan War was directed by hallucinations. And the soldier who were so directed were not at all like us. They were noble automatons who knew not what they did.
The Bicameral Mind
The picture then is one of strangeness and heartlessness and emptiness. We cannot approach these heroes by inventing mind-spaces behind their fierce eyes as we do with each other. Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as do we; he had no awareness of his awareness of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon. In distinction ro our own subjective conscious minds, we call the mentality of the Mycenaeans a bicameral mind. Volition, planning, initiative is organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' to the individual in his familiar language, sometimes with the visual aura of a familiar friend or authority figure or 'god', or sometimes as a voice alone. The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not 'see' what to do himself.
More quotes:
The words in the Iliad that in a later age come to mean mental things have different meanings, all of them more concrete. The word psyche, which later means soul or conscious mind, is in most instances life-substances, such as blood or breath: a dying warrior bleeds out his psyche onto the ground or breathes it out in his last gasp. The thumos, which later comes to mean something like emotional soul, is simply motion or agitation. When a man stops moving, the thumos leaves his limbs. But it is also somehow like an organ itself, for when Glaucus prays to Apollo to alleviate his pain and to give him strength to help his friend Sarpedon, Apollo hears his prayer and "casts strength in his thumos" (Iliad, 16:529). The thumos can tell a man to eat, drink, or fight ...
... a raging ocean has thumos ...
Perhaps the most important word is the word noos which, spelled as nous in later Greek, comes to mean conscious mind. It comes from the word noeein, to see. Its proper translation in the Iliad would be something like perception or recognition or field of vision ...
... essentially [mermerizein] means to be in conflict about to actions, not two thoughts. It is always behavioristic. It is said several times of Zeus (20:17, 16:647), as well as of others. The conflict is often said to go on in the thumos, or sometimes in the phrenes, but never in the noos. The eye cannot doubt or be in conflict, as the soon-to-be-invented conscious mind will be able to.
page 69-70
... consciousness is an operation rather then a thing, a repository, or a function. It operates way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog 'I' that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts. Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things. Or, to say it another way with echoes of John Locke, there is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first.
page 65-66
From Wiki:
Brian McVeigh maintains that many of the most frequent criticisms of Jaynes' theory are either incorrect or reflect serious misunderstandings of Jaynes' theory, especially Jaynes' more precise definition of consciousness. Jaynes defines consciousness — in the tradition of Locke and Descartes — as "that which is introspectable." Jaynes draws a sharp distinction between consciousness ('introspectable mind-space') and other mental processes such as cognition, learning, and sense and perception — which occur in all animals. This distinction is frequently not recognized by those offering critiques of Jaynes' theory.
According to the theory, the voice of God was a voice in our heads which replaced consciousness (defined as that which is introspectable) and is responsible for the development of civilization.