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From: kondrak <kon..._at_phreaker.net>
Subject: A Holistic Vision for the Intelligence Analysis
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>
>
>Intelligence Analysis
>
>
>A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit
>
>
>Richard
><https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Richar
>d_Kerr> Kerr, Thomas
><https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Tom_Wo
>lfe> Wolfe, Rebecca
><https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Rebecc
>a_Donegan> Donegan,
><https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Aris_P
>appas> Aris Pappas
>
> _____
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>"What is needed
>is a vision,
>from the bottom up,
>of intelligence analysis that focuses
>on the
>basic
>analytic unit."
>
>
>In early 2003, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asked Richard
>Kerr, former deputy director of central intelligence, to organize a small
>group-the authors of this article- to provide an overall assessment of the
>intelligence produced before the war in Iraq began that spring. After that
>report was finished in June 2003, the group produced two additional reports
>dealing with Iraq: a critique of the National Intelligence Estimate on
>Weapons of Mass Destruction and a report aimed at identifying systemic
>problems and issues in the Intelligence Community the group uncovered in
>working on the preceding two reports. The unclassified version of this last
>report was published in Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 in 2005.
>These reports were informed by interviews, documents, and other material, as
>well as by our background and experience as former managers of intelligence
>analysis. From these studies and from our own past observations and
>independent experience, we, under the sponsorship of then-Assistant Director
>of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal, took a
>fresh look at the principal components of the intelligence process:
>requirements, collection, analysis, product, and dissemination. Although
>this report was prepared in May 2005 and changes have been taking place at
>many levels in the Intelligence Community, we continue to believe this
>vision remains relevant today.
>-The Kerr Group
>Beginning in the late 1970s, the US military entered an era sometimes
>referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs. During this period, the
>military went through a fundamental reassessment of capabilities, force
>structure, and operations- a process that some argue is continuing to this
>day. In contrast, although the Intelligence Community also made a variety of
>changes following the end of the Cold War, they were incremental in nature.
>They did not fully address longstanding issues, including analysis and
>products, nor did they tackle emerging problems creatively.
>Over the past several years, proposals for improving intelligence have been
>many and varied. Most have emphasized the overall structure and management
>of the Intelligence Community, with recommendations aimed at making top-down
>changes. This paper argues that what is needed is a vision, from the bottom
>up, of intelligence analysis that focuses on the working of the basic
>analytic unit. We examine the analytic process, note problems and issues,
>and make recommendations to enhance the Intelligence Community's analytic
>capabilities and products.
>
>The Holistic Analytic Unit
>The advent of a Director of National Intelligence and changes mandated by
>commission reports on the performance of the Intelligence Community present
>unique opportunities to apply a new framework for intelligence analysis.
>Herewith is a vision for an approach that creates analytic units with a
>holistic view of their mission, responsibility, and capability. They will
>comprise physical units at their core and virtual units with presence
>throughout their areas of responsibility.
>Implementation should begin with a single country and then expand
>region-wide. Once decided upon, changes should be made quickly, and
>high-level attention and enhanced resources will be key. The individual
>steps of the process should be undertaken simultaneously rather than
>serially.
>Identify six to 12 countries or areas of particular importance to the US.
>Pick one or two, perhaps Iran and North Korea, as test cases. Create
>analytic units for the test case countries with the following
>characteristics:
>* Internal expertise, mixed with strong abilities to identify and
>use knowledge not resident in the unit. Avoid the myth of "total resident
>knowledge"
>* Very senior leadership, with rich resources in personnel and
>funding, to include significant amounts of external contract money, with
>contracts developed and approved within the unit
>* Creativity the key
>* Responsibility for the "whole." Units should:
>o Perform research
>o Produce current intelligence and long-term estimates
>o Identify intelligence requirements
>o Establish collection priorities
>o Manage IC funding directed against the target
>* Non-traditional staffing. Units should include or have close
>relationships, including formal contracts and informal contacts, with:
>o Experts without security clearances, including non-US citizens
>o Private sector firms and Federally Funded Research and Development
>Corporations for administration and substance
>o Universities and other seats of knowledge
>* Inclusive structure
>o Self-contained assets for research assistance, contract management,
>conference organization,
>administration, and security
>o Embedded representatives from key organizations and customers
>* Strong external presence to ensure that the unit is regarded as a
>central player in the preparation of dynamic assessments and the application
>of existing knowledge
>o Assign personnel to other principal organizations in the area of
>responsibility, including Defense, State, pertinent Federal and NGOs,
>academic and private entities
>o Institute regular conference calls, videoconferences, visits, and
>other interactions with country teams, chiefs of station, national
>laboratories, military commands, State desk officers, and collection
>agencies
>o Preside over programs sponsoring in-country research, academic
>exchanges, student programs, conferences, and other efforts
>* New products and state-of-the-art dissemination systems should
>produce intelligence on a near-real-time basis keyed to customer interests
>and designed to provide reference material to support current issues
>* Intelligence estimates should be short, validated outside the IC,
>and focused not on single-point outcomes but on the implications of change
>* Strong, high-level review, accountability, and measurement of
>performance to ensure against backsliding
>
>Requirements and Collection
>Fundamental to the success of intelligence analysis are robust, flexible
>collection strategies guided by analyst input. In fact, too often today
>collection drives analysis rather than the other way around. This is due, at
>least in part, to the separation of collectors from analysts. Accordingly,
>collection priorities often do not reflect the true needs of the analysts
>working important issues.
>Collection of information on difficult targets is a core mission of
>intelligence, and neither clandestine nor technical collection measures are
>up to the challenges of today. The key issues facing US national security
>over the next decades include the political, economic, and social strains in
>key countries and the ability of countries to develop and deliver
>destructive weapons. Experience in Iraq shows that technical, and even
>clandestine, reporting provided only superficial information on weapons
>programs, with little or no insight or understanding of the inner workings
>and dynamics of the programs. In fact, it can be argued that information
>from these sources sometimes was as misleading as it was at times valuable.
>Such issues raise questions about future investment priorities. It is
>inevitable there will be intense competition for resources among collection
>disciplines, and a careful review is needed of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT
>relative to the resources devoted to them. In addition, the value-added and
>the relative merit of each source must be examined. The involvement of
>intelligence analysts in such a review will be key to its success.
>A productive relationship between collectors and analysts must still be
>created, and when it is, it will be fundamental to establishing collection
>priorities and resource allocations. Currently, however, there is a
>significant gap between them. Too many analysts do not understand collection
>capabilities, and many are not even familiar with collection systems. To a
>significant extent this has resulted from the reduction over the past decade
>of the professional collection management cadre capable of integrating
>human, imagery, and signals intelligence capabilities into coherent
>strategies and closely tied to the analysts. This development has been
>compounded by the separation of collection professionals from the analytic
>cadre who had been intimately involved in identifying and ranking collection
>gaps and developing collection strategies.
>Although many analysts have contacts with collectors, it is not at a level
>that furthers their knowledge of collection capabilities or what collectors
>are collecting or not collecting. Moreover, analysts generally are not very
>adept at anticipating collection needs. They tend to be reactive, focusing
>on existing issues rather than identifying emerging issues or those likely
>to emerge down the road. In part this results from the absence of coherent
>research programs to help stimulate sound collection strategies. Many issues
>can be anticipated and collection requirements and strategies established
>before issues become the focus of policymakers' attention.
>One response to the analyst/collection problem is to have collectors
>embedded in analytic units. Although this has been tried in various ways
>over the years, it has been haphazard and with only a collector or two for
>short periods. Although not all collection platforms are right for all
>issues, expert representatives from appropriate collection entities (NSA,
>NGA, OSC, etc.) should be permanently integrated, on a rotating basis, into
>key analytic units. Understanding that finite personnel resources would
>preclude this from being done for every analytic unit, it could be done for
>at least high profile issues, for example, Iran.
>For targets and issues of lower priority, an embedded collection generalist
>could substitute for the several experts representing particular collection
>agencies/capabilities in high profile-units. That individual should be
>familiar with all collection systems and not just the one in which his/her
>expertise resides. Moreover, regardless of the issue's priority, the
>collectors must work intimately with analysts on developing strategies and
>filling gaps, as well as on educating analysts on how system capabilities
>can or cannot contribute to the questions raised by the issues at hand.
>Too often, however, collectors argue that dispersal of personnel to analytic
>units diminishes the benefits obtained from organizational purity, i.e., the
>interaction among personnel working the same issues. This argument may have
>some validity, but organizational purity cannot carry the day if the
>Intelligence Community is to avoid the weak and unimaginative collection
>strategies that prevailed in the lead-up to the Iraq war.
>Source descriptions and reliability remain serious problems, and only a
>closer association of analysts and clandestine services will resolve them.
>With respect to US clandestine reporting in particular, more incisive
>analyst involvement in establishing the reliability of sources is essential
>if analytic products are to reflect the actual quality of intelligence
>information and evidence. Although collection itself is a problem, analysts
>often must rely on reporting whose sourcing is misleading and even
>unreliable. US clandestine reporting still too often uses different
>descriptions for the same source, leading analysts to believe they have
>corroborating information from more sources than is actually the case. More
>recently, obliquely worded caveats have been put on reissued reports that do
>not appear on earlier issuances of the same report, further confusing
>analysts in determining how much confidence they should place in the
>reporting.
>Analysts and collectors need effective mechanisms for establishing
>collection strategies, vetting ideas, discussing issue priorities, and
>identifying emerging problems and likely customer interests and concerns.
>The Intelligence Community Hard Target Boards seem, for some countries, to
>fill this role. Recognizing that not all boards are equal, some manage to
>accomplish these important tasks across agencies. A board's effectiveness,
>however, seems to a large extent dependent on the depth and breadth of
>expertise and leadership capabilities of the chairman, usually the issue
>manager. The Hard Target Board concept could be strengthened by ensuring
>that representation is at the right level and that participation is taken
>seriously. Finally, the chairman must indeed be respected in the community
>as the foremost expert in the substantive area and have the leadership
>skills to capably guide the participating agencies.
>In addition, new approaches to information collection must be given high
>priority. A "soft" intelligence collection program should be developed. For
>example, there is need to better exploit information obtained from a
>country's elites-academics, politicians, businessmen, clergy, and the myriad
>other groups that make up a complicated society. In the case of Iraq, such
>information would have helped analysts better understand the context in
>which seemingly threatening developments were unfolding.
>A system for collecting, reporting, and disseminating this type of
>information, similar to that used by the clandestine service, needs to be
>established, as well as an appropriate assessment process. The State
>Department, as well as the business and scientific communities, must be
>involved. This soft intelligence collection effort should not be
>accomplished separate from the basic analytic unit but should be a direct
>part of the unit's activities.
>The Analytic Unit: Business Practices for a High-quality Product
>Country and regional analytic units, because of their expertise, need to
>again lay claim to primary responsibility for all facets of their areas.
>They have historically been better at integrating disciplines and providing
>products with perspective and context than have single-issue entities.
>Moreover, this also would address the difficulty of dealing with the
>intersection of issues, where the Intelligence Community has not been
>particularly effective. Regional units are better positioned than
>single-issue units to anticipate the global impact of regional/intersecting
>issues, such as the global impact of economic growth in India and China.
>Leadership of these units should reside in very senior personnel with
>well-established expertise. Senior and experienced leadership of regional
>units must be a high priority. Special salaries must be authorized for key
>personnel, and incentives for expertise and remaining in a particular
>substantive area must be better than the incentives to become, for example,
>a PDB briefer. That means a new reward system, substantial bonuses, and
>enough backup so that both senior and junior analysts have time to travel,
>attend conferences, and have opportunities for short assignments in target
>countries. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the management of
>analysis.
>The unit's resources should be unconstrained, and creativity and
>high-quality analytic products must be the focus. In other words, much
>greater emphasis needs to be placed on the supervisor as a driver of
>analytic quality. Less attention should be given to the mechanics of the
>production process, such as fitting intelligence pieces into prescribed
>formats. High-quality, continuous mentoring of analysts is essential to
>ensure they have the capability and the confidence to reassess comfortable
>assumptions in the face of contrary evidence. To accomplish this, in
>addition to capable leadership, the unit must be intimately involved in
>requirements, priorities, and funding directed against the target.
>At the same time, country and regional analytic units must overhaul their
>business practices, particularly with regard to outreach. They must engage
>in aggressive and extensive consultation with other intelligence
>organizations, collection entities, foreign liaison, military commands,
>academic experts, and chiefs of station, and ensure comprehensive
>exploitation of open source information. The means of consultation should
>include conference calls, extensive use of videoconferences, regular
>face-to-face meetings, frequent exchanges and communications via fax and
>e-mail, and other means that further the sharing of information and ideas
>among entities that provide value added to the analysis of priority issues.
>These activities cannot be casual or episodic, as is now too frequently the
>case, but must be routine and built into the daily and weekly business
>practices of each unit.
>The objective is not only to create expertise inside the unit but also to
>educate analysts about where expertise and information reside outside the
>unit. The unit should not aim to become the repository of all expertise and
>knowledge. A major push should be undertaken to contract with the academic
>and private sectors for research and analysis on specific countries, regions
>and issues. A satellite company outside the classified environment should be
>established where foreign nationals could be housed to support translations,
>assist in research projects, and generally support unclassified analysis.
>Either as part of this organization or separate, it would be important to
>develop internet and open-source teams to search the net, sample or monitor
>bloggers, exploit academic and guild journals, and ensure knowledge of a
>country's political, social, and economic life. The country or regional
>analytic unit could profitably make use of one or several private-sector
>firms or even establish its own federally funded research and development
>corporation.
>Routine administrative chores need to be reduced, with the focus on the
>business of intelligence- the production of quality analysis. Significant
>human resources, such as research assistants, contract personnel, conference
>organizers, and administrative and security officers, should be attached to
>the unit. External contract money should be made available with contracts
>developed and approved inside the unit.
>Contextual Analysis
>The press of writing for current products and addressing daily customer
>demands, in other words getting the job done, are the usual reasons cited
>for not pursuing new business practices and products more aggressively. In
>addition, the siphoning off of personnel and expertise to staff single-issue
>centers has further hampered the ability of regional and country analytic
>units to be the centers of primary responsibility for their areas. The
>advent of an increase in analytic personnel would seem to reduce the
>legitimacy of the first claim and mitigate the second problem, providing new
>personnel are directed to country and regional analytic units and not
>dispersed elsewhere.
>The Intelligence Community's use of single-issue centers, offices of
>functional expertise, and crisis-response task forces may satisfy a
>political or substantive need, but they have a downside for the analytic
>product. Entities such as those focused on weapons proliferation, drugs,
>economic crime, and particularly terrorism provide an important focus for
>analysis, policy development, and action. These issues are most effectively
>addressed, however, in a country or regional context.
>An examination of pre-war intelligence on Iraq revealed systemic analytic
>problems that resulted from the separation of technical and regional
>analysis. Intelligence produced on the technical and cultural/political
>areas was largely distinct and separate, with little attempt to examine the
>impact of one on the other. In the end, technical analysis came to dominate.
>Thus, perspective and a comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target per
>se were lacking.
>Stripping expertise from regional offices to staff these entities, along
>with the continuing emphasis on current intelligence, diminishes the ability
>to provide perspective and context for issues and too often leads to
>analysis narrowly focused on only part of an issue. For example, a piece
>written by a functional office on Iran's nuclear capabilities most likely
>would have little or no political context. Yet, such technical capabilities
>derive from the country's political policies, which are developed in a
>regional, if not an international context. Such narrowly focused analysis
>forces the policymaker to knit together separate products to provide context
>and perspective for the issues to be addressed. This is something most
>policymakers are unwilling or unable to accomplish and, if it is done, it
>usually results in support of an already established policy objective.
>Moreover, fragmentation of intelligence issues creates coordination problems
>that lead to products that often become watered down to meet the demands of
>an ever-larger number of components. It also leads to duplication,
>confusion, and misuse of scarce resources. To wit, the violence in Iraq has
>been characterized as terrorism by a center and as an insurgency by the Iraq
>office. The same violence should not be separated into two baskets of
>responsibility, running the risk of analytic units providing confusing, if
>not conflicting, analysis to the policymaker.
>Functional expertise should be collocated with regional expertise, if not
>wholly, then at least with some representative experts. Offices that focus
>solely on functional/technical issues are necessary to the analytic process,
>but their narrowly focused intelligence should be integrated into pieces
>with the wider perspective produced by regional or country analytic units.
>Again, it was the focus on functional/technical intelligence absent the
>political/cultural/social context that proved so misleading in the Iraq
>situation.
>The Analytic Product and Dissemination
>Country and regional analytic units should have responsibility for all
>intelligence production, to include current intelligence, research,
>estimates, and policy support. They should have the staffing and support and
>aggressively work to establish themselves as experts or to have ready access
>to experts in all facets of all issues in their areas of responsibility.
>They should have the necessary resources, editorial capability, and
>authority to publish without a complicated review process. There should be
>flexibility in the types of products. Research pieces, even if not
>published, should be required because they build the depth of expertise that
>does not come from a focus on current intelligence. Estimates should be
>short, validated outside the Intelligence Community, and focused not on
>single-point outcomes but on the implications of changes in conditions or
>different outcomes.
>Emphasis on in-depth research is essential to the development of country and
>regional expertise, which enables the analyst to provide perspective and
>context. Although some interviewees claimed that more research is being
>accomplished than commonly believed, the preponderance of analyst activity
>continues to be current intelligence and policy support. In fact, some
>managers described analysts as "action junkies." That is, locked into the
>current intelligence process, they know bits and pieces and can answer
>discrete questions, but they lack sophisticated contextual knowledge.
>The fast-paced world of current intelligence leaves little time for careful
>examination of assumptions, alternatives to accepted lines of analysis, or
>discussion of sources and evidence. Moreover, quick, rapid-fire responses to
>policymaker queries often give the impression of certitude about analysis
>and sources that discourages thoughtful examination of the analytic line.
>This was one of the chief problems evidenced in the examination of the
>analysis on Iraq.
>Quite apart from content, products intended for policymakers are too rigid
>in form, format, and function. Some products are required to be written even
>when there is nothing to say or when the intelligence fails to meet policy
>thresholds. This diminishes the quality and impact of the published product.
>If intelligence does not rise to the presidential/VIP level of interest,
>then the analyst's time might be better spent on deepening expertise. Lack
>of an intelligence input will not cause the policymaker to assume that he
>has been forgotten or that the analysts have disbanded.
>Some different perspectives on analytic products need to be developed. A
>careful review of an approach originally developed by the CIA in the 1980s
>for a serial publication that focused on political instability would be
>useful. This publication used specific indicators to monitor subtle changes
>in the social, political, economic, and military climate in key countries.
>Produced by a unit dedicated to analytic methodologies and international
>issues, the quarterly was based on country analysts' assessments of
>prospects for regime or major policy changes over particular periods of
>time. It provided regular, systematic assessments of recent developments
>affecting the stability of those countries. Both policymakers and collectors
>of intelligence found the indicators approach useful, the former for
>spotting trends and the latter for tasking assets. Such an approach,
>combined with a sophisticated set of polls-using those already underway or
>polls structured inside the country or regional units-would help identify
>social change and conflict. Combined with attendance at international
>conferences, in-country research, academic exchanges, or student programs,
>this type of intelligence could provide valuable insight supported by data.
>New forms for disseminating analysis need to be developed. In addition to
>printed publications, an official but less formal way of communicating with
>policymakers is warranted. One approach may be an e-mail type system or
>other means of electronic communication. Although not everyone should be
>allowed to e-mail policymakers, electronic systems would enable appropriate
>personnel to send timely, informal messages on important issues.
>On a broader level, contracts should be let for the development, or at least
>a feasibility study, of a near-real-time system with online support to the
>customer. Such a system should merge current intelligence with direct
>reference to research products, and it must allow for quick response to
>customer questions. An intelligence professional should be available for
>major customers to provide assistance in tailoring the products to their
>needs.
>Tradecraft and Training
>Tradecraft training should play an important role in providing opportunities
>to examine and try new approaches to intelligence analysis, but rigid
>products and procedures are often resistant to new ideas. Programs focused
>specifically on critical thinking skills and analytic tools have recently
>been introduced into the Intelligence Community training curriculum.
>Although analysts generally praise the new training programs, they find many
>of the lessons from courses in analysis, writing, and production difficult,
>if not impossible, to apply in the real world. Too often the training is
>rendered irrelevant by inflexible product formats, writing styles, and
>content requirements that cannot accommodate newer presentational concepts,
>sophisticated analytic thinking, and alternative analytic approaches.
>Moreover, some products are packaged or even written by editors whose
>primary interest is in making the analysis fit the current format.
>High-level managers, often not exposed to newer training courses, frequently
>claim that it is risky to apply lessons from training that change the
>products too radically. Finally, new concepts have traditionally been
>introduced at the working level with no attempt to hold managers accountable
>for their implementation or success.
>Some training specialists and senior managers argue that methodologists and
>tradecraft experts should be embedded with key analytic units as a way to
>promote analytic rigor. They believe that this approach would help
>mainstream the analytic techniques taught in the classroom and inculcate
>critical thinking skills into the day-to-day work of the unit. The success
>of this approach, however, depends on convincing skeptical managers and
>analysts that such techniques are valuable tools that should be applied
>routinely to their issues.
>Ever watchful for ways to enhance a unit's capabilities,
>scholars-in-residence have attained a certain cachet among many managers of
>analysis. These academics are seen as bringing substantive expertise,
>broader perspective on issues, and teaching skills, all of which should
>inform and enable analysts to produce better intelligence. In fact, the
>experience with these scholars has not been uniformly favorable. It is often
>difficult to find the right person who understands and can work within the
>intelligence environment and who is capable of producing actionable
>intelligence assessments rather than academic treatises. If the right fit
>can be found, the rewards can be enormously positive. Nonetheless, sending
>analysts to a university for a course or a semester can be an easier, less
>expensive, and more effective approach.
>In the last analysis, the most important issue with respect to training is
>the sustainability of the analytic techniques and tradecraft that are taught
>in the classroom. They must be reinforced in the work place, and first line
>supervisors must take the lead in doing so.
>Final Thoughts
>The intelligence world is one of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. Dealing
>with these elements is difficult in the world intelligence serves, where
>success or failure is the uncomplicated measure by which the Intelligence
>Community is judged. Serious shortcomings in collection, inadequate use of
>outside expertise and knowledge, the lack of exploitation of open source
>intelligence, and the emphasis on current intelligence have been the result
>of well-intentioned attempts to do the best analytic job with the resources
>provided.
>The US Intelligence Community is robust, highly capable, and thoroughly
>motivated and represents an invaluable asset to the nation and its citizens.
>Nonetheless, the community must be sufficiently mature to both adapt to the
>changing circumstances and counteract the evolutionary processes that have
>conspired to threaten its reputation and its ability to successfully perform
>its mission. The alternative is unacceptable.
> _____
>
>All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are
>those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting
>or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and
>interpretations.
> _____
>
> _____
>
>
>
>
>[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
>--------------------------
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>--------------------------
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>bis..._at_intellnet.org
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>http://www.intellnet.org
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<blockquote type te class te cite=""><font size<br><br>
Intelligence Analysis<br><br>
<br>
A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit<br><br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<<a href="
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Richar" eudora="autourl">
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Richar</a>
<br>
d_Kerr> Kerr, Thomas<br>
<<a href="
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Tom_Wo" eudora="autourl">
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Tom_Wo</a>
<br>
lfe> Wolfe, Rebecca<br>
<<a href="
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Rebecc" eudora="autourl">
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Rebecc</a>
<br>
a_Donegan> Donegan,<br>
<<a href="
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Aris_P" eudora="autourl">
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Contributors.htm#Aris_P</a>
<br>
appas> Aris Pappas<br><br>
_____ <br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
<br><br>
<br>
"What is needed<br>
is a vision, <br>
from the bottom up,<br>
of intelligence analysis that focuses<br>
on the <br>
basic<br>
analytic unit."<br><br>
<br>
In early 2003, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asked
Richard<br>
Kerr, former deputy director of central intelligence, to organize a
small<br>
group-the authors of this article- to provide an overall assessment of
the<br>
intelligence produced before the war in Iraq began that spring. After
that<br>
report was finished in June 2003, the group produced two additional
reports<br>
dealing with Iraq: a critique of the National Intelligence Estimate
on<br>
Weapons of Mass Destruction and a report aimed at identifying
systemic<br>
problems and issues in the Intelligence Community the group uncovered
in<br>
working on the preceding two reports. The unclassified version of this
last<br>
report was published in Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 in 2005. <br>
These reports were informed by interviews, documents, and other material,
as<br>
well as by our background and experience as former managers of
intelligence<br>
analysis. From these studies and from our own past observations and<br>
independent experience, we, under the sponsorship of then-Assistant
Director<br>
of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal, took
a<br>
fresh look at the principal components of the intelligence process:<br>
requirements, collection, analysis, product, and dissemination.
Although<br>
this report was prepared in May 2005 and changes have been taking place
at<br>
many levels in the Intelligence Community, we continue to believe
this<br>
vision remains relevant today.<br>
-The Kerr Group <br>
Beginning in the late 1970s, the US military entered an era
sometimes<br>
referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs. During this period,
the<br>
military went through a fundamental reassessment of capabilities,
force<br>
structure, and operations- a process that some argue is continuing to
this<br>
day. In contrast, although the Intelligence Community also made a variety
of<br>
changes following the end of the Cold War, they were incremental in
nature.<br>
They did not fully address longstanding issues, including analysis
and<br>
products, nor did they tackle emerging problems creatively.<br>
Over the past several years, proposals for improving intelligence have
been<br>
many and varied. Most have emphasized the overall structure and
management<br>
of the Intelligence Community, with recommendations aimed at making
top-down<br>
changes. This paper argues that what is needed is a vision, from the
bottom<br>
up, of intelligence analysis that focuses on the working of the
basic<br>
analytic unit. We examine the analytic process, note problems and
issues,<br>
and make recommendations to enhance the Intelligence Community's
analytic<br>
capabilities and products. <br><br>
The Holistic Analytic Unit <br>
The advent of a Director of National Intelligence and changes mandated
by<br>
commission reports on the performance of the Intelligence Community
present<br>
unique opportunities to apply a new framework for intelligence
analysis.<br>
Herewith is a vision for an approach that creates analytic units with
a<br>
holistic view of their mission, responsibility, and capability. They
will<br>
comprise physical units at their core and virtual units with
presence<br>
throughout their areas of responsibility.<br>
Implementation should begin with a single country and then expand<br>
region-wide. Once decided upon, changes should be made quickly, and<br>
high-level attention and enhanced resources will be key. The
individual<br>
steps of the process should be undertaken simultaneously rather than<br>
serially.<br>
Identify six to 12 countries or areas of particular importance to the
US.<br>
Pick one or two, perhaps Iran and North Korea, as test cases. Create<br>
analytic units for the test case countries with the following<br>
characteristics:<br>
* Internal expertise,
mixed with strong abilities to identify and<br>
use knowledge not resident in the unit. Avoid the myth of "total
resident<br>
knowledge"<br>
* Very senior leadership,
with rich resources in personnel and<br>
funding, to include significant amounts of external contract money,
with<br>
contracts developed and approved within the unit<br>
* Creativity the key<br>
* Responsibility for the
"whole." Units should:<br>
o Perform research<br>
o Produce current intelligence
and long-term estimates<br>
o Identify intelligence
requirements<br>
o Establish collection
priorities<br>
o Manage IC funding directed
against the target<br>
* Non-traditional
staffing. Units should include or have close<br>
relationships, including formal contracts and informal contacts, with:
<br>
o Experts without security
clearances, including non-US citizens<br>
o Private sector firms and
Federally Funded Research and Development<br>
Corporations for administration and substance<br>
o Universities and other seats
of knowledge<br>
* Inclusive
structure<br>
o Self-contained assets for
research assistance, contract management,<br>
conference organization, <br>
administration, and security <br>
o Embedded representatives from
key organizations and customers<br>
* Strong external
presence to ensure that the unit is regarded as a<br>
central player in the preparation of dynamic assessments and the
application<br>
of existing knowledge <br>
o Assign personnel to other
principal organizations in the area of<br>
responsibility, including Defense, State, pertinent Federal and
NGOs,<br>
academic and private entities <br>
o Institute regular conference
calls, videoconferences, visits, and<br>
other interactions with country teams, chiefs of station, national<br>
laboratories, military commands, State desk officers, and collection<br>
agencies<br>
o Preside over programs
sponsoring in-country research, academic<br>
exchanges, student programs, conferences, and other efforts<br>
* New products and
state-of-the-art dissemination systems should<br>
produce intelligence on a near-real-time basis keyed to customer
interests<br>
and designed to provide reference material to support current issues
<br>
* Intelligence estimates
should be short, validated outside the IC,<br>
and focused not on single-point outcomes but on the implications of
change <br>
* Strong, high-level
review, accountability, and measurement of<br>
performance to ensure against backsliding <br>
<br>
Requirements and Collection<br>
Fundamental to the success of intelligence analysis are robust,
flexible<br>
collection strategies guided by analyst input. In fact, too often
today<br>
collection drives analysis rather than the other way around. This is due,
at<br>
least in part, to the separation of collectors from analysts.
Accordingly,<br>
collection priorities often do not reflect the true needs of the
analysts<br>
working important issues.<br>
Collection of information on difficult targets is a core mission of<br>
intelligence, and neither clandestine nor technical collection measures
are<br>
up to the challenges of today. The key issues facing US national
security<br>
over the next decades include the political, economic, and social strains
in<br>
key countries and the ability of countries to develop and deliver<br>
destructive weapons. Experience in Iraq shows that technical, and
even<br>
clandestine, reporting provided only superficial information on
weapons<br>
programs, with little or no insight or understanding of the inner
workings<br>
and dynamics of the programs. In fact, it can be argued that
information<br>
from these sources sometimes was as misleading as it was at times
valuable.<br>
Such issues raise questions about future investment priorities. It
is<br>
inevitable there will be intense competition for resources among
collection<br>
disciplines, and a careful review is needed of SIGINT, IMINT, and
HUMINT<br>
relative to the resources devoted to them. In addition, the value-added
and<br>
the relative merit of each source must be examined. The involvement
of<br>
intelligence analysts in such a review will be key to its success.<br>
A productive relationship between collectors and analysts must still
be<br>
created, and when it is, it will be fundamental to establishing
collection<br>
priorities and resource allocations. Currently, however, there is a<br>
significant gap between them. Too many analysts do not understand
collection<br>
capabilities, and many are not even familiar with collection systems. To
a<br>
significant extent this has resulted from the reduction over the past
decade<br>
of the professional collection management cadre capable of
integrating<br>
human, imagery, and signals intelligence capabilities into coherent<br>
strategies and closely tied to the analysts. This development has
been<br>
compounded by the separation of collection professionals from the
analytic<br>
cadre who had been intimately involved in identifying and ranking
collection<br>
gaps and developing collection strategies.<br>
Although many analysts have contacts with collectors, it is not at a
level<br>
that furthers their knowledge of collection capabilities or what
collectors<br>
are collecting or not collecting. Moreover, analysts generally are not
very<br>
adept at anticipating collection needs. They tend to be reactive,
focusing<br>
on existing issues rather than identifying emerging issues or those
likely<br>
to emerge down the road. In part this results from the absence of
coherent<br>
research programs to help stimulate sound collection strategies. Many
issues<br>
can be anticipated and collection requirements and strategies
established<br>
before issues become the focus of policymakers' attention.<br>
One response to the analyst/collection problem is to have collectors<br>
embedded in analytic units. Although this has been tried in various
ways<br>
over the years, it has been haphazard and with only a collector or two
for<br>
short periods. Although not all collection platforms are right for
all<br>
issues, expert representatives from appropriate collection entities
(NSA,<br>
NGA, OSC, etc.) should be permanently integrated, on a rotating basis,
into<br>
key analytic units. Understanding that finite personnel resources
would<br>
preclude this from being done for every analytic unit, it could be done
for<br>
at least high profile issues, for example, Iran.<br>
For targets and issues of lower priority, an embedded collection
generalist<br>
could substitute for the several experts representing particular
collection<br>
agencies/capabilities in high profile-units. That individual should
be<br>
familiar with all collection systems and not just the one in which
his/her<br>
expertise resides. Moreover, regardless of the issue's priority, the<br>
collectors must work intimately with analysts on developing strategies
and<br>
filling gaps, as well as on educating analysts on how system
capabilities<br>
can or cannot contribute to the questions raised by the issues at
hand.<br>
Too often, however, collectors argue that dispersal of personnel to
analytic<br>
units diminishes the benefits obtained from organizational purity, i.e.,
the<br>
interaction among personnel working the same issues. This argument may
have<br>
some validity, but organizational purity cannot carry the day if the<br>
Intelligence Community is to avoid the weak and unimaginative
collection<br>
strategies that prevailed in the lead-up to the Iraq war.<br>
Source descriptions and reliability remain serious problems, and only
a<br>
closer association of analysts and clandestine services will resolve
them.<br>
With respect to US clandestine reporting in particular, more
incisive<br>
analyst involvement in establishing the reliability of sources is
essential<br>
if analytic products are to reflect the actual quality of
intelligence<br>
information and evidence. Although collection itself is a problem,
analysts<br>
often must rely on reporting whose sourcing is misleading and even<br>
unreliable. US clandestine reporting still too often uses different<br>
descriptions for the same source, leading analysts to believe they
have<br>
corroborating information from more sources than is actually the case.
More<br>
recently, obliquely worded caveats have been put on reissued reports that
do<br>
not appear on earlier issuances of the same report, further
confusing<br>
analysts in determining how much confidence they should place in the<br>
reporting.<br>
Analysts and collectors need effective mechanisms for establishing<br>
collection strategies, vetting ideas, discussing issue priorities,
and<br>
identifying emerging problems and likely customer interests and
concerns.<br>
The Intelligence Community Hard Target Boards seem, for some countries,
to<br>
fill this role. Recognizing that not all boards are equal, some manage
to<br>
accomplish these important tasks across agencies. A board's
effectiveness,<br>
however, seems to a large extent dependent on the depth and breadth
of<br>
expertise and leadership capabilities of the chairman, usually the
issue<br>
manager. The Hard Target Board concept could be strengthened by
ensuring<br>
that representation is at the right level and that participation is
taken<br>
seriously. Finally, the chairman must indeed be respected in the
community<br>
as the foremost expert in the substantive area and have the
leadership<br>
skills to capably guide the participating agencies.<br>
In addition, new approaches to information collection must be given
high<br>
priority. A "soft" intelligence collection program should be
developed. For<br>
example, there is need to better exploit information obtained from a<br>
country's elites-academics, politicians, businessmen, clergy, and the
myriad<br>
other groups that make up a complicated society. In the case of Iraq,
such<br>
information would have helped analysts better understand the context
in<br>
which seemingly threatening developments were unfolding. <br>
A system for collecting, reporting, and disseminating this type of<br>
information, similar to that used by the clandestine service, needs to
be<br>
established, as well as an appropriate assessment process. The State<br>
Department, as well as the business and scientific communities, must
be<br>
involved. This soft intelligence collection effort should not be<br>
accomplished separate from the basic analytic unit but should be a
direct<br>
part of the unit's activities.<br>
The Analytic Unit: Business Practices for a High-quality Product <br>
Country and regional analytic units, because of their expertise, need
to<br>
again lay claim to primary responsibility for all facets of their
areas.<br>
They have historically been better at integrating disciplines and
providing<br>
products with perspective and context than have single-issue
entities.<br>
Moreover, this also would address the difficulty of dealing with the<br>
intersection of issues, where the Intelligence Community has not
been<br>
particularly effective. Regional units are better positioned than<br>
single-issue units to anticipate the global impact of
regional/intersecting<br>
issues, such as the global impact of economic growth in India and
China.<br>
Leadership of these units should reside in very senior personnel
with<br>
well-established expertise. Senior and experienced leadership of
regional<br>
units must be a high priority. Special salaries must be authorized for
key<br>
personnel, and incentives for expertise and remaining in a
particular<br>
substantive area must be better than the incentives to become, for
example,<br>
a PDB briefer. That means a new reward system, substantial bonuses,
and<br>
enough backup so that both senior and junior analysts have time to
travel,<br>
attend conferences, and have opportunities for short assignments in
target<br>
countries. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the management
of<br>
analysis.<br>
The unit's resources should be unconstrained, and creativity and<br>
high-quality analytic products must be the focus. In other words,
much<br>
greater emphasis needs to be placed on the supervisor as a driver of<br>
analytic quality. Less attention should be given to the mechanics of
the<br>
production process, such as fitting intelligence pieces into
prescribed<br>
formats. High-quality, continuous mentoring of analysts is essential
to<br>
ensure they have the capability and the confidence to reassess
comfortable<br>
assumptions in the face of contrary evidence. To accomplish this, in<br>
addition to capable leadership, the unit must be intimately involved
in<br>
requirements, priorities, and funding directed against the target.<br>
At the same time, country and regional analytic units must overhaul
their<br>
business practices, particularly with regard to outreach. They must
engage<br>
in aggressive and extensive consultation with other intelligence<br>
organizations, collection entities, foreign liaison, military
commands,<br>
academic experts, and chiefs of station, and ensure comprehensive<br>
exploitation of open source information. The means of consultation
should<br>
include conference calls, extensive use of videoconferences, regular<br>
face-to-face meetings, frequent exchanges and communications via fax
and<br>
e-mail, and other means that further the sharing of information and
ideas<br>
among entities that provide value added to the analysis of priority
issues.<br>
These activities cannot be casual or episodic, as is now too frequently
the<br>
case, but must be routine and built into the daily and weekly
business<br>
practices of each unit.<br>
The objective is not only to create expertise inside the unit but also
to<br>
educate analysts about where expertise and information reside outside
the<br>
unit. The unit should not aim to become the repository of all expertise
and<br>
knowledge. A major push should be undertaken to contract with the
academic<br>
and private sectors for research and analysis on specific countries,
regions<br>
and issues. A satellite company outside the classified environment should
be<br>
established where foreign nationals could be housed to support
translations,<br>
assist in research projects, and generally support unclassified
analysis.<br>
Either as part of this organization or separate, it would be important
to<br>
develop internet and open-source teams to search the net, sample or
monitor<br>
bloggers, exploit academic and guild journals, and ensure knowledge of
a<br>
country's political, social, and economic life. The country or
regional<br>
analytic unit could profitably make use of one or several
private-sector<br>
firms or even establish its own federally funded research and
development<br>
corporation.<br>
Routine administrative chores need to be reduced, with the focus on
the<br>
business of intelligence- the production of quality analysis.
Significant<br>
human resources, such as research assistants, contract personnel,
conference<br>
organizers, and administrative and security officers, should be attached
to<br>
the unit. External contract money should be made available with
contracts<br>
developed and approved inside the unit.<br>
Contextual Analysis<br>
The press of writing for current products and addressing daily
customer<br>
demands, in other words getting the job done, are the usual reasons
cited<br>
for not pursuing new business practices and products more aggressively.
In<br>
addition, the siphoning off of personnel and expertise to staff
single-issue<br>
centers has further hampered the ability of regional and country
analytic<br>
units to be the centers of primary responsibility for their areas.
The<br>
advent of an increase in analytic personnel would seem to reduce the<br>
legitimacy of the first claim and mitigate the second problem, providing
new<br>
personnel are directed to country and regional analytic units and
not<br>
dispersed elsewhere.<br>
The Intelligence Community's use of single-issue centers, offices of<br>
functional expertise, and crisis-response task forces may satisfy a<br>
political or substantive need, but they have a downside for the
analytic<br>
product. Entities such as those focused on weapons proliferation,
drugs,<br>
economic crime, and particularly terrorism provide an important focus
for<br>
analysis, policy development, and action. These issues are most
effectively<br>
addressed, however, in a country or regional context.<br>
An examination of pre-war intelligence on Iraq revealed systemic
analytic<br>
problems that resulted from the separation of technical and regional<br>
analysis. Intelligence produced on the technical and
cultural/political<br>
areas was largely distinct and separate, with little attempt to examine
the<br>
impact of one on the other. In the end, technical analysis came to
dominate.<br>
Thus, perspective and a comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target
per<br>
se were lacking.<br>
Stripping expertise from regional offices to staff these entities,
along<br>
with the continuing emphasis on current intelligence, diminishes the
ability<br>
to provide perspective and context for issues and too often leads to<br>
analysis narrowly focused on only part of an issue. For example, a
piece<br>
written by a functional office on Iran's nuclear capabilities most
likely<br>
would have little or no political context. Yet, such technical
capabilities<br>
derive from the country's political policies, which are developed in
a<br>
regional, if not an international context. Such narrowly focused
analysis<br>
forces the policymaker to knit together separate products to provide
context<br>
and perspective for the issues to be addressed. This is something
most<br>
policymakers are unwilling or unable to accomplish and, if it is done,
it<br>
usually results in support of an already established policy
objective.<br>
Moreover, fragmentation of intelligence issues creates coordination
problems<br>
that lead to products that often become watered down to meet the demands
of<br>
an ever-larger number of components. It also leads to duplication,<br>
confusion, and misuse of scarce resources. To wit, the violence in Iraq
has<br>
been characterized as terrorism by a center and as an insurgency by the
Iraq<br>
office. The same violence should not be separated into two baskets
of<br>
responsibility, running the risk of analytic units providing confusing,
if<br>
not conflicting, analysis to the policymaker.<br>
Functional expertise should be collocated with regional expertise, if
not<br>
wholly, then at least with some representative experts. Offices that
focus<br>
solely on functional/technical issues are necessary to the analytic
process,<br>
but their narrowly focused intelligence should be integrated into
pieces<br>
with the wider perspective produced by regional or country analytic
units.<br>
Again, it was the focus on functional/technical intelligence absent
the<br>
political/cultural/social context that proved so misleading in the
Iraq<br>
situation.<br>
The Analytic Product and Dissemination<br>
Country and regional analytic units should have responsibility for
all<br>
intelligence production, to include current intelligence, research,<br>
estimates, and policy support. They should have the staffing and support
and<br>
aggressively work to establish themselves as experts or to have ready
access<br>
to experts in all facets of all issues in their areas of
responsibility.<br>
They should have the necessary resources, editorial capability, and<br>
authority to publish without a complicated review process. There should
be<br>
flexibility in the types of products. Research pieces, even if not<br>
published, should be required because they build the depth of expertise
that<br>
does not come from a focus on current intelligence. Estimates should
be<br>
short, validated outside the Intelligence Community, and focused not
on<br>
single-point outcomes but on the implications of changes in conditions
or<br>
different outcomes.<br>
Emphasis on in-depth research is essential to the development of country
and<br>
regional expertise, which enables the analyst to provide perspective
and<br>
context. Although some interviewees claimed that more research is
being<br>
accomplished than commonly believed, the preponderance of analyst
activity<br>
continues to be current intelligence and policy support. In fact,
some<br>
managers described analysts as "action junkies." That is,
locked into the<br>
current intelligence process, they know bits and pieces and can
answer<br>
discrete questions, but they lack sophisticated contextual
knowledge.<br>
The fast-paced world of current intelligence leaves little time for
careful<br>
examination of assumptions, alternatives to accepted lines of analysis,
or<br>
discussion of sources and evidence. Moreover, quick, rapid-fire responses
to<br>
policymaker queries often give the impression of certitude about
analysis<br>
and sources that discourages thoughtful examination of the analytic
line.<br>
This was one of the chief problems evidenced in the examination of
the<br>
analysis on Iraq.<br>
Quite apart from content, products intended for policymakers are too
rigid<br>
in form, format, and function. Some products are required to be written
even<br>
when there is nothing to say or when the intelligence fails to meet
policy<br>
thresholds. This diminishes the quality and impact of the published
product.<br>
If intelligence does not rise to the presidential/VIP level of
interest,<br>
then the analyst's time might be better spent on deepening expertise.
Lack<br>
of an intelligence input will not cause the policymaker to assume that
he<br>
has been forgotten or that the analysts have disbanded.<br>
Some different perspectives on analytic products need to be developed.
A<br>
careful review of an approach originally developed by the CIA in the
1980s<br>
for a serial publication that focused on political instability would
be<br>
useful. This publication used specific indicators to monitor subtle
changes<br>
in the social, political, economic, and military climate in key
countries.<br>
Produced by a unit dedicated to analytic methodologies and
international<br>
issues, the quarterly was based on country analysts' assessments of<br>
prospects for regime or major policy changes over particular periods
of<br>
time. It provided regular, systematic assessments of recent
developments<br>
affecting the stability of those countries. Both policymakers and
collectors<br>
of intelligence found the indicators approach useful, the former for<br>
spotting trends and the latter for tasking assets. Such an approach,<br>
combined with a sophisticated set of polls-using those already underway
or<br>
polls structured inside the country or regional units-would help
identify<br>
social change and conflict. Combined with attendance at
international<br>
conferences, in-country research, academic exchanges, or student
programs,<br>
this type of intelligence could provide valuable insight supported by
data.<br>
New forms for disseminating analysis need to be developed. In addition
to<br>
printed publications, an official but less formal way of communicating
with<br>
policymakers is warranted. One approach may be an e-mail type system
or<br>
other means of electronic communication. Although not everyone should
be<br>
allowed to e-mail policymakers, electronic systems would enable
appropriate<br>
personnel to send timely, informal messages on important issues.<br>
On a broader level, contracts should be let for the development, or at
least<br>
a feasibility study, of a near-real-time system with online support to
the<br>
customer. Such a system should merge current intelligence with
direct<br>
reference to research products, and it must allow for quick response
to<br>
customer questions. An intelligence professional should be available
for<br>
major customers to provide assistance in tailoring the products to
their<br>
needs.<br>
Tradecraft and Training<br>
Tradecraft training should play an important role in providing
opportunities<br>
to examine and try new approaches to intelligence analysis, but
rigid<br>
products and procedures are often resistant to new ideas. Programs
focused<br>
specifically on critical thinking skills and analytic tools have
recently<br>
been introduced into the Intelligence Community training curriculum.<br>
Although analysts generally praise the new training programs, they find
many<br>
of the lessons from courses in analysis, writing, and production
difficult,<br>
if not impossible, to apply in the real world. Too often the training
is<br>
rendered irrelevant by inflexible product formats, writing styles,
and<br>
content requirements that cannot accommodate newer presentational
concepts,<br>
sophisticated analytic thinking, and alternative analytic
approaches.<br>
Moreover, some products are packaged or even written by editors
whose<br>
primary interest is in making the analysis fit the current format.<br>
High-level managers, often not exposed to newer training courses,
frequently<br>
claim that it is risky to apply lessons from training that change
the<br>
products too radically. Finally, new concepts have traditionally
been<br>
introduced at the working level with no attempt to hold managers
accountable<br>
for their implementation or success.<br>
Some training specialists and senior managers argue that methodologists
and<br>
tradecraft experts should be embedded with key analytic units as a way
to<br>
promote analytic rigor. They believe that this approach would help<br>
mainstream the analytic techniques taught in the classroom and
inculcate<br>
critical thinking skills into the day-to-day work of the unit. The
success<br>
of this approach, however, depends on convincing skeptical managers
and<br>
analysts that such techniques are valuable tools that should be
applied<br>
routinely to their issues. <br>
Ever watchful for ways to enhance a unit's capabilities,<br>
scholars-in-residence have attained a certain cachet among many managers
of<br>
analysis. These academics are seen as bringing substantive
expertise,<br>
broader perspective on issues, and teaching skills, all of which
should<br>
inform and enable analysts to produce better intelligence. In fact,
the<br>
experience with these scholars has not been uniformly favorable. It is
often<br>
difficult to find the right person who understands and can work within
the<br>
intelligence environment and who is capable of producing actionable<br>
intelligence assessments rather than academic treatises. If the right
fit<br>
can be found, the rewards can be enormously positive. Nonetheless,
sending<br>
analysts to a university for a course or a semester can be an easier,
less<br>
expensive, and more effective approach. <br>
In the last analysis, the most important issue with respect to training
is<br>
the sustainability of the analytic techniques and tradecraft that are
taught<br>
in the classroom. They must be reinforced in the work place, and first
line<br>
supervisors must take the lead in doing so. <br>
Final Thoughts<br>
The intelligence world is one of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity.
Dealing<br>
with these elements is difficult in the world intelligence serves,
where<br>
success or failure is the uncomplicated measure by which the
Intelligence<br>
Community is judged. Serious shortcomings in collection, inadequate use
of<br>
outside expertise and knowledge, the lack of exploitation of open
source<br>
intelligence, and the emphasis on current intelligence have been the
result<br>
of well-intentioned attempts to do the best analytic job with the
resources<br>
provided. <br>
The US Intelligence Community is robust, highly capable, and
thoroughly<br>
motivated and represents an invaluable asset to the nation and its
citizens.<br>
Nonetheless, the community must be sufficiently mature to both adapt to
the<br>
changing circumstances and counteract the evolutionary processes that
have<br>
conspired to threaten its reputation and its ability to successfully
perform<br>
its mission. The alternative is unacceptable. <br>
_____ <br><br>
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article
are<br>
those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as
asserting<br>
or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements
and<br>
interpretations. <br>
_____ <br><br>
_____ <br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]<br><br>
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bis..._at_intellnet.org<br><br>
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Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:26 CST